Christian Brose at FP's Shadow Government ("Notes from the loyal opposition") remarks on the end of the GWOT.
Money quote(s):
"So this means an end to preemptive strikes against "gathering threats", no more hard slogging on the "central fronts" (either Afghanistan or Iraq), a quick resolution to that whole Guantanomo problem, and no more need for the president to worry about what authorities he has to detain "enemy combatants", or whatever you want to call them?"
"(N)o one human being, only a government committee, could come up with something so awful as "Overseas Contingency Operation.""
&
"We could speak of fights, and confrontations, and violent extremism, and everyone would know what we were talking about. The policies wouldn't change. And we would avoid signalling that the most powerful nation on earth was at war with Islam, which though obviously wrong, most Muslims believed nonetheless."
Showing posts with label Christian Brose. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Christian Brose. Show all posts
Monday, March 30, 2009
Monday, February 2, 2009
And what about Botswana?
There were one or two points I meant (but in my haste neglected) to address in my last post.
First: worldwide assignments availability.
As Mr. Brose put it:
When the Department was just starting the selection process to staff the new (temporary) embassy there (the CPA was still in business), the sheer numbers of planned FSO staffing, combined with one-year assignments, convinced me that Iraq and Afghanistan would, sooner rather than later, become the tails wagging State's personnel "dog."
This, more or less, has happened.
Nonetheless, State still has to staff the other 265 (more or less) diplomatic and consular posts around the world. And that includes Botswana. Worsening shortages of FSOs (due to the ongoing multi-administration legacy of hiring-below-attrition, with the Diplomatic Readiness Initiative having provided a welcome pause in that personnel implosion) have meant that some ten percent of open assignments are no longer even put on the "bid lists" of available jobs, since there's no hope of filling them all.
There's a DoD parallel to State's worldwide responsibilities. There are ongoing U.S. military commitments in over a hundred countries globally, not just the obvious ones like Iraq and Afghanistan, Germany and Japan, or even Korea, the U.K., and Italy.
So far the hard choices necessitated by shortages of diplomats (worsened by the Department's commitments in Afghanistan and Iraq), such as deciding which countries no longer "rate" a U.S. diplomatic presence, have been deferred.
But let me move away from the negative for a moment. Easing the hiring of military officers and others with relevant reconstruction experience for service outside the regular FS career paths might make sense, depending upon the new adminstration's priorities. Even providing an avenue for qualified persons to transition or convert to FSO generalist careers wouldn't be an impossibility. But given how little has actually been accomplished in establishing and staffing a cadre dedicated to stability and reconstruction, it doesn't appear to have been at the top of anyone's list of real (as opposed to theoretical) priorities.
Lastly, I seem to recall that there were shortages of Army captains, and that the promotion rate from captain to major was approaching 100 percent. This doesn't suggest to me that there are great numbers of experienced military officers that the DoD can spare, there being a war on and all, nor that those it can spare are necessarily the cream of the crop.
First: worldwide assignments availability.
As Mr. Brose put it:
"The thought that some military officer would move laterally into a mid-career diplomatic or civilian post in the State Department, jumping ahead of Foreign Service officers who had served their time
stamping visas in Botswana or someplace, was a non-starter for the institutional Foreign Service. And needless to say, no military officer worth a damn would retire after a decade or so in uniform to stamp visas in Botswana with 24-year-olds fresh out of their A-100 class."
When the Department was just starting the selection process to staff the new (temporary) embassy there (the CPA was still in business), the sheer numbers of planned FSO staffing, combined with one-year assignments, convinced me that Iraq and Afghanistan would, sooner rather than later, become the tails wagging State's personnel "dog."
This, more or less, has happened.
Nonetheless, State still has to staff the other 265 (more or less) diplomatic and consular posts around the world. And that includes Botswana. Worsening shortages of FSOs (due to the ongoing multi-administration legacy of hiring-below-attrition, with the Diplomatic Readiness Initiative having provided a welcome pause in that personnel implosion) have meant that some ten percent of open assignments are no longer even put on the "bid lists" of available jobs, since there's no hope of filling them all.
