re: "State Dept. in ‘Open War’ With White House"

Pamela Geller at The Geller Report ("a foremost defender of the freedom of speech against attempts to force the West to accept Sharia blasphemy laws, and against Sharia self-censorship by Western media outlets") is highly critical of the new SecState.  For that matter, she clearly has no great love for the State Department or Foreign Service themselves.

"Foreign Service is a different kind of animal. Most get subsumed by the culture at State and the snakes in Foreign Service. Condi was consumed by them, and Kerry was completely and utterly out of his depth."

Her recommendation:

"Amateur hour is over. Send in the cavalry. It’s time for a pro. It’s time for John Bolton."

Memorial Day 2013

Like many of you, at least part of this weekend was devoted to the scorching of foodstuffs on an outdoor grill, as is our national custom.

Flags were put out in daylight and taken in, as is also the custom, before evening darkness fell.

CAA did not, this year, participate in any public displays (beside the flags) or observances marking the occasion of Memorial Day.  CAA's observances of Memorial Day were mostly private.  A few words on the subject were exchanged between CAA and Madam-at-Arms, who teases me on my pedantic insistence about what Memorial Day signifies.

(I know some of my Foreign Service colleagues abroad were representing our country in public observances of Memorial Day at some surprisingly far-flung locales.)

Memorial Day has an interesting and distinguished history.  It honors not (at least not any more) the veterans of a particular conflict.  In fact, it is intended not to honor veterans at all, but to allow civilians (and surviving veterans) to honor those who died in our country's wars.

Living veterans have our own day, in November, which is well and just in its way.

So today, privately, I took some time to remember the fallen, those I knew personally and those whom I never had the chance to meet.  I also reflected upon those veterans who survived their wars, returning home, but who have since gone to their final, well-deserved, rest.

Most of the veterans in my generation ("Generation X" as many call it) are still in the prime of their lives, many still serving in uniform.  We served, side-by-side (actually, most of the time we were their leaders, supervisors, or commanders), with the "Millenials" or "Generation Y."

So unlike The Greatest Generation which won World War II, those of us who served in Iraq and Afghanistan will be around for many decades to come, most of us, although eventually we too will no longer be around to celebrate Veterans Day but will, hopefully, still be remembered and honored on Memorial Day.

I hope all (both?) of my readers had good weather over the long weekend, enjoyed a good old-fashioned cookout or two, and in the course of the day itself, spared a thought or prayer for our nation's fallen service members.

Service versus Sacrifice & Remembering someone I never met, FSO Anne Smedinghoff

This post, my first in some time, is going to ramble a bit, without much in the way of internal structure or logic.  Deal with it.  Or not.

-----

We lost another colleague the other day.

And we lost three comrades-in-arms at the same time.

They did not sacrifice their lives.

And if any of us sacrificed their lives, well, then we're doing it wrong.

Because that's not what it's about.

-----

Service members in (and out of) uniform do make sacrifices, let there be no misunderstanding.

They undergo stressful and difficult selection and training processes, go to uncomfortable places, deal with often hostile natives, get fed crappy food, miss children's/spouses'/parents' birthdays (and anniversaries, first-words/steps, &tc.), are under-compensated (no matter how you measure it), endure sub-standard housing and living conditions in unhealthy climates.... you get the idea.

(And that's not even mentioning all the shots and immunizations just to get out of the country in the first place.)

Sure, not all the time and certainly not in every assignment, on either the military or the FS sides of the ledger.  Still, those are the sacrifices you knowingly and willingly make for your country, for your comrades and colleagues, for the missions and causes America has committed itself towards.

But you do have a big bullseye painted on your back; you're representing, for good or ill, the United States of America.  So to America's enemies, you will always represent, at the very least, a target-of-opportunity.

-----

Uniformed service members know the risks.  So do diplomats.  But we take them because we believe in what we're doing.  We believe that, to our country, the missions on which we are sent are sufficiently important that taking those risks is justified.

The Foreign Service, FSOs and specialists combined, is only about the size of an Army (or Marine Corps) division, if that.  So when one of us gets killed, there's generally only one-or-two degrees of separation between us.  A second-tour entry-level officer like Anne Smedinghoff would have only been in the Foreign Service for three years or so; some initial training at the Foreign Service Institute, language training perhaps, two years at her first post (Caracas, Venezuela), perhaps some (more?) language training before going to Kabul, and most of a year there, so far.

And in that time she had A-100 classmates and FSI instructors, colleagues in two countries; it quickly adds up to hundreds of people within the State Department.  And there aren't that many more than 13,000 Foreign Service Officers (i.e., "generalists") and Foreign Service Specialists altogether.  So if you're currently in the Foreign Service, you either knew Anne (I didn't), know people who knew her (several), or know people who know people who knew Anne (dozens and scores, at least).

Going back to the parallel I made above, about the entire Foreign Service being only about the size of a division, when a fellow soldier in your division dies you know about it.

Maybe you didn't know him or her but you know you trod a lot of the same ground.  Your families shopped in the same stores.  You probably ate in the same fast food joints, cafeterias, or restaurants.  To say nothing of frequenting the same bars.  A death at that level of contrasting proximity and distance gives you pause, gives your spouse some added stress and tears, and makes you hug your kids a little tighter.

-----

Of Madam-at-Arms' words on the subject, the less said the better.  For all my perverse pride in in being a plain-talking, straight-shooting consular officer, she's much more of a plain-speaker than I am.

-----

Since I didn't know Anne Smedinghoff personally (it's possible we passed in the hallways at FSI or elsewhere, or sat at the same cafeteria table in either of those places), I'm not going to spend a lot of time extolling her dedication, fine qualities, and such.  By all reports (and you should read them), she had all of that in full measure and I'm proud to have been her (distant) colleague.  My sympathies go out to her family, not least because when I think of them I think of my own family back home, and what they would go through in similar circumstances.

-----

One FSO out of a Foreign Service of only 13,400 (more-or-less) put into the context of a military comprising roughly 1.4 million uniformed personnel means 100 deaths being an equivalent loss.

One hundred dead.  I don't think we've had that many losses on a single day of warfare since 9/11.  (Someone will correct me if I'm wrong.)

For those unhappy with the amount of press this one death has gotten by comparison to most individual military deaths, well, I get it.  I truly do.  It made me a little angry, as a veteran (and I'm an FSO as well).  But for the press it is a novelty, it's someone who the media's Kabul contingent will likely have known personally.

Add to that the kind of elite education Anne Smedinghoff had (which I'm not criticizing, it's a good thing that we have well-educated diplomats and I think rather well of Johns Hopkins' international relations programs) makes her someone whom our media elites feel just a little more kinship to compared to most of our uniformed folks, for good or ill.

