re: "Did we Lose the GWOT Bubble?"

The Phibian at Cdr Salamander ("PROACTIVELY “FROM THE SEA”; LEVERAGING THE LITTORAL BEST PRACTICES FOR A PARADIGM BREAKING SIX-SIGMA BEST BUSINESS CASE TO SYNERGIZE A CONSISTENT DESIGN IN THE GLOBAL COMMONS, RIGHTSIZING THE CORE VALUES SUPPORTING OUR MISSION STATEMENT VIA THE 5-VECTOR MODEL THROUGH CULTURAL DIVERSITY.") examined excessive self-examination.

Money quote(s):

"It is important for a man to have self-doubt. You must nurture your self-doubt; question your own motives and preconceptions. Take what you "know" is true, and seek out those who say it is false.

When you do that, one of two things happen. Either you find other side's argument lacking and so build something else a man must have; self-confidence - or you find your own ideas weak or off-center. When that happens, you reassess, modify, and reposition to a stronger place. Self-generated creative friction, if you will."

In the realm of intelligence analysis, this sort of thing manifests itself as "red-teaming" or other forms of questioning (or at least identifying) your basis assumptions and/or biases.

"One thing I do know though is this; we could be in a worse place if we did less - it could have been better if we did more; or the other way around. We don't know, do we? What we do know is where we are. What we need to focus on is how to make things better and to avoid repeating our mistakes."

Always good advice.

4/25

WP - Nuclear weapon reductions must be part of strategic analysis

Henry A. Kissinger and Brent Scowcroft at the Washington Postissued an arms control caution.

Money quote(s):

"A New START treaty reestablishing the process of nuclear arms control has recently taken effect. Combined with reductions in the U.S. defense budget, this will bring the number of nuclear weapons in the United States to the lowest overall level since the 1950s. The Obama administration is said to be considering negotiations for a new round of nuclear reductionsto bring about ceilings as low as 300 warheads. Before momentum builds on that basis, we feel obliged to stress our conviction that the goal of future negotiations should be strategic stability and that lower numbers of weapons should be a consequence of strategic analysis, not an abstract preconceived determination." (Bold typeface added for emphasis. - CAA)

Measure first, then cut. Pre-determined outcomes are subobtimal, to say the least. They may possibly be disastrous. Keep reading.

"Strategic stability is not inherent with low numbers of weapons; indeed, excessively low numbers could lead to a situation in which surprise attacks are conceivable."

Excessively low numbers of weapons available for a second strike (i.e., retaliation) translates into an excessively low number of targets necessary for a successful first strike (against us).

"The precondition of the next phase of U.S. nuclear weapons policy must be to enhance and enshrine the strategic stability that has preserved global peace and prevented the use of nuclear weapons for two generations."

In other words, something seems to be working, so let's not just dissassemble it because we've got a nice, shiny new (old/unproven) theory.

Frankly, despite decades of nuclear theoretizing and "thinking about the unthinkable," nobody really knows why deterrence has worked (if, in fact, it's "deterrence" that's been operative theory) or whether MAD worked or what.

(But something's kept the wheels from falling off since 1945.)

"(S)trategic stability requires maintaining strategic forces of sufficient size and composition that a first strike cannot reduce retaliation to a level acceptable to the aggressor."

The U.S. has depended upon the "triad" doctrine for its strategic nuclear forces, resting upon three "legs": ICBMs, strategic bombers, and nuclear-armed submarines. Undercutting one (or more) of these legs is something that should only be attempted after considerable forethought.

(Other nuclear capabilities have been developed and deployed over the years, especially in the realm of theatre [or tactical-level] nuclear forces such as artillery, intermediate-range missiles, and ADMs.)

"(I)n assessing the level of unacceptable damage, the United States cannot assume that a potential enemy will adhere to values or calculations identical to our own. We need a sufficient number of weapons to pose a threat to what potential aggressors value under every conceivable circumstance. We should avoid strategic analysis by mirror-imaging."

Mirror-imaging is just one of the analytic traps to be avoided at all costs, but un-trained analysts do it all the time.

"(T)he composition of our strategic forces cannot be defined by numbers alone. It also depends on the type of delivery vehicles and their mix. If the composition of the U.S. deterrent force is modified as a result of reduction, agreement or for other reasons, a sufficient variety must be retained, together with a robust supporting command and control system, so as to guarantee that a preemptive attack cannot succeed."