There's a DoD parallel to State's worldwide responsibilities. There are ongoing U.S. military commitments in over a hundred countries globally, not just the obvious ones like Iraq and Afghanistan, Germany and Japan, or even Korea, the U.K., and Italy.
So far the hard choices necessitated by shortages of diplomats (worsened by the Department's commitments in Afghanistan and Iraq), such as deciding which countries no longer "rate" a U.S. diplomatic presence, have been deferred.
But let me move away from the negative for a moment. Easing the hiring of military officers and others with relevant reconstruction experience for service outside the regular FS career paths might make sense, depending upon the new adminstration's priorities. Even providing an avenue for qualified persons to transition or convert to FSO generalist careers wouldn't be an impossibility. But given how little has actually been accomplished in establishing and staffing a cadre dedicated to stability and reconstruction, it doesn't appear to have been at the top of anyone's list of real (as opposed to theoretical) priorities.
Lastly, I seem to recall that there were shortages of Army captains, and that the promotion rate from captain to major was approaching 100 percent. This doesn't suggest to me that there are great numbers of experienced military officers that the DoD can spare, there being a war on and all, nor that those it can spare are necessarily the cream of the crop.
re: "Is the military invading the State Department?"
Christian Brose at FP's Shadow Government ("Notes from the loyal opposition") explores the idea of a mid-career entry program for military officers joining the Foreign Service.
Money quote(s):
"The thought that some military officer would move laterally into a mid-career diplomatic or civilian post in the State Department, jumping ahead of Foreign Service officers who had served their time stamping visas in Botswana or someplace, was a non-starter for the institutional Foreign Service. And needless to say, no military officer worth a damn would retire after a decade or so in uniform to stamp visas in Botswana with 24-year-olds fresh out of their A-100 class."
The idea that "stamping visas" is merely a form of serving time, a rite of passage for new FSOs crops up fairly often, sometimes even among actual FSOs (who should know better).
First, if all you're doing is "stamping" visas, then you're doing it wrong. Vice consuls and other visa adjudicators are expected to apply the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (as amended, and boy is it ever) and related regulations (found in the Foreign Affairs Manuals, the Foreign Affairs Handbook, scores of SOPs and tables, and hundreds of cables) in order to facilitate legitimate travel to the U.S. while serving as the first-line of border security.
So if you're doing it right, it's not exactly sleep-walking. This is serious business; nobody wants to import foreign criminals, terrorists, or even extra economic migrants; the U.S. domestic supply will suffice.
Second, while the visa functions (both non-immigrant and immigrant) probably account for 60-70 percent of consular jobs overseas, they aren't the sum total of consular work. While from the outside looking in, most foreigners would think of the visa function as being the most important part of consular section, from the U.S. perspective the American Citizen Services (ACS) function is much more important. Helping U.S. travelers and residents abroad is a State Department mission going back to the founding of our Republic.
Third, while entry-level FSOs may expect to serve at least one year (but I think two years is more likely) of their probationary period (typically two 2-year assignments abroad) doing consular work.
Those in other career tracks (political, economic, management, public diplomacy, & consular) will only return to consular work if they choose to bid on consular positions. That being said, a professional FSO needs to have a working knowledge of consular work, both visa and ACS, in order to effectively perform their jobs overseas.
Every U.S. diplomat will be the recipient of questions about visas and passports in the course of their assigned duties; except for the most senior of diplomats abroad, every FSO will take their turn as duty officer, where 90 percent of after-hours calls will be consular-related; and the senior-most diplomats will find themselves as the supervisors of consular managers, and be legally obligated to provide oversight of consular accountability and perform adjudication reviews. So having a clue is helpful in avoiding any career-killing mis-steps.
Fourth, the average age of a new FSO is 32 years old, the maximum age of a new FSO is in the late 50's; so the number of 24 year old vice consuls, fresh from grad school or university, is fairly small. Most are starting their second or even third careers, just like the hypothetical military officer with a decade in uniform behind him (or her).
(Thought experiment: how do you suppose the DoD would react to the suggestion that government employees with 10 years experience transfer in as majors and colonels? Would they embrace this bold, fresh new approach?)