In case I was being opaque, this is much more a criticism of our national press and editorial corps than of any of our country's services, military or un-military.

-----

Unlike Benghazi (four dead), there's a lot more clarity about how these four deaths happened, at least from the macro level.  Bad guys (most likely Taliban, even though they're taking credit for it and trusting their press releases is a sucker's game) hit a convoy (or two convoys converging or passing one another) that was taking books to donate them to a school.  FSO Smedinghoff was the assistant public affairs officer going along to deliver the books and probably make sure some good photography or video of the handover got in the can.

Because while the fact of the books themselves is important, it's just as important to let people know that books are getting to schools, and that it's the United States (and allies) that is making this happen.

No, I'm not kidding.  Good media coverage of accomplishments multiplies the good you accomplish; it's as simple as that.  If we're going to do this sort of thing in a place like Afghanistan, we have to make every success count, in as many ways as we can.

I don't have a problem with the United States providing books to an Afghan school, far from it, granting for the sake of argument that the books themselves are useful ones.  And you shouldn't have a problem with that either.  (If there's a country out there that could use more help educating its next generation than Afghanistan, I'd like to hear about it.)

I'm generally quite open (being a fairly skeptical sort of contrarian) to discussions about whether the U.S. ought to be in the business of nation-building in general, or whether (and how) that ought to be done (by us) in Afghanistan, but not today or even for the rest of the week.

This week, more than usual, it's just a little too personal a question.  Just as it is the other 51 weeks of the year when people talk about supporting the troops but not believing in the mission (whether that's Afghanistan or Iraq or Vietnam or Franistan).

Military members (and their families) have, as the saying goes, "skin in the game."  U.S. diplomats (and their loved ones) do too.

Foreign Service Family

The latest figures I’ve seen show State Dept. as having 16,631 Civil Service (i.e., GS or “General Schedule” and Senior Executive Service or SES) employees, 44,764 Locally-Engaged Staff (i.e., what used to be called “Foreign Service Nationals,”) who are predominantly foreign nationals but also FS family members employed at our missions overseas, and only 13,636 Foreign Service staff members, including both Foreign Service Specialists (FSS) and “Generalists.”

The Foreign Service is a very small corps, overall.  It’s been said, truthfully, in this and other fora that there are more Army bandsmen than U.S. diplomats, more military lawyers in the Pentagon, &tc.

Looked at through the other end of the telescope, it’s also something of a very large extended family.  We’re pretty spread out, it’s true, but we get our orientation, language, and professional training in the same place, through the Foreign Service Institute (FSI) at Arlington Hall.  Then we work in widely dispersed locations around the world or across the country, oftentimes living in the same buildings or on the same residential compounds with our co-workers (with your kids going to the same schools) before winging back to D.C. to work at “Main State” in Foggy Bottom (near the GWU campus) or one of the various State Annex facilities scattered around Maryland, Virginia, and the District of Columbia.

After awhile, the “degrees of separation” narrow down pretty far, so that if you don’t know someone in the Foreign Service personally, from having worked or trained with them, chances are pretty good that someone you have worked or trained with has worked or trained with them.  Or your spouse has.

So when something like Benghazi happens, where a senior foreign service officer/ambassador like Chris Stevens is killed, along with a long-time Information Management Officer (IMO) like Sean Smith and two of our contract employees, Glen Doherty and Tyrone Woods, it hits home.  It’s like four of your fellow citizens in small hometown were suddenly murdered.

There’s a sudden and visceral impact, something like hearing of casualties from another military unit within the same division.  You might not have known them yourself, but you know you’ve walked the same hallways, sat in the same classrooms, and have similar missions facing similar dangers.

Another of those factoids that comes up from time to time is how there have been more ambassadors killed in the line of duty, since World War II, than general officers or admirals.  That remains true.

(One columnist or commenter, I forget where, voiced the criticism that if, in a decade of warfare, not a single general has been killed, our senior military leaders are leading from too far behind.)

Much of Main State emptied out, apparently, in order to be bused to Andrews AFB for attendance at a sort of ceremonial or memorial reception of the four caskets containing our fallen diplomats.   It was pretty well-attended, by all accounts, although marred somewhat by the behavior of those who simply had, in contravention of their instructions, to raise their arms in a sort of fascist salute as they took cell phone pictures.

(And don’t quibble with about whether our two ex-SEAL colleagues count as diplomats.  If they were part of our diplomatic mission in Libya, that’s good enough for me.)

re: "Is the United States a Militaristic Imperialists Nation?"

TOWNIE 76 at OP-FOR examined the continued usefulness of regional combatant commands.

Money quote(s):

"Several weeks ago, Tom Dispatch published an extended article on the shadow war in Africa. In part it questioned why the United States military has divided the world into six fiefdoms or Combatant Commands."

Note to State Dept. readers: don't click on any of the Tom Dispatch links since you'll just get one of those scary "wikileaks" warning notices.

"The short answer is they are a continuation of our division of the world during World War II into Theaters of War. In fact they are often referred to as Theaters by today’s military. But that is not the sole reason. The United States being the dominate Western partner in our Cold War against global communism required the ability to establish priorities for the employment of our military. Lastly, today’s Combatant Commands and the defined power of the Commander[1], is an outgrowth of the debacle that was Grenada and Lebanon in the early 80’s. In the case of Grenada it was each service Chief adding their forces to the mix resulting in a Cluster Firetruck. In the case of Lebanon it was the failure of United State European Command to accept responsibility of the bombing in Beirut that left countless Marines dead. As a result in the Goldwater-Nichols Act the power of the services over operational matters was severely constrained and the Combatant Commanders were ultimately responsible for determining which military capabilities were required for a specific operation."

Townie76 noted three consequences of the above, including these two:

"(T)he Combatant Commanders have become de Facto Pro Counsels (sic) for their respective Regional Commands. In many cases they are the representatives of the United States Government who have the most exposure in their particular Theater. As such Military Power has become the dominat (sic) element of the United States National Power (Diplomatic, Informational, Military, Economic.)

Second, the Department of Defense regional division of the world differs from the Department of State regional division of the world. Thus the Department of State Regional Director for Near East must coordinate diplomatic activities in two Combatant Commanders Areas of Responsibility (Africa Command and Central Command). More importantly, while attempted with Africa Command, there is generally no high ranking member of the Foreign Service within the Headquarters of the Regional Combatant Commands. The only presence in the Regional Combatant Commands is the Political Advisor who is a Senior Member of the Foreign Service but from my experience has little influence inside the State Department."

