Foreign Policy Goals

Somewhere I recall, perhaps fallaciously, reading Russia described as being "Mexico with nukes."

(All apologies to Mexico.)

The main point apparently was that if Russia didn't have nuclear weapons, it's international significance would shrink accordingly to the purely regional powers, like Mexico.

As I observe what passes for foreign policy these days in Washington, I can't help but suspect that the over-arching strategic goal seems to be of reducing America's international significance to being something that could be summed up thusly:

Russia with precisions-guided munitions.

re: "8 myths about American grand strategy"

Peter Feaver at Shadow Government ("Notes From The Loyal Opposition") thinks about grand strategy (so you don't have to).

Money quote(s):

"Grand strategy appears to be the flavor of the month in the strategic community. I have planned or been invited to numerous conferences looking at the topic and the debates on this topic are as lively as I can remember in a long time. Just recently, I gave a talk to a grand strategy conference at NDU on the myths that afflict the field."

Mr. Feaver listed eight myths; CAA has selected his favorite three for your consideration.

"Myth 1: The U.S. can't do grand strategy

Many critics claim that the United States is simply too disorganized to do strategy on a grand scale.

In fact, we had a coherent grand strategy during the 19th century build around the Monroe Doctrine. We had a coherent grand strategy during WWII built around winning in Europe first. And we had a coherent grand strategy during the Cold War built around the idea of containment." (Bold typeface added for emphasis. - CAA.)

&

"Myth 3: A grand strategy has to have a 3-syllable label that rhymes with "ainment"

This gets to the heart of why you get the odd argument that we had a grand strategy during the Cold War but we haven't since. When critics say that we haven't had a grand strategy since the end of the Cold War, what they really mean is that we haven't had a label like "containment" that enjoys widespread popularity. This is true, but trivial.

In fact, since the fall of the Soviet Union a 5-pillar grand strategy has been clearly discernible:

Pillar I. The velvet covered iron fist. Iron fist: build a military stronger than what is needed for near-term threats to dissuade a would-be hostile rival from achieving peer status. Velvet covered: accommodate major powers on issues, giving them a larger stake in the international distribution of goodies than their military strength would command to dissuade a near-peer from starting a hostile rivalry.

Pillar 2. Make the world more like us politically by promoting the spread of democracy.

Pillar 3. Make the world more like us economically by promoting the spread of markets and globalization.

Pillar 4. Focus on WMD proliferation to rogue states as the top tier national security threat.

Pillar 5 (added by George W. Bush). Focus on terrorist networks of global reach inspired by militant Islamist ideologies as another top tier national security threat, i.e. co-equal with WMD in the hands of rogue states. The nexus of 4 & 5 is the ne plus ultra threat.

No administration described the strategy in exactly these terms. Every single president succumbed to the political temptation to product differentiate and especially to describe one's own actions as a bold new departure from the "failed" efforts of his predecessor. Yet a fair-minded reading of the core governmental white papers on strategy, especially the National Security Strategy reports prepared by each administration, as well as the central policy efforts each administration pursued, reveals a broad 20-year pattern of continuity.

All post-Cold War presidents championed the first 4 pillars. The last two presidents (Bush and Obama) adopted the last 2. And the major grand strategic moves of the period derive from one or more of these pillars: eg. The outreach to India derives from Pillar 1, the invasion of Iraq derives from Pillars 4 and 5, and so on.

Obama campaigned as if he was going to make a grand strategic innovation by adding a 6th pillar: elevating climate change to be co-equal with WMD and terrorism. But he chose to do health care instead." (Bold typeface added for emphasis. - CAA.)

&

"Myth 7: A grand strategy requires an existential threat

It may be easier to describe the grand strategy when there is an overarching existential threat to concentrate the mind. But as the post-Cold War has shown, it is possible to have a coherent grand strategy even when the threats are dispersed and less-than-existential.

The Cold War was not a time when everything was simple or when everyone knew priorities or everyone agreed on the threat. And it sure wasn't "a time of great stability and security unlike these really dangerous times today," -- a curious view that I hear most often from students who never lived through the Cold War era.

But it was a time when the much more obvious, and by the late 1950's possibly existential threat posed by the nuclear confrontation overlaid on top of a global ideological contest with the Soviet Union circumscribed strategic thinking in a way that is not the case today.

Compared to the Cold War period, we have more slack in our security environment and that introduces a certain amount of indeterminacy in the strategic debate."

Having "won" (i.e., we survived, Russia survived to become, er, Russia, Eastern Europe survived to become "Central Europe," and Western Europe survived to become the Eurozone) the Cold War, it's fun (for values thereof) to see so many latter-day Reaganites coming out of the woodwork to pretend that all along they'd meant to " jump on the team and come on in for the big win ."

11/23

re: "The Iraq Fiasco"

Hugh Hewitt at HughHewitt.Com conveyed a sense of frustration.

