Thursday, July 26, 2012
re: "Reducing Politically Correct Ad Hominems to Absurdity"
Monday, June 18, 2012
Implementing the laws and regulations as they're written, not as we might write them ourselves
Under this directive, individuals who demonstrate that they meet the following criteria will be eligible for an exercise of discretion, specifically deferred action, on a case by case basis:
- Came to the United States under the age of sixteen;
- Have continuously resided in the United States for a least five years preceding the date of this memorandum and are present in the United States on the date of this memorandum;
- Are currently in school, have graduated from high school, have obtained a general education development certificate, or are honorably discharged veterans of the Coast Guard or Armed Forces of the United States;
- Have not been convicted of a felony offense, a significant misdemeanor offense, multiple misdemeanor offenses, or otherwise pose a threat to national security or public safety;
- Are not above the age of thirty.
Only those individuals who can prove through verifiable documentation that they meet these criteria will be eligible for deferred action. Individuals will not be eligible if they are not currently in the United States and cannot prove that they have been physically present in the United States for a period of not less than 5 years immediately preceding today’s date. Deferred action requests are decided on a case-by-case basis. DHS cannot provide any assurance that all such requests will be granted. The use of prosecutorial discretion confers no substantive right, immigration status, or pathway to citizenship. Only the Congress, acting through its legislative authority, can confer these rights.
Friday, June 15, 2012
re: "When Good Politics Is Bad Policy and Bad Law"
Friday, May 25, 2012
re: "Libya and MI6 (again): Sir Mark Allen"
Charles Crawford at Blogoir ("A digital hybrid of blog and memoir presented on a daily basis, or not.") described a thorny British problem that parallels one we have in the U.S.
Money quote(s):
"The issue here is not any claim that MI6/HMG engaged in torture. Rather it is that MI6/HMG are said to have been 'complicit' in torture in Libya of certain Libyans by certain other Libyans. Which raises the question: what does complicity mean?"
Let's see where he goes with this.
"(M)aximalists insist that even to possess information which is suspected as having come from torture amounts to 'complicity'. That position, as the House of Lords found in 2005, is incorrect as a matter of law (and common sense)" (Bold typeface added for emphasis. - CAA.)
Not that this finding carries any water in the U.S., but one hopes that the U.S. Supreme Court would reason as well as the House of Lords.
"The problem here is that any secret 'rendition' by us or even a contribution to secret rendition by others is likely to have been endorsed by Ministers, either specifically or as a general rule. So to single out one civil servant for litigation is mischievous if not malevolent.
Second, the whole case turns on the idea that 'complicity' can be stretched far beyond any immediate link to maltreatment. Any abuse or torture was not committed by HMG or its officials. Is it really fair to make us legally responsible for horrors committed by others far away?
Even if you think that it is reasonable to do so on the moral level, you need to draw a line somewhere and say that the actions alleged were too 'remote' to amount to complicity. Under what principle should the line be drawn in specific cases? What balancing factors should be taken into account?" (Bold typeface added for emphasis. - CAA.)
British civil (or foreign) servants are as unlikely as our own to go "rogue" and try to "Lone Ranger" this sort of thing. They like a policy, preferably written, that delimits what their authority, and liability, is.
"This nasty, bleak, lonely policy and moral frontier was where Mark Allen and his colleagues were operating. If the way is opened to sue them for outcomes which were far from ideal if not awful, who is going to be ready to do this sort of fundamentally important work?
The issue here is simple. Not what the 'right' choice is when you are dealing with a regime like Gaddafi's. There isn't one.
Rather it is 'who decides?'.
We seem to be ending up in the absurd position that sanctimonious lawyers and unelected judges far from the operational and policy realities of such questions are seen as more 'responsible' than elected politicians and civil servants who are elected to do our dirty work while operating to arguably the highest standards of public probity in human history.