The morphing of military commanders into imperial proconsuls is a criticism that's been leveled before, going back many years. Combatant commanders used to be called commanders-in-chief until the point was made, forcibly, that under the Constitution there is only one commander-in-chief.

Political advisors, despite their relatively high rank within the Foreign Service (i.e., flag or general officer equivalents) encumber positions which are, not surprisingly, advisory. They exist within the combatant command's headquarters, without bringing any non-DoD resources to the table other than their own expertise, as staff officers.

(This is not meant as a criticism, only to realistically define their role.)

"The question that should be debated not only by the military but also by an informed citizenry is the organization of the Regional Combatant Commands making the United States imperialistic in the execution of its foreign policy?

I have believed for a long time that there is a need for a new National Security Act for the 21^st Century.[2] Among the provision I would like to see is the common alignment of Regions across the entire federal government. While there may be arguments for different divisions it seems that a whole government approach would benefit from all the players reading off the same script. I think it also time to consider rather than having the Department of Defense Combatant Commanders being the lead that perhaps it is time of the Department of State to take the lead."

7/29

re: "Foreign Service Conversion - All About The Benjamins"

TSB at The Skeptical Bureaucrat ("From deep inside the foundations of our Republic's capital city") provided his take on the midlevel staffing gap.

Money quote(s):

"I've been browsing the GAO report on Foreign Service staffing gaps, which is discussed by Domani Spero today, and particularly the portion on Civil Service to Foreign Service conversions. She noted the comically insufficient extent of those conversions"

&

"According to the GAO report, State "opened" only 88 CS employees to conversion in 2011, of which a mere 26 applied. Those 26 were winnowed down to 7 who were given the opportunity to convert, only four of whom were actually converted. With numbers like those, something tells me State really isn't all that into the whole idea of Civil Service conversion." (Bold typeface added for emphasis. - CAA.)

&

"State hires for FS positions only at the entry pay grades, which max out at the FP-04 level. That means the CS employees who are most likely to be conversion candidates would take a big pay cut, even if there were some flexibility as to the exact step within that pay grade at which a converted employee might enter.

By "big" I mean about 50 percent, assuming the conversion candidate is a GS-13 pay grade employee who has been around ten or more years.

Even that temporary Chief of Mission job would lose its appeal if I had to take such a severe financial haircut to convert. " (Bold typeface added for emphasis. - CAA.)

With the exception of our Foreign Service Specialist colleagues, State Department's Civil Service cadre are probably the best-prepared, most-likely-to-be-successful group of candidates for conversion into the Foreign Service.

7/17

Happy Independence Day!

As part of eDiplomacy and "Communities @State on OpenNet", FSO Andy Miller runs an internal web log at the State Department. It's good stuff, for those with access to OpenNet (i.e., State's internal internet).

In Andy's latest post there he discusses the phenomenon of July 4th from the Foreign Service perspective. CAA won't excerpt (or outright steal) from his internatl blog, but will expand on his theme.

Independence Day in the Foreign Service breaks-down a couple of different ways.

If you're in a domestic assignment, it's a lot like a normal, hometown America Fourth of July, except 90+ percent of FS jobs in the U.S. are in the D.C. area and FSOs come from all 50 states. So for only a few of us are ever actually "home" even when we're back in the U.S.

Not a complaint, mind you; military folks go through the same thing, and since FSOs (and their families) will spend around a third of their working careers stationed in D.C., it becomes home.

Of course, there are more than a few FSO jobs jobs in D.C. that are going to make you work over the July 4th holiday, but that can happen in any job or career.

Overseas is a bit different.

In diplomatic circles, every embassy celebrates their "national day" and for the U.S., our national day is Independence Day.

So we put on a great big official shindig. And it's generally an all-hands evolution, with the "official" embassy Americans acting as the hosts, with lots of local dignitaries, diplomatic bigwigs, and quite a few guests with whom the mission may have established working relationships of one sort or another, a July 4th invitation being a very tangible way of expressing our appreciation for continued cooperation, &tc.

Official Fourth of July celebrations can be held at the ambassador's residence, the embassy itself, or even a hotel. Some are very informal affairs, with the familiar barbecue grill taking the place of honor; others are on the dressy and ceremonial end of the spectrum.

FSOs and other embassy staff do all the preparation, planning, set-up, execution, and clean-up. And while its going on we're "working" the party. And it is work, even if we're smiling and acting like it's a good time.

And, just due to the problems of local climate or other scheduling considerations, the official observance may be weeks or even months in advance, or after, the actual holiday.

Again, not a complaint; just an explanation of how this works overseas.

(Since 2003, CAA always takes a moment on Independence Day to recall the July 4th he spent in Iraq, at an out-of-the-way place he's unlikely ever to visit again. The MP battalion co-located with us expended some colored illumination flares by way of a fireworks display. Good times.)

(Some of my most favorite, if somewhat blurrily remembered, July 4th memories are from my military assignments in Germany, where the entire week of Independence Day was "Deutsche-Amerikanische Freundschaft Woche" or German-American Friendship Week, complete to beer tents and oompah bands. Good times.....)

At many posts, as Andy Miller noted in his blog, there are other, unofficial celebrations at most U.S. embassies and consulates abroad.

That's when we'll organize a picnic/cookout at somebody's house or on a residential compound, play some slow pitch softball, drink some beers from our coolers, and watch our kids and dogs play.

Or whatever; it's the low-pressure, letting-off-some-steam version where we let our hair down, relax, and act very much like our friends and family do back home on Independence Day.

Only without fireworks (in a lot of places), parades, and other public patriotic observances; it's not our there country after all.

That's not to say that in many countries we're not wished well on our national day, just that it's not their national day.

Anyhow, I hope this gives something of a feel for how July 4th works in the Foreign Service.

re: "A Traveler In The Foreign Service: You Say You Want a Revolution? We All Want To Change The World"

Dave Seminara at A Traveler In The Foreign Service offered some good advice to prospective FSOs.

Money quote(s):

"When I meet people who are interested in joining the State Department's Foreign Service, I always ask them why they're motivated to serve. Everyone has their own reasons, but one common motivation shared by many is a desire to help shape U.S. Foreign Policy. Many of these same people are dissatisfied with the current state of affairs and how we conduct ourselves on the global stage, and believe that by joining the Foreign Service, they can play some role in creating change.

There's no doubt that we all need to be informed and engaged on global issues so that we can vote for politicians who will support the type of approach to global affairs we favor. But I wouldn't recommend joining the Foreign Service if your primary goal is to influence how U.S. Foreign Policy is conducted. Those who think they're going to be creating policy are often disappointed and disillusioned when they realize that Foreign Service Officers (FSO's) are tasked with implementing policy, not creating it."

Yes, yes, YES!

