re: "Your masters are not in Brussels, Gen. Dempsey"

Pundita ("US foreign policy for the 21st Century") cautioned the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Money quote(s):

"If you think a person is crazy, what use is it to attempt to reason with him? However, I don't know whether the chairman is actually crazy, or just doing a good imitation whenever he discusses Pakistan -- a mental blip that seems to manifest in all ranking members of the U.S. military who hold forth on Pakistan whenever they get in front of a microphone.

But despite my discomfort I should like to point out that while the U.S. military is under civilian control, this doesn't mean it's supposed to be under the control of civilians in foreign nations, even NATO ones." (Bold typeface added for emphasis. - CAA.)

And yet.... going all the way back to World War I, the U.S. has had to learn to work within alliances, with its allies, even when it's leading said alliances.

Having said that, prior to NATO, all of the United State's alliances were fairly short-term ones.

Perhaps such long-term familiarity blurs our own clarity of mission.

"I can't find a sound rationale for U.S. commanders basing their war planning on the geopolitical machinations and business concerns of European, Turkish and Canadian governments. This, in my view, is taking the 'You gotta have a gang' mentality too far.

I confess I've been particularly concerned about the gang mentality since February 2010, when AFP reported that NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasumssen had floated the idea of NATO becoming "the hub of a network of security partnerships and a centre for consultation on international security issues -- even issues on which the alliance might never take action." "

&

"(Y)ou know how it is, when people seek to assure you about something that hadn't even occurred to you before. Not to be unkind, but NATO demonstrated in Afghanistan that it can't fight its way out of a paper bag. All that NATO seems to excel at in the military sphere is carpet bombing. So I certainly hope it's not entertaining the idea of becoming a global constabulary -- one that takes its political guidance from Brussels, no less."

7/30

re: "Would the U.S. pay Pakistan's military to help murder American troops if the U.S. had military conscription?"

Pundita (" US foreign policy for the 21st Century ") isn't actually in favor of bringing back the draft, but is angry enough to ask the question.

Money quote(s):

"Through it all -- throughout all the deceptions, denials, evasions, rationalizations and insultingly useless advice given over the years by Americans in civilian government, the military and academia -- there is one question relating to U.S. tolerance for Pakistan's proxy war against NATO and Afghanistan that towers above all others. And yet it's the one question that has never been asked of a public figure. So in the title of this post I've put the question to the public."

She continued:

"I don't mean to shift blame to Americans at large, nor am I arguing to restore conscription. I'm simply pointing out that if service in the U.S. military was compulsory, there would have been such a large number of Americans personally involved in the outcome of the Afghan War that there would have been no 'dark' or 'lost' years in the war while the U.S. was fighting in Iraq.

Combine this with the instant era in global communications, and I think the outcome would have been that factions in Washington that managed for the better part of a decade to hide Pakistan's proxy war from the American public would have found their machinations quickly overwhelmed by the volume of complaints from conscripted Americans and their parents -- many of those parents veterans of the Vietnam War, I might add."

CAA questioned, at the time, both the timing and utility of our Iraq intervention back in the 2002-3 timeframe, both before and during his deployment there to.

While the 23 writs of the Iraq War Resolution sufficed as justification for the invasion, whether Afghanistan should have been put on a back burner (as opposed to a more general mobilization, if both campaigns were so urgently needful) is a good set of questions.

"I'm not arguing for conscription but I am asking whether it's possible for the United States to field an all-volunteer fighting force that's not treated as a mercenary army. The question needs to be answered."

Americans, as a people, have not (since Vietnam, when it was even less true) treated the AVF as mercenaries.

That privilege seems reserved to the inside-the-beltway folks, big picture thinkers, whose connections to the folks who do the deploying, fighting, and dying, are tenuous at best.

(The crocodile tears of the national media elite remain wholly unconvincing.)

"If you want to run with the fiend thesis, it's possible the entire problem of the U.S. approach to Pakistan could be solved by deploying a contingent of exorcists around various civilian government and military buildings, lobbying firms and academic institutions in Washington and Brussels.

But if you pooh-pooh the idea that Hell somehow got loose in those two seats of power you might want to opt for the only other proposition I can see that covers all the bases. This is that U.S. soldiers wouldn't be treated with such contempt if they weren't considered disposable; i.e., as mercenary hirelings. And as corollary that this treatment wouldn't occur if U.S. military service was compulsory."

