TSB at The Skeptical Bureaucrat ("Giving my fellow Americans the view from my cubicle") gives a professional evaluation of the site security at the scene of this massacre.
Money quote(s)
"(T)he UN Mission relied on the presence of local police and their own (third country national) armed guards to deter mobs. They evidently did not put up the kinds of physical barriers - high perimeter walls and gates, entry control facilities, protected guard booths and police fighting position, etc., - that would have delayed and channeled the mob, and made it more feasible for the armed presence to prevent anyone from entering.
Without that element of physical delay, guards and police can't be fully effective."
"Inside the UN compound, the headquarters building likewise lacked physical security relevant to a mob attack."
"While most people will assume that any wall, door, or window that was built to resist bomb blast will also resist small arms fire and forced entry, that is not at all the case. In order to protect people against a prolonged mob attack that uses small arms and improvised hand tools ("hammers or whatever they could find") you need products that were specifically designed for that purpose, like the ones that U.S. embassies use.
FYI, for a detailed description of how those embassy products are tested, and I do mean detailed, see this article in an old issue of a construction trade journal."
&
"(T)he international community might want to take a lesson from our Fortress Embassies"
This last might be more difficult than you'd think, since it would require a mental shift from the "we're the UN, everyone loves us" to "some of our ungrateful public may try to kill us" mindset.
Also, there's a reason for all those security features we saddle ourselves with, they're really not there just to employ hardware manufacturers in favored congressional districts.
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