Dave gets it, but then he was one of us not so long ago.

FSOs do not create U.S. foreign policy, we carry it out.

Military folks should understand this well enough; except at the very highest levels (and this is also true of FSOs), military personnel do not create defense policy or make strategy, they make it happen.

"FSO's are often called Foreign Policy foot soldiers. They receive marching orders and they carry them out. This doesn't mean that FSO's play no role in shaping policy at all. The insights provided by FSO's on the ground overseas via cables, memos, and in-person briefings can help influence decision-making in Washington."

There's nothing wrong or dishonorable with being a "foot soldier." And Dave correctly remarks on the considerable influence FSO reporting from overseas can have on decision-making back in D.C. CAA can attest to the remarkable respect that diplomatic reporting cables garner among intelligence analysts around the beltway; readers of wikileaks (CAA is not, can not, be one) may be able to back me up on that.

"(I)f you enter the Foreign Service thinking you're going to be calling the shots on how to shape the bilateral relationship with the country you're posted in, you're going to be disappointed. Even if you rise to the level of Ambassador, you're still going to need to seek approval from Washington before proceeding on all matters of substance.

The practicality of this reality is that passionate, idealistic, crusaders with very strong opinions don't always make the best diplomats. You're free to have your own opinions and the State Department has a formal "dissent" channel whereby FSO's can voice their objections to U.S. government policies, but as a representative of the United States government, you really have to keep your politics to yourself, particularly while serving abroad. Not all FSO's follow this rule but the most effective senior level diplomats do."

Please note that CAA is not a senior level diplomat.

Also note that CAA keeps his politics to himself at work, particularly when serving overseas.

"I'd estimate that a majority of FSO's lean Democratic, and given the fact that the George W. Bush administration was at times openly hostile towards the State Department, it should come as no surprise that there were plenty of dissenters in the Foreign Service during the W years. The war in Iraq and the subsequent mass diversion of human and material resources to our mega mission in Baghdad created lots of malcontents, but only a few, like Brady Kiesling, resigned on principle.

Kiesling and others followed their conscience, but I think that when you join the Foreign Service, you have to expect that you'll probably serve under Presidents you dislike who will implement policies you disagree with. If you're not the good soldier type who can live with that, the Foreign Service probably isn't a great career choice for you."

Like the military, you trust in the system (that you're an integral part of) to proceed in a lawful, Constitutional manner that reflects the will of the American people as embodied by their elected representatives.

It's a terrible system, no doubt, the worst possible one, of course, except for all the worse ones.

"The bottom line is that the Foreign Service is a highly structured, chain-of-command focused bureaucracy, not that unlike the military. If you're not capable of holding your nose and delivering a message you find personally repulsive, don't sign up."

5/2

re: "The Obama Foreign Policy (Part I)"

The DiploMad ("Wracked with angst over the fate of our beloved and
horribly misgoverned Republic, the DiploMad returns to do battle on the world
wide web, swearing death to political correctness, and pulling no
punches.") began a valedictory series of posts about our foreign policy apparatus.

Money quote(s):

"My career in the Foreign Service began when Jimmy "Wear a Sweater" Carter was President; the Shah sat on the Peacock Throne; the Soviets and their Cuban servants were all over Africa, Central and South America, and the Caribbean; our economy was in the sewer; our cities drug and race-fueled combat zones; our military, a hollowed out racially divided horror; and CIA and State, under appalling leadership, could do nothing right internationally. And things only got worse: the Shah fell to the Muslim crazies; the Soviets invaded Afghanistan; Communism, Socialism, and Liberation were on the march around the world. The bon pensant knew the future belonged to the Soviets and the Japanese, while we sat in the dark, shivering in our cardigan sweaters, suffering "malaise," and praying Moloch would eat us last.

Since those dark "Carter on Mars" days, thanks to Ronald Reagan, with his optimism and ability to see through mainstream cant, our country underwent a massive social, economic, and political renovation that showcased an unmatched American ability to regroup, reinvent, and implement. Our economy came roaring back; our military reaffirmed its unequaled status; the Soviets, unable to compete with the American economy and technical wizardry, came crashing down; and mighty ten-foot-tall Japan could not match the United States for innovation and the
ability to put it to work at a dazzling speed. Even Bill Clinton learned not to fix a working model; he went along with GOP efforts to reform welfare, and poured money into sustaining and expanding the world's best special forces--as the Taliban and al Qaeda soon discovered. The confused waning days of the Bush administration, alas, pried opened the Gates of Hell once more; the inept McCain campaign couldn't close them, allowing the malevolent Obama misadministration to escape the Depths, and take over the White House--immediately making us nostalgic for Carter. We are in crisis mode, again." (Emphasis in original text. - CAA.)

Persons quibbling with the above summary of those several decades will reveal far more about themselves than they might wish.

"In its defense, let me say that to call it a policy designed for America's defeat gives it too much credit. My experience at State and the NSC, has shown me that most Obamaistas are not knowledgable enough to design anything. Foreign policy for the Obama crew is an afterthought. They really have little interest in it; many key jobs went vacant for months at State, DOD, CIA, and the NSC. The Obama foreign policy team is peopled by the "well-educated," i.e., they have college degrees, and as befits the "well educated" in today's America, they are stunningly ignorant and arrogant leftists, but mostly just idiots. They do not make plans; they tend to fly by the seat of their pants using a deeply ingrained anti-US default setting for navigation. They react to the Beltway crowd of NGOs, "activists" of various stripes, NPR, the Washington Post and the New York Times. Relying on what they "know," they ensure the US does not appear as a bully, or an interventionist when it comes to our enemies: after all, we did something to make them not like us. Long-term US allies, e.g., Canada, UK, Israel, Japan, Honduras, Colombia, on the other hand, they view as anti-poor, anti-Third World, and retrograde Cold Warriors. Why else would somebody befriend the US? Obama's NSC and State are staffed with people who do not know the history of the United States, and, simply, do not understand or appreciate the importance of the United States in and to the world. They are embarrassed by and, above all, do not like the United States. They look down on the average American, and openly detest any GOP Congressman or Congresswoman, especially
Representative Ros-Lehtinen and Senator DeMint, who dares question their wisdom. They have no problem with anti-American regimes and personages because overwhelmingly they are anti-American themselves (Note: I exempt Hillary Clinton from the anti-American tag; she is just ignorant--more on that in my next posting)." (Emphasis in original text. - CAA.)

Bear in mind that Rep. Ros-Lehtinen is the Chairman of the House Committee of Foreign Affairs. For anyone who is a staff member at NSC or State to ignore her is about as stupid as ignoring gravity.

