re: "China, Sudan, and a dose of irony"

Ian Bremmer at The Call ("Political Futures from Ian Bremer and Eurasia Group") provided an excellent analysis.

Money quote(s):

"Western officials (and more than a few Western celebrities) have criticized China in recent years for its protection of Sudan's government. They've charged Omar al-Bashir's regime in Khartoum with support for ethnically motivated militia attacks on civilians in the country's Darfur region -- and China's government with complicity. Bashir, the world's only fugitive head of state, was indicted by the International Criminal Court in 2008 for Darfur-related crimes against humanity. Beijing uses its veto power to block international efforts to supply UN peacekeepers for Darfur, critics say, to protect its oil interests in the country.

It's ironic then that China's energy needs are now helping forestall a broader (and perhaps bloodier) confrontation in Sudan."

China's got needs, and even Khartoum's greed and bloodthirst have to take a backseat to that fact.

"Last July, Sudan became two countries. The mostly Muslim North and mainly Christian South finalized a relatively amicable break-up as South Sudan became an internationally recognized independent state. But like most divorces, this one did not produce a clean break, because the two countries share custody of the country's oil wealth."

Not only that, but there are major issues about the un-agreed-to border and local ethnic and religious minorities straddling or to the north of that border.

"Not surprisingly, North and South have yet to agree on how to share oil revenue, and each side has used its leverage to pressure the other. An opening of negotiations offered little promise of progress: Khartoum demanded a transit fee of $36 per barrel. The southern government in Juba offered less than a dollar.

On Nov. 8, President Salva Kiir of South Sudan dramatically upped the stakes in the dispute by ordering the expulsion from the south of Sudapet, the North's national oil company and a financial lifeline for its government. Khartoum countered with an announcement that oil exports from South Sudan would be suspended.

China quickly jumped in.

This oil is especially important to the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), which has equity production in Sudan of about 200,000 bpd, 15 percent of its total overseas output."

For now, all the pipelines run north into Sudan, but there are other directions in which pipelines can run.

"Most of the crude that CNPC draws from Sudan is not shipped home to China but is sold on international markets. Yet Beijing has emphasized the importance of holding oil assets overseas, providing fuel that can be directed to China if events threaten a sharp drop in supply."

Oil, to a degree, is fungible. You can sell Sudanese oil somewhere conveniently close by (saving on shipping costs) and use the money to buy oil closer to Chinese ports (and markets), where you want it.

And, in extremity, you just ship it all the way to China.

"To save face, Khartoum announced it would allow the oil to pass but would seize about a quarter of the profits as compensation. Low-level violence will continue, and we can expect to see more of the increasingly common attacks on oil fields along the two countries' poorly demarcated border. There will be more turmoil in restive oil-producing regions in the North. But thanks to aggressive Chinese mediation, the oil continues to flow, and Chinese diplomats are now trying to broker a long-term deal on transit fees.

Don't expect China to dive more deeply into conflict resolution in other countries. On foreign policy, China's leadership is risk-averse even in the most confident of times, and the looming transition to a new president, premier, and party elite over the next two years will make officials even more cautious. Only when political and commercial interests clearly coincide, as they do in Sudan, will Beijing move quickly to intervene in the politics of other countries"

For decades, China's had an overall Non-Intervention Policy (NIP) regarding its international partners' internal matters.

(Of course, as of South Sudanese independence last July, Khartoum's relationship with the south is no longer an internal matter.)

12/15

re: "An awkward independence day for diplomats in South Sudan"

Edmund Downie at PASSPORT ("A Blog By The Editors Of Foreign Policy") noted a little problem of an ICC warrant being out on one of the invited guests.

Money quote(s):

"The International Criminal Court's March 2009 indictment alleged that Bashir was responsible for war crimes in the ongoing conflict in Darfur. Recent violence in border states Abyei and South Kordofan hasn't endeared him to the international community either. Bashir and rebel leaders pledged in late June to pull troops out of Abyei before the referendum, but Bashir's ambassador to Kenya reaffirmed yesterday the north's claim to the region."