Money quote(s):

"The outlines of the Iraq fiasco are becoming clear this morning even to the MSM"

I'm still not seeing that, but individual mileage may vary.

"So much good was accomplished for the people of Iraq but at such a terrible price that this sudden retreat is stunning to the people like the veterans who called yesterday and Kagan who, with a few others, helped craft the successful surge strategy which President Bush adopted.

What must Generals Petraeus and Odierno think, and with them the vast majority of the men and women who served in this long war?

Imagine if the U.S. and Great Britain had simply left Berlin three years after the Berlin Wall went up in 1961. How long could the city have withstood Soviet pressure, and what chance would there have been of 1989 ever arriving?"

CAA can think of historical examples where even the myth of domestic political betrayal of military sacrifice has lead to no good result. As Dr. Pournelle often puts it: "Beware the fury of the legions."

10/22

re: "Taking Out Dictators"

Victor Davis Hanson at Private Papers ("victor davis hanson on the web") deduced the rules for U.S. intervention.

Money quote(s):

"In the past 40 years, the United States has intervened to go after autocrats in Afghanistan, Grenada, Haiti, Iraq, Libya, Panama, Somalia, and Serbia. We have attacked by air, by land, and by a combination of both. In the post-Vietnam, post-Cold War era, are there any rules to guide us about any action envisioned against Syria or Iran — patterns known equally to our enemies?"

Prof. Hanson outlined 15 rules.

"(W)e can make two general observations about Syria and Iran. In Syria, the US, on proper humanitarian grounds, could easily intervene through air power alone — without either congressional or UN sanction — to so weaken the non-nuclear Assad regime that, as happened in Serbia and Libya, it would surely and quickly implode. That said, we probably will not, given that such action would offend China and Russia, would not ensure quiet or stability in the aftermath, be soon criticized by those pundits who originally urged us to go in, and in six months be either unappreciated or overtly criticized by nations that had initially demanded that we do something to stop the slaughter.

As far as Iran goes, based on past precedents, there is zero chance that the United States would ever intervene to change the government, either on the ground or by an extended bombing campaign — and only a slight chance we will preempt by bombing suspected Iranian nuclear facilities."

3/2

re: "Chinese Dragons and Russian Bears"

"Sam Huntington" at Always On Watch ("Semper Vigilans") reviewed strategic issues involving our near-peer competitors.

Money quote(s):

"(A) far more dangerous situation is developing in Asia. No surprise, Americans are not hearing about any of this from the state-run media. Here are a few examples:

· China is claiming island territory within fifty miles of the Philippines.

· Chinese frigates regularly intruded Philippine territorial waters.

· Chinese ships fired upon Philippine fishing boats.

· Chinese naval vessels rammed Vietnamese fishing boats (See Note 1)

· Chinese accost Indian naval vessels operating off the coast of Vietnam, demanding to know why they are operating in Chinese waters.

· Chinese military aircraft intrude into Taiwanese air space.

· China intruded Japanese mainland territorial waters on 14 occasions.

· China intruded Okinawa territorial waters on 10 occasions.

· China created six major incidents with the US Navy at sea.

· Raise your hand if you aren’t aware that North Korea is China’s redheaded stepchild.

Note 1: Vietnam possesses one of the world’s largest armies: (China: 4.5 million, Vietnam: 5.9 million)."

You know the one about amateurs studying tactics and professionals studying logistics?

Well, in terms of international relations, geopolitics, and grand strategy, the professionals are studying China.

"Danger of a regional conflict is real. The consequence to China’s arrogance has been a dramatic increase in military spending among Southeast Asian countries. Australia, Japan, India, the Philippines, Vietnam, and Taiwan have all dedicated billions of dollars on new or upgraded military hardware. The United States is upgrading naval facilities in Guam —so much so that Representative Hank Johnson(D-GA) worries the island may capsize. Nevertheless, all of these countries recognize the wisdom of pooling their resources to keep China in check; Japan has taken the lead in establishing mutual defense cooperatives with Australia, South Korea, India, and the United States. Singapore has offered to provide bases for the US Navy."

CAA no longer worries that Guam will become overburdened, over-balanced, and capsize, having received assurances that Guam possesses a sufficiently sturdy keel and gyroscopic stabilizer.

"Owing to the fact that we don’t know what motivates Chinese behavior, the Australian General Staff worries that a mistake could lead to disastrous consequences —particularly when it is likely that China will attempt to use its military to enforce a Chinese Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).

The problem is that while demanding that other nations treat Chinese EEZs as its sovereign territory, China routinely refuses to acknowledge the EEZs of other nations. From the standpoint of international law, EEZs are not sovereign territory. We can therefore see how China might regard the US Navy’s mission to safeguard open sea-lanes as an intolerable trespass —a situation that could lead to deadly confrontation."