"Our foreign policy is not made in any real sense. It slithers out from this foggy fetid leftist primeval mire and "evolves" into the weird amorphous "policy" we now have. It is guided by The Anointed One's long-standing Triple AAA motto: Apologize. Appease. Accommodate. There is no understanding of the relationship between military power and diplomacy, between expending the blood and treasure of America and our interests. For the Obamaistas the topics of burning interest tend to be those far removed from the core national interests of the United States, e.g., treatment of prostitutes in Sri Lanka, gay rights around the world, the status of women in Africa, beating up the inconsequential junta in Burma, helping overthrow U.S. ally Mubarak, but doing nothing about the Iran-Venezuela alliance, the imprisonment of an American AID contractor in Cuba, the growing anti-Americanism spreading throughout Latin
America, the disintegration of the few remaining moderate Muslim states, and on and on. This leftist, anti-American disease is contagious. Just look at the recent statements by Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta, once a moderate middle of the road politician, now spouting rubbish about needing "international permission" to deploy US military power, undermining over two centuries of US defense doctrine, not to mention the Constitution. " (Emphasis in original text. - CAA.)

This stuff ("There is no understanding of the relationship between military power and diplomacy, between expending the blood and treasure of America and our interests.") is actually taught in (at least some of) our senior military schools, the war colleges and such. DIMEFILS, for the initiate. Strategy and Grand Strategy. The up-and-coming majors and lieutenant commanders, the lieutenant colonels and commanders, and the colonels and captains, the ones from among tomorrow's generals and admirals will be selected, are at least exposed to the concepts that can mean life or death for entire nations and alliances of nations.

These field-grade ("mid-grade, in State Dept. parlance) officers will have already proven themselves tactically and operationally proficient (or at least not criminally inept) by the time they are selected for these schools and colleges, where their studies will be at least nominally at the graduate and post-graduate levels.

And what do we have on the diplomatic side of the house?

The Institute for Peace? Not quite sure what they do, but has anyone else who's worked in Foggy Bottom ever noticed how often they seem to be having big parties and receptions over there across "C" Street at their post-modern building?

(The big catering trucks and the blocked lanes of traffic are kind of a giveaway. As are the hispanic waiters, bartenders, and waitresses coming and going from the Metro Station by GWU.)

Well, there's the Foreign Service Institute, which has a nice campus on the former Arlington Hall Station site (a.k.a. "the George P. Shultz National Foreign Affairs Training Center").

"The Foreign Service Institute is organized like a university and
consists of five schools:
The School of Language Studies
The School of Applied Information Technology
The School of Leadership and Management
The School of Professional and Area Studies
The Transition Center "

The key word in that passage is "like." FSI has deans, t-shirts, a registrar, and an attractive coat-of-arms, but it's not a university, not a college, not really a center of advanced or even (for the most part) undergraduate-level education. NFATC is what it says it is in the name, a "Training Center." It's the equivalent of a corporate training center.

Don't get me wrong, FSI training is in fact essential for preparing our employees to accomplish their missions when they deploy abroad to our more than 260 embassies and consulates. The language school alone would be worth the investment of staffing hours and funding. And I hasten to say good things about the FS and CS orientation programs as well as the consular training. Couldn't have done it without you guys!

But it's emphatically not the equivalent of any of the DoD's war colleges, or even the C&GS School.

Former SecState Colin Powell was a big believer in the notion of a training continuum, as befitted a career U.S. Army officer, and he led the Department of State long enough to make that notion part of the corporate culture. That's a good thing.

But there's still a lingering institutional prejudice against professional development education. As FSO blogger Two Crabs quoted from a recent article:

"The people who are successful in the State Department are people who
can be thrown in the deep end of the swimming pool and not drown; but the department never teaches them to swim, and the successful ones even come to discredit the value of swimming lessons, because they succeeded without them."

The FS Written Examination (now reflagged as the computer-based FS Officer Test) and the FS Oral Assessment do select for broadly- and highly-educated candidates. While eschewing the explicit requirement of a particular diploma or credential, the more years of formal education a bright FS candidate has completed, the more likely they are to be successful in the FSO accession process.

So our newest diplomats enter the Foreign Service already highly educated (graduate degrees or other post-undergraduate education such as law school, more often than not) unless they manage to wrangle a training assignment (or a sabbatical to take even higher education) away from the State Department they're never really going to get anything but training from FSI.

Training is not education. It's training. Nothing wrong with training; training is good. But training will only train students about how to do things or sets of things. It's a lot less likely to prepare diplomats to think about the why of things any more than their pre-State Dept. education already did.

Heretical statement: diplomats, like leaders, can be born to be diplomats or they can be educated to be diplomats. But even the born-diplomats can be educated to be better diplomats.

"The career Foreign Service is hapless. Many of the FSOs, especially the young ones, come from the same "educational" background as the political Obama types. Many have strong sympathies for the Obama view of the world because it is easy, it requires less work--thinking is hard. It is best to come up with long carefully nuanced memos regurgitating the most conventional of conventional left-of-center "wisdom," so that the powers above do not get displeased. Deny a
problem exists, then you do not have to do anything about it, "He is just an agricultural reformer . . .". " (Bold typeface added for emphasis. - CAA.)

Hmm. My initial thought was the "agricultural reformer" line was just Castro, but it was used to label Mao as well.

(And it was "agrarian reformer" the way CAA learned it.)

At least I can't dismiss DiploMad's critique of career FSOs as more outdated stereotypical nonsense about striped-pants and passing cookies. That gets old, although, like Don Quixote, CAA will continue to tilt at that windmill until it finally falls like the skewered ogre it ought to be.

No, DiploMad's comments are up-to-date and Millenial. They encompass the transformational and (for those who can't avoid it) expeditionary diplomacy that currently encoils the Foreign Service.

3/15

re: "12 Things for 2012"

OSB at The OpSec Blog ("Security and privacy information and advice at home and abroad.") shared 12 thoughts about living abroad in the Foreign Service.

Read them all.

My favorite?

Number 5, of course:

"5. No matter how hard you think you are working, your Marine Security Guard detachment is working much harder. Give them the respect and kindness they deserve. Address them as “sir” or “ma’am” (until you learn their names, of course), invite them to your happy hours (even if it’s just for snacks), and go out of your way to ensure that they are invited to your social functions."

Actually, don't call them "sir" or "ma'am" (which is something of an exception to my rule-of-thumb* in this matter); as enlisted and non-commissioned officers (which most MSGs will be), they are not addressed as "sir" or "ma'am."

Commissioned (and warrant) officers are addressed as "sir" and "ma'am." Very few (if any) overseas missions will have MSG detachments whose members are either commissioned or warrant officers. MSG detachment commanders will often be USMC gunnery sergeants and other detachment members will be varying grades of sergeants and corporals.