Yes, judges have the benefit of detachment. And yes, Ministers and officials can get so wrapped up in what they are doing that serious errors get made. But this is one where the best people to judge are voters, not lawyers."
Our own courts, operating under our unitary written Constitution, have taken some pains over the years to differentiate between the political and judicial spheres of authority, ceding that some things are not for courts to decide, but are the province of executives and legislators.
1/31
Wednesday, May 23, 2012
re: "Perry and the Illegals"
Friday, November 4, 2011
re: "Congress’s Constitutional Power to Establish National War Policy in Violation of International Law – A (Belated) Response to Professors.... "
John Dehn at Opinio Juris ("a forum for informed discussion and lively debate about international law and international relations") summarized the play-by-play on some international law back-and-forth.
Money quote(s):
"Opinio Juris hosted an excellent discussion of an important new book, International Law in the U.S. Supreme Court, a well-edited collection of essays about the Supreme Court’s approach to international law. Professor David Golove’s contribution asserting that post-9/11 Supreme Court “War on Terror” decisions are consistent with what he called our “Just War constitutional tradition” drew significant attention. In Professor Golove’s view, both the President and Congress are constitutionally required to comply with at least some international laws of war. Professor Andrew Kent critiqued the essay here, arguing that Golove’s claims, particularly those involving Congress, are inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent recognizing Congress’s power to set national policy in violation of international law.
I agree with Golove’s assertion that the executive branch must generally comply with any applicable international laws of war. Like Professor Kent, I am quite circumspect of the claim that Congress must as well. Harlan Cohen responded to Professor Kent’s post, suggesting that Professor Golove and Professor William Dodge (one of the book’s editors) may believe that all nations, including ours, are “absolutely bound” by certain rules of international law, those that the well-known (to the Framers and to academics) and influential Eighteenth Century international law commentator Emmerich de Vattel categorized “voluntary law.” " (Emphasis in original text. - CAA.)
There's actually no such thing as "international law."
Don't get me wrong; there is a body of customary, traditional, and treaty-based law (for values of "law") comprising a body of specialized knowledge which is generally termed "international law." But that "law" doesn't even come close to passing the common sense tests that would make it equivalent to other forms of actual law.
"After reading Professor Golove’s contribution to the book, Professor Ramsey’s response, and Professor Dodge’s related essay, I think there may be confusion regarding the obligatory nature of what Vattel denominated “voluntary law” and its relationship to both the contemporary laws of war and the war powers of Congress.
I believe Congress possesses the constitutional power (in conjunction with the executive, when necessary) to establish national war policy contrary to relevant international law so long as it does not violate the text of the Constitution. To the extent that Professor Golove’s unpublished research may have uncovered “longstanding understandings in Congress” that it must follow certain international laws of war, I suspect those understandings to be based in morality or wise policy, not necessarily constitutional law. Golove has to date given only scant evidence of what seems an elegant argument in favor of granting constitutional status to any such congressional understandings.
I agree that there are (and were) rules of international law that nations were believed “absolutely bound” to observe. They included what Vattel denominated the “perfect rights” of nations. Perfect rights were those “accompanied by the right of compelling those who refuse to fulfill the correspondent obligation” through armed force. However, the absolute “bindingness” of these rules existed only in international law." (Bold typeface added for emphasis. - CAA.)
There are some issues (more than some, but bear with me) with this perspective on the "bindingness" of international law.
For one thing, the perspective is astonishingly narrow in scope.
What we in the West call "international law" is a body of artifacts whose only relevance is within the larger context of the post-Westphalian international system. It is the height of civilizational and cultural chauvanism to suppose that it is truly global in application.
"(A) national policy, even one properly established under domestic law, may permit a violation of international law. But it cannot excuse that violation from the perspective of international law. In such cases, the policy is lawful in the domestic (municipal) legal system, but remains a violation of international law.