It's the old "what's-mine-is-mine-what's-yours-is-negotiable" attitude turned somewhat sideways: China will use existing international norms and fora to its own advantage and ignore those which infringe upon its own interests. That's what one does when one is the center of the Earth, after all.

"Some politicians argue that given China’s dependence on global trade, a deadly confrontation is unlikely. They may have forgotten that economic ties did not hinder German aggression at the beginning of the 20^th Century —a costly mistake for France. ....but here is where we find the real and present danger. Defense cuts may encourage China to challenge allied nations within the region of Southeast Asia —they are that arrogant."

Nor did close economic ties deflect World War I; for that matter, the United States' close economic ties with Saudi Arabia deter the 9/11 attacks.

(Marx notwithstanding, man is not solely, nor even primarily, an economic animal.)

"From Russia’s perspective, there couldn’t be a better time to threaten the United States and NATO with pre-emptive strikes unless we agree to cancel the so-called Missile Defense Shield, designed as a safeguard from Iranian ICBMs."

This seems a little over-the-top; threatening pre-emptive strikes is way more sabre-rattling than is necessary. Russia has far more effective economic and political levers to pull than jacking things up on the defcon meter.

"If one understands international relations, Russia’s timing couldn’t be better. We should anticipate this sort of behavior by an adversary whenever they perceive American leadership as weak, incompetent, ineffective, or confused."

Harsh words, but hardly unwarranted.

The "reset" button must have been like those ones installed near crosswalks: not really wired to anything but they give pedestrians something to do with their hands while waiting for the lights to change.

"This situation should once again remind us that American politicians and diplomats seldom learn important lessons of history. America cannot afford another war right now. Neither can we afford the perception of weakness, incompetence, or abject stupidity. We continue to live in a dangerous world"

Diplomats actually aren't slouches when it comes to learning their history lessons; however if you expand your definition of "diplomat" beyond those actually trained and experienced in it to those who practice it on our behalf at the highest levels....

"Rather than facing a deadly and costly regional conflict in Southeast Asia, it would be far less expensive to deter Chinese aggression vis-à-vis a strong military presence along the Pacific Rim. As for the Russian Bear, they understand but one thing: force or its promise."

5/4

re: "Managing decline"

David Warren at DavidWarrenOnline ("newspaper columns") argued against the inevitability and necessity of declinism.

Money quote(s):

"Gideon Rachman got his otherwise much-ignored Financial Times column linked on the Drudge Report, this week. (Drudge is "the bull" in this scenario.) In his smuggest, most superior, British tone, he lectured the Americans on "the management of decline." "

Even last October (when this saw print), it was far too late for any Europeans (even the British) to be lecturing Americans on this topic.

"(T)he phrase was meant to be droll: to ridicule the mindset of people who were destroying the British economy through nationalizations, while walking away from her responsibilities "east of Suez"; who portrayed Britain's decline as inevitable, and themselves as the ingenious lords of this great recessional dance."

The British have always done droll quite well.

"We "running dogs of American imperialism" (as the Maoists used to call us) regret the decline of American power, not necessarily from adoration of everything American, but because the alternative to American power in the world is Chinese power, and the rise to consequence of an array of regional powers perhaps nastier. For as America goes down, these unspeakable powers go up, relatively, and get their opportunity to throw their weight around."

True enough. America's decline, to the extent that it is real and not merely public relations in advance of reality, does not occur in a vacuum. Nature, and international relations, abhores a vacuum.

"In a similar way, in a previous generation, many not British themselves, cheered on the works of "British imperialism." For imperialism is always with us, and the British form was rather more benign than, say, the German form.

That is a point characteristically lost upon "progressive" minds, with their underlying, usually unexamined, utopian premises. This has been on exhibit throughout the Arab Spring, where it is assumed that the overthrow of Arab dictators must naturally lead to roses."

Clearly Mr. Warren's crystal ball was working pretty well last year, since he saw where the Arab Spring would almost inevitably lead in places like Egypt.

"Decline is of two kinds, relative and absolute. The relative decline of the U.S. was inevitable, as other countries which had destroyed themselves through war and totalitarianism gradually recovered, and wealth with its accompanying powers was disseminated through the world. The misfortune here is that America's allies in Canada, Europe, and elsewhere, declined their share of military expenditure. All were content to let the U.S. carry the weight of NATO, while they embarked on nanny-statist ventures more advanced than the American.

These in turn contributed to absolute decline: and to the effective bankruptcy of states across the European Union, as well as America and Japan. Behind the budgetary catastrophes are the demographic realities of aging societies, which can never catch up. They simply don't have enough working young to pay all the "entitlements."

Relative decline was unavoidable; but absolute decline was a choice."

Relative decline isn't such a bad thing when a rising tide is lifting other countries out of poverty. It's less of a good thing when poor countries are getting poorer.

""Managing decline" now means making the best of the fallout; of choosing what we can still afford and what we can no longer. The British "managed their decline," and now sneer at Americans whose turn it is to manage theirs.