(7/8)

re: "House Human Rights Committee Considers Christian Genocide in Sudan"

George McGraw at Big Peace gives a clear picture of ethnic cleansing.

Money quote(s):

"The Nuba people of Sudan’s Southern Kardofan region are being systematically exterminated in the midst of a developing genocide described as “the world’s next Rwanda.” "

These are the people from whom the region gets its traditional name of Nubia. Their culture predates that of the arabicized Sudanese muslims who dominate Sudan.

"Sudanese military forces under the command of President Omar Al Bashir are targeting civilians – particularly women and children – with both ground and air assaults in an effort to eradicate the Christian and ethnic Nuba populations. The move also aims to diminish capacity and support for the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM), which has taken up arms in opposition to the violence."

Nothing surprising in any of that. It's how they roll. The SAF and Pres. Bashir can be relied upon, always, to oppress, massacre, or marginalize any of their fellow citizens who won't pretend they're Arabs.

"On June 5th Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) began the aerial bombardment of civilian targets followed by the house-to-house mass extermination of Christians, Nubans and SPLM by Sudan’s Popular Defense Force (PDF) – described by some as the “Al Qaeda of Sudan.” "

The SPLM (a.k.a. the SPLA or even SPLM/A) now has its own country, South Sudan. However there are plenty of its supporters north of the (mostly undefined) border in Sudan. Pres. Bashir clearly aims to change the facts on the ground to make that no longer the case.

"Egyptian peacekeepers stationed outside of the state capital (Kadugli) allowed government forces to enter the their base and separate Nubans and SPLM supporters from other civilians seeking shelter there. Sudanese forces then murdered them outside of the mission’s gates."

Anybody reading the news out of Cairo these days? Anybody going to be surprised at this behavior. Why wouldn't the Egyptian army allow their Sudanese brethren access to the UN compound and the civilians there?

"(T)he escalation in violence is directly linked to the disputed gubernatorial appointment of Ahmed Haroun, who like Bashir, is wanted for war crimes in Darfur by the International Criminal Court. In a recent open letter to the UN, Bishop Elnail recently declared that, “once again, we are facing the nightmare of genocide of our people in a final attempt to erase our culture and society from the face of the earth.” For his part, Mr. Phillips estimated that one half of the Nuban population has been exterminated by Northern military leaders since the 1980s."

The good bishop has this exactly right. This is genocide aimed at ethnic cleansing of what remains of Sudan. If you don't match Pres. Bashir's template of constitutes one of his true countrymen, then your life and livelihood is forfeit.

"As strafing and high-altitude bombing drive civilians into nearby caves, important agricultural plots have been left untended. Widespread food shortage and infrastructural destruction, coupled with mass internal displacement, are expected to contribute to a humanitarian emergency that Mr. Phillips characterized as “slow motion genocide by design.” "

It's a good plan, if ethnic cleansing is your goal. As things get worse, some will become refugees headed to South Sudan (a state without much in the way of resources themselves) to either die en route or become a burden to their neighbors.

"If nothing is done, violence in Southern Kardofan threatens to destabilize recent political independence in neighboring Southern Sudan, drawing it back into a state of active conflict with the North."

Unfortunately, this place is just so remote and there is so little U.S. interest (since U.S. oil companies pulled out decades ago) there that it's a miracle that the U.S. (and others) were able to get South Sudan pulled out of Sudan to begin with. There are going to be borders, and central governments dominated by ethno-religious politics are going to pursue policies of ethno-religious cleansing. And unless the "international community" is willing to "cowboy up" and do something about it, it's going to happen without much being done about it other than providing aid to the survivors.

Frankly, sometimes all that can be done is to bear witness. Not necessarily in silence, but take note nonetheless. And recall the Kennedy administration's admonition to "don't get mad, get even."

(There are some minor concrete things that should, quietly, be happening behind the scenes. Like making note of who the Egyptian peacekeepers, and their commanders, are, and making sure that none of them ever get a dime of U.S. military aid or training again, to say nothing of U.S. visas.. Blacklisting them from participation in future UN peacekeeping activities would seem too obvious to mention, but probably has to be. Having them court-martialed and hanged would be too much to hope for, I fear.)