re: "Dudes! Misinterpreting DoD's strategic guidance repeats mistakes, ignores emerging trends, and leads to failure"

Janine Davidson posted at Thomas E. Ricks' The Best Defense blog ("Tom Ricks' Daily Take on National Security"), read the "Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21^st Century Defense and Defense Budget Priorities and Choices" documents (so you don't have to).

Money quote(s):

"The fact is, whether we call it "COIN," "stability operations," "peacekeeping," or "irregular warfare," such frustrating, complex, population-centric, and increasingly urban operations against and among savvy and networked non-state actors are simply a modern version of an age-old phenomenon. And they are here to stay."

&

"(N)ot sizing the force for large-scale operations like Iraq and Afghanistan is a responsible and prudent strategic approach. As these two huge wars wind down, of course the force will be down-sized. This is what we do after every war, no matter the type. It would irresponsible, and in fact unconstitutional, to do otherwise. Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution of the United States clearly indicates the power of the Congress to "raise and support Armies..." but to "provide and maintain a Navy." This language is deliberate, as the founders did not want to maintain large expensive standing ground forces in peacetime. The Congress is empowered to appropriate money to expand the force as needed to fight wars. And that is exactly what happened during the past decade. Our force planning can and should account for our ability to do this again when needed.

For operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the army grew from just over 480,000 soldiers in 2001 to a peak of 570,000 just a couple of years ago. Likewise, the marine corp grew from approximately 170,000 to 210,000. Following redeployment from these wars, the new strategy calls for downsizing back to about 490,000 soldiers and 182,000 marines by 2017, (assuming we manage to disengage in Afghanistan) which is slightly larger than the what President George W. Bush inherited eleven years ago. And still, it is nearly four to five times the size of the ground forces of any of our NATO allies."

Strategy (as outlined in the document being reviewed by Prof. Davidson) is one thing: the meat ax of sequestration is another. The downsizing she posits may be the best case scenario.

"(L)et's not confuse size with competency. Not sizing for Iraqs or Afghanistans does not, and should not, mean forgetting how to conduct such missions -- no matter the size."

&

"Throughout its entire 250-year history, coin, stability operations, and nation building have been far from an "irregular" occurrence. The U.S. has conducted such missions -- on a large scale -- about every 25 years since the Mexican War in the 1840's. U.S. ground troops conducted nation-building, peace-keeping, and a series of counter-guerilla wars against American Indians on the western frontier throughout the 1800's. They conducted a bloody counterinsurgency in the Philippines (1898-1902), a number of "small wars" in the Caribbean (1930's), and occupation duty after the American Civil War and the two World Wars. Since the end of the Cold War, the U.S. has deployed every 18-24 months in response to complex crises of various size, with the average duration of these endeavors becoming increasingly protracted.

From the beginning, these missions have been frustrating and ill-defined, and they have always been controversial. Repeatedly, after each painful episode, the military has sought to avoid having to do them again by forgetting its doctrine and failing to plan, leaving the next generation to re-learn on the fly.

The U.S. army was so fed up with counterinsurgency after its bloody and protracted experience in the Philippines that it eagerly -- with the support of the secretary of War -- managed to turn the whole mission set over to the marines in the early 20^th century. While the army focused on "real" war, the marines were sent to the Caribbean for the "Banana Wars," where they had to re-learn all the hard-learned lessons from old U.S. army manuals that were being discarded. The marine corps did allow a small team of officers to capture this Caribbean experience in the 1940 Small Wars Manual; but the mainstream corps had little appetite for these missions and was already trying to reinvent itself as specialists in amphibious operations. Once WW II began, the marines discarded its doctrine, training, and education for small wars in order to focus intensely on amphibious operations. This left the Vietnam generation to re-invent relevant doctrine once again."

&

"Today we face a global environment characterized by transnational criminals, terrorists, insurgents, and myriad illicit and violent bandits and traffickers. Some of these "bad guys" are aligned with nation states, but most operate in the gray space between what we consider crime and war. Importantly, our future enemies have been paying attention to our struggles against low-tech, high-impact fighters in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere and have been sharing their own "lessons learned" across global social networks. One lesson is clear: Go asymmetric and "irregular" against the U.S. military, because taking it on head to head conventionally would be just plain stupid. " (Bold typeface added for emphasis. - CAA.)

