re: "RQ: What Do FSOs Do When Not At Work?"

OSB at The OpSec Blog ("focused on security issues, safety overseas, and privacy online… and perhaps a few tidbits here and there about being a Specialist if I’m feeling uninspired") answered a reader's questions:

"What do Foreign Service Officers/Specialists do when they’re not working? How is the social scene? Do FSOs tend to clump or do they “go local”?"

Money quote(s):

"(I)t depends a great deal on where one is posted. Those serving in Afghanistan, Iraq, or Pakistan (AIP) will not be going off the compound very much. Each post has its own unique social culture. Even in places I wouldn’t consider very dangerous, sometimes the current work force just isn’t interested in going out much. Other times the embassy community is very tight knit and very supportive of one another (there’s something about being trapped together in Lagos that really brings a group of Americans together…)."

True. Oddly, the worse (for relative values of "better") a post is, the more likely that post will have a more closely-knit embassy community. The fewer opportunities there are for activities (travel, sight-seeing, safety) outside the embassy, the more they will fall back on their own resources. Some really nice Western European posts don't have that cohesive a community simply because the people assigned there have so many other things to do, either traveling out of town on a weekend or on the town after work hours.

"In my opinion, holing up in your government housing is a good way to go crazy during your tour. Participating in the embassy community, while not only one of the Foreign Service dimensions, is a good way to network both for yourself and your family."

In the Army, we called people like this "barracks rats." Don't be a "barracks rat."



9/22

re: "12 Things for 2012"

OSB at The OpSec Blog ("Security and privacy information and advice at home and abroad.") shared 12 thoughts about living abroad in the Foreign Service.

Read them all.

My favorite?

Number 5, of course:

"5. No matter how hard you think you are working, your Marine Security Guard detachment is working much harder. Give them the respect and kindness they deserve. Address them as “sir” or “ma’am” (until you learn their names, of course), invite them to your happy hours (even if it’s just for snacks), and go out of your way to ensure that they are invited to your social functions."

Actually, don't call them "sir" or "ma'am" (which is something of an exception to my rule-of-thumb* in this matter); as enlisted and non-commissioned officers (which most MSGs will be), they are not addressed as "sir" or "ma'am."

Commissioned (and warrant) officers are addressed as "sir" and "ma'am." Very few (if any) overseas missions will have MSG detachments whose members are either commissioned or warrant officers. MSG detachment commanders will often be USMC gunnery sergeants and other detachment members will be varying grades of sergeants and corporals.

Don't know what that means? Well, then that's a great "area-for-improvement" to improve upon.

My advice, for those who haven't learned USMC rank insignia: if they're on guard or standing watch in your embassy or consulate, and you don't know their names or ranks, see if they have any chevrons (or "stripes") on their shirt sleeves. And just call them "Sergeant."

If they are sergeants, in any of the several pay grades that encompasses, then they won't take offense that a civilian wasn't able to guess their precise rank; and if they're one of the enlisted or non-com ranks below sergeant, they probably won't be offended by an unintentional promotion.

12/31


* CAA's rule-of-thumb about terms of address comes from the perspective of customer service (and Southern gentility and manners). Treat everyone respectfully, addressing gentlemen as "sir" and ladies as "ma'am." And referring to them each, in the third person, as "gentlemen" and "ladies."

The exception (there's always an exception) to that are those folks who rate a more specific term of address. Such as ambassadors, many government officials, the clergy, certain academics, and members of the military and naval services.

Entire books have been written on how such persons should be addressed. As commissioned officers of the U.S. Foreign Service, people will be looking to you for leadership and guidance in such, and other, matters of protocol and etiquette. A good start is learning, at least in a general way, the various rank structures and insignia of our own armed forces and how to correctly refer to and address such fine people.

re: "Do Victory Laps and Spiking the Football outweigh Operational (and Personal) Security?"

Jeff Emanuel at Redstate ("the most widely read right of center blog on Capitol Hill") considers the Tourette's Syndrome approach to OPSEC.

Money quote(s):

"Shut up about the SEALs already, please"

Excellent advice. Here's why:

"While the information being reported by various media outlets and individuals has often missed the accuracy bulls-eye by quite a bit (yet again demonstrating that life imitates the Onion), enough accurate-ish information has apparently been revealed to the public by the usual suspects - the administration and those members of Congress who hold security clearances because of the voters’ actions rather than for any personal character qualities they may actually possess - that some units within, and affiliated with, JSOC are reportedly being forced to consider adapting their Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) — not to mention the fact that some operators are now concerned for the safety of their families (more on this later).

Joint Special Operations Command is the umbrella under which “black SOF” falls. This does not mean that every individual within the command is a secret agent or Chuck Norris-like commando; however, it does mean three things: (1) the organization, its people, and those it aligns itself with for mission and intelligence purposes conduct operations which are of particular importance to the national security of the United States, and therefore are of particular sensitivity; (2) its members utilize specific procedures and equipment which are highly specific to the types of missions they undertake (and which can therefore be outside the norm of conventional military procedures and equipment, or even of those utilized by “white SOF” units); and (3) due to the former two points, the equipment used by JSOC units and those with which they work, the TTPs employed by them, and the identities of the operators themselves are sensitive to excessive sunlight. In other words, of all the military units the United States has, JSOC is perhaps the one most damaged by public attention being paid to its equipment, its TTPs, and its personnel."

