Security Decisions, part the first

Before I wrote my "Foreign Service Family" post, I jotted down a list of possible topics to address concerning matters which I believed must arise from the Benghazi 9/11 attacks and their aftermath.

The topics were:  “Haste to Narrative,” “Calendar,” “War On Terror,” “Free Speech,” “Video,” “Intelligence Failure,” and “Security Decisions.”

Over the following weeks, most of these themes were addressed, in one fashion or another, by other bloggers, pundits, and commentators all around the blogosphere and in professional print and online media (to say nothing of TV and radio bloviators, bloviatrices, and bloviatrics).  Among others, I would direct you to We Meant Well, Diplopundit, DiploMad, and Life After Jerusalem.

Longtime friend and colleague TSB at The Skeptical Bureaucrat has covered topics relating to actual matters of security quite well.  Specifically, I commend for your reading the following:  "Did I Miss Much While I Was Gone?,""About That Non-Standard, Un-Fortress, Not-A-Consulate In Benghazi," "A Futile Exchange of Letters On Benghazi, But A Bit Of News About The ARB,""How Many Fortress Embassies?,""Benghazi - Not The Worst Place On The Planet,""A Couple Thoughts About the Benghazi Hearing," and "I Love the Smell Of Dip Notes In the Morning."

A great deal of confusion, unintentional if not otherwise, has cascaded from the events of last month.  Among those are the somewhat existential questions relating to the U.S. facility in Benghazi which was attacked and ultimately destroyed.  More than one TV talking head (but I repeat myself in a redundancy) called Benghazi an “embassy.”  An honest mistake, and one which is perfectly understandable given the miserably low levels of education and sophistication evident in today’s media “personalities.”

The U.S. Embassy in Libya is located in Tripoli.  A history of that mission may be found here.

There are no public links for the Benghazi facility but an article at the AmEmb Tripoli page calls it a “mission.”

I know:  what’s the difference?

Well, take it from me that there are a range of security standards and protection measures that apply to State Dept. facilities overseas.  While most are not actually classified, the standards and other regulatory documents themselves are not available for public dissemination.

Within the State Dept., there are two sets of documents which serve as regulations for how things are done.  They are the Foreign Affairs Manual(s) or “FAM” and the Foreign Affairs Handbook(s).  Essentially, the FAM sets out the regulations and the FAH explains in greater detail how to implement those regulations. 

Matters pertaining to diplomatic security are covered in the “12 FAM."

The specific handbook explaining physical security standards for overseas diplomatic facilities is 12 FAH 5.  Its contents aren’t for public dissemination but if you’re a State Dept. reader you already knew that or can research it on your own.

As TSB has pointed out, the procedures for obtaining waivers to security standards are explained in 12 FAM 315.

The point of all this errata is that several somebodies at various levels across more than one bureau (within State Dept.) had to go on record at various times to accomplish such things as deciding to have a DOS facility in Benghazi in the first place and then to sign-off as to what security standards were appropriate to that type of facility.

As as to “type,” that includes not just its purpose but whether its an existing facility (which it apparently was) or whether State built it “to code” (i.e., the highest possible security standards).

Reality rears its ugly head with regards to existing buildings.  There’s only so much that can be done to make a building more robust and attack-resistant.  And there are lots of ways to attack a facility, with there being to guarantees of absolute security no matter what you do to prepare.

TSB explained this quite well.

Some of it can be boiled-down to just two bullet-points, PowerPoint-style.

- Ultimately, the host government is responsible for protecting diplomatic facilities within its sovereign territory.  Blather about embassies and consulates being “sovereign U.S. soil” are so much b.s.  Under treaty and customary international law, embassies are “inviolable.”  They are not extraterritorial.

- Security measures, whether they are physical, electronic, active, passive, or armed, can only provide a measure degree of safety in terms of delaying an attacker until host government forces can restore order.  If the host government doesn’t have effective control of the location in question, than some hard decisions need to be made about whether to have a diplomatic facility there in the first place.

re: "Foreign Service Conversion - All About The Benjamins"

TSB at The Skeptical Bureaucrat ("From deep inside the foundations of our Republic's capital city") provided his take on the midlevel staffing gap.