See my remarks about the nuclear triad.

And read the whole thing.



Henry A. Kissinger was secretary of state from 1973 to 1977 and national security adviser from 1969 to 1975. Brent Scowcroft was national security adviser from 1975 to 1977 and 1989 to 1993.

4/22

re: "For Rick Perry"

Ace at Ace of Spades HQ had some commentary on the Republican primary candidacies.

Money quote(s):

"There are two main sorts of primary voters: Those who know too little, and those who know too much. As for the former -- there's not much I can do about them. They don't read this site, or probably too much of any political source.

Maybe they read Time. Bless their hearts." (Emphasis in original text. - CAA.)

CAA is often asked, by persons preparing to take the Foreign Service Officer Test (FSOT; the computer-based exam that replaced the FSWE), for advice on how to prepare for it. Now, in olden times, when dinosaurs walked the Earth and the essay portion of the FSWE involved a "blue book" style handwritten essay, CAA took a fairly standard approach to get his brain right before test day.

A lot of the approach involved developing and maintaining a good situational awareness of current events, both domestic and international, and not just about politics. One of the specific suggestions for doing that is to read a weekly news magazine, such as TIME, Newsweek, or U.S. News & World Report.

Not so much anymore, at least as regards TIME. And I say that with sadness.

CAA grew up in a household where we got the Washington Post delivered in the morning, the Evening Star delivered in the afternoon, and every week the mailman would bring a TIME magazine, and I'd read it cover-to-cover.

It's just not the same magazine, although perhaps it never was.

"The online community consists mainly of the latter -- we know a lot about the candidates, and are each making complicated decisions about trade-offs between electability and agenda (and likelihood of advancing that agenda).

My belief is that we know so much that the secondary and tertiary level things we know are crowding out the primary things we know. That is, that we know a bunch of second- and third- order things and knowing so much is crowding out consideration of the top-level, major bullet-point, controlling facts."

Ace makes an interesting point here. People who are wonks and geeks about politics and elections tend to get fairly far down in the weeds about candidates, their positions, and their histories. To the point where we'll drop references in normal conversation that garner puzzled looks from those around us, since it may not have been covered in the broadcasts of American Idol, Dancing With The Hasbeens, Real Housewives, or other trash TV like the Daily Show or the current latenight successors to Johnny Carson.

While I may not be enthusiastic about the relative treatment of dogs by either the Republican front-runner versus the Democratic incumbent, in neither case will they be dispositive regarding my vote come election day.

"(B)iographical and character details. Much of the More Informed cohort of the party seems to be giving these factors short shrift. I would suggest to such folks that a certain type of candidate tends to prevail in elections, and that type of candidate tends to have a positive narrative in biographical and characterological traits."

I like the point Ace makes here. Consider Reagan in light of this, likewise Clinton (to a degree). Optimism sells.

"I can only say so often that the swing voters in the center of the country are among the least-informed voters on the planet. Every survey demonstrates that, despite their claims to be all about "the substance" and "the issues," they know less about the substance and the issues than partisans on either side of the aisle.

Being apolitical, they're not very interested in politics. Stands to reason. This means, then, that they don't read much about politics.

Their decision-making is very superficial."

See how Ace builds an argument here. Crafty.

"I would suggest that we should not get too hung up on fighting the last war, because the media will simply change the rules of engagement."

Well, duh.

"Barack Obama did not serve in the military. That is perhaps the most understated sentence in the history of communications, but since people are interested in drawing contrasts, consider that one."

This passage followed one contrasting the various service (and non-service) records of the various Republican candidates at the time in was written. It wasn't a stand-alone potshot at the president, although it certainly would serve as one.

"I cannot and will not say that brainpower is unimportant. I would however say that character matters too."

Yes.

None of the candidates, no matter what one may be influenced to think by the media, are particularly dumb. They may have worldviews and political perspectives far to the left or right of what you consider to be smart, but that doesn't mean they're dumb.

Presidential debates, public speeches, and the like are hard to do. Which is why most people don't do them. Most people don't like to do them. Some people make them look easier than others. This only means they're better at making speeches (or reading teleprompters, but I digress). I would submit that the particular set of talents and personality traits that help make a good public speaker or debater may or may not make a good president. Still, practice will help. Minor slip-ups in public speaking shouldn't be made too much of though.