The "fiend thesis" seems to have been that our decision-makers and strategy-setters have come under actual demonic and diabolical influence.

(CAA can neither confirm nor deny that.)

As touched as CAA is by Pundita's solicitousness on behalf of the troops and their welfare, sometimes an army has to be used. That puts men (and women) at risk. Troops understand that, they just ask that their risks be justified and not wasted.

When an army is used in an expeditionary fashion, as a furtherance of some national policy or another, the risks multiply.

12/17

re: "Chinese Dragons and Russian Bears"

"Sam Huntington" at Always On Watch ("Semper Vigilans") reviewed strategic issues involving our near-peer competitors.

Money quote(s):

"(A) far more dangerous situation is developing in Asia. No surprise, Americans are not hearing about any of this from the state-run media. Here are a few examples:

· China is claiming island territory within fifty miles of the Philippines.

· Chinese frigates regularly intruded Philippine territorial waters.

· Chinese ships fired upon Philippine fishing boats.

· Chinese naval vessels rammed Vietnamese fishing boats (See Note 1)

· Chinese accost Indian naval vessels operating off the coast of Vietnam, demanding to know why they are operating in Chinese waters.

· Chinese military aircraft intrude into Taiwanese air space.

· China intruded Japanese mainland territorial waters on 14 occasions.

· China intruded Okinawa territorial waters on 10 occasions.

· China created six major incidents with the US Navy at sea.

· Raise your hand if you aren’t aware that North Korea is China’s redheaded stepchild.

Note 1: Vietnam possesses one of the world’s largest armies: (China: 4.5 million, Vietnam: 5.9 million)."

You know the one about amateurs studying tactics and professionals studying logistics?

Well, in terms of international relations, geopolitics, and grand strategy, the professionals are studying China.

"Danger of a regional conflict is real. The consequence to China’s arrogance has been a dramatic increase in military spending among Southeast Asian countries. Australia, Japan, India, the Philippines, Vietnam, and Taiwan have all dedicated billions of dollars on new or upgraded military hardware. The United States is upgrading naval facilities in Guam —so much so that Representative Hank Johnson(D-GA) worries the island may capsize. Nevertheless, all of these countries recognize the wisdom of pooling their resources to keep China in check; Japan has taken the lead in establishing mutual defense cooperatives with Australia, South Korea, India, and the United States. Singapore has offered to provide bases for the US Navy."

CAA no longer worries that Guam will become overburdened, over-balanced, and capsize, having received assurances that Guam possesses a sufficiently sturdy keel and gyroscopic stabilizer.

"Owing to the fact that we don’t know what motivates Chinese behavior, the Australian General Staff worries that a mistake could lead to disastrous consequences —particularly when it is likely that China will attempt to use its military to enforce a Chinese Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).

The problem is that while demanding that other nations treat Chinese EEZs as its sovereign territory, China routinely refuses to acknowledge the EEZs of other nations. From the standpoint of international law, EEZs are not sovereign territory. We can therefore see how China might regard the US Navy’s mission to safeguard open sea-lanes as an intolerable trespass —a situation that could lead to deadly confrontation."

It's the old "what's-mine-is-mine-what's-yours-is-negotiable" attitude turned somewhat sideways: China will use existing international norms and fora to its own advantage and ignore those which infringe upon its own interests. That's what one does when one is the center of the Earth, after all.

"Some politicians argue that given China’s dependence on global trade, a deadly confrontation is unlikely. They may have forgotten that economic ties did not hinder German aggression at the beginning of the 20^th Century —a costly mistake for France. ....but here is where we find the real and present danger. Defense cuts may encourage China to challenge allied nations within the region of Southeast Asia —they are that arrogant."

Nor did close economic ties deflect World War I; for that matter, the United States' close economic ties with Saudi Arabia deter the 9/11 attacks.

(Marx notwithstanding, man is not solely, nor even primarily, an economic animal.)

"From Russia’s perspective, there couldn’t be a better time to threaten the United States and NATO with pre-emptive strikes unless we agree to cancel the so-called Missile Defense Shield, designed as a safeguard from Iranian ICBMs."