Money quote(s):

"I've been browsing the GAO report on Foreign Service staffing gaps, which is discussed by Domani Spero today, and particularly the portion on Civil Service to Foreign Service conversions. She noted the comically insufficient extent of those conversions"

&

"According to the GAO report, State "opened" only 88 CS employees to conversion in 2011, of which a mere 26 applied. Those 26 were winnowed down to 7 who were given the opportunity to convert, only four of whom were actually converted. With numbers like those, something tells me State really isn't all that into the whole idea of Civil Service conversion." (Bold typeface added for emphasis. - CAA.)

&

"State hires for FS positions only at the entry pay grades, which max out at the FP-04 level. That means the CS employees who are most likely to be conversion candidates would take a big pay cut, even if there were some flexibility as to the exact step within that pay grade at which a converted employee might enter.

By "big" I mean about 50 percent, assuming the conversion candidate is a GS-13 pay grade employee who has been around ten or more years.

Even that temporary Chief of Mission job would lose its appeal if I had to take such a severe financial haircut to convert. " (Bold typeface added for emphasis. - CAA.)

With the exception of our Foreign Service Specialist colleagues, State Department's Civil Service cadre are probably the best-prepared, most-likely-to-be-successful group of candidates for conversion into the Foreign Service.

7/17

re: "A Kind Word For Fortress Embassies, From A Surprising Source"

TSB at The Skeptical Bureaucrat (" In the words of Dr. Evil, "the details of my life are quite inconsequential." However, I will say that I work in a small branch office of the foreign affairs department of the Washington DC area's largest employer. ") was surprised by support for robust embassy security (from an unlikely source).

Money quote(s):

"The Washington Diplomat had an article on embassy architecture versus security the other day (America’s Embassy Building Boom Fortifies Diplomacy, Security Abroad), which I thought was only mildly interesting until I got to the obligatory quote from Jane Loeffler. She is our foremost - only? - historian of diplomatic architecture, and premier critic of Fortress Embassies, and no article on the subject would be complete without her remarks.

Normally in an article of this sort, Dr. Loeffler provides unrelenting criticism of defensive embassy architecture, and then it's left to some poor Department spokesman or project architect to put up a weak rebuttal about the need for security. But this time, Dr. Loeffler played for the other team."

CAA has Dr. Loeffler's book. She raises perfectly valid points about the tension between wanting attractive architecture, suitable for the day-to-day working of diplomacy, and the onerous needs for security measures.

There will always be a tension between the ideal, which would be, I suppose, a sort of park-like campus without walls, and what's necessary to hinder bad actors from murdering our staff and guests.

"(T)he risks of terrorism can be high even in purportedly low-threat countries such as Latvia and Malta. For example, that new secure embassy in Malta replaced one that was located inside a multi-tenant commercial office building, a type of property in which it would never have been able to achieve satisfactory security.

If we are serious about moving our people out of high-risk situations and into better and more secure buildings, then our new embassies will inevitably have to have certain fortress-y characteristics. I'm not saying we need to go medieval and do the whole castle-on-an-island, but our embassies will need features such as setback distance from surrounding streets if they are to be reasonably well-protected against physical attack."

4/2

re: "That's An Excellent Point, LTC Peters"

TSB at The Skeptical Bureaucrat ("From deep inside the foundations of our Republic's capital city") listened, as we all should, to the inimitable LTC (Ret.) Peters, speaker of uncomfortable truths.

Money quote(s):

"While channel-surfing TV news programs this morning, I caught a few seconds of the retired Army officer and writer/columnist Ralph Peters commenting on the Afghanistan situation and how it forces us into a highly troubled relationship with Pakistan.

Quoting him from memory, he said this:

“When I went to Command and General Staff College, I would have flunked out if I proposed to put 100,000 troops at the end of a single supply line that ran through a thousand miles of hostile territory.”"

This why we keep having to put up with Pakistan.