Don't know what that means? Well, then that's a great "area-for-improvement" to improve upon.

My advice, for those who haven't learned USMC rank insignia: if they're on guard or standing watch in your embassy or consulate, and you don't know their names or ranks, see if they have any chevrons (or "stripes") on their shirt sleeves. And just call them "Sergeant."

If they are sergeants, in any of the several pay grades that encompasses, then they won't take offense that a civilian wasn't able to guess their precise rank; and if they're one of the enlisted or non-com ranks below sergeant, they probably won't be offended by an unintentional promotion.

12/31


* CAA's rule-of-thumb about terms of address comes from the perspective of customer service (and Southern gentility and manners). Treat everyone respectfully, addressing gentlemen as "sir" and ladies as "ma'am." And referring to them each, in the third person, as "gentlemen" and "ladies."

The exception (there's always an exception) to that are those folks who rate a more specific term of address. Such as ambassadors, many government officials, the clergy, certain academics, and members of the military and naval services.

Entire books have been written on how such persons should be addressed. As commissioned officers of the U.S. Foreign Service, people will be looking to you for leadership and guidance in such, and other, matters of protocol and etiquette. A good start is learning, at least in a general way, the various rank structures and insignia of our own armed forces and how to correctly refer to and address such fine people.

re: "Second Item"

CAA (that's me!) continued his response to Jeff Emanuel's post at RedState:

"Second, the “urgent” town hall meeting was nothing of the kind.
Town Hall meetings are held all the time, both at Main State, and at our misions around the world.

One FSO stood up and made stupid comments.

By contrast, every single FS position, which have to be re-filled
every 12 months, in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, have been filled with volunteers every single year since 9/11. No FSOs have had to be ordered to go involuntarily. Ain’t happened.

Not that State hasn’t had to institute various incentives to make
that happen, but there are incentives (including financial ones) for military service in those places as well. It’s somewhat apples and oranges, but there are parallels.

This old Town Hall Meeting story is like a zombie. It rises from
the grave, no matter how many times discredited, whenever someone needs a handy club to bash the Foreign Service."

2/9

re: "Spending bills threaten Foreign Service pay and hiring"

Digger at Life After Jerusalem ("The musings of a Two-Spirit American Indian, Public Diplomacy-coned Foreign Service Officer") outlined the demerits of cutting the salaries of diplomats deployed beyond the beltway (and the borders).

Money quote(s):

"Government Executive has an excellent piece on the spending bills before Congress and what this could mean for the Foreign Service.These bills would cut my pay by 16% while I am overseas, on top of the fact that my pay is already frozen for the next two years at least."

Anecdotally, most FSOs I've spoken with understand the necessity for freezing government worker's pay, particularly in an economic environment where many Americans have lost their jobs or otherwise lost ground economically. Nobody's crazy-happy about it (who would be?), but the political necessity, the optics of it, are apparent enough.

Also, the pay freeze simply means that pay rates stay the same; no across-the-board salary increases of some percents or so. Individuals can still advance by promotion or longevity pay to higher pay grades; it's just that those pay grades remain constant for two years.

On the other hand, decreasing, by 16 percent, the pay of FSO serving abroad (while leaving that of those in Washington intact) doesn't pass the smell test.

"Yes, we get free housing overseas. But we still have our mortgage to pay at home. And renting our place doesn't cover that."

"Free" housing overseas is one of those areas where the Foreign Service is more like unto the military (and naval) services than is the Civil Service.

(Caveat: CAA has been a member of not only the Foreign Service and military service, but was also in the Civil Service for several years.)

(Note: There are actually three foreign services; those of the State Dept., USAID, and the Foreign Agricultural Service of the USDA. For CAA purposes, assume "Foreign Service" refers to that of the State Dept.)

Most Civil Service folks (there are exceptions, e.g., DIA, FBI, &tc.) are appointed into a position for which they qualify and stay there. Their "rank" is by position, not by individual. And they can stay in that job until the heat death of the universe without penalty; they get promotions by competing for (and being hired into) jobs at a higher grade.

A consequence of this is that, compared to the foreign and military services, is much less geographical mobility. In each of the cases, this is not a bug, it is a feature. Foreign Service and military members expect to move around during their careers; Civil Service much less so.

So, like for military members, housing (or a housing allowance) is provided for Foreign Service members, but only when stationed or deployed abroad.

Military folks get their housing allowances no matter where they are stationed; this is not a complaint, merely a statement of the reality.

Something like 99 percent of FS jobs are in the D.C. area. There are passport centers, diplomatic security field offices, and some facilities that support State operations located beyond the beltway, but the Department's center-of-gravity in terms of personnel is Washington, D.C. This has been true since long before the Department took up residence in Foggy Bottom.

Granted, the decision to buy (or not) a home is an individual one. The government doesn't make FSOs buy houses. That being said, if in the course of your career you're going to be overseas two-thirds of the time and spend the remaining third of your working life in a single metropolitan area, then you're an idiot (or have another plan involving a place to retire to elsewhere) if you don't invest in owning your own residence there. Otherwise you're just micturating your money away on rent rather than building some equity.

"Because most in the FS are not tandem couples like M and I, going overseas means the loss not just of that 16% but of one spouse's ENTIRE income. Most spouses who work in the states have a limited ability to do so overseas, and even when they do, it is for substantially less pay.

Especially for those with children, this is an nearly impossible loss to bear.

None of us mind sacrificing for the country. We know that this is part of the nature of our service. We willing leave our homes, our stability, our families, for the good of the country."

The days of Leave It To Beaver stay-at-home spouses as the rule stopped being true for middle class couples and families as a consequence of the sexual revolution. No big surprises there. As often as not (there are still lots of single-income families out there) though, university-educated couples tend to be two-income couples.

College-educated persons tend to marry other college-educated persons.

It shouldn't be any surpise that at least 98/99 percent of FSOs have at least a university degree (and that 100 percent of FSO have at least some college).

One of the consequences (for good or bad) of Foreign Service life is the difficulty FS spouses (of either sex) have in finding gainful employment during the course their FSO spouse's career. There's been lots of progress made in this arena in terms of creating opportunities for FS spouses to work, where appropriate, in our overseas posts. Even in D.C. this is a problem, in large part because FSO will generally only serve for two years at a stretch in the U.S. before going back overseas for three (or more) years.

This works out to a huge bite out of an FS couple's lifetime earnings compared with similarly-educated/credentialed persons working in the U.S.

I mention this not so much to complain as to explain why nickel & diming FS families on their primary income becomes so significant; much of the time it will be their only income.