This seems a little over-the-top; threatening pre-emptive strikes is way more sabre-rattling than is necessary. Russia has far more effective economic and political levers to pull than jacking things up on the defcon meter.

"If one understands international relations, Russia’s timing couldn’t be better. We should anticipate this sort of behavior by an adversary whenever they perceive American leadership as weak, incompetent, ineffective, or confused."

Harsh words, but hardly unwarranted.

The "reset" button must have been like those ones installed near crosswalks: not really wired to anything but they give pedestrians something to do with their hands while waiting for the lights to change.

"This situation should once again remind us that American politicians and diplomats seldom learn important lessons of history. America cannot afford another war right now. Neither can we afford the perception of weakness, incompetence, or abject stupidity. We continue to live in a dangerous world"

Diplomats actually aren't slouches when it comes to learning their history lessons; however if you expand your definition of "diplomat" beyond those actually trained and experienced in it to those who practice it on our behalf at the highest levels....

"Rather than facing a deadly and costly regional conflict in Southeast Asia, it would be far less expensive to deter Chinese aggression vis-à-vis a strong military presence along the Pacific Rim. As for the Russian Bear, they understand but one thing: force or its promise."

5/4

re: "Managing decline"

David Warren at DavidWarrenOnline ("newspaper columns") argued against the inevitability and necessity of declinism.

Money quote(s):

"Gideon Rachman got his otherwise much-ignored Financial Times column linked on the Drudge Report, this week. (Drudge is "the bull" in this scenario.) In his smuggest, most superior, British tone, he lectured the Americans on "the management of decline." "

Even last October (when this saw print), it was far too late for any Europeans (even the British) to be lecturing Americans on this topic.

"(T)he phrase was meant to be droll: to ridicule the mindset of people who were destroying the British economy through nationalizations, while walking away from her responsibilities "east of Suez"; who portrayed Britain's decline as inevitable, and themselves as the ingenious lords of this great recessional dance."

The British have always done droll quite well.

"We "running dogs of American imperialism" (as the Maoists used to call us) regret the decline of American power, not necessarily from adoration of everything American, but because the alternative to American power in the world is Chinese power, and the rise to consequence of an array of regional powers perhaps nastier. For as America goes down, these unspeakable powers go up, relatively, and get their opportunity to throw their weight around."

True enough. America's decline, to the extent that it is real and not merely public relations in advance of reality, does not occur in a vacuum. Nature, and international relations, abhores a vacuum.

"In a similar way, in a previous generation, many not British themselves, cheered on the works of "British imperialism." For imperialism is always with us, and the British form was rather more benign than, say, the German form.

That is a point characteristically lost upon "progressive" minds, with their underlying, usually unexamined, utopian premises. This has been on exhibit throughout the Arab Spring, where it is assumed that the overthrow of Arab dictators must naturally lead to roses."

Clearly Mr. Warren's crystal ball was working pretty well last year, since he saw where the Arab Spring would almost inevitably lead in places like Egypt.

"Decline is of two kinds, relative and absolute. The relative decline of the U.S. was inevitable, as other countries which had destroyed themselves through war and totalitarianism gradually recovered, and wealth with its accompanying powers was disseminated through the world. The misfortune here is that America's allies in Canada, Europe, and elsewhere, declined their share of military expenditure. All were content to let the U.S. carry the weight of NATO, while they embarked on nanny-statist ventures more advanced than the American.

These in turn contributed to absolute decline: and to the effective bankruptcy of states across the European Union, as well as America and Japan. Behind the budgetary catastrophes are the demographic realities of aging societies, which can never catch up. They simply don't have enough working young to pay all the "entitlements."

Relative decline was unavoidable; but absolute decline was a choice."

Relative decline isn't such a bad thing when a rising tide is lifting other countries out of poverty. It's less of a good thing when poor countries are getting poorer.

""Managing decline" now means making the best of the fallout; of choosing what we can still afford and what we can no longer. The British "managed their decline," and now sneer at Americans whose turn it is to manage theirs.

There was in Britain a Churchillian force that did not accept decline. It "won the war" on its last sprint, then snuffed out just after.