Fifth (and last), prior government (including military) experience is accounted for in determining an entering FSOs initial class and step (similar to GS grades and steps). There's a formula whereby HR evaluates each entering FSO's level of formal education along with their years of professional-level experience. I'm reasonably certain that the hypothetical major (or lieutenant commander) with 10 years experience will get credit for all of those 10 years as being "professional-level." So I would expect them to enter in Class 4 (or "FP-o4"), the FS equivalent of a captain. And within five years to be Class 3 ("FS-03", the first of the three mid-grade ranks and equivalent to a major).
A fairly brief journeymanship of 3-5 years would put a military officer, starting in an entirely new commissioned service, back at a rank equivalent (or higher) than the one they held in their former career, with the potential to reach the "brass" they'd thought out of their reach.
I should also mention that a Veteran's Preference is factored into the FS selection process.
"I remember in the fall of 2006 asking one U.S. Army officer whether mid-career entry into the State Department appealed to him, and he answered emphatically, yes. He was a veteran of both the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq as I recall. He had maybe a dozen years of experience -- managing people, programs, resources, and working overseas. He loved to serve, but he could see the writing on the wall. He knew he wasn't destined for brass on his shoulders, and the thought of moving to work as a civilian or Foreign Service Officer thrilled him."
I encourage any U.S. military or naval person, commissioned or not, to at least look into the Foreign Service as your next career.
And to not limit that consideration solely to the generalist FSO fields. Someone with overseas experience managing people, programs, and resources might also be a fit for one of the Foreign Service Specialist fields.
"(R)eal change requires institutionalizing the thinking behind "smart power" -- which really requires creating an entirely new set of assumptions and expectations about what life today as a diplomat will be (hint: more dangerous, more lonely, and less glamorous). Another hint: this will be extremely unpopular with much of the Foreign Service."
Not to get into personalities, but I took a moment to read Mr. Brose's bio page and note that his State Department experience is limited to being a speech writer for Secretaries Powell and Rice. As one or two of FS web loggers have noted in the past, one of the ways the Foreign Service does itself a disservice is by our over-diligence as control officers for foreign visits by members of Congress and high-ranking State Department officials. We literally knock ourselves silly ensuring that these visits go smoothly and bump-free.
I'm sure traveling the world inside the secretary of state's "bubble" was quite cozy for Mr. Brose, but it certainly doesn't equip someone to get snarky about how glamorous Foreign Service life is these days, nor about how in the future it'll be more dangerous and lonely.
The future is now, Mr. Brose.
_____
Hat tip to The Hegemonist ("a personal weblog touching on international relations, foreign policy, and diplomacy").
_____
Please see my additional comments at "And what about Botwana?"
Money quote(s):
"The thought that some military officer would move laterally into a mid-career diplomatic or civilian post in the State Department, jumping ahead of Foreign Service officers who had served their time stamping visas in Botswana or someplace, was a non-starter for the institutional Foreign Service. And needless to say, no military officer worth a damn would retire after a decade or so in uniform to stamp visas in Botswana with 24-year-olds fresh out of their A-100 class."
The idea that "stamping visas" is merely a form of serving time, a rite of passage for new FSOs crops up fairly often, sometimes even among actual FSOs (who should know better).
First, if all you're doing is "stamping" visas, then you're doing it wrong. Vice consuls and other visa adjudicators are expected to apply the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (as amended, and boy is it ever) and related regulations (found in the Foreign Affairs Manuals, the Foreign Affairs Handbook, scores of SOPs and tables, and hundreds of cables) in order to facilitate legitimate travel to the U.S. while serving as the first-line of border security.
So if you're doing it right, it's not exactly sleep-walking. This is serious business; nobody wants to import foreign criminals, terrorists, or even extra economic migrants; the U.S. domestic supply will suffice.
Second, while the visa functions (both non-immigrant and immigrant) probably account for 60-70 percent of consular jobs overseas, they aren't the sum total of consular work. While from the outside looking in, most foreigners would think of the visa function as being the most important part of consular section, from the U.S. perspective the American Citizen Services (ACS) function is much more important. Helping U.S. travelers and residents abroad is a State Department mission going back to the founding of our Republic.