"(W)hen you carve out 16% of our pay, bear in mind that the senior levels of the Foreign Service do not experience this cut. The other agencies serving with us at post do not experience this cut. The military and their civilian employees do not experience this cut. Their base salaries are their DC salaries, not some fake base salary with DC locality pay.

It is only those of us in the mid and lower levels who must take a pay cut to serve you overseas."

Shockingly, when Senior Foreign Service (SFS; the Foreign Service's "flag officers") compensation was "reformed" so that D.C. base pay was incorporated, much of the steam seemed to go out of Department's leadership in terms working to get that accomplished for the lower and middle-ranking FSOs.

Fancy that.

All snarking aside, the issue was (at long last) addressed just a few short years ago and a three-step phase-in was begun to bring overseas compensation in line with D.C. pay so that diplomats would not actually have to take a pay-cut in order to serve overseas.

That's right. Diplomats take a pay-cut (to their base pay) when they leave Washington, D.C., and deploy abroad to serve their country.

As a one-time Business Administration major, this kind of financial disincentive scheme leaves me nearly speechless at its utter counter-intuitive idiocy.

Now, to give the whole-truth-and-nothing-but-the-truth, many overseas assignments bring with them certain other pay allowances, such as cost-of-living allowances, hardship allowances, and danger pay. But it still never made any sense that someone leaving D.C. would have go to a post where hardship and danger pay allowance exceeded 2o percent or more just to break even.

So that's what Digger's talking about.

10/7

re: Anonymous comment

CAA received a rather ill-tempered (much like laser-mounted sea-bass) comment at his "Seasons Greetings" post the other day.

To wit:

"Anonymous said...

Anyone who wishes a career in the Foreign Circus deserves it. It recruits people lacking spines and brains to insure that the officers never question their fuedal lords. You are one step away from dismissal. There is no real appeal as your supervisor can call you an incompetent, racist, toad and not have to prove a word of it. You must prove him to be wrong, but remember the system protects the guilty not the innocent. This is how it enforces complete submission. Expose theft, criminality, etc and you are dead meat because you rock the boat. An ambassador would never violate the laws of the US for personal profit. Right?

Assignments are on the basis of rabis, not the needs or talents required. Don't speak German, don't even bother asking for Germany. Don't speak Russia, an assignment to one of the coackroach stans is just the ticket you need. Find out your supervisor has served in Europe for the past 20 years and his hardship tour is Mexico City, tough it is how the system works.


Better yet the best do not make it past the senior grading process which is reserved for the prime examples of what the foreign circus considers to be "outstanding." I've seen these losers trying to get posts in law firms and lobbyists in DC once people can no longer tolerate their gaffs, mistakes, and omissions,


One other word, imagine living in housing that is subpar, dangerous and assigned by people who care little and do less. No wonder the divorce and alcoholism rate among FSO is through the roof. Worse yet is the number of kiddies who become warped little monsters because of the availibity of drugs and the mindset that they are part of an "elite."


Talk to an FSO. Most if they speak honestly will not recommend it as a career. If they are honest see if they mention these points. If they do not you know you are being had.


As for the tests, these are for losers. State has stated for years it wants to look more like the US as a whole. What do you think this means? Probably 25% of all candidates do not take the test to get in. They simply don't cut the mustard, but these same people will be ahead of you in the promotion and assignment ques.


Great organization. Do yourself a favor and join the IRS. At least its professional. Even the ATF isn't as politically incoherent as State.


One last point, State status as a bad joke is recognized throughout Washington. Ask any staffer if State is the first choice to be consulted on economic, military or political data that is considered realiable, timely or relevant."

As near as I can figure it, Anonymous came to CAA from the Eternity Road blog where CAA is listed in the "Mainly Politics" blogroll. Anonymous was apparently posting from Manassas, Virginia, where he (or she) is a Verizon customer.

1. "Anyone who wishes a career in the Foreign Circus deserves it. It recruits people lacking spines and brains to insure that the officers never question their fuedal lords. You are one step away from dismissal. There is no real appeal as your supervisor can call you an incompetent, racist, toad and not have to prove a word of it. You must prove him to be wrong, but remember the system protects the guilty not the innocent. This is how it enforces complete submission. Expose theft, criminality, etc and you are dead meat because you rock the boat. An ambassador would never violate the laws of the US for personal profit. Right?"

Aww. This sort of talk is liable to hurt my feelings.

Oddly, the recruitment and examination process seemed (to me) designed to ensure that prospective FSOs exhibited both brains and good judgment. Part of good judgment, to me, means picking your battles carefully and being picky about upon which hill you want to die, upon which sword you wish to fall.

(Military and naval officers have to know how to do the same thing.)

As a consular officer, I know that when it comes to fraud or malfeasance or matters of integrity, the Bureau of Consular Affairs will have my back if I'm in the right. Part of being in the right is knowing the applicable laws, directives, and regulations and following them in the spirit they're intended. Not being burdened overmuch with ambassadorial ambitions, perhaps that's easy for me to say....

As a former intelligence professional, I've always taught my subordinates to tell the truth. The truth being what they themselves saw, heard, read, or otherwise sensed and intuited, and being very clear about which is which. Err on the side of clarity at the expense of politeness or political correctness; don't be afraid to voice a conclusion or informed opinion but label it as such and be clear about your sources and reasoning. In other words, show the math. Let those who have broader access (i.e., all-source analysts) make broader conclusions.

And to be frank, any supervisor who called me "an incompetent, racist, toad" would probably suffer an accident walking into a door jamb.

(But CAA has been hoarding his PTSD card for just such an occasion.)

2. "Assignments are on the basis of rabis (sic), not the needs or talents required. Don't speak German, don't even bother asking for Germany. Don't speak Russia, an assignment to one of the coackroach stans is just the ticket you need. Find out your supervisor has served in Europe for the past 20 years and his hardship tour is Mexico City, tough it is how the system works."

This has not been, to say the least, my experience of the assignments process to date. Needs of the post or bureau have generally seemed paramount.

While it's certainly imperfect, and something of a black box in spots, I know (for instance) plenty of officers who had to learn (or re-learn) German in order to be assigned therein. Once FSI-trained in German and with an assignment under ones belt, however, legend has it that being in the "German mafia" could get you re-assigned back to Germany later on after an assignment (or three) elsewhere in the (Third?) (W)orld. I've seen that happen, including instances where the intervening assignments were in Iraq or Afghanistan (or both).

(To me, that always seemed more a matter of taking advantage of language/country experience rather than favoritism. Germany alone boasts six different post, plus Austria, plus Switzerland. Due to the decline in the number of high school and college German curriculae, fewer and fewer FSOs enter the Foreign Service speaking the language, which means most FSOs taking an assignment there have to be trained in-house at FSI.)