There is likewise in the United States today a force - call it Tea Party - that does not accept inevitable decline. It is allied with every other faltering life force in American society. And, as an exponent of this "rabid right" myself, I will not only cheer them on, but continue biting their detractors. "

10/19

re: "Next: Drone Strikes on Pakistan's ISI?"

WALTER RUSSELL MEAD at The American Interest's Via Meadia ("Walter Russell Mead's Blog") really put his brain to work with this one.

Money quote(s):

"If you read recent statements by senior US officials on the relationship between Pakistan’s ISI and attacks on US and NATO interests, it is impossible to avoid the conclusion that a state of war exists between an agency of the government of Pakistan and the United States of America." (Bold typeface added for emphasis. - CAA.)

Remember, it can still be a war when one side isn't fighting back.

"One should be clear about this; attacks on embassies and on military personnel and positions are acts of war. They are not college pranks, they are not “signals”, they are not robust statements of policy disagreement and they are not bargaining chips in an extended negotiation. They are acts of force in violation of international law and they can legitimately be met by acts of force and war in return." (Bold typeface added for emphasis. - CAA.)

As I noted on Facebook yesterday (paraphrasing aeklus' "the phrase "act of war" is really a political, rather than legal distinction"):

"Casus belli denotes a political decision rather than a legal consequence. It's a reason to go to war only if we say it is."

"(R)etired senior officials of the ISI at different times, and they make no bones about their attitudes toward the United States. They are our enemies and they are not ashamed to say so. They believe they have grounds: the US in their view is a treacherous ally which has never fully backed Pakistan in what they believe to be an existential conflict with India, and that today the US is openly in India’s camp, supporting its nuclear program, its global ambitions, and pursuing an Afghan policy which increases Indian influence in direct opposition to Pakistan’s efforts to ensure a friendly government in Kabul when the Americans leave. Moreover they believe that America is a power that is fundamentally hostile to Islam, and that our invasion of Afghanistan was an act of wanton mayhem which threatens the sovereignty and security of Pakistan and which has cost Pakistan untold billions of dollars, far exceeding any US aid.

While these views are not universally held in the Pakistani military and government, they are prominent — perhaps central — in ISI strategy, and it is clear that the rest of the Pakistani government either cannot control the ISI or does not wish to." (Bold typeface added for emphasis. - CAA.)

Regardless of what they believe, from over here in the cheap seats it's obvious that the U.S. cares very little about Pakistan, certainly not enough to conspire against it with India, except insofar as Pakistan is necessary to our military efforts in Afghanistan. Period. Full stop.

(So just get over your bad selves.)

"The United States has generally also tried to run its Pakistan policy in ways that allow a split consciousness. On the one hand, we know much of what the ISI is up to while US forces seek to kill people that the ISI regards as colleagues and allies. On the other hand, we push the Pakistani military command to limit the space in which the ISI is permitted to operate and to collaborate with us on those areas where collaboration remains possible. There are, after all, some groups we both want to defeat. In a sense we try to exact the highest price possible for our willingness to turn a blind eye to ISI activities of which we disapprove.

This is the ugly logic of war." (Bold typeface added for emphasis. - CAA.)

Did no one ever tell you that war is an ugly thing?

Okay, you already know about the John Stuart Mills quote, right? Good. Moving right along....

"“Frenemies” are part of the international scene and have been for thousands of years.

But US-Pakistan relations seem to be moving past the “Bosom Buddy” stage to something sharper. When the nation’s most senior military official, a man who follows US-Pakistani relations closely and speaks frequently with the head of the Pakistani military, makes the kind of charges in a public forum that Admiral Mullen has done, it is no longer possible for either side to pretend that nothing is happening.

The United States is telling Pakistan that something must change. It is not, however, clear just how committed we are to this contest with the ISI. If the bottom line for the United States is that Pakistani cooperation is essential for our Afghan policy to work, the Pakistanis will play this card for all it is worth." (Bold typeface added for emphasis. - CAA.)

Y'know, when Adm. Mullins' made that statement I figured it was better than even odds that he'd was just about to retire in order to "spend more time with his family."

"The current tussle between the US and Pakistan involves an effort by the Americans to invoke the stated threat of a military aid cut off and the implied threat of a full-bore US realignment with India to force Pakistan to give up at least part of its fifth pillar: the links to terror and guerrilla groups and the use of these groups in Afghanistan.