There was in Britain a Churchillian force that did not accept decline. It "won the war" on its last sprint, then snuffed out just after.

There is likewise in the United States today a force - call it Tea Party - that does not accept inevitable decline. It is allied with every other faltering life force in American society. And, as an exponent of this "rabid right" myself, I will not only cheer them on, but continue biting their detractors. "

10/19

re: "Groundbreaking Report on Anti-Americanism in European Media"

Ray D. at Davids Medienkritik remarked on anti-American bias in European media.

Money quote(s):

"Perhaps the most striking statement on German media was made by Andrei Markovits, who related that a German journalist openly admitted to him that the editors back home were pushing him to provide negative material - because it sells so well. That is something we have known for years - but his statement is just further evidence."

&

"It is also beyond argument that individuals of faith in the United States have been unfairly vilified and targeted in European media. To conclude, let's hope that the larger mainstream media picks up on the subject of anti-Americanism in foreign media as well. Considering the general political attitude of the American mainstream media, however, (one of sympathy and empathy for the America-bashers) it is relatively unlikely that this will happen." (Bold typeface added for emphasis. - CAA.)


12/9

re: "Nuke the News: Kill the Aliens Before They Kill Us"

Frank J. at IMAO ("Unfair. Unbalanced. Unmedicated.") is for honesty.

Money quote(s):

"Isn’t staying staying in the country illegally a crime, hence the term “illegal”? I don’t know.

I wish the pro-illegal immigration crowd would be honest and just argue for open borders with no checks on anyone instead of this “we’ll keep saying its a crime and never enforce it” position. And that’s the main thing about the pro-illegal immigration people: Dishonesty. The way they’re always trying to conflate illegal immigration with legal immigration shows they know they have an untenable position and want to do anything they can to avoid dealing with it head on. That’s why we have to keep the pressure on. We can’t give up America’s sovereignty just because some people think they have a great position to win votes."

CAA is a big fan of legal immigration and legal immigrants. Mainly because they, by definition, exhibit law-abiding behavior in the course of immigration to the U.S. What's not to like about that?

CAA is not professionally unaware of the inefficiencies and burdensome requirements incorporated into the processes and system (and CAA uses that term somewhat loosely) through which legal immigrants must navigate. But CAA is also professionally aware of the many frauds and other abuses those many obstacles are intended to discourage and prevent.

8/19

re: "Our Wars of Choice Harm our Interests"

Joerg Wolf at Atlantic Review ("A Press Digest for Transatlantic Affairs") noted some opining at the Council on Foreign Relations and the Atlantic Council.

Money quote(s):

"Richard Haass, president of the Council on Foreign Relations, calls for a doctrine of restoration that "would help the U.S. shore up the economic foundations of its power." He is basically urging more limited foreign policy engagements, which would mean that the US should act more like the European countries."

"(M)ore limited foreign policy engagements"? Like putting an expiration date on our engagement with NATO, the UN, &tc.?

(I begin to suspect that, despite the big brains that the CFR is able to finagle articles for their periodical, Foreign Affairs, the CFR may not require so much brain-wattage in its officers.)

"An interesting additional argument against wars of choice is the message that the Libya war sends to Iran, North Korea and other rogue regimes who contemplate getting nuclear weapons: "An unnoted consequence of the NATO military effort to topple the Gaddafi regime may be any hope of eventual denuclearization of North Korea or Iran," writes Banning Garrett, director of the Atlantic Council's Strategic Foresight Project"

Garrett hit this right on the head.

7/23

re: "Addendum on National Myths"

Joseph W. at Grim's Hall considered the necessity of the national myth.

Money quote(s):

"The highly successful (the Chinese have one of the most successful national myths in the world; and their beastly treatment of the Uighurs and Tibetans comes along with it), the once successful (for I can dimly remember a time when public schools in this country taught an American national myth, and I've read enough old things to know it was once very strong), and the decidedly troubled."

Consider the highly successful and millenia-long experiment in cultural imperialism, and assimilation, waged by the Han. It's truly remarkable.

(Although it's much harder to consider it dispassionately if you're the next target for assimilation.)

"(I)f I had to pick a single factor that really makes a recognizable "people," a national myth is that factor. A common language helps; a common government helps; a common religion helps; but it is the national myth (that may well be bound up with all these things) that really does the trick."

Calling something a myth doesn't necessarily mean it's untrue, per se, although the imputation is certainly there.

"Smith however concludes that the Palestinian myth is not "strong enough" because their leadership is unwilling to accept a limited state that coexists with its Israeli neighbors. But I think that is not a sign of the myth's weakness, but simply its character. For better or worse, and mainly for worse, the Palestinians have indeed become a people because they have got a national myth. It's just a barren and ugly one. It is of recent vintage - that is the kernel of truth in Mr. Gingrich's statement (which I used to agree with) - but that doesn't invalidate it. All national myths have got to start somewhere." (Bold typeface added for emphasis. - CAA.)