"After ten years, we still haven't found an alternative to routing all our Afghan-bound truck convoys from the port of Karachi through the Khyber Pass, thereby putting ourselves at the mercy of Pakistan's ISI and its Taliban allies. Shouldn't the CGSC have revoked some diplomas by now?"

Not having a Leavenworth diploma to put at risk, I will venture that the decisions, and the decision-makers, that are relevant are not at the CGSC-graduate level. They are at the war and electoral college level. These are policy and grand strategy-level questions, and they are putting the operational cart in front of the logistical horse.

9/24

re: "Costs"

CAA (that's me!) continued his response to Jeff Emanuel's post at RedState:, responding to snowshooze's comment of Friday, February 10th at 2:00 PM EST(link).

snowshooze said:

"Are you guys really thinking there is any sanity in that?"

My response:

"Building an embassy complex to securely house not only our diplomatic mission but the management of a national reconstruction effort in a combat zone where they take indirect fire every day (including during construction) is going to cost a lot.

A lot.

And when I say “house,” I mean not only their working spaces (and warehouses, workshops, &tc. to support that work) but actual living quarters BECAUSE NONE OF IT MAY BE SAFELY PLACED OUTSIDE OF YOUR SECURITY PERIMETER.

For some perspective, take a look at The Skeptical Bureaucrat’s latest post: http://skepticalbureaucrat.blogspot.com/2012/02/and-another-thing-about-that-baghdad.html

TSB and I go way back. He knows whereof he speaks and is a security professional second to none."



2/11

re: "Working On That Baghdad Footprint"

TSB at The Skeptical Bureaucrat ("From deep inside the foundations of our Republic's capital city") examined remarks related to AmEmb Baghdad by DepSec Nides.

Money quote(s):

"Downsizing the U.S. Mission in Baghdad isn't really about rationing chicken wings in the embassy's dining hall after all, despite yesterday's New York Times story.

Instead, it's all about the reducing the footprint, according to remarks by Thomas Nides, Deputy Secretary for Management and Resources, at a press teleconference today. He said "footprint" seven times."

The chicken wing (and arugula) story was never really more than just another big-media club with which to pummel Americans serving their country in a warzone, uniformed or not.

"(I)f we replace enough third-country security contractors with Iraqis, buy our groceries in the local market, and always, always, always re-think our engagement (Deputy Secretary Nides also said "engagement" seven times) we will eventually fit into a more nearly normal shoe."

Thinking is good. Right-sizing an embassy is a useful activity, particular when it's a out- (notice I don't say "over-") sized as our diplomatic/reconstruction/development/democratication establishment in Iraq.

That being said, placing too much of our embassy security in the hands of essentially un-vettable Iraqis, to say nothing of surrendering our food security, is a recipe for disaster.

"(M)ost of this footprint reduction will come about by hiring fewer foreign (i.e., non-Iraqi) security contractors and replacing them with local hires. That will help in at least two ways. First, it will eliminate a leading source of aggravation for the Iraqis. Second, the mission will not have to house and logistically support so many contractors, since our local hires will go home after their shifts are over, just like a normal local guard force does at a normal mission."

2/8

re: "The British Ambassador To Tehran Experiences a 1979 Flashback"

TSB at The Skeptical Bureaucrat ("Giving my fellow Americans the view from my cubicle") provides some professional insight into Amb. Chilcott's remarks.

Money quote(s):

"(T)he embassy staff assumed they would have sufficient warning of a 'serious' mob attack, as opposed to a 'normal' rock-and-bottle throwing demonstration, and that they could send the non-essential staff and dependents home where they would be safely out of the way. Stop me if you've heard this one before."

This is, IIRC, known to students of behavioral conditioning as "operant conditioning." Career intelligence officers know if for something somewhat different, but the goal is similar: condition your target to expect certain situations and conditions to play out a certain way. It's a form of intelligence deception, and the Iranians are good at it.

"Going to the windows is a very bad practice. I hope British embassies have technical means for seeing what's happening outside without needing to expose staff to bullets and flying glass."

U.S. foreign service staff know better than to run to windows when they hear scary noises outside; not to say someone won't do it anyway, but they've been trained not to do so.