There seems to be a genuine division in Pakistan about how to respond. There are some who see the present national strategy as suicidal (the Via Meadia view, by the way) and want to use the American threat as a way to force ISI hands off the levers of power and call a halt to activities in both India and Afghanistan that hurt rather than help Pakistan in their view. These are nice people, but there are not enough of them to swing the debate.

Then there are those who want to temporize: always in the past it has been possible to buy off the Americans with a few pretty gestures or even occasionally a real concession. Throw them a few more Al-Qaeda officials, give them a bit more help eradicating some rebel units you also don’t much like in the tribal areas, and guilt-trip the Americans into more aid.

There are those who think the Americans are bluffing: that America needs Pakistan so badly to get out of Afghanistan that Pakistan can safely defy the Americans at minimal cost.

And finally there are those who think that America is Pakistan’s enemy. Either for religious reasons (we are the leader of a global western and Christian assault against Islam as they see it) or national ones (we have decisively chosen to take India’s side) we are hostile to Pakistan and our cooperation and aid is intended to confuse Pakistanis, gain an intelligence edge and, quite probably, prepare ourselves for a strike to destroy or capture their nuclear weapons." (Bold typeface added for emphasis. - CAA.)

America is only Pakistan's enemy if Pakistan makes us one. It's that simple. Afghanistan itself didn't become our enemy until it became the sanctuary state for those who attacked us on 9/11, and stopped being treated like an enemy as soon as a non-Taliban government was established.

"One must then ask what Admiral Mullen and his colleagues (who surely understand the basic facts of Pakistani national security policy better than a humble blogger) hope to achieve by ratcheting up the pressure in this public and official way. The most likely theory: they believe the last group of Pakistanis who think of America as a strategic enemy (presumably the ones responsible for supporting the recent attacks) are not yet strong enough to dominate Pakistani policy making. Forcing a showdown will lead the other groups in Pakistan to clip the wings of the ISI-types who might welcome an open breach. That won’t be enough to stop the ISI from playing games, but it may limit how far they dare to go.

One hopes this calculation is correct, but it would be unwise to underestimate the degree to which many Pakistanis think they have the US in a trap, how deeply a culture of brinkmanship has embedded itself into Pakistani security thinking, and how much contempt many Pakistani decision-makers feel for many of their US counterparts.

The ISI and its allies just might not back down. At that point, the US would face some extremely difficult choices — although there are plenty of people in the US armed forces and diplomatic corps who are angry enough with Pakistan at this point to make and to implement those choices." (Bold typeface added for emphasis. - CAA.)

Hat tip to Glenn Reynolds at Instapundit.

9/23

re: "In Your Face"

Richard Fernandez at Belmont Club ("the blogger formerly known as Wretchard") explained our logistical and political difficulty.

Money quote(s):

"Translation: Both you and I know we’ve stabbed you in the back, but keep paying us and like it.

How can Islamabad have the temerity to act like this? Well consider their hand. Pakistan’s biggest ace in the hole lies in being able to hold Afghanistan, Barack Obama’s strategic centerpiece in his war against terror, hostage. The full price of waging operations in an area that can’t be supplied from the sea has become apparent. America is maritime power and to conduct land warfare without being able to look back on the sea is to forgo a major source of strategic strength. In fact Afghanistan is the only major military operation in US history, apart from the Indian wars, in which America had to supply its troops largely through a foreign power’s sovereign territory.

That choice to shift emphasis to Afghanistan gave Pakistan veto power over the major part of NATO’s ground effort. Its multinational character made it a particularly expensive political investment. And it was all conditional on Pakistan’s support."

How's that working out for us?

9/23

re: "Heresy over defense, part 2"

Tom Mahnken at Shadow Government ("Notes from the Loyal Opposition") responded to Kori Schake.

Money quote(s):

"Kori Schake responded to my call for a debate over defense spending by firing a volley in defense of the new orthodoxy on defense spending. Specifically, she attempts to make the case that the federal debt is a national security threat that demands further defense cuts, that the United States has a large margin of superiority over potential adversaries, and we need to seek greater efficiency in defense.

I agree with Kori that our national debt is an important national security concern, but I also agree with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin Dempsey that it is not our most important one. In my view, it would be strategically unsound, even if it were economically possible, to balance the budget on the back of defense.

