re: "What's Wrong and What's Right With the War Colleges"

Dr. George E. Reed at Defense Policy ("a non-partisan forum for news, opinions, viewpoints, blogs, commentary, analysis, and debate from America’s defense and national security community") has a great round-up of recent kerfuffles surrounding the war college system, and has his own ideas about it.

Money quote(s):

"A cascade of withering criticism has recently been leveled at the war colleges– those venerable institutions that represent the pinnacle of the hierarchy of professional military education. Each service maintains a war college or equivalent designed to prepare lieutenant colonels and colonels for the highest levels of responsibility, and while they have different cultures in many respects they also share some common attributes and challenges."

Foreign service officers above a certain rank have the opportunity to attend most (if not all) of these colleges, as well as some others. It broadens both the FSO and the student body of which they become a part, giving military and naval officers a chance to see past the stereotypes (which works both ways).

If you read (as I do) the published biography sheets of our most senior diplomatic appointees, you'll often notice that they are graduates of one or more of these institutions.

"The most widely read and vitriolic criticism came from a series of Foreign Policy.com blogs by former Washington Post writer Thomas Ricks. Ricks actually called for closure of the war colleges calling them both expensive and second-rate."

There are several of these colleges, run by both the individual services and by various parts of the DoD itself, so individual mileage may vary widely.

"Ricks made some good points that we are likely to see again as defense spending decreases and tough decisions are made about where to get most bang out of a much smaller budget.

Daniel Hughes published a chapter, “Professors in the Colonels’ World” in a 2010 book entitled Military Culture and Education edited by Douglas Higbee that examined the divide between military and academic cultures. His depiction of the Air War College pointed out a nasty strain of anti-intellectualism, ultra conservativism, Christian nationalism and a largely disinterested student body. While some might reject the observations of an outsider like Ricks, Hughes served for eighteen years at the Air War College providing an insider view, albeit from the perspective of an underappreciated academic imbedded in military culture. Some might be inclined to dismiss him as a disgruntled former employee."

Dismiss away, but disgruntled former employees were often disgruntled during their employment, and with good reason.

"(P)articularly insightful from a systemic perspective, was an article published in Proceedings Magazine by Robert Scales, retired two-star general and former commandant of the Army War College. He did not address the war colleges specifically, except for noting that the average age of attendees has increased from 41 to 45 making an expensive educational experience more of a preparation for retirement than a platform for leadership at higher levels. He lamented the possibility that the military is becoming “too busy to learn.” He decried the wane of experienced officers as instructors in the system of professional military education and suggested that a bias for action over learning and organizational malaise in the schools have made them an “intellectual backwater.” His solution is to change the military’s reward system to elevate soldier scholars rather than denigrate them. He advocates a return to the day when uniformed officers rather than civilian instructors and contractors are assigned to the schoolhouse to teach, not because their careers are dead-ended, but as career enhancing assignments on the way to even higher levels of responsibility."

It's difficult, especially during wartime, to balance the competing needs to reward and promote proven combat leaders, not disadvantaging their warzone service by favoring promotion of those who stayed behind in staff or educational assignments. The military (correctly) took a boot in the behind during the early years of Iraq and Afghanistan for pulling out military officers from their deployments in order to get them into their scheduled military educational assignments on time. Which led to deferment, sometimes indefinitely or permanently, of useful military education for exactly those upcoming leaders who should get it.

There's no (to my understanding) perfect solution to this problem. Real leaders want to be with their troops, to be in the fight, to win the fight. Taking a year or more at a time for "book learning" can seem pointless. But unless you want your generals and admirals to all be staff weenies, you need to get your gunslingers into the schoolhouse too.

"An increasing number of officers are deferring attendance. Allen points out that over the last five years 50 percent of those initially selected will choose to defer attendance leading him to assert that it is becoming more important to be selected for senior level schooling than to actually attend. Combat arms officers are apparently going elsewhere, perhaps to fellowship programs or joint service colleges that are viewed as more career enhancing." (Bold typeface added for emphasis. - CAA.)

Both the fellowship programs and joint service colleges are all good programs, but if the service's war colleges are perceived as being second-rate in comparison, then they will get neither first-tier students or faculty. And become tempting targets for the budget axe.