&

"Demographic trends such as urbanization, the youth bulge, resource scarcity, and radicalization ensure that future conflicts requiring ground forces will occur in cities and slums and among populations, where differentiating friend from foe, and victim from "combatant," much less just trying to navigate through the crowded urban "battle space" will continue to plague traditionally-minded and conventionally trained ground forces."

&

"The military should continue to develop special operations and civil affairs capabilities as key components for security force assistance, conflict prevention, and crisis response. Army modularity, which allows ground units to be scaled and tailored for various operations should continue to be developed, and competencies in foreign languages, interagency coordination, and human intelligence collection and analysis should be sustained and enhanced." (Bold typeface added for emphasis. - CAA.)

&

"So how then, do we size this new more enlightened and capable force to ensure success in future coin or stability operations missions? With 490,000 soldiers and 182,000 marines on active duty, plus the forces in the selected ready reserve (560,000 in the army and 39,000 in the marine corps), America's ground forces will arguably be large enough for stability operations of significant size even without needing to add to the force once a crisis hits. Still, there is no crystal ball to predict the exact scenario our military might face. Moreover, despite much debate, there is still no consensus over the question of how many ground troops are required to bring stability to a country of a given population. Clearly neither sizing the peacetime force for the largest imaginable stability operation, nor down-sizing and hoping we won't face another large-scale mission of this sort, is no way to plan. Because we have the demonstrated ability to grow the force and adapt once a war begins, the trick is to find the right size that allows us to conduct smaller and medium scale operations and to initiate an operation while scaling up for something larger if and when needed."

&

"(W)e need to be confident that we can access the capable and ready forces we need, when we need them. Being able to grow the force for large-scale missions if required means having a reserve component that is ready for mobilization and an active duty-training cadre that can deliver the expertise on demand. The DoD's plan to, "... leverage the operational experience and institute a progressive readiness model in the National Guard and Reserves in order to sustain increased readiness prior to mobilization," is aiming in the right direction. On the active duty side, the army and marine corps are both planning to retain a greater percentage of mid-grade NCO's and officers even as they downsize, reflecting their understanding that a slightly more senior force is not only required in the conduct of these complex missions, but is also the seed corn needed to train and grow a force if required."

.

Janine Davidson is assistant professor at George Mason University's Graduate School of Pubic Policy. From 2009-2012, she served as the deputy assistant secretary of Defense for Plans, where she oversaw the development of guidance for military campaign and contingency plans and the review and assessment of plans. Before all that she was a pilot in the air force.

7/27

re: "To fix PME, decide whether you are training or educating officers -- and do it!"

LTC Jason Dempsey, USA guest-posted at The Best Defense ("Tom Rick's Daily Take on National Security") about how to improve professional military education.

Money quote(s):

"The Scales and Kuehn discussion on PME has piqued a long-running interest of mine in the failures of professional military education (PME). While obviously I am more with Scales in my overall assessment of the system, I think Kuehn's piece helps frame the debate because it highlights some of the confusion over the purpose of PME. Specifically, it seems our colleges cannot decide whether they are in the business of training or educating. This confusion has led to a muddied curriculum and a faculty that is required to cover both educating and training, and which as a result fails to do either one very well."

The semi-public debate to which Col. Dempsey* alludes is, somewhat, inside baseball. But serious students of national security would do well to pay attention. What gets decided will have very real consequences for decades to come.

Training and education are executed quite similarly, have extensive areas of overlap, and serve parallel purposes. But they aren't (quite) the same thing.

It's perfectly fine if the military wishes to combine the two purposes into single curriculae at the various service schools and colleges, but it should be quite clear and transparent, to both faculty and staff, as to which courses belong to which categories.

"(L)et's look at the faculty. These are typically officers on the verge of retirement who have been out of the operational force for several years and are interested in academia, but have not yet completed advanced degrees or had any classroom experience outside of the military system. This places them on the fringes of both the operational force and academia. Yet we ask them to cover both the 'core curriculum' and electives, essentially guaranteeing mediocrity in both areas."

Looking over Col. Dempsey's bio blurb (see below), he appears to have personal experience in the PME swamp up to the Command & General Staff College (CGSC) level. Plus whatever research he did as a Ph.D. student and/or researching his book.

Not to knock or discredit him personally, but CAA's experience with PME faculty appears to have been considerably more positive.

Yes, in the course of CAA's military and diplomatic careers, CAA attended at least one