"America, and especially the Republican party, has long favored elevating governors to the presidency. Governors are, after all, the presidents of single states. They have nearly the exact same duties and functions (including even maintaining and controlling the state national guards). They have similar executive powers and set the agendas for their respective legislatures. In the case of border states such as Texas, they even require some foreign policy making duties.No job in the world really prepares someone for the Presidency. But one job, more than any other, comes fairly close to doings so."

While the U.S. Senate is famous for housing one hundred politicians who earnestly believe they should be president, the fifty governor's mansions house the people who are most likely to be better chief executives. Or if not better, at least better tested, so the voters can examine a record of leadership in office rather than that of a legislator. Being the "chief legislator" is only a part of the president's job, and it's a part of every state governor's job as well.

"The stakes in this election are enormous. The next president may well appoint five justices the Supreme Court, essentially choosing our basic jurisprudence for the next 30 years. This will be the presidency in which we make fundamental decisions about debt, and spending, and entitlements. Decisions on those may decide our fiscal policy for the next 20 or 30 years, too.

But while those are the stakes of this election, the election will actually turn on... Jobs.

Unemployment is at 8.6%, with real unemployment around 16%. For the sake of comparison, unemployment during the Great Depression hit 25% at its high. We are not there yet, but we've consistently been at around 9% for years (with real unemployment higher).

Primary voters tend to be strongly ideological. We have very strongly held beliefs about abstract notions of government and "The Good." But general election voters -- especially those swing voters -- do not have strong opinions about such matters. Otherwise they would be partisans for one camp or another. They tend to be pragmatic, rather than abstract, thinkers. They do not have any prevailing theory of governance, which is what gives them the flexibility to vote for George W. Bush in 2004 and then an all-but-declared socialist four years later.

They care almost entirely about results, because they have no underlying theory that might explain away failures"

CAA is torn between deciding whether this should be considered a bug or a feature. I suppose it'll have to simply be accepted as something that simply is.

"If you think the unaffiliated, mostly apolitical voters in the center are going to be swayed by full-throated announcements of steadfast ideological commitment, you're guilty of universalizing from your own experience.

If they thought that way, they would not be independents. They would, like you, be declared partisans and ideologically-motivated voters.

Speeches are nice but facts are what change minds." (Emphasis in original text. - CAA)

Ace is describing a sort of cognitive bias, the version of "mirror-imaging" to which political geeks may fall prey.

"I will say this without fear of contradiction: A president can only really push 3-4 major initiatives in his first term, and 1-2 in his second. By the last half of his second term, he's a lame duck, and is chiefly clocking time and fighting off efforts to undo whatever he's done in the first six years."

&

"(T)hat impulse -- the idea that the first questions should always be "Wait, does the federal government need to do this? Is it even constitutional that they do this?" -- is the right impulse."

1/3

re: "Pearl Harbor and 9-11: Imagination, Deception and Audacity"

Austin Bay at Strategy Page explains how old lessons remain relevant.

Money quote(s):

"Imagination, deception and audacity, in combination, are the deadly acme of warfare. Japan’s Pearl Harbor ambush of America’s Pacific Fleet, which occurred 70 years ago this week, displayed these traits. So did al-Qaida’s 9-11 savaging of American cities.

Despite clues and suggestive bits of intelligence, both attacks caught America by surprise and thrust the nation headlong into ongoing global wars that it either tried to avoid or ignore. In other words, both imaginative and deceptive attacks, executed with audacity, leveraged American self-deception and lack of imagination.

Both attacks spawned critical re-examination of intelligence data and grim reflection on the complex process of intelligence assessment and political decision-making."

Self-deception is a somewhat harsher term, if still accurate, than the more neutral terminology surround the concept of cognitive bias. But it'll all get you there. Lots of very bright folks have studied, and continue to study, the best way to leverage our collection and analysis capabilities into an architecture that keeps us safer. Mostly it works, except when it doesn't.

"Operational and tactical intelligence data, however -- in 1941, 2001 and in 2011 -- arrive in fragments. A useful analogy is a pointillism painting or a Jackson Pollock drip painting. In the process of creation, the painting is random dots or disjointed splashes. Over time, a lucid pattern emerges; the viewer can step away from the canvas; what looked like chaos appears as a coherent design.

In the midst of events, the significance of an intercepted coded Imperial Japanese Navy radio transmission indicating a fleet can be missed, especially if it didn’t fit a logically convincing (though preconceived) pattern. American strategists knew an attack on Pearl Harbor by carrier aircraft was possible, and they believed Japan might well expand its war. Their imaginative insight, however, was incomplete. They underestimated Japanese imagination and audacity.