I agree that defense should not be "out of bounds" in budget matters. But the fact is that in a period that has witnessed a massive expansion of government spending, the Defense Department has already sustained several rounds of cuts, dating back to the first months of the Obama administration. As both Robert Gates and Leon Panetta have argued, additional cuts cannot help but affect U.S. security." (Bold typeface added for emphasis. - CAA.)

Entire departments, not to mention lesser agencies, have little-or-no Constitutional basis. Even Gov. Perry could probably name at least two.

"Some parts of the world (Europe, for example) are clearly safer and more secure than in decades past. But other parts of the world, such as Asia, are less secure. Of particular concern is China's ongoing military modernization, a portion of which is aimed at coercing U.S. allies and denying the United States access to the Western Pacific. As I have argued elsewhere, the United States has consistently underestimated the scope and pace of China's fielding of new weapons, including those designed to counter U.S. power projection forces. Moreover, over the past decade the weapons most needed to respond to such developments have received short shrift in the Pentagon budget. As a result, the United States faces an increasingly unfavorable military balance in the Western Pacific."

Europe, at least the central and western portions, are safer and more secure from threats posed by other central and western European states. And even, it seems, from Russia (hopefully). That still leaves non-state threats as well as NATO's seeming inability to manage, collectively, even their Libyan intervention without lots of heavy lifting by the U.S.

And by "heavy lifting" I mean logistics, ISR, and basic re-supply. Shiny fighter-bombers are just pretty paperweights once you can't re-arm them anymore.

"(T)he post-9/11 military buildup has produced few new weapon systems, and those that have been fielded over the past decade have been geared toward a particular kind of war against a particular kind of foe. For example, the United States fielded thousands of Mine-Resistant Ambush-Protected (MRAP) vehicles for Iraq and a sent a second generation to Afghanistan. Such vehicles are unlikely to be of much use in future wars, however. And the Unmanned Aerial Vehicles that have been crucial to U.S. success in combating insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan and targeting terrorists in Pakistan are unlikely to survive in a conflict with an adversary that possesses even a rudimentary air defense network.

Whole parts of the U.S. armed forces have been left out of whatever "rolling modernization" has taken place. U.S. Air Force aircraft are on average more than 23 years old, the oldest in Air Force history, and are getting older. Many transport aircraft and aerial refueling tankers are more than 40 years old, and some may be as old as 70-80 years before they retire. The U.S. Navy is smaller now than it was before the United States entered World War I, and is getting smaller. No "rolling modernization" will reverse these trends; only full-scale recapitalization of the U.S. armed forces will."

The Air Force, like the Navy, suffers from the huge per unit capital outlays needed to launch even a single ship or new airframe.

"(T)he ultima ratio of defense is effectiveness, not efficiency. That is, defense spending ultimately exists to provide security to the American people. Inefficient yet effective defense remains preferable to efficient yet ineffective defense."

10/14

re: "The United States should breathe new life into the Atlantic community"

Joerg Wolf at the Atlantic Review ("A Press Digest for Transatlantic Affairs") commented on an essay by Prof. Charles Kupchan of Georgetown U.


Money quote(s):


"Europe welcomed the election of President Obama. America is much more popular than before, but European policies have not changed that much. The US is not getting that much more support from Europe. When Obama surged in Afghanistan for instance, Europe has also increased troops, but not at a level to justify the term "surge". I think Democrats had illusions regarding support from Europe before Obama's election, but now they don't have them anymore."


Nothing to add to that.


"I thought the term "progressives" referred to only the very left wing of the Democrats, but this seems to have changed as Kupchan seems to adress the party mainstream."


I laugh every time I read that sentence. The former parts of the Democratic Party which are not "progressives" (i.e., what used to be "the very left wing") are primarily two: the so-called "Reagan Democrats," many of whom are still members of the party, but not comprising many of its party or elected officialdom; and those known as neo-conservatives. That is, once the party moved too far left, they found themselves to be conservatives-by-default.


The "progressives" are like Europe's 68-ers, except that since the Soviet Union was safely and so far away they never had to grow up.


"(I)t seems to me that Kupchan is trying to convince the Democrats that Europe and NATO are important, while acknowledging that conservatives already recognize this."