Historically, the majority of casualties in an embassy attack have come from flying glass, particularly when blast effects shatter a window. However the majority of fatalities have come from catastrophic structural collapse.

"I am guessing that the residential compound was less well protected against mob attack than was the embassy office building. Bottom line: the non-essential staff and dependents were "rounded up" - i.e., captured and held hostage - unlike the staff who were locked down in the embassy. That's enough to make a reasonable man ask whether foreign missions in unstable places shouldn't protect their residential compounds to the exact same degree they do their office buildings."

Clearly, they've read our playbook and know that Western embassies put the emphasis of their security measures at their working facilities rather than their residences. And have adjusted their offensive strategies against them accordingly. We can expect to see this happen again.

12/5

re: "Supreme Court Denies Stay for Mexican Convict In Texas"

TSB at The Skeptical Bureaucrat ("Giving my fellow Americans the view from my cubicle") covered some consular notification news.

Money quote(s):

"The U.S. Supreme Court tonight denied a stay of execution for that Mexican citizen who had been sitting on death row in Texas for 16 years. The court's vote was 5-4 (the usual suspects) and the majority opinion is full of strong statements"

SCOTUS, like consular officers, deals with the laws as they're written, not as they'd like them to be written. Except, of course, when they don't. But consular officers have considerably less, er, interpretive discretion.

"Nothing in the record shows that Leal ever asked for consular access, or even told the police that he was a Mexican citizen (he had lived in the U.S. - illegally - since he was two years old and represented himself as a U.S. citizen). And in any case, he made his incriminating admissions to the police before they arrested him, and therefore before they had any obligation to inform him of his right to consular assistance.

Even if Leal had had the benefit of Mexican consular access before his trial, that would not have changed the fact that he had incriminated himself, nor change any of the other evidence against him. The lack of consular access, then, was not relevant to his conviction and death sentence." (Emphasis in original text. - CAA.)

The facts as cited above make me wonder how/why this case ever made it to the SCOTUS. Who/what was pushing it upwards through the court system and to what end?

"The matter of reciprocity or Mexican retaliation against U.S. citizens is a real concern, but it is much less important than the interest Texas has in carrying out its state laws and punishing murder. The U.S. Supreme Court ruled two years ago that when adherence to a treaty such as the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations is contrary to a state statute, the President cannot override the statute unilaterally, but legislation is required. And as the Supreme Court noted tonight, Congress has not provided that legislation. The Vienna Convention, therefore, has no bearing on the case of Humberto Leal, and Texas was completely free to execute him."

Federalism rears its ugly head. Again. Federal laws don't trump state laws unless Congress specifically authorizes them to do so. So Congress has such power, but must definitely and discretely exercise it in each instance of legislation.

Good to know.

As for reciprocity, the suggestion of official Mexican retaliation against U.S. citizens is a real concern, but pre-supposes that the Mexican government actually does, or will continue to in the future, have some control over events and activities within its borders.

re: "The Media Turns On Obama, And My Head Is Spinning"

Thanks to TSB at The Skeptical Bureaucrat ("Giving my fellow Americans the view from my cubicle") for the link and the mention:

"I've been following Consul-at-Arms and cheering as he defends the Constitutional powers of Congress against the administration's interpretation dismissal of the War Powers Act."

I'd quibble about my defending Congress, exactly. I feel like I've been as critical of Congress (for not defending its Constitutional perogatives) as I've been of the executive branch for continuing to push the envelope of its own Constitutional perogatives.

Money quote(s):

"President Obama started the Libyan action with a March 21 letter to Congress that cited the requirements of the War Powers Act ("I am providing this report as part of my efforts to keep the Congress fully informed, consistent with the War Powers Resolution. I appreciate the support of the Congress in this action") but, when the May 20 deadline for withdrawal approached, he changed his mind about those requirements.This morning, as I caught up on my reading, I saw that both the New York Times and the Washington Post have attacked the administration's position that the War Powers Act no longer applies to its military action in Libya. The Mainstream Media in a united front with CAA? I must be dreaming." (Emphasis in original text. - CAA.)