After Dec. 7, 1941, the U.S. built a defense establishment designed to prevent another Pearl Harbor. America spent trillions of dollars spying on potential perpetrators of a surprise attack, building a security establishment to deter or defeat it, and engineering equipment to fulfill those missions.

Though the U.S. and U.S. allies suffered severe surprise attacks -- for example, Korea in 1950 and Tet (Vietnam) in 1968 -- in terms of protecting military capacities from pre-emptive attack, that effort has been successful."

Col. Bay hits a key point here: what used to be called our "second strike" capability has never, since Pearl Harbor, been successfuly attacked.

It's possible that 9/11 was genuinely intended as a decapitating strike against our economic, political, and military leadership. Which is a fascinating conversation unto itself; still, if it were, it failed. Even in (assumed) failure, 9/11 was plenty damaging enough.

"Al-Qaida declared war on the U.S., but American leaders preferred to treat the threat as criminal rather than military. Violent cults waging long-term cultural and theological struggles with the terms of social and technological modernity aren’t new. Their ability to employ massively destructive power at strategic distances is, however.

Al-Qaida used jumbo jets as ICBMs; all it lacked was a nuclear weapon. U.S. strategists had wargamed suicide aircraft attacks, but the conventional wisdom labeled the plot too Hollywood. Like Pearl Harbor, post-911 attack examination revealed that U.S. intelligence agencies had clues and facts, but failed to assimilate the data into a design -- the design of an audacious enemy."

Usually I've seen this argument phrased in terms of hijacked passenger jets being the poor-man's cruise missile, but Mr. Bay is still quite correct in his larger theme.

"A violent organization that announces it has declared war on America is no mere criminal problem."

And that is the lesson I wish more people would take to heart.

12/5

re: "The top ten unicorns of China policy"

Daniel Blumenthal at Shadow Government ("Notes From The Loyal Opposition") examined some China-specific cognitive biases.

Money quote(s):

"Much of China policy is also underpinned by belief in the fantastical: in this case, soothing but logically inconsistent ideas. But unlike unicorns, our China policy excursions into the realm of make believe could be dangerous. Crafting a better China policy requires us to identify what is imaginary in our thinking about China."

CAA is not a "China hand." CAA barely speaks "take-out menu Chinese."

(CAA has, however, noticed a phenomenon where, even in non-English, non-Chinese speaking countries, restaurant orders are relayed, using English menu designations, e.g., "Number Seven!")

Rebounding from that tangent, any U.S. intelligence (especially counterintelligence) professional can't fail to notice, and learn a few things about, China.

So take a look at Mr. Blumenthal's "ten unicorns." What do you think?

10/3

re: "Will There Be War?"

Adam Yoshida at American Thinker ("a daily internet publication devoted to the thoughtful exploration of issues of importance to Americans") thinks about the unthinkable (somebody should).


Money quote(s):


"An American credit downgrade. Europe in turmoil. Israel menaced by an Iran with nuclear ambitions. Mexican drug cartels run amok. Chinese ghost cities. With each passing day the news gets worse. To my amateur historian's eye, we seem to be drowning under the greatest flood of crisis, both international and domestic, since the 1930s. We all know how that ended. Will it be possible, in terrible 2010s, to resolve the world's problems without war? I'm not so certain."

The American credit downgrade, among other economic faltering, continues without much (non-OWS related) turmoil just yet. The Eurozone is breaking trail where no currency union has gone before, but that's been true all along; it's very existance is unprecedented.

Still, at least some folks in the consular racket are a little concerned. I hope our folks in CA and EUR bureau are leaning forward with their contingency planning.

"(E)ven a decade ago, it was clear to some that we were headed towards some sort of cataclysm. Nations all over the world have made promises that, because they have been undermined by demographic change, cannot possibly be kept. It was always clear that, eventually, the laws of fixed numbers would catch up with us and that there would be a day of judgement. It's just that, until very recently, it had always appeared that it would be in a further future and that maybe -- just maybe -- the white heat of technological advance would propel us faster than the danger."

The possibility that technology will let us cheat the hangman isn't completely closed out just yet, but each day's headlines make it increasingly unlikely.

"The world's problems are so entrenched and so far-reaching that it seems doubtful that they will be resolved without the resort by some to the expedient of war. Worse, it now seems possible that a cascade of conflict will wash over the entire world as it did some seven decades ago."