"My time as a student at the Army War College resulted in an intellectual awakening. Before attending I was so busy doing things like commanding a battalion that I had little time to reflect on larger issues affecting my profession. Reflection is the essential bridge between experience and learning. The Army War College gave me opportunities to delve deeply into national security issues and other aspects of my profession that I never would have had in a civilian academic institution. Comparing war colleges to traditional civilian graduate institutions is an “apples to oranges” exercise. The very best graduate program at a top tier university would, in many respects, be a poor substitute for what should happen at the war colleges. The model for the War Colleges is much more akin to that of a professional school (e.g., law or medicine) where sophisticated craft knowledge is blended to a lesser degree with disciplinary forays more common to where I now teach. I loved my time at the Army War College both as a student and a teacher. The adult learning model, seminar method, use of case studies contextually appropriate to a unique group of experienced practitioners, and the many opportunities to engage in no holds barred professional discussions with a parade of flag officers and civilian officials are bright spots that should not be underestimated for their positive impact on future senior military leaders. It is important to have a place where military officers can delve deeply into the nuances of their profession, and most importantly plumb the tensions, intricacies, and limitations of operating a large standing military in a democracy. If done properly that very process can serve as an important protection of the republic. Uninformed and undereducated officers who control vast amounts of military power can fall, or be led, to serious mischief."

That paragraph should be required reading for all military and naval officers at all ranks.

FSOs too.

Military and foreign service officers spend a lot of their careers in training assignments, getting ready for their next jobs. This is not a bug, it's a feature. If anything, FSOs need more of that, not less, although since Sec. Powell's tenure the gap seems to be narrowing in comparison to our military colleagues' career patterns. This is a good thing. But there's a difference between training and education.

The war colleges bridge the difference between training and education and offer the opportunity to take officers to that next level, where they're thinking those deep thoughts about big issues, stuff that you expect generals and admirals (at least American ones) to understand, that go beyond the (expected) technical and tactical proficiency in the profession of arms.

"The war colleges may be the only institutions of higher learning that have such paltry control over who attends them. Boards comprised of officers from the field select attendees who have not necessarily expressed any interest at all in attending. No writing samples are required and there’s no graduate record exam or any other testing considered for admission."

This is not completely true. But it will suffice as a general qualification.

&

"The war colleges really should be, and indeed could be, intellectual centers of excellence with a mix of the best and brightest military and civilian faculty members. They have the potential to serve as incubators of big and even disruptive ideas fueled by cutting edge research on important and relevant questions and dedicated to preparing high potential senior military officers for the great challenges of our age. In return for the investment of national treasure that goes into operating the war colleges, the American people and indeed the service members who will serve under their graduates deserve far better than mediocre."

_____

Hat tip to the editors at Small Wars Journal ("news and commentary on the goings on across the broad community of small wars practitioners, thought leaders, and pundits").

re: "Military-Academic Conflict"

James Joyner at Outside the Beltway ("an online journal of politics and foreign affairs analysis") discusses the contradictions in military higher education.

Money quote(s):

"Thomas Ricks has had a series of blog posts over the academic quality and integrity of the Air War College and its parent Air University in Montgomery, Alabama. It was sparked by a book chapter written by disgruntled retired AU professor named Daniel Hughes, which prompted Ricks to argue for closing the college."

See my earlier post on this topic.

"The war colleges simply have to be hybrid institutions, blending the best cutting edge scholarship with practical training. Each of the services now sends a large number of promising mid-career officers to civilian universities and Washington think tanks (including my own) to broaden their horizons. And that’s great! But the vast number of young colonels and captains need to learn to be strategic thinkers in today’s environment. That means being around really smart scholars who’ve had the luxury of thinking really hard about Iraq, Afghanistan, counterinsurgency, military interventions, and a host of related issues. There just aren’t many institutions in the country with more than one or two of these people on staff.

Now, here’s where my own bias comes in: Anders’ arguments for having most of the faculty at the war colleges consist of active duty officers are well taken. While almost by definition they’re less accomplished scholars than some of their civilian peers–it’s not their chosen career after all–it’s perfectly reasonable to have senior officers training the next generation at these institutions.

But, as Anders notes, Congress stepped in two decades ago and mandated that a certain percentage of the faculty at the various professional military education (PME) schools and the service academies (West Point, Annapolis, and Air Force) be civilian academics. The rationale was obvious: leaven the faculty with professional scholars to move the education-training balance further in the direction of the former while at the same time broadening the perspectives to which students are exposed."

Read the whole thing.