He had to take a lie down until the dizziness passed.

re: "Peshawar: Bomb Attack On Consulate Car With No Serious Injuries"

TSB at The Skeptical Bureaucrat ("Giving my fellow Americans the view from my cubicle") has some good news about a bad thing.

Money quote(s):

"State Department employees in Pakistan have another reason to thank the U.S. taxpayer for the enormous investment he has made in heavily armored vehicles for our missions abroad."

We do spend a lot of money on security for our diplomatic and consular missions abroad. We make them harder targets for the bad guys. This helps keep our people alive.

It just doesn't do to make it easy to kill our people. It's good not only make that difficult to accomplish, but to discourage it whenever possible.

"(T)he bomb was about 50 kilos (100 pounds), which is more than large enough to destroy an unhardened vehicle. Happily, our well-protected vehicle sustained only minor damage, and the two employees riding in it were only slightly injured."

re: "UN's Compound In Mazar-i-Sharif Was Not Well Protected "

TSB at The Skeptical Bureaucrat ("Giving my fellow Americans the view from my cubicle") gives a professional evaluation of the site security at the scene of this massacre.

Money quote(s)

"(T)he UN Mission relied on the presence of local police and their own (third country national) armed guards to deter mobs. They evidently did not put up the kinds of physical barriers - high perimeter walls and gates, entry control facilities, protected guard booths and police fighting position, etc., - that would have delayed and channeled the mob, and made it more feasible for the armed presence to prevent anyone from entering.

Without that element of physical delay, guards and police can't be fully effective."

"Inside the UN compound, the headquarters building likewise lacked physical security relevant to a mob attack."

"While most people will assume that any wall, door, or window that was built to resist bomb blast will also resist small arms fire and forced entry, that is not at all the case. In order to protect people against a prolonged mob attack that uses small arms and improvised hand tools ("hammers or whatever they could find") you need products that were specifically designed for that purpose, like the ones that U.S. embassies use.

FYI, for a detailed description of how those embassy products are tested, and I do mean detailed, see this article in an old issue of a construction trade journal."

&

"(T)he international community might want to take a lesson from our Fortress Embassies"

This last might be more difficult than you'd think, since it would require a mental shift from the "we're the UN, everyone loves us" to "some of our ungrateful public may try to kill us" mindset.

Also, there's a reason for all those security features we saddle ourselves with, they're really not there just to employ hardware manufacturers in favored congressional districts.

re: "A Fitting Inspiration"

TSB at The Skeptical Bureaucrat ("Giving my fellow Americans the view from my cubicle") found a sign for hope.

Money quote(s):

"Omar Mukhtar, the political-religious figure who led native resistance to Italian colonization of Libya from 1912 to 1931. Anthony Quinn played him in the movie.

A national hero. That's a good sign."

re: "Gaffes and Guns (Or, What To Do About Libya?)"

TSB at The Skeptical Bureaucrat ("Giving my fellow Americans the view from my cubicle") notes a Washington "glamour don't."

Money quote(s):

"our two most important intelligence officials committed an official gaffe - meaning, they blurted out the truth - while testifying before a Senate committee"

Politicians and the media (but I repeat myself) hate being told something that's so if it contradicts what they wish were so. They didn't tell the committee what they wanted to have happen, they told the committee the conclusion that the facts as they were known, and analysis thereupon, led them to reach.

"Naturally, this led to calls for Clapper to resign. But it might, more productively, have led people to wonder how we can change the dynamics in Libya so as to favor the Libyan rebels."

_____

Update (2/24/2011): Clearly TSB was onto something here, as the U.S. and several allies are now changing the dynamics.

Wikileaks-related posts

TSB at The Skeptical Bureaucrat ("Giving my fellow Americans the view from my cubicle") has three good posts here, here, and here.

Memorial Day

Formerly known as Decoration Day, when the graves of our nation's fallen would be decorated with flowers and flags, we now observe Memorial Day as the the coming of summer (vacation), long traffic jams on the way to the beach, and cookouts.

And the fallen would have wanted it that way, except for the traffic jams at least.

