re: "Losing a war and a peace"

UNCLE JIMBO at Blackfive ("the paratrooper of love") explained some quite simple concepts.

Money quote(s):

"We are making a deal with the Taliban, a losing one. Our Commander in Chief fundamentally misunderstands the way wars must be fought, and I am not talking about strategy or tactics. I am talking about winning or losing."

There is, for those who haven't been following along at home, quite a difference between the two, and the consequences will echo into eternity.

He goes on to admonish the president:

"You can't end wars Mr. President; They are won or lost. Afghanistan has been lost."

In all fairness, he also notes:

"I am not certain at all that the war in Afghanistan could have been won."

Not as it's been fought; it seems reasonable to question whether the proper action in Afghanistan should have been simply a punitive expedition to schwack a sufficient number of alligators, rather than attempting to drain, and subsequently gentrify, the swamp.

"We will now cede the field of battle, where so much US blood has been shed, to the enemy. And we will sue for something less than peace from the very people who hosted the planning and execution of 9/11."

I suppose the inevitable question, should this proceed as it appears envisioned, is how long before Taliban-sponsored and sheltered embark on their offensive against the U.S.

That and how much money we will pay in tribute, er, development assistance during the interim.

"It has been a long decade of war and we are all tired, none more so than the troops who have marched to the sound of gunfire over and over again. They, with the steadfast support of a real Commander in Chief George W. Bush, won the war in Iraq."

1/5

re: "Unless You’re In The Military, The President Is Not Your Commander In Chief"

Doug Mataconis at Outside the Beltway ("an online journal of politics and foreign affairs analysis") expanded upon a pet-peeve.

Money quote(s):

"(S)ince the September 11th attacks, and probably before then although I can’t say I noticed it quite as much, there has been a tendency to refer to the President as “our” Commander in Chief, or for civilians to say that the President is their Commander in Chief. In reality, of course, the Constitution merely states that the President “shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United States.” "

The president wears several "hats," as it were. He's indeed the commander in chief; he also embodies a number of "chief executive" roles, as well as some having legislative or judicial aspects. Oh, and chief diplomat as well.

"This idea of the President as “Commander in Chief of America” is at the center of what has been called the Imperial Presidency. As Gene Healy noted in his excellent book The Cult of the Presidency, the Presidency we know today bears almost no resemblance to the institution the Founding Fathers created when they drafted Article II of the Constitution. For roughly the first 100 years of the Republic, Presidents kept to the limited role that the Constitution gave them. There were exceptions, of course. Most notably revolving around military crises, wars, or similar circumstances. Abraham Lincoln greatly expanded the powers of his office during the Civil War but so did Presidents such as James Polk and Andrew Jackson. Even that great beacon of limited government Thomas Jefferson used the opportunity of the Louisiana Purchase to exceed the powers of his office. For the most part, though, America’s 19th Century Presidents held to the limited role that is set forth in Article II, which is probably why they aren’t remembered very well by history." (Emphasis in original text. - CAA.)

Nice historical recapitulation.

"Presidents from Theodore Roosevelt to Woodrow Wilson to FDR went far beyond anything resembling Constitutional boundaries to achieve their goals, and they were aided and abetted in that effort by a compliant Supreme Court and a Congress that lacked the courage to stand up for it’s own Constitutional prerogatives. Then, when World War Two ended and the Cold War began, the powers of the Presidency began to grow exponentially.

Throughout this period, the one common theme regardless of who sat in the Oval Office was the manner in which the Presidency itself became more and more entangled with a military air. Where previous Presidents were open and available to the public, the President today goes from the White House to Marine One to Air Force One, all the while encased in the tightest security bubble of any person in the world."

Much of this is the inevitable result of the world wars and subsequent Cold War. Some of it has less to do with presidential egos (or showmanship) than with the egos of presidential staff.

"(T)here’s the question of whether it’s really appropriate for a President to return the salute of a military officer. Since he is a civilian, there’s a fairly good argument that it not only isn’t necessary for the President to return a salute, but that it’s inappropriate."

