re: "Obama's Afghanistan strategy and the right to be wrong"

Peter Feaver at Shadow Government ("Notes From The Loyal Opposition") considered the U.S. civil-military relationship.


Money quote(s):


"(F)rom the parochial perspective of civil-military relations theory, Obama is within his rights to make the decision in the way that he did, and so far, the senior military have behaved in an exemplary fashion."

That's a good BLUF ("bottom line up front"). Mr. Feaver then ratchets up his granularity a bit.


"(N)ot only will the coalition have fewer forces than the generals believe they require to implement the overall strategy effectively -- probably much fewer, as our allies respond to the dog whistle "retreat" sounding from the president's decision and accelerate their rush to the exits -- but those forces will be facing an enemy that has good reason to believe that time is on its side. The military brass report that the new course just might work, but it will be a very close run thing."

Nobody, least of all our allies, wants to be the last ones on the ground within a shrinking operational footprint. Still, we have the best troops in the world, capable of winning even when resourced to fail.

"Since the military logic of the move is so weak, one naturally looks for some other explanation, such as a political angle. The president's decision to interrupt next summer's fighting season makes no military sense whatsoever; better to let the troops finish the fighting season and come home in the late fall or winter. But that would be after the election. So far as I have been able to determine, that is the only explanation of the timeline that makes sense, but I am open to hearing a convincing counterargument. I am very reluctant to charge a president with elevating domestic political interests over national security ones because I remember how unfairly Democrats made that charge against President George W. Bush -- and that was on a much more flimsy evidentiary basis."

Civility. Accusing a sitting president of playing politics with U.S. soldier's lives is serious business. Sadly, better presidents than this one have done it before.

"(T)here is one aspect of the decision that is legitimate and one that may even warrant praise. The legitimate aspect is that, notwithstanding a torrent of leaks, the decision-making process seems to have conformed more or less to democratic civil-military norms. The military presented a range of options, including options that it did not want to execute; it would have been inappropriate of Gen. David Petraeus to tie Obama's hands by only providing a narrow range of options, minor variants of the military's preferred plan. He didn't do so; instead, he and the rest of the military leadership have saluted and are obeying, and such professionalism is very definitely worthy of praise. To be sure, the military gave its best personal judgment as to the risks inherent in those plans. Obama was fully aware of the military's judgment, and the public, through Congress, is also aware of that judgment. But it is the president's job to balance the risks of battlefield failure against other risks. The military gets to say this is a high-risk plan. The president gets to say that he will accept this risk and impose it on them.

Accept it and impose it he did. That has important political consequences. Before, one could say that he merely chose General Stanley McChrystal and General Petraeus's strategy. Now it is unmistakably President Obama's strategy. It is his war. But he will be ordering others to fight his war, which brings me to one bit of unfinished civil-military business."

So there's ownership of the outcome here, however it turns out. And we should all wish our commander-in-chief's plan every success in the world.

"I have been thinking of the troops that will remain. They are locked in the fight of their lives, and they (or at least their commanders) probably paid more attention to the president's speech than did most other Americans. Did the president give them a convincing rationale for continuing to risk their lives? Did he convince them that the stakes were worth it, that the prospects for lasting success good enough? Do they believe that their commander in chief is as committed to the war effort as he is asking them to be? Only when those answers are answered satisfactorily will Obama have fulfilled the dictates of democratic civil-military theory."

That's a real question asked by real troops on the ground. I know I asked it myself and, during the previous administration, I often found various civilian and military officials to be, shall we say, insufficiently serious about their commitment.

"From a civil-military perspective, the president has the right to be wrong. He might well be wrong this time, and if so, that may be evident to all by next fall. In that case, democratic theory points to the duty of others: the voters."

In the democratic model of civil-military relations, the voters get the final word on a commander-in-chief's fitness to lead the nation, to say nothing of the military. However it should never be forgotten that in other lands, at other times, a commander-in-chief's errors have been so serious as to take the civil-military relationship right out of the democratic context. The history or literary-minded will recall "It Can't Happen Here" was a warning, not a promise.

re: "Jaw-Dropping Obama Quotes of the Day"

Aaron Worthing at Patterico's Pontifications ("Harangues that Just Make Sense") doesn't buy waffling dressed up as something else.