These are indeed the key points to carry away from Mr W.'s analysis: the Palestinian national myth is a "barren and ugly" (indeed, it's genocidal) one; and, it's of very recent vintage.

"What makes our own myth remarkable is the way it rests on ideas and laws, more than any race or religion. The complaints that led to independence for certain grew out of the British constitution, and its common-law way of developing rights. Let colonists vote for the assemblies that tax them, as Britons vote for the Parliament that taxes them, and they'll pick up the idea that they have a right to it - not in the civil-law sense that someone formally granted it, but in the common-law way, that the unifying theory is to be discerned from the actual decisions made. And our myth certainly relies on the idea of these things as rights - yet is blessedly detached from any continued racial identity. Our national identity is not weakened if we admit that Anglo-Saxons can commit beastly atrocities - the document that started it all is filled with such accusations. More remarkably, if we admit that the ideas are noble, and the men who made them law were doing noble acts, we can admit much more wihtout weakening the myth at all - that they carried flaws with their nobility, as true heroes always do, and that Americans have done many awful things since by not living up to those ideas." (Emphasis in original text. - CAA.)

1/3

re: "The U.S.A. – ten-second summary."

Col. B. Bunny at Intergalactic Source of Truth (TM) ("Daily raising the bar on personal charisma") paints a gloomy picture.



10/5

re: "A Day That Shall Live in Infamy"

Emperor Misha at The Anti-Idiotarian Rottweiler ("HQ of the Rottweiler Empire. An Affiliate of the VRWC.") shares some trans-generational words of encouragement.*

Money quote(s):

"(A)s I grew up it wasn’t some point in ancient history, which is how our children will see it. To put it into perspective, think back on who you were in 1984. Then think about how you thought about the outbreak of World War I. That, back then, was 70 years ago as well. I can’t recall being taught much about the lessons of the Guns of August back when I was a strapping teen, and I don’t imagine that our kids will be taught much about December 7, 1941 today."

Growing up, CAA still had family members who not only served in the Second World War, but were already in uniform when the U.S. entered it. I still remember some of their stories; about fighting the Japanese, about the surrender in the Philippines, and about the Baatan Death March and the horrific captivity which followed.

Lessons?

(Don't Lose & Never Surrender.)

"Among the things we can learn was that this great nation of ours is a lot more resilient than most people think, and that includes myself in my darker moments.

We were attacked in an act of utmost perfidy, ambushed by an enemy who, although professing to worship honor, had none himself. We were hit hard, hit to the point where many wondered if we’d ever get up again from the initial blow, hit at a point in our history where our military was, compared to other nations already at war for two long years, barely in its infancy."

Resiliency is a word much bandied about in certain, Homeland Security, circles.

This does not, by itself, discredit the concept; far from it. If anything, it's a good sign that the quality, and its necessity, is recognized even today.

(A few words about DHS: While I am sympathetic to the notion that they have an impossible job, I also yield to no one when it comes to skepticism about how their missions are being implemented. Indeed, from a business-case standpoint, I wonder whether some of their self- and/or Congress-assigned missions are things that the federal government is best suited to do or whether they need to be done at all. By anyone. That being said, I suffer from a serious case of cognitive dissonance when I try reconcile the very serious and smart working agents and intelligence analysts whose work I admire which the absolute and apparent public bone-headedness exhibited by their policy-makers.)

"Few at the time thought that the United States would be a force to be reckoned with for years after that if ever, but all of the pessimists were proven wrong. In one year, the United States was strong, getting ready to fight a war on not one but two fronts. In a mere two years, the tide had turned and in a relatively short two more years, the United States would be the strongest military force this world had ever seen."

Ten years later the U.S. would have to re-build that military force, virtually from scratch.

There's a lesson there, for those paying attention to military funding debates.

"The resilience, the determination, the “can do” spirit, the love of country, the willingness to sacrifice and our endless optimism and belief in ourselves and the righteousness of our cause, that has always made us unique as a nation. That is what that poo-poo’ed “American Exceptionalism” is all about, and we’re blessed to have it because without it we wouldn’t be here."

There's also the little matter of being both a continental and a sea power, with an unmatched industrial bases and tremendous natural resources.

But without the human resources, those would not have sufficed.

"The Americans of 1941 didn’t moan and cry that defeat was inevitable, that the fleet was crushed, that our enemies were too strong and on the offensive (and you have to keep in mind that December of 1941 was the high water mark of the Axis Powers) and that the best we could do was to compromise, to drag out the inevitable and hope for the best.

They rolled up their damn sleeves and decided that, come what may, it was time to kick some ass. That victory would be ours no matter what it took, no matter how long it took, and that anything short of total, crushing, unconditional victory was NOT an option. Like the Brits at the time of the Battle of Britain when all seemed lost, we shrugged it off and went to work, confident in our cause and our ultimate victory." (Emphasis in original text. - CAA.)