Recent changes of military courtesy as regards veterans not in uniform being allowed (it was never specifically forbidden, apparently) to render the hand salute for the U.S. flag or for the playing of the National Anthem make this less of a stretch, to my mind. At least in those instances where the person rendering the hand salute is himself (or herself) a veteran. Which is nice.

As for us Foreign Service folks, when abroad the only non-military/naval person at an embassy who should be saluted is an ambassador. Presumably, the ambassador would then return the salute. I've heard of presidents (and ambassadors) being criticized for not returning a salute, of the "what?-are-they-too-good-for-it?" variety. So it's not like you can win but for losing.

In some places, local embassy guard forces (Monrovia, I'm looking at you!) salute all American staff entering the embassy, which is, on the one hand, simply another form of "sniper check" and on the other hand a veritable cloud bank of disinformation. To a degree, having to return such a salute tickles the former-NCO side of CAA; what really made my day was how the local thugs, er, "special police" (these were the Charles Taylor days) would also snap to attention and salute us as well.

"In any case, along with the Imperial Presidency, is seems that we’ve also developed a Militaristic Presidency. The fact that such a view of a President’s proper role makes it easier for them to commit American forces to dubious missions raises the question of whether we’ve gone way too far in cloaking the Presidency with an air of authority (t)hat is wholly inappropriate.

There’s another danger in the idea that the President is “our Commander in Chief.” If the man, or woman, in the White House is just “the President,” then disagreeing with and criticizing them isn’t much different than disagreeing with any other politician. Accept the idea that they are your “Commander in Chief,” though, and all of a sudden the subtle idea that they are their to give all of us orders that must be obeyed gets introduced into the mix." (Bold typeface added for emphasis. - CAA.)

And that's just wrong. For those of us who're just-plain-citizens, i.e., voters, the president works for us, not the other way around.

"(D)o we really want to start introducing into our political culture the idea that the relationship between citizen and President is in anyway similar than, say, the relationship between a Pfc. and their commanding officer?

So, let’s stop this nonsense that the President is our Commander in Chief, because unless you happen to be uniform at the moment he isn’t."

1/2

re: "Obama's Afghanistan strategy and the right to be wrong"

Peter Feaver at Shadow Government ("Notes From The Loyal Opposition") considered the U.S. civil-military relationship.


Money quote(s):


"(F)rom the parochial perspective of civil-military relations theory, Obama is within his rights to make the decision in the way that he did, and so far, the senior military have behaved in an exemplary fashion."

That's a good BLUF ("bottom line up front"). Mr. Feaver then ratchets up his granularity a bit.


"(N)ot only will the coalition have fewer forces than the generals believe they require to implement the overall strategy effectively -- probably much fewer, as our allies respond to the dog whistle "retreat" sounding from the president's decision and accelerate their rush to the exits -- but those forces will be facing an enemy that has good reason to believe that time is on its side. The military brass report that the new course just might work, but it will be a very close run thing."

Nobody, least of all our allies, wants to be the last ones on the ground within a shrinking operational footprint. Still, we have the best troops in the world, capable of winning even when resourced to fail.

"Since the military logic of the move is so weak, one naturally looks for some other explanation, such as a political angle. The president's decision to interrupt next summer's fighting season makes no military sense whatsoever; better to let the troops finish the fighting season and come home in the late fall or winter. But that would be after the election. So far as I have been able to determine, that is the only explanation of the timeline that makes sense, but I am open to hearing a convincing counterargument. I am very reluctant to charge a president with elevating domestic political interests over national security ones because I remember how unfairly Democrats made that charge against President George W. Bush -- and that was on a much more flimsy evidentiary basis."

Civility. Accusing a sitting president of playing politics with U.S. soldier's lives is serious business. Sadly, better presidents than this one have done it before.