Just so.



1/2

re: "Will R2P become NMP"

Cdr Salamander at the Naval Institute Blog ("a venue for thoughtful, vigorous debate on naval and security policy") generated some decent lessons-learned while the civil war, er, revolution, er, "humanitarian intervention" was still going on.


Money quote(s):


"The Battle of Tripoli will work itself out, as will the conflict over time. We can pick it apart then in reasoned hindsight. There are other things a few levels out at the POL/MIL level that are a lot clearer and worth discussing."


As it did. The Law of Unintended Consequences, however, has not been suspended.


"Something that came out at the beginning; “Responsibility to Protect” known by the shorter, R2P. The concept has been embraced by decision makers such as US Ambassador to the UN Susan Rice. A form of “Humanitarian Imperialism” – it is something that over the last few months we have heard less of. The reasons are clear; Libya still isn’t worth the bones of a Pomeranian Grenadier, and both sides are responsible for the deaths of untold numbers of civilians. So much was heard early that we were there to “protect civilians,” but time has shown that some civilians are more important than others. There is no appetite anywhere for Western boots on the ground to execute “R2P” in Libya’s cities. As long as African migrants are kept in Africa and the oil flows – NATO will be more than willing to move from R2P to NMP – Not My Problem. Few really believed that was the reason for intervention anyway – at least the serious." (Bold typeface added for emphasis. - CAA.)


R2P is just as scary a prospective "international norm" as anything else to have come down the pike in recent years. Yet, the more it becomes part of "international law," the less likely it will become anything more than what it is now: a figleaf for use when intervention is in support of some other, less noble-sounding, national interest.


Recall that once "genocide" became a crime under international law (and a treaty was widely signed that obligated states to act to prevent/stop it) all kinds of lawyering and tap-dancing ensued to call what were clearly ongoing programs of genocide from what they obviously were, just to avoid having to actually do anything about it.


"When sustainable logistics and baseline C4ISR are defined as “unique capabilities” – then the facts of NATO non-USA military capacity should be very clear."


Essentially, what are (with a straight face) termed the military capabilities of most (if not all) of our NATO allies amount, in an international sense, to the niche capabilities of our own various state National Guard entities. They provide often useful specialties, but can't function in combat unless they're embedded within a larger, coalition, deployment. Assumed (but un-said) is that the U.S. will always be there to provide the larger context and support.


"(T)he essential effectiveness and efficiency of the CV/S/N once again has been proven. Land based air has its place – but any distance makes the ability to provide persistent effects from the air over the battlespace prohibitively expensive compared to a carrier off shore."


CAA has, for years and in different venues, held that one of the essential characteristics of a superpower in the modern-to-current era are the ability to develop, deploy, and maintain global force projection capabilities. Since World War II and the dawn of the nuclear age, that has meant the following: inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBM) of the nuclear variety (may be ground or sea-based) and the aircraft carrier battle group.


(Experience has caused me to add expeditionary ground forces but let's not go down that particular rabbit hole today.)


If you've got an aircraft carrier (and the screening and support forces it requires to successfully deploy), you can project air power just about anywhere excepting the far interiors of Central Asia and Antarctica.


"Whatever happens in Libya will happen. No one outside a few fringe-types will light a candle for the Gadaffi family of thugs. They have been a blight on the planet for decades. What happens next will be up to the Libyan people. We should all wish them luck and hope that something positive can come out of this."


Hat tip to The Phibian at Cdr Salamander ("Proactively “From the Sea”; leveraging the littoral best practices for a paradigm breaking six-sigma best business case to synergize a consistent design in the global commons, rightsizing the core values supporting our mission statement via the 5-vector model through cultural diversity.").

8/23

re: "Our Wars of Choice Harm our Interests"

Joerg Wolf at Atlantic Review ("A Press Digest for Transatlantic Affairs") noted some opining at the Council on Foreign Relations and the Atlantic Council.

Money quote(s):

"Richard Haass, president of the Council on Foreign Relations, calls for a doctrine of restoration that "would help the U.S. shore up the economic foundations of its power." He is basically urging more limited foreign policy engagements, which would mean that the US should act more like the European countries."