As at least some of us still do today.

"Some say that we don’t have that spirit anymore. I wonder at times myself. But then again I look at our generation’s youngsters who keep going back into the breach, believing as those grandparents and great-grandparents of theirs, that victory comes only to those who never give up, that this is a fight worth fighting because the alternative to victory is not worth living with.

Yes, we have grown a bit soft as a result of decades of affluence and indifference to our nation’s enemies march through our institutions, but even though this is our darkest hour, we still have what it takes to beat back the forces of darkness and prevail in the end. It’s been done before. Our nation has faced perils larger than ours, yet here we are.

The only way we can lose is if we give up the fight before the fight is over." (Bold type added for emphasis. - CAA.)

It's that next "Greatest Generation" that even TIME magazine believed in for approximately 45 minutes. They haven't given up and if their victories are micturated away, there'll be Hell to pay.

_____

* Encouragement in the original sense of intended to instill courage.

12/7

re: "Avoiding Armageddon with China"

Dan Blumenthal, Mark Stokes, and Michael Mazza at Shadow Government ("Notes From The Loyal Opposition") look at changing U.S. perception of China's intentions.

Money quote(s):

"It is good news that James Traub, a highly regarded journalist and writer, may be startled out of his belief that China is a "status quo" power, based in part on a paper we wrote.

We hope that more writers of Traub's caliber will be similarly startled by China's growing menace. The truth is that like every rising power in history (including the United States) China wants to change rules, territorial delineations, and laws written while it was weak."

CAA is by no means a China (or even an "Asia") "hand." Not my speciality. But for any practicioner or student of foreign, military, or intelligence affairs, China is simply too big to ignore.

Like unto Texas, there are (or should be) more than one China. Probably (again like unto Texas), there should be at least five Chinas. And that doesn't even include Formosa in the count.

"Throughout its history, China has lumbered into disaster after disaster, costing untold sums in lives and treasure (e.g. the Great Leap Forward, the Cultural Revolution, Beijing's war with Vietnam). Certainly as China re-emerged as a power it had its chance to "bide its time and hide its capabilities" as Deng Xiaoping instructed. But instead, it decided to build a highly destabilizing military (see the last decade of Department of Defense reports on China's military power, the latest of which is here) and has proceeded to rattle its saber against Taiwan, Japan, Vietnam, the Philippines, South Korea, and, most troublingly, the United States. It has now created the conditions for the encirclement is so fears."

There's this concept of imperial overreach. Make no mistake about it, any China larger than one-fifth of its current mass constitutes an empire and may be expected to behave (and misbehave) accordingly.

Hope for the best, but plan for the worst.

"Responding to years of Chinese harassment of U.S., Japanese, Vietnamese, and Philippine ships, last year Clinton broke new ground by declaring at a summit in Hanoi that "The United States, like every nation, has a national interest in freedom of navigation, open access to Asia's maritime commons, and respect for international law in the South China Sea." This is a diplomatic way of telling China that we will continue to exercise our forces inside its exclusive economic zone, consistent with international custom, and we will ensure that our partners in Asia are able to resist Chinese bullying.

This brings us to what seem to be Traub's biggest problem with the paper: that doing what Gates and Clinton proclaimed we need to do (respond with our own military programs and ensure freedom of navigation and open access to Asia's maritime commons) is expensive. True enough. National security is an expensive endeavor. But as our own history shows (pre-Pearl Harbor, pre-Korean War) military weakness in the face of new threats are more expensive still, in lives and in treasure."

Nothing I read in our nation's capital newspaper(s) give me any confidence that we are any less likely to re-commit our interwar and post-WW2 forefathers' mistakes with respect to military preparedness. And as my WW2 veteran grandfather rather chillingly put it to a much younger CAA, young men end up paying for that with "a bayonet in the guts."

"The Cold War is too simple a metaphor to describe Sino-U.S. relations. China is an economic partner, and Washington is deeply engaged in a diplomacy that tries to convince China to peacefully take its place as a great power. At the same time, we are balancing China's power and hedging against a more bellicose China."

Hope for the best, but prepare for the worst. China certainly is, expanding its military and naval capabilities at a rapid pace, becoming in fact the peer-competitor that theorists like to pontificate about.

"The idea of a self-fulfilling prophecy -- of turning China into an enemy by treating it as one -- is like a unicorn; it is a make believe creature that still has its believers. The United States has done more than any other country to "turn China into a friend" by welcoming it into the international community. Alas, China has not fulfilled this U.S. "prophesy of friendship." Instead China has built what all credible observers call a destabilizing military that has changed the status quo by holding a gun to Taiwan's head even as Taiwan makes bold attempts at peace, by claiming ever more territory in the South China Sea, and by attempting to bully and intimidate Japan."