"(T)here is one aspect of the decision that is legitimate and one that may even warrant praise. The legitimate aspect is that, notwithstanding a torrent of leaks, the decision-making process seems to have conformed more or less to democratic civil-military norms. The military presented a range of options, including options that it did not want to execute; it would have been inappropriate of Gen. David Petraeus to tie Obama's hands by only providing a narrow range of options, minor variants of the military's preferred plan. He didn't do so; instead, he and the rest of the military leadership have saluted and are obeying, and such professionalism is very definitely worthy of praise. To be sure, the military gave its best personal judgment as to the risks inherent in those plans. Obama was fully aware of the military's judgment, and the public, through Congress, is also aware of that judgment. But it is the president's job to balance the risks of battlefield failure against other risks. The military gets to say this is a high-risk plan. The president gets to say that he will accept this risk and impose it on them.

Accept it and impose it he did. That has important political consequences. Before, one could say that he merely chose General Stanley McChrystal and General Petraeus's strategy. Now it is unmistakably President Obama's strategy. It is his war. But he will be ordering others to fight his war, which brings me to one bit of unfinished civil-military business."

So there's ownership of the outcome here, however it turns out. And we should all wish our commander-in-chief's plan every success in the world.

"I have been thinking of the troops that will remain. They are locked in the fight of their lives, and they (or at least their commanders) probably paid more attention to the president's speech than did most other Americans. Did the president give them a convincing rationale for continuing to risk their lives? Did he convince them that the stakes were worth it, that the prospects for lasting success good enough? Do they believe that their commander in chief is as committed to the war effort as he is asking them to be? Only when those answers are answered satisfactorily will Obama have fulfilled the dictates of democratic civil-military theory."

That's a real question asked by real troops on the ground. I know I asked it myself and, during the previous administration, I often found various civilian and military officials to be, shall we say, insufficiently serious about their commitment.

"From a civil-military perspective, the president has the right to be wrong. He might well be wrong this time, and if so, that may be evident to all by next fall. In that case, democratic theory points to the duty of others: the voters."

In the democratic model of civil-military relations, the voters get the final word on a commander-in-chief's fitness to lead the nation, to say nothing of the military. However it should never be forgotten that in other lands, at other times, a commander-in-chief's errors have been so serious as to take the civil-military relationship right out of the democratic context. The history or literary-minded will recall "It Can't Happen Here" was a warning, not a promise.

re: "In Case Anyone Cares, Obama Is Fighting What Is Actually, Demonstrably an "Illegal War" "

Ace at Ace of Spades HQ gets this about ninety-percent correct.

Money quote(s):

"The scheme of the War Powers Act is that a president can make war, absent authority, for sixty days. Once that sixty day limit is reached, he must begin winding down the effort as soon as possible, and must end all confrontation (even of the retreat/withdrawal under fire type) thirty days after that.

Now, the President can of course seek authorization for war in that sixty day window, in which case the Constitution is satisfied and the War Powers Act no longer applies.

The President has not sought any resolution or authorization. Has not even sought it."

There are some exceptions to this, such as when U.S. forces or territory come under attack.

According to the Library of Congress: "the President's powers as Commander in Chief are exercised only pursuant to a declaration of war, specific statutory authorization from Congress, or a national emergency created by an attack upon the United States (50 USC Sec. 1541)."

"Clinton did the same thing with Bosnia. So this isn't the first time.

Odd that only Republican Presidents need to, and do in fact, seek resolutions of war, while the Democrats who scream the loudest about this part of the Constitution (one of the few they like) just ignore it again and again.

Obama's theory (as was Clinton's) is that because this is being fought "by NATO," then it's not... what, war? I don't get this."

It's always been my understanding that the U.S. was a fully-vested, voting member of NATO. And that the current supreme commander in NATO is a U.S. Navy admiral.

"Most nations go to war as part of an alliance of some kind. They always have. They likely always will.

Where does this idea spring from that when a Democrat wants to go to war without constitutional authorization, he can point to whatever countries he's in alliance with and say "I know the Constitution says I need an authorization of war, but look, I've got Martinique on my side, Hoss. Gold standard." "

&

"I(t) doesn't bloody matter what organization is nominally in charge of a war, or what combination of countries you're allied with. The Constitution does not say that you need either a declaration of war or France has your back.