As for the former Soviet "Stan" assignments going to newly trained Russian speakers, this is of a piece with French speakers serving in West Africa before getting a much-coveted Paris gig or similar scenarios involving Portugese/Angola-Mozambique-Brazil/Lisbon and Spanish/South&Central-America/Madrid. It's not prejudice or favoritism; it's paying your dues.

Generally speaking, very few of even the senior ranks of the career Foreign Service will spend all that long in Western Europe before taking a "career enhancing" hardship assignment. That being said, some hardship assignments are harder than others; there is a range involved there and hardship ratings can be based on a variety of factors.

CAA has himself received hardship differential pay in countries which are home to quite posh resorts. It should be noted that CAA did neither live nor work (nor even much visit) in said resorts; U.S. embassies tending to be located in slum-filled capital cities rather than along an exotic coast or in picturesque mountains.

3. "Better yet the best do not make it past the senior grading process which is reserved for the prime examples of what the foreign circus considers to be "outstanding." I've seen these losers trying to get posts in law firms and lobbyists in DC once people can no longer tolerate their gaffs, mistakes, and omissions,"

If I read this correctly, the "losers" in this paragraph are those who make it into the Senior Foreign Service (SFS). Not having spent much time around D.C. law or lobbying firms since joining the Foreign Service, I must yield to Anonymous' expertise.

(For those keeping score, CAA is in no imminent danger of becoming a member of the Senior Foreign Service.)

4. "One other word, imagine living in housing that is subpar, dangerous and assigned by people who care little and do less. No wonder the divorce and alcoholism rate among FSO is through the roof. Worse yet is the number of kiddies who become warped little monsters because of the availibity of drugs and the mindset that they are part of an "elite." "

Wow. CAA married a Foreign Service brat; on the morrow I will inquire whether she is a "warped little monster."

Housing varies. Rules as to how it's assigned are uniform throughout the service, but its quality, quantity, and availability are subject to the reality of life abroad. Generally it's more comfortable than military tentage in a combat zone or even enlisted dependent housing at domestic military bases. But that is going to depend upon what's available on the local market or what the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations was able to construct.

I'm not trying to sugar-coat this; much of the world is simply not up to providing the kind of amenities (i.e., safety, comfort, and health) the average American suburbanite takes for granted. That's one of the tradeoff Foreign Service families make, or at least have made for them by their Foreign Service Officer/Specialist parent or spouse.

The availability of drugs is not something unique to FS or even expat life. I hear tell, in fact, that there are drugs even in American public schools nowadays. As for the "elite" charge, this is where the occasional domestic assignment helps keep FS brats grounded, just as a year or three of commuting to Foggy Bottom by Metrorail will blunt the elitest edge of even the most credentialed FSO.

Lastly, I can't really speak to divorce and/or alcoholism rates beyond the anecdotal.

5. "Talk to an FSO. Most if they speak honestly will not recommend it as a career. If they are honest see if they mention these points. If they do not you know you are being had."

Who shaves the barber? All Cretans are liars.

An honest FSO (and we all at least start honest) will tell you it's not for everyone, but we're still only half kidding when we tell each other we're "living the dream."

Every assignment isn't a dream, and there are supervisors (and co-workers) you will grow to loath so much that you will rather take Lower Slobovia without them rather than work in London with them. FSOs need to be very honest with their spouses and children and weigh their interests fairly during the course of their FS careers.

6. "As for the tests, these are for losers. State has stated for years it wants to look more like the US as a whole. What do you think this means? Probably 25% of all candidates do not take the test to get in. They simply don't cut the mustard, but these same people will be ahead of you in the promotion and assignment ques."

CAA presumes that Anonymous is referring to those who, as either Pickering or Presidential Management Fellows (or similar) bypass having to take the written examination (actually, nowadays it's computer-based). They still have to make it past the FS Oral Assessment (and not all of them do).

Once upon a time, when CAA was in his A-1oo class (new FS Officer orientation), out of idle curiousity and political incorrectness he crunched the numbers with regards to ethnic background. Within a percentage point (or two), they did in fact match what I recalled of the general U.S. population.

CAA is a pretty smart guy (if I do say so myself) and without false modesty can admit to having served in several career fields which can fairly be described as being quite selective, even elite. The folks that make it into an A-100 class can only be described as smart.

(I never bothered to crunch the numbers with regards to gender, but it's fair to say that the women in the Foreign Service are simply scary smart.).

7. "Great organization. Do yourself a favor and join the IRS. At least its professional. Even the ATF isn't as politically incoherent as State."

Conclusion insufficiently grounded by facts in evidence. Hearsay. Comparing State with these two federal agencies in particular is something in the way of libel by itself.

(Lies. Damned Lies. Statistics!)

8. "One last point, State status as a bad joke is recognized throughout Washington. Ask any staffer if State is the first choice to be consulted on economic, military or political data that is considered realiable, timely or relevant."

Which staffers would those be? Congressional members or committee staff (i.e., "hill rats")? CAA's sense is that many of the wannabee policy-wonks that infest Capitol Hill/Adams-Morgan/Georgetown never managed to pass the FS exam and are holding a grudge about it.

As for being consulted on data of various sorts, when CAA was schooled in intelligence analysis, he was cautioned that policy- and decision-makers tend to rely less on official- and/or intelligence reports than on the sources of information to which they had access before becoming policy- and/or decision-makers. Personal contacts. Media. Pre-existing impressions and prejudices. And usually only as an afterthought would actual processed intelligence be considered, and that for what-do-you-have-that-I-haven't-already-heard.

State has decent political and economic collection and analysis, and it's all-source analysts in INR have a uniformly stellar reputation within the Intelligence Community (IC) (although frankly, going to State for military information seems like a fairly stupid thing to do). Where State really adds the value is in providing context for intelligence by having a cadre of folks who're either on the ground and know the players or have been there.

By way of example, during a previous assignment I happened to have a lot of general access to intelligence products from across the spectrum of the IC. On a whim I looked up satellite imagery of a area of significance in a prior overseas assignment (am I being vague enough?). The imagery didn't match what I knew were the facts (geography) on the ground. After a bit of head-scratching, I realized what I was looking at, and that was imagery of the town just west of what I should have been seeing, and I was quickly able to find the correct imagery.

Now, imagine you're on an aircraft carrier and you're launching helicopters to evacuate American citizens from a certain Third World city, and you end up in the wrong place. Or worse, imagine you're in a bad way and you're waiting on a helicopter to come get you, and it's late or never makes it at all, simply because someone who had the local knowledge never had input.

This sort of thing can get complicated.