Engagement works both ways. All the economic levers we attempt to work into our engagement with China run right back to us through our own economy and international economic institutions and arrangements. And China's military theorists aren't shy in their theorizing about the multidimensional nature of any future conflict with the U.S. Forewarned isn't necessarily fore-armed, but it's a start.

"(I)t is time for the United States to offer more serious assistance so that matters do not get out of hand. A strong U.S. presence and commitment to the region's security can help avoid a regional nuclear arms race, for example. The United States can be a force multiplier by providing the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance that only Washington possesses, and by training, and equipping our allies and friends.

This strategy is one way of beginning to put Asia back in balance as China changes the status quo. Not doing so, we fear, would lead to Armageddon."

(9/6)

re: "The ‘First Fruits’ Of Our Support Of The Arab Spring Endeavor In Libya"

John Bernard, 1st Sgt. USMC (ret.), at Big Peace doubts that Libya's Arab Spring will amount to an improvement.

Money quote(s):

"(B)oth the United States and France have reached out to the Libyan National Transitional Council (NTC) and predictably, the NTC turned it’s back on those very same nations that came to their rescue.

The US State Department reached out to our “new friends” in Libya, hoping to retrieve Abdel Basset Ali al-Megrahi, the mastermind behind the 1988 Lockerbie airline bombing and the NTC said no. The no was neither tentative nor was it contingent on some prerequisite understanding or action. They said no with emphasis. The NTC spokesman said; ” [We] will not give any Libyan citizen to the West…”. So much for thanks, the spirit of cooperation, any understanding of right and wrong or any semblance of a common understanding of human rights, just; no."

Followed by a mention of disappointment regarding France's expections about Libyan oil production.

(One begins to suspect that "no blood for oil" doesn't parse well into French.)

"For those who choose to immediately dismiss these as the “growing pains” of a new regime protecting it’s interests, let me say that this continued naïveté toward the Islamic mind and their collective vision of the west and all non-compliant nations, is delusional! These are not the actions of righteous people whose vision includes a belief that all men are created equal. These are the actions of a people who deem all men are either submitted to Allah or they are not; and there are consequences for non compliance.

Naïve or not, the United States and our NATO friends, embarked on a mission to help secure freedom for the Libyan people, as though freedom is a universally understood concept. The US Constitution generally defines freedom as every individual’s God given inalienable right to self determination."

What about the Libyans' definition?

"What the Koran teaches is anathema to any constructive understanding of personal freedom. Rather it teaches submission and it’s adherents, to propagate, by the sword if necessary.

This is not a new revelation, this is an age old truth as defined in the Koran, the Hadith and the very words of the Islamic Scholars. So what continues to give hope to our western minded “leadership” that what these various rebellions are seeking is indeed, freedom? And what gives them the idea that supporting their efforts will in the end support our unilateral interests to defend these shores, and our Constitution?"

Change is not always for the better. And some do not see their interests, even while in national office, as being unilateral.

"Let me be clear; the world will be no worse off with Ghadaffi’s head on a pike but supporting a gaggle of 7th century thugs who would have Al Qaida in their number never mind in a position of leadership, will set us all back two decades."

1st Sgt Bernard is specific in just what kind of U.S. leadership there was two decades ago, and cites an example in U.S.-Libyan relations to make his point.

re: "National Security Part 3: The Role Of Economics"

The Curmudgeon Emeritus at Eternity Road reviewed the economic basis for military strength.

Money quote(s):

"The last thing any commander wants to do is take his men into an unwinnable war, especially a war unwinnable by reason of inadequate material resources"

Unfortunately, wars aren't always fought by two sides which chose to go to war against each other. It only takes on side to start a war. The enemy gets a vote.

"If a commander dislikes to go to war inadequately provisioned, a national command authority -- in the case of the United States, the president -- should dislike to send him there. Yet it's in the nature of nation-states that, as John Jay said most memorably, they'll go to war whenever there's a good chance of profiting thereby."

This pre-supposes that a commander-in-chief is sufficiently knowledgable, or sufficiently well-advised, that he (or she) knows the difference. Or cares.

(Yes, I'm still pissed about the whole "the army you have" crack.)

"Economic strength is both the precondition for military readiness and the requirement for military endurance. To be considered well defended, a nation must have both.

Analysts disagree on the extent to which a nation can endure various degrees of economic militarization. In the early years of the RAND Corporation, studies were submitted to the Pentagon that proposed that the United States could divert as much as 50% of its GDP to military expenditures, if that were necessary to meet some contingency. Needless to say, there was a wide spread of opinion on whether that was true, and if so, on how long the nation could remain in being under so large a military burden."

Full mobilization is something that the U.S. has never, not really, experienced. Nothing like what various European states, such as Britain, Russia, or Germany, experienced during World War II.