There is one statement. It applies to all circumstances. It doesn't matter if we're doing it on behalf of the UN, NATO, the G-8, the NAFTA trade zone, SEATO, or fuck-all else."

re: "Why the Libyan War is important to us - and to our children"

Fabius Maximus ("A discussion of geopolitics – broadly defined as economics, government, sociology and the military arts – from an American’s perspective.") puts our intervention in Libya and the War Powers Act into mutual perspective.

Money quote(s):

"Summary: The Libyan War will have long-term consequences, no matter who eventually rules Libya. It’s another precedent. Another step away from the Second Republic (1788-) towards a new political regime. One with a far stronger Executive than the Founders wanted. One as strong as they feared."

This is not an uncommon viewpoint on the right side of the political spectrum.

"The Libyan War does not meet the requirements for Presidential authorization of military action. The relevant clauses are both brief and clear."

"US Code Title 50, Chapter 33: The War Powers Resolution, § 1541. Purpose and policy Section C: Presidential executive power as Commander-in-Chief; limitation
The constitutional powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief to introduce United States Armed Forces into hostilities, or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, are exercised only pursuant to
1. a declaration of war,
2. specific statutory authorization, or
3. a national emergency created by attack upon the United States, its territories or possessions, or its armed forces."

No president, since the War Powers Act was first passed, has conceded that it actually binds them, but all have been punctilious about not violating it and complying with it, even if only as a courtesy.

"A cure will come only when we as a people decide to return to a Constitutional form of government. That would mean no public support for these discretionary wars, and the senior military leadership coming to a different understanding of how to balance their duties to obey the Commander-in-Chief and defend the Constitution.

The latter is an important and seldom mentioned point. I fear we’re slowly moving to a time where the two duties of our most senior officers will conflict, radically and unmistakably. Perhaps not in our time, but likely in our children’s time"

Accepting congressional resolutions authorizing the use of force, as was done for Afghanistan and Iraq, as constituting declarations of war is reasonable enough; it's not like the Constitution established any sort of format for this kind of document. It's up to Congress to make that sort of rule for itself, or not. It's once you start subcontracting that element of sovereignty outwith the federal system, to UN or NATO or other organs, that Constitutionalists get.... twitchy.

"The primary precedent expanding Presidential war powers; “The Korean War: On What Legal Basis Did Truman Act?“, Louis Fisher (Congressional Research Service), American Journal of International Law, January 1995 – American history might have taken a different course if our senior generals had gently requested that Truman first get Presidential approval. If they had only taken their oath more seriously."

_____

Hat tip to Tigerhawk ("thoughts of the day on international affairs, politics, things that strike us as hilarious and personal observations").

re: "A new use of military force doctrine"

Uncle Jimbo at Blackfive ("the paratrooper of love") is looking for the silver lining, and finds some doctrinal clarity.

Money quote(s):

"Out of the great and ongoing dithering, world sports & war by remote control tour some good may come. If the Libya no fly zone goat rope showed one thing it's that we have no coherent established and articulated policy for the use of military force. We have what seem to be some fairly clear guidance in the Constitution and the War Powers Act, and yet we don't seem to feel like holding our Presidents to the letter of those laws. We seem to recognize that a Commander in Chief needs some freedom of maneuver before having to herd those cats of Congress into a formal declaration of war or some lesser writ of ass kickery."

"Writ of ass kickery" is just pure gold.

Uncle Jimbo concludes, therefore, that:

"The President can, when he deems it necessary, under his Article II constitutional authority as CinC occasionally pummel bad actors, tyrants, terrorists, genocidists etc. as long as he does not roll tanks. It has been common practice for long enough now that we ought to just be able to nod our heads and agree. I don't want any President to have to ask Congress if he can whack a terrorist camp, or send a friendly cruise missile reminder to bad guys. These things can help focus the bad guy's minds on consequences and therefore avoid actual open conflict."

The problem is that these are acts of war, whether legal or Constitutional or not, and the adversary isn't likely to parse the nuances, dontchaknow.

The flip side of that is that the typical adversary has likely been waging war on us already, on the quiet and on the cheap, and didn't ask our Congress for permission to do that either.