Third, while entry-level FSOs may expect to serve at least one year (but I think two years is more likely) of their probationary period (typically two 2-year assignments abroad) doing consular work.
Those in other career tracks (political, economic, management, public diplomacy, & consular) will only return to consular work if they choose to bid on consular positions. That being said, a professional FSO needs to have a working knowledge of consular work, both visa and ACS, in order to effectively perform their jobs overseas.
Every U.S. diplomat will be the recipient of questions about visas and passports in the course of their assigned duties; except for the most senior of diplomats abroad, every FSO will take their turn as duty officer, where 90 percent of after-hours calls will be consular-related; and the senior-most diplomats will find themselves as the supervisors of consular managers, and be legally obligated to provide oversight of consular accountability and perform adjudication reviews. So having a clue is helpful in avoiding any career-killing mis-steps.
Fourth, the average age of a new FSO is 32 years old, the maximum age of a new FSO is in the late 50's; so the number of 24 year old vice consuls, fresh from grad school or university, is fairly small. Most are starting their second or even third careers, just like the hypothetical military officer with a decade in uniform behind him (or her).
(Thought experiment: how do you suppose the DoD would react to the suggestion that government employees with 10 years experience transfer in as majors and colonels? Would they embrace this bold, fresh new approach?)
Fifth (and last), prior government (including military) experience is accounted for in determining an entering FSOs initial class and step (similar to GS grades and steps). There's a formula whereby HR evaluates each entering FSO's level of formal education along with their years of professional-level experience. I'm reasonably certain that the hypothetical major (or lieutenant commander) with 10 years experience will get credit for all of those 10 years as being "professional-level." So I would expect them to enter in Class 4 (or "FP-o4"), the FS equivalent of a captain. And within five years to be Class 3 ("FS-03", the first of the three mid-grade ranks and equivalent to a major).
A fairly brief journeymanship of 3-5 years would put a military officer, starting in an entirely new commissioned service, back at a rank equivalent (or higher) than the one they held in their former career, with the potential to reach the "brass" they'd thought out of their reach.
I should also mention that a Veteran's Preference is factored into the FS selection process.
"I remember in the fall of 2006 asking one U.S. Army officer whether mid-career entry into the State Department appealed to him, and he answered emphatically, yes. He was a veteran of both the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq as I recall. He had maybe a dozen years of experience -- managing people, programs, resources, and working overseas. He loved to serve, but he could see the writing on the wall. He knew he wasn't destined for brass on his shoulders, and the thought of moving to work as a civilian or Foreign Service Officer thrilled him."
I encourage any U.S. military or naval person, commissioned or not, to at least look into the Foreign Service as your next career.
And to not limit that consideration solely to the generalist FSO fields. Someone with overseas experience managing people, programs, and resources might also be a fit for one of the Foreign Service Specialist fields.
"(R)eal change requires institutionalizing the thinking behind "smart power" -- which really requires creating an entirely new set of assumptions and expectations about what life today as a diplomat will be (hint: more dangerous, more lonely, and less glamorous). Another hint: this will be extremely unpopular with much of the Foreign Service."
Not to get into personalities, but I took a moment to read Mr. Brose's bio page and note that his State Department experience is limited to being a speech writer for Secretaries Powell and Rice. As one or two of FS web loggers have noted in the past, one of the ways the Foreign Service does itself a disservice is by our over-diligence as control officers for foreign visits by members of Congress and high-ranking State Department officials. We literally knock ourselves silly ensuring that these visits go smoothly and bump-free.
I'm sure traveling the world inside the secretary of state's "bubble" was quite cozy for Mr. Brose, but it certainly doesn't equip someone to get snarky about how glamorous Foreign Service life is these days, nor about how in the future it'll be more dangerous and lonely.
The future is now, Mr. Brose.
_____
Hat tip to The Hegemonist ("a personal weblog touching on international relations, foreign policy, and diplomacy").
_____
Please see my additional comments at "And what about Botwana?"
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