re: "China, Sudan, and a dose of irony"

Ian Bremmer at The Call ("Political Futures from Ian Bremer and Eurasia Group") provided an excellent analysis.

Money quote(s):

"Western officials (and more than a few Western celebrities) have criticized China in recent years for its protection of Sudan's government. They've charged Omar al-Bashir's regime in Khartoum with support for ethnically motivated militia attacks on civilians in the country's Darfur region -- and China's government with complicity. Bashir, the world's only fugitive head of state, was indicted by the International Criminal Court in 2008 for Darfur-related crimes against humanity. Beijing uses its veto power to block international efforts to supply UN peacekeepers for Darfur, critics say, to protect its oil interests in the country.

It's ironic then that China's energy needs are now helping forestall a broader (and perhaps bloodier) confrontation in Sudan."

China's got needs, and even Khartoum's greed and bloodthirst have to take a backseat to that fact.

"Last July, Sudan became two countries. The mostly Muslim North and mainly Christian South finalized a relatively amicable break-up as South Sudan became an internationally recognized independent state. But like most divorces, this one did not produce a clean break, because the two countries share custody of the country's oil wealth."

Not only that, but there are major issues about the un-agreed-to border and local ethnic and religious minorities straddling or to the north of that border.

"Not surprisingly, North and South have yet to agree on how to share oil revenue, and each side has used its leverage to pressure the other. An opening of negotiations offered little promise of progress: Khartoum demanded a transit fee of $36 per barrel. The southern government in Juba offered less than a dollar.

On Nov. 8, President Salva Kiir of South Sudan dramatically upped the stakes in the dispute by ordering the expulsion from the south of Sudapet, the North's national oil company and a financial lifeline for its government. Khartoum countered with an announcement that oil exports from South Sudan would be suspended.

China quickly jumped in.

This oil is especially important to the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), which has equity production in Sudan of about 200,000 bpd, 15 percent of its total overseas output."

For now, all the pipelines run north into Sudan, but there are other directions in which pipelines can run.

"Most of the crude that CNPC draws from Sudan is not shipped home to China but is sold on international markets. Yet Beijing has emphasized the importance of holding oil assets overseas, providing fuel that can be directed to China if events threaten a sharp drop in supply."

Oil, to a degree, is fungible. You can sell Sudanese oil somewhere conveniently close by (saving on shipping costs) and use the money to buy oil closer to Chinese ports (and markets), where you want it.

And, in extremity, you just ship it all the way to China.

"To save face, Khartoum announced it would allow the oil to pass but would seize about a quarter of the profits as compensation. Low-level violence will continue, and we can expect to see more of the increasingly common attacks on oil fields along the two countries' poorly demarcated border. There will be more turmoil in restive oil-producing regions in the North. But thanks to aggressive Chinese mediation, the oil continues to flow, and Chinese diplomats are now trying to broker a long-term deal on transit fees.

Don't expect China to dive more deeply into conflict resolution in other countries. On foreign policy, China's leadership is risk-averse even in the most confident of times, and the looming transition to a new president, premier, and party elite over the next two years will make officials even more cautious. Only when political and commercial interests clearly coincide, as they do in Sudan, will Beijing move quickly to intervene in the politics of other countries"

For decades, China's had an overall Non-Intervention Policy (NIP) regarding its international partners' internal matters.

(Of course, as of South Sudanese independence last July, Khartoum's relationship with the south is no longer an internal matter.)

12/15

re: "Ramping Up to Another Jihad Genocide in The Sudan?"

Andrew Bostom ("Uncreated, Uncreative Words") puts the situation in Nubia (i.e., South Kordofan) into historical perspective.

Money quote(s):

"(Y)et another jihad genocide may be under way in The Sudan—Arab Muslim mass murderers preying upon indigenous non-Arab, primarily Christian blacks—this time in the Nuba Mountains."

The Nuba Mountains are, mostly, in the central part of what is now (since the formerly semi-autonomous Southern Sudan is now independent South Sudan) southern Sudan.

"Conservative death toll estimates as of now suggest that the number is at least in the “hundreds,” with a minimum of 60,000 displaced.

The feckless UN peacekeeping presence confined to its Kadugli base, includes Egyptian peacekeepers, viewed as very sympathetic toward the Arab Khartoum government, and accused by many Nuba of being complicit in targeted assassinations within the U.N. camp sheltering displaced refugees."

This is a very old story for Sudan, predating independence by centuries.

"Jihad depredations against the Nuba are a recurring phenomenon in Sudan’s history. Winston Churchill’s accounts from The River War as a young British soldier fighting in the Sudan at the end of the 19th century, described the chronic situation, in its larger context"

Looks like I'll have to find this book.

"During the 1990s, some 500,000 Nuba were killed when the Arab Muslim Khartoum government declared jihad against them."

Governments declaring jihad against their "own" people? That can't be a good thing, can it? I suppose it's easier if you don't actually see them as either "yours" or "people."

"The Nuba’s chronic plight raises yet again this overarching moral and existential question for our era of resurgent global jihad posed in 1999 by the late southern Sudanese leader John Garang:

Is the call for jihad against a particular people a religious right of those calling for it, or is it a human rights violation against the people upon whom jihad is declared and waged?"

John Garang, who died in 2005, got his start as a South Sudanese leader when he was sent to quell a mutiny among Sudanese troops in the south who had been ordered to move to the north (where they didn't want to go).

He joined them. (Before that, he was an officer in the Sudanese Armed Forces.)