"(M)ore limited foreign policy engagements"? Like putting an expiration date on our engagement with NATO, the UN, &tc.?

(I begin to suspect that, despite the big brains that the CFR is able to finagle articles for their periodical, Foreign Affairs, the CFR may not require so much brain-wattage in its officers.)

"An interesting additional argument against wars of choice is the message that the Libya war sends to Iran, North Korea and other rogue regimes who contemplate getting nuclear weapons: "An unnoted consequence of the NATO military effort to topple the Gaddafi regime may be any hope of eventual denuclearization of North Korea or Iran," writes Banning Garrett, director of the Atlantic Council's Strategic Foresight Project"

Garrett hit this right on the head.

7/23

re: "For God's sake Amb. Munter, don't Go Native on us now"

Pundita ("US foreign policy for the 21st Century") has some sharp criticism of the Department.

Money quote(s):

"In yet another sign that the U.S. Department of State should relocate to Brussels U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan Cameron Munter advised White House officials that President Obama should deliver a "formal video statement," according to White House officials interviewed by the New York Times, regarding the NATO air strike inside Pakistan on November 26."

Amb. Munter is a career professional diplomat who gave, from his in-country vantage point, foreign policy advice tempered by knowledge of local politics, sentiment, and conditions.

That's kinda/sorta his job.

(Disclaimer: CAA met, briefly and in passing, the aforementioned ambassador a few years ago.)

He was notably one of the senior FSOs who, fairly early, volunteered for service in Iraq, where he lead the first PRT in Mosul in 2006; he also served at the Baghdad embassy in 2009-2010.

I recall him stating publicly (paraphrase follows) that if senior leadership was going to ask FSOs to volunteer for service in war zones it would behoove them to lead by example. Or word to that effect.

"As to how Munter's highly sensitive discussion with White House officials came to be made public, I'd say that the U.S. Department of State is the prime suspect."

Leaking to the press is simply outside of CAA's area of competency. I got nothing.

"As to how State arrived at the idea that any advice they could give on Pakistan would be helpful to the United States is beyond me. State's track record on Pakistan since the Afghan War heated up has been awful"

Frankly, the United States' track record on Pakistan is something that needs to be examined holistically, from top-down decisions down to our working level relationships. The State Dept. doesn't set policy. It implements it, it provides advice beforehand and feedback as implementation proceeds.

"Moving along, Munter's advice was given on the 28th, just two days after the NATO air strike, when the U.S. Department of Defense was still trying untangle how the strike came about and exactly what had happened during the strike. So it's almost beyond belief that a career diplomat of Munter's experience would ask the President of the United States for a formal apology before the strike had been properly investigated.

Yet when it comes to State not much is beyond belief anymore. State officials have come to think of themselves as 'policymakers' even though State is only supposed to advise the White House on policy."

See my comments above. That being said, at a certain level and above, senior officials are not only implementers and advice-givers, they are policy-makers. This is just as true at DoD, the CIA, and the DoJ as it is in Foggy Bottom.

"This is no way to run foreign policy; this is no way to conduct any kind of policy and certainly not the way to run a war. This is headless horseman thinking, which means there is no real thinking at all; there is just a bureaucracy's obsession with expanding its turf by attempting to please scores of competing factions."

Part of the problem is the pretense that Pakistan is not part of a.) the larger campaign in Afghanistan; and b.) the larger "war on terror."

That being said, while we do send our honorable diplomats abroad to lie for their country, they must always take care to tell only the truth when reporting back to Washington, whether that is to the Department or to the White House.

12/1

re: "Obama's Absolutely Unbelievable Press Conference"

DrewM. at Ace of Spades HQ had a laundry list of observations.

They included:

"First...who is defending Gadaffi? No one.

Second...Remember when Obama demanded that Democrats like himself stop criticizing Bush over Iraq lest it send something other than "a unified message" to Saddam or al Qaeda in Iraq?

And finally...standing up for the constitutional role of Congress in matters of war and peace is a "cause célèbre". This is how the President of the United States views the constitutional responsibilities of a co-equal branch of government."

Old news in terms of NATO's Libyan intervention, but the war-powers issue isn't going to go away. It transcends the current administration and the roots of the current Constitutional dilemna reach back beyond the Gulf of Tonkin all the way to the Korean War.

6/29