To our friends, our brothers and sisters in arms, our forefathers; we remember, we honor your sacrifice with our continued service, and we will not forget.

re: "FBI: Ciudad Juarez Attackers Might Have Been "Confused" "

TSB at The Skeptical Bureaucrat ("Giving my fellow Americans the view from my cubicle") continues to be dubious about motives and targeting.

Money quote(s):

"The FBI speculates the attackers might have been looking for two other white vehicles that were leaving another kid's party in Juarez that same Saturday afternoon. And, therefore, our employees weren't targeted due to their employment and this wasn't an attack on U.S. government interests.

That's an awfully big stretch of speculation that reaches a comforting conclusion."

"(W)hy wouldn't the narcos be willing to strike directly at U.S. interest targets, especially soft ones? Aren't the narcos facing an "existential threat" from the U.S.-supported Mexican federal government's narcotics control campaign, as is stated on page 14 of the State Department's 2010 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report that was released to Congress two weeks ago?"

"The Mexican drug cartels are fighting for their survival at this point."

&

"What would they have to lose?"

re: "Abdulmutallab (TWA "Christmas Bomber") Had a Visa Denial Reversed"

TSB at The Skeptical Bureaucrat ("Giving my fellow Americans the view from my cubicle") has "about the complicated visa history of the "Christmas Bomber," young Mister Abdulmutallab of Nigeria."

Money quote(s):

"The bottom line is that the 18 year-old Abdulmutallab committed a non-material error on his first visa application, which was forgiven based upon his lack of willful misrepresentation and his strong ties to Nigeria, i.e., his Daddy's $$$$$$$. This all happened before he was radicalized and became a security threat."

Be sure to read the commentary; it's right on point.

re: "Obama's Aunt Zeituni is Back in Boston"

TSB at The Skeptical Bureaucrat ("Giving my fellow Americans the view from my cubicle") had an update on a famous visa overstay case.

Money quote(s):

"Ms. Zeituni Onyango, the Kenyan Aunt of the President of the United States (KAOPOTUS) and our nation's foremost immigration scofflaw, is back in Boston and living in public housing again while preparing for her next deportation hearing"

&

"(H)er next hearing is scheduled for April Fools Day. If an immigration judge rewards her decade of law-breaking with a grant of asylum, I don't know who will be the bigger fools: the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement agency, or the millions of immigrants who went to the trouble of complying with U.S. laws over the past ten years."

re: "Green Cards for the GITMO Gang?"

TSB at The Skeptical Bureaucrat ("Giving my fellow Americans the view from my cubicle") is wondering about certain soon-to-released Gitmo detainees.

Money quote(s):

"Exactly what legal status will these ex-detainees have if they are admitted? Can they qualify for Lawful Permanent Residence? If not, then what? "

re: "Street Crime, or Chinese Retaliation?"

TSB at The Skeptical Bureaucrat ("Giving my fellow Americans the view from my cubicle") starts connecting the dots.

Money quote(s):

"(T)here may have been a foreign angle to the unsolved murder of William Bennett, a retired U.S. Army officer and former CIA contractor, and the near-fatal beating of his wife, in suburban Virginia two weeks ago (Spooky murder in Loudon County, VA connected to 1999 Chinese embassy bombing?)."

"I normally scoff when people advance convoluted assassination theories to explain what could more easily be explained by ordinary street crime, but in this case I find an assassination plausible."

"Mr. Bennett and his wife were attacked while they were walking or jogging along a road in Lansdowne at 5:30 AM, which is a time and place when I wouldn't expect to come across meth-heads or crack addicts. For another thing, the only witness to any part of the incident said the attackers left in a white van, a type of vehicle that I also don't associate with gang-bangers out cruising.

Furthermore, Bennett was a former Army Special Forces officer. Retired old geezer or not, he certainly would have put up a hell of a fight when he and his wife were attacked by - as is reported - three men armed with blunt weapons."

He then asks the essential question:

"Would the Chinese actually track down and murder Bennett in retaliation for his accidental targeting of their Belgrade embassy? It seems so, well, Cold War-ish."

Answer: I just don't know. - CAA (FSO and former "Cold Warrior")