Newsflash: CAA is not now nor has he ever been assigned or attached to a JSOC unit. But the principles of operational security (OPSEC) which underly this are the same ones which applied to our MI units operating in OIF1.

"The high-profile nature of the target made it virtually impossible not to acknowledge the success of this particular mission or to provide some details regarding how, and by whom, it was accomplished. However, the Obama administration’s tourette’s-like insistence on telling the press whatever version of the operational story they felt like giving at that time or on that day (before they decided not to say anything any more), in tandem with the president’s own insistence on reinforcing his narrative of the “gutsy call” that resulted in bin Laden’s death at fundraisers and through media surrogates, have demonstrated that OPSEC and the safety of America’s premier special operators and their families are far less important to the Commander in Chief and his administration than taking so many victory laps and spiking the football with such frequency and repetition that it’s a wonder Obama himself hasn’t coughed up a (redacted) lung yet while simultaneously deflating the prop football he’s been handed for this purpose."

&

"(A)dapting to a changing battlefield environment and a changing enemy is one thing; being forced to adapt because members of your own government - particularly those who see one successful mission as a silver bullet to be used in a reelection campaign, and to enact a comprehensive and completely unrelated agenda - couldn’t keep their traps shut about sensitive information."

re: "Historical Revisionism [Part 3]"

Bill at Castle Argghhh! finishes off the Big Lie about Iraq's WMD.

Money quote(s):

"Right after we captured Baghdad, there were a *lot* of PAO-type pix appearing in SIPRNET mail to various units (all combat arms outfits, as far as I could tell), showing US and Iraqi equipment, battlefield shots of blown-up tanks and people, etc., and some stuff highlighting the technology we used. Our S-2 knew I'd think that was real neat, so he called me in to show me. Among the goodies were two AWACS radar screenshots labeled "Iraqi truck convoys converging on Syria" -- lines of little glowing dots on the highways heading north, then turning northwest. They gave a timeline, but all I remember was it happened the night before we jumped.

Next day, there was a recall of the mail with the pix, citing OPSEC violations on the AWACS pix because they showed US positions -- bear in mind that the pix were a full week old, and that US units had already reached Baghdad by the time they were released. Our S-2, being a good S-2, promptly deleted the stuff without a thought. So did everybody else, as far as I can determine, including the military intel types OCONUS with SIPRNET access. Later, I heard the oblique AWACS screenshots were compared with satellite overhead photos and were matched to a gnat's eyelash.

Some time later, the Dems in Congress began screaming that Bush was a war criminal because we hadn't found Saddam's WMD -- we had found a lot of WMD and WMD-related stuff, but the Dems kept screaming "That's not the WMD Bush said they had."

Which morphed into the pre-election Talking/Screaming Point “We went to war in Iraq for a lie, because there were no WMD!” that continues to this day.

Now, let’s recap.

Did we find chemical weapons that Saddam had hidden from the UN inspectors? Yup.

Did we find biological warfare labs and delivery systems? Yup.

Two out of three, so far, and either one standing alone exposes “There were no WMD” as a lie."

It helps if you have no real understanding of the meaning of WMD in the first place. Then it's easier to be that stupid. (Ignorance is like that.)

That being said, I never saw any of that sort of "take." But then I didn't see much else in that line of intelligence collection: as intelligence collectors, we were just too far down in the weeds ourselves.

"Did we find a nuclear weapons program? Well, yes and no.

Yes, we found the evidence, but was it an ongoing program? Saddam himself lied about stopping and starting so often, that, if it wasn’t ongoing during the weeks before the invasion – and Saddam *knew* it was on the way -- chances are very good that he would have cranked it up again had we *not* jumped in.

Was the program stolen from under our noses while we were in the process of restoring some semblance of normalcy to Iraq?

Or was it just on hiatus until Saddam – or his designated heir – could open up for business in a new location? *Something* was on the convoys going into Syria, which the Iraqis, sources in at least two of Iraq’s neighbors, and the CIA's ace advisor have confirmed."

Bill then goes on to explain some basic facts about the party politics of Saddam's Iraq and Assad's Syria (which remains true today).

He concludes:

"Dick Cheney had the pix, he had the background info, he had the ear of the President, and he had enough personal authority to release them to shut the Dems up.

Those of us who knew about the pix kept expecting a dog-and-pony show from the White House which would stop this particular Big Lie in its tracks and reveal the Dems for what they were.

Any day, now... any day.

When he was asked (in 2010) why he didn't at least advise GWB to go public with the pix and their probable significance, Cheney just blew the question off, and said "we had other concerns at the time."

Swell. Thanks so much for being midwife to this particular Big Lie, Dick -- you gave us Barack Obama in 2008 and the resulting cascade of Big Lies we've been bombarded with ever since."

This is the most original reason for disliking Dick Cheney I've ever read. It bears thinking upon.