In my view, the key question is not whether the U.S. has ‘the power but not the right’ (to paraphrase Louis Henkin) to violate international law; it does. The key question is: which branch(es) of the U.S. government may constitutionally establish national policy contrary to international law? My research leads me to believe that in most contexts, including war, Congress does. In some very narrow circumstances it has been (and may still be) the executive alone." (Emphasis in original text. - CAA.)
The thing about violations of international law which are legal within a domestic legal system is the limited scope for enforcement. Who or what gets to enforce "international law" within another sovereign state and using what means or mechanisms?
"(T)he bulk of the contemporary international law of war (both jus ad bellum and jus in bello or international humanitarian law (IHL)) consists of customary and conventional constraints on conduct the natural law-based law of nations permitted. Therefore, contemporary IHL is not properly equated with Vattel’s “voluntary” law, which is law evidenced in or derived from natural law principles, generally observed for its utility, and obligatory on civilized states through their presumed (rather than express or implied) consent.
Vattel identifies three other categories of international law, (1) necessary, (2) customary and (3) conventional. Only necessary law, which consisted of the direct application of natural law to nations, was immutable or absolute. Vattel classified the other three types, including voluntary law, as composing the “positive law of nations” because “they proceed from the will of nations.” It defies logic to say that any species positive law cannot be altered at the will of the same nations that establish it." (Emphasis in original text. - CAA.)
"(T)o the extent that any rules in the contemporary law of war might be properly categorized “voluntary” law, the Constitution expressly assigns Congress the power to derogate from or abrogate such law. Importantly, this includes the power to infringe the “perfect rights” of other nations. Nothing in the constitutional text expressly requires Congress to exercise its powers to declare war or grant letters of marque (or reprisal, see below) in a manner consistent with relevant international law. This is why the Court did not, in its early decisions, review a congressionally established general or partial war for compliance with the law of nations."
The OJ article included a nice quote from Chief Justice Marshall (Talbot v. Seeman) to back up that last claim:
“The whole powers of war being, by the constitution of the United
States, vested in congress, the acts of that body can alone be resorted to as our guides in this enquiry [into whether France was properly deemed an enemy].” (emphasis added)
"Of course, none of these observations directly addresses Golove’s claim: that Congress believed itself to be limited by the law of nations when exercising its powers, and that this sense of obligation had a constitutional dimension or basis. There are, quite obviously, many reasons why members of Congress or Congress as a body might have boisterously made such claims. Chief among them would be to claim the legitimacy of law for proposed or adopted legislation infringing the perfect rights of other nations. Given the widely accepted origins of the natural law, some might also have felt morally obligated to observe it in spite of having constitutional discretion not to do so."
(9/6)
Wednesday, May 27, 2009
LoveFM - SUPREME COURT ORDERS THAT CHINESE NATIONALS BE EXPELLED
LoveFM
SUPREME COURT ORDERS THAT CHINESE NATIONALS BE EXPELLED
April 14, 2009
Acting Chief Justice Samuel Awich has made a ruling in the case of a group of illegal Chinese nationals.
Read the whole article here.
Snippet(s):
"The group, comprising seven men and one woman arrived in Belize two weeks ago without a travel visa. And because of the Supreme Court's ruling, they are tonight awaiting expulsion from the country."
&
"The plane that the group arrived on reportedly took off from Havana, Cuba, but it is unclear how they managed to get on the aircraft in the first place without a valid travel visa."
Friday, May 15, 2009
AO - Two Cubans and a Somalian seeking refugee status find favor with Supreme Court
Amandala Online
Two Cubans and a Somalian seeking refugee status find favor with Supreme Court
Posted: 07/05/2009 - 10:55 PM
Author: Rowland A. Parks
It is standard procedure for the Government of Belize to ship people back to their countries of origin once they arrive in Belize seeking some kind of refugee status. At the Kolbe-managed prison, there are a number of persons who are awaiting repatriation to their countries of origin. Although Belize has a refugee law and is a signatory to the United Nations Refugee Convention, the rights of persons seeking refugee status in Belize are at times overlooked.
