Cdr Salamander at the Naval Institute Blog ("a venue for thoughtful, vigorous debate on naval and security policy") generated some decent lessons-learned while the civil war, er, revolution, er, "humanitarian intervention" was still going on.
Money quote(s):
"The Battle of Tripoli will work itself out, as will the conflict over time. We can pick it apart then in reasoned hindsight. There are other things a few levels out at the POL/MIL level that are a lot clearer and worth discussing."
As it did. The Law of Unintended Consequences, however, has not been suspended.
"Something that came out at the beginning; “Responsibility to Protect” known by the shorter, R2P. The concept has been embraced by decision makers such as US Ambassador to the UN Susan Rice. A form of “Humanitarian Imperialism” – it is something that over the last few months we have heard less of. The reasons are clear; Libya still isn’t worth the bones of a Pomeranian Grenadier, and both sides are responsible for the deaths of untold numbers of civilians. So much was heard early that we were there to “protect civilians,” but time has shown that some civilians are more important than others. There is no appetite anywhere for Western boots on the ground to execute “R2P” in Libya’s cities. As long as African migrants are kept in Africa and the oil flows – NATO will be more than willing to move from R2P to NMP – Not My Problem. Few really believed that was the reason for intervention anyway – at least the serious." (Bold typeface added for emphasis. - CAA.)
R2P is just as scary a prospective "international norm" as anything else to have come down the pike in recent years. Yet, the more it becomes part of "international law," the less likely it will become anything more than what it is now: a figleaf for use when intervention is in support of some other, less noble-sounding, national interest.
Recall that once "genocide" became a crime under international law (and a treaty was widely signed that obligated states to act to prevent/stop it) all kinds of lawyering and tap-dancing ensued to call what were clearly ongoing programs of genocide from what they obviously were, just to avoid having to actually do anything about it.
"When sustainable logistics and baseline C4ISR are defined as “unique capabilities” – then the facts of NATO non-USA military capacity should be very clear."
Essentially, what are (with a straight face) termed the military capabilities of most (if not all) of our NATO allies amount, in an international sense, to the niche capabilities of our own various state National Guard entities. They provide often useful specialties, but can't function in combat unless they're embedded within a larger, coalition, deployment. Assumed (but un-said) is that the U.S. will always be there to provide the larger context and support.
"(T)he essential effectiveness and efficiency of the CV/S/N once again has been proven. Land based air has its place – but any distance makes the ability to provide persistent effects from the air over the battlespace prohibitively expensive compared to a carrier off shore."
CAA has, for years and in different venues, held that one of the essential characteristics of a superpower in the modern-to-current era are the ability to develop, deploy, and maintain global force projection capabilities. Since World War II and the dawn of the nuclear age, that has meant the following: inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBM) of the nuclear variety (may be ground or sea-based) and the aircraft carrier battle group.
(Experience has caused me to add expeditionary ground forces but let's not go down that particular rabbit hole today.)
If you've got an aircraft carrier (and the screening and support forces it requires to successfully deploy), you can project air power just about anywhere excepting the far interiors of Central Asia and Antarctica.
"Whatever happens in Libya will happen. No one outside a few fringe-types will light a candle for the Gadaffi family of thugs. They have been a blight on the planet for decades. What happens next will be up to the Libyan people. We should all wish them luck and hope that something positive can come out of this."
Hat tip to The Phibian at Cdr Salamander ("Proactively “From the Sea”; leveraging the littoral best practices for a paradigm breaking six-sigma best business case to synergize a consistent design in the global commons, rightsizing the core values supporting our mission statement via the 5-vector model through cultural diversity.").
8/23
Friday, March 23, 2012
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