The "rational actor" fallacy keeps a lot of folks from seeing just how likely some national leaders are to resort to warfare as solutions to their domestic problems.

"The worst-case scenarios all share a common root cause: the failure of our politicians to recognize that, in the words of the late Enoch Powell, "the supreme function of statesmanship is to provide against preventable evils." "


8/10

re: "A Foolish Consistency"

Lex at Neptunus Lex ("The unbearable lightness of Lex. Enjoy!") takes us into some "inside baseball" at the high end of the intelligence community.

Money quote(s):

"For years, intelligence agencies at home and abroad have watched the nuclear program in Iran with growing concern. In 2007, a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) provided to policy makers by the intelligence community deprecated that threat, saying that Iran had stopped work on its weaponization program in 2003. There were concerns at the time that the NIE had been deliberately shaded by members of the IC to forestall a rumored attack on Iranian nuclear sites by the George W. Bush administration in its waning years."

This was hardly the first NIE whose conclusions seemed policy- (or politics) rather than intelligence-driven, but it's one of the more prominent ones.

"(A) veteran CIA analyst critical of the agency’s 2011 NIE says that the agency has prevented him from revealing the names of outside analysts who reviewed the draft"

Why is that important?

Outside analysts such as academics, think-tankers, and former intelligence officials are used as a form of outside validation. Publicizing those names makes them accountable for that validation.

"Critics have long claimed, with little supporting evidence, that the Bush administration deliberately politicized intelligence in order to justify the Iraq war. At worse, the intelligence community in 2002 was guilty of “confirmation bias”: Told to look for evidence of an Iraqi WMD program, analysts found what they were looking for in the tangled mess of pre-war all-source data and disregarded what didn’t fit the picture. It was a costly, if understandable mistake. Using outside analysts to endorse a position on Iranian nuclear weapons which is clearly at odds with the evidence, and who have evident biases of their own may be just as costly, if not more so."

It's nice to read something outside the specialist literature that touches on the problems of cognitive bias in intelligence analysis. Confirmation bias isn't something you set out to have, although it's something you maybe could have perhaps avoided.

re: "Ending America: The Slaughter of Free Speech, Congress to "explore the need to limit some forms of freedom of speech" "

Pamela Geller at Atlas Shrugs ("Evil is made possible by the sanction you give it. Withdraw your sanction.") takes her (and your) freedom of speech seriously.

Money quote(s):

"The very idea that our legislators would restrict free speech and impose the sharia (blasphemy laws) as a response to inhuman barbarity is an act of sedition and treason. When did we ever shred America's golden, historic principles in submission to bloody savage totalitarianism? If America really understood what was happening here and was not psy-oped by an enemedia, they would take to the streets with pitchforks and torches."

Whoa. She had me at pitchforks and torches.

(Everyone always forgets the hayrakes.)

"The idea that this will threaten American troops is just another terror tactic. This is based on the assumption that they are fighting us because we are doing things they don't like. Actually they are fighting us because of imperatives within the Islamic faith. They will never like us unless we convert to Islam or submit to Islamic rule. If we stop doing things they dislike, where will we draw the line? How far will Sharia advance in the U.S., with Americans afraid to stop its advance for fear of offending Muslims and stirring them up to violence? This is incompatible with American freedom. We have to draw the line."

It helps if one takes into account what ones enemies claim they are doing, and why. Attributing some other set of motives (poverty, anti-colonialism, environmentalism) based upon ivory tower precepts generated in Western think tanks betrays some serious mirror-imaging cognitive bias.

"Limiting free speech won't stop the jihadis from killing people. It will have just the opposite effect, but serve as reinforcement of their murderous actions. More people will die. Many more." (Bold type in original. - CAA)

re: "The Reasonable Man Premise"

Lex at Neptunus Lex ("The unbearable lightness of Lex. Enjoy!") reminds us how biases may mislead us.

Money quote(s):

"In a normal hostage negotiation, authorities want to 1) control the situation in order to, 2) prevent it from getting any worse. But once the pirates understood that they were not going to be allowed to go ashore with their “booty”, the hostages were worthless to them. Their humanity apparently counted for nothing.

So why not kill them, then move forward, empty your hands, surrender and await your trial?

Lessons: People everywhere are really not the same. We don’t understand these people."

The "Reasonable Man Premise" is a form of the cognitive bias known as "mirror imaging."