Read the whole article here.
Snippet(s):
"But today in the Supreme Court, Belize’s Refugee Law was upheld, when Justice Michelle Arana ruled in favor of human rights activist Antoinette Moore in a judicial review that she filed on behalf of two Cubans and a citizen of Somalia, who are seeking refugee status in Belize.
The two Cubans filed an application for a judicial review, challenging the Government of Belize’s policy in relation to their refugee interest. The Cubans, Pedro Garcia Carrera and Karelis de Los Angeles Sosa Sanchez, and the Somalian, Nur Abdi Shire, took the Attorney General, the Minister of National Security, and the Director of Immigration to court, asking the court to affirm their rights to seek refugee status in Belize.
In her judgment that was issued in the applicants’ favor, Justice Arana ruled that the petitioners have a right to a refugee hearing. But most importantly, while they are awaiting such a hearing, they will do so in protective custody outside the walls of the prison."
Sunday, March 29, 2009
S&S - Envoy: Rape case shouldn’t affect Philippines agreement
Envoy: Rape case shouldn’t affect Philippines agreement
By David Allen, Stars and Stripes
Pacific edition, Sunday, March 29, 2009
The U.S. ambassador to the Philippines does not believe the Daniel Smith rape case will affect the Visiting Forces Agreement with the Philippines.
Read the whole article here.
Snippet(s):
"In a statement reported by media in Manila on Wednesday, Ambassador Kristie Kenney said negotiations regarding where the Marine lance corporal should be held pending his appeal of his December 2006 conviction should not result in any changes to the entire agreement.
The Philippines Supreme Court ruled last month that Smith, who is being held on the grounds of the U.S. Embassy in Manila pending his appeal, should have been remanded to a Philippines jail. The court ruled the agreement allowing Smith’s transfer to the embassy compound did not follow the guidelines set forth in the bilateral Visiting Forces Agreement, known as the VFA."
&
"On March 12, the 25-year-old woman who testified during the trial that Smith raped her, signed an affidavit stating she now doubts Smith actually raped her.
The woman, known publicly as "Nicole," has since moved to the U.S. with her American boyfriend, according to statements made by her mother."
Monday, January 19, 2009
PBP - With U.S. in slump, dual citizenship in EU countries attracts Americans
Palm Beach Post
With U.S. in slump, dual citizenship in EU countries attracts Americans
By ANDREW ABRAMSON
Palm Beach Post Staff Writer
Saturday, June 07, 2008
For millions of Europeans who braved the Atlantic Ocean for a glimpse of the Statue of Liberty and dreams of a lavish life, there was little thought of ever emigrating back. Yet for a new generation of Americans of European descent, the Old Country is becoming a new country full of promise and opportunity.
Read the whole article here.
Snippet(s):
"The creation of the European Union and its thriving economy is very appealing for Americans in a global economy.
"With an EU passport, I can live and work in 27 countries," said Suzanne Mulvehill of Lake Worth. "With a U.S. passport, I can live and work in one."
Americans can claim citizenship in any of the 27 European countries that are in the EU based on the nationality of their parents, or in some cases, grandparents and great-grandparents.
Citizenship in one of those countries allows you to live and work in any EU nation.
Since the United States doesn't keep statistics on dual citizens, it's impossible to know exactly how many people have applied for citizenship in Europe.
But it's estimated that more than 40 million Americans are eligible for dual citizenship, and a growing number of Americans want to try their luck elsewhere."
&
"Dual citizenship became a major issue during the War of 1812, when the British military tried recruiting, and in some cases forcing, British-born American citizens to fight on Britain's side.
For years, being a dual citizen was seen as unpatriotic, and until 1967 it was possible for the United States to revoke American citizenship for people who voted in foreign elections.
But in the 1967 Afroyim vs. Rusk decision, Supreme Court justices ruled 5-4 that it was unconstitutional to bar dual citizenship."