"(A)nnual military expenditures come to about $700 billion: 5% of GDP. Given that the armed forces are one of the seventeen enumerated powers of Congress, that doesn't seem disproportionate, especially considering the broadening of the military's missions and responsibilities in recent years."

Ah, but what about the penumbras!

"It must be said that we spend as much as we do on our military because our "allies" spend so little on theirs. Not only are we committed to their defense; we are all too frequently called in to handle crises they have disdained to address.

Yet despite all that spending and the large, capable military it supports, we are not secure."

There's no such thing as being completley secure, at least this side of the Pearly Gates. The writer discusses some of the ways in which he believes Americans perceive themselves to be insecure, which are worth reading, particularly with regards to the problems causing, and resulting from, illegal immigration.

"(N)ational security is affected by our willingness and ability to maintain mobilization bases: facilities from which we could rapidly develop new or previously rejected military capabilities, or greatly expand the ones we have.

Mobilization bases are important because few major wars begin as "bolts from the blue." There are normally clear indications that conflict is brewing well before the first exchange of fire. That would be so even in our present age, in which the interval between a firm decision and the ballistic nuclear bombardment of any point on the globe is no more than thirty minutes."

A firm decision should be made upon a basis of firm information. More than likely somewhat longer than 30 minutes would be required to assemble, to say nothing of developing, actionable intelligence.

"(S)uch mobilization bases cost money. Worse, it's money spent to remain flexibly poised against notional threats: possibilities that might never materialize. They're the first targets of budget-cutters in a time of austerity. Thus, we cannot be sanguine about building and maintaining such bases without maintaining our economic health and vitality. Even then, it would be necessary to keep unpleasant but yet unrealized possibilities in mind when the budget-cutters come to call."

Good advice for the strategic-minded, but the strategic-minded won't be calling the shots when the knives come out for budget cutting.

"America was not altogether ready for World War II. We had reduced our World War I Army to pre-war levels, and had retreated from most aspects of military production. Fortunately, the psychological response of Americans to the attack on Pearl Harbor left us ready and willing to endure a considerable degree of privation for the sake of the forces and materiel the war would require. Above all, America was rich enough, and free enough, to convert half of its productive sector to the making of weapons of war. It is unclear that we could do that today."

I'm a bit more optimistic about our ability to convert great swaths of our productive sector to war production, but I'm less sanguine about what of our productive sector actually remains within our own borders.

re: "American Denial"

Steve McCann at American Thinker ("a daily internet publication devoted to the thoughtful exploration of issues of importance to Americans") shared a little doom-saying to brighten our days.

Money quote(s):

"Many of us who immigrated to the United States from either war-ravaged or totalitarian countries, where freedom was either unknown or the quintessence of daydreams, find ourselves baffled by a trait common to the majority of Americans: the belief, consciously or subconsciously, that the worst cannot happen here. That somehow the demoralizing images and disturbing experiences of those elsewhere are confined to those poor souls and will never find their way to American shores."

Oddly, we import by the tens of thousands (as refugees) the very people whose folkways and cultures make this more likely.

"Is this mindset a by-product of 66 years of unprecedented peace and prosperity? Is there something unique in the American character that revels in denial? Is there over-confidence that Americans can accomplish anything? Is this outlook the end-product of a lack of education and appreciation of how the success of the United States is extraordinary and of the fact that since modern man took his first tentative step on the plains of Africa 200,000 years ago until the present less than 9% of all humanity has ever experienced true freedom?"

Yes and no. There's nothing uniquely American about denial. But there are uniqueties about the American character, however it might currently be alloyed.

"The United States is unique among nations because of its founding principles, geography and mix of cultures and races. Those factors enabled the country to overcome a myriad of tribulations in its early years and develop an atmosphere conducive to an overwhelming barrage of creativity, ingenuity and individual advancement."

The "mix of cultures and races" part actually something of a recent development. For most of the four centuries of America's modern history, America's non-indigenous cultures and races were a fairly homogenous blend of Western Europeans; Indians and Blacks were outsiders to it.

"The American populace is no longer taught the basics of the the founding the United States and how it was able to achieve the peace and prosperity that is the hallmark of the present day. Nor are they aware that the annals of history are littered with the refuse of once invincible cultures whose citizenry never thought the worst would ever happen to them. All succumbed to greed, complacency and hubris; traits which have also begun to dominate American society.

While some Americans are waking up to the potential economic and security disasters that loom over the horizon, the vast majority are not. There still exists, deep in the recesses of the American mindset, the entrenched thought that none of this will really happen. That somehow, because this is the United States, there will be an easy and painless way to offset the potential problems -- that is if these dilemmas really are genuine.

Those of us who have first-hand experience from other nations of what the worst can be, say with great assurance that it can happen in the United States and it will unless Americans, and in particular the governing class, awaken from their self-induced stupor and honestly face that reality."

Words of warning indeed.

_____

Hat tip to Col. B. Bunny at Eternity Road.