Money quote(s):

"(L)ook, I’m not saying that there is no argument for staying out of it. I personally think we should have done something long ago. But I respect the other side."

&

"Exactly when did Gaddafi have legitimacy? A dictator is illegitimate every day of his rule." (Emphasis in original text. - CAA)

re: "There's Willful Blindness, and Then There's Willful Stupidity"

Andrew C. McCarthy at The Corner ("a web-leading source of real-time conservative opinion") puts a smackdown on the DNI.

Quote(s):

"James Clapper, the head of intelligence for the United States of America, has explained to Congress that the Muslim Brotherhood is “largely secular.” It further has “eschewed violence,” decries al-Qaeda as a “perversion of Islam,” and really just wants “social ends” and “a betterment of the political order in Egypt.”"

&

"If this is what $40 billion–plus buys you, maybe Representative Ryan can make up the rest of that $100 billion by eliminating the intelligence community."

I don't happen to know the DNI personally, but a lot folks in the IC whom I do know speak of him with respect.

I haven't read the whole testimony, but one thing I can tell you is that what someone from the IC briefs an open meeting with the media present is not what he or she briefs behind closed doors where everyone inside has the appropriate security clearance. Unclassified briefings are, necessarily, somewhat dumbed-down, and they are so for very good reasons. Such reasons as not exposing the crown jewels of your best sources or means of collection, &tc., so as to make your source's lives shorter and riskier or to make it easier for an adversary to fool or evade your intelligence capabilities.

(The reader may recall, or is invited to discover, why it is that Osama Bin Ladin no longer uses a cellular or satellite telephone.)

That being said, the MB (like Hamas, like Hezbollah) uses the disfunction or disinterest of the legal government and authorities wherever they are to buy legitimacy by providing social services. In other words, they go secular and they do so in a very deliberate, very public way. It's not fake, the medical or social safety net they erect is quite real, and in an environment (such as Egypt) where the overtly political and violent aims of the MB are quite ruthlessly quashed, this sort of thing is much less likely to get one a date with the security ministries interrogators.

With that in mind, it may be that reporting on the DNI's testimony is a little slanted, a little incomplete, and that maybe all that shocked reaction on the part of committee members was just the slightest, teensiest bit stage-managed.

(Not that there's ever any stagecraft and drama practiced in the public eye on Capitol Hill. Perish the thought.)

JG - Peace treaties, detention and human rights

From my archive of press clippings:

Jamaica Gleaner

Peace treaties, detention and human rights

published: Sunday June 29, 2008

Martin Henry, Contributor

Since the police cannot find the men on its most wanted list or among the leaders of the 150 gangs, which Kingfish ACP Glenmore Hinds estimates operate in the country, perhaps they should begin by detaining the organisers and participants in peace treaties.

Read the whole article here.

Snippet(s):

"Peace treaties are wrong and dangerous - and they have never worked.

The pattern is clear: A pretence at peace until there is a reason for the war to resume.

The warriors of August Town, who signed last week, have insisted that they continue to bear arms as long as the weapons are not 'brandished'."

"The shameful failure of the Jamaican state to enforce law and order and to protect citizens from each other is lending legitimacy to militias and their peace treaties.

Dissing someone at a 'peace' dance, or chatting up the wrong girl, disagreement over spoils captured by the combined forces from the rest of society, or just sheer lust for blood influenced by drugs and jobless boredom will, in due course, terminate the peace."

&

"Peace treaties legitimate the state within the state.

They convert criminals into soldiers and gang leaders into statesmen.

But even more perniciously, peace treaties leave communities captive to criminal forces and deny justice.

Perhaps, the most important reason why peace treaties do not hold - and cannot hold - is the fact that unless justice is provided to the victims of crime and their families and friends, mere boys with guns at their disposal will continue to carry out reprisal killings, a leading motive for murder in Jamaica.

Violence is inter-generational and inter-tribal, and peace treaties haven't broken that cycle."

_____
Martin Henry is a communication consultant. Please send feedback to medhen@gmail.com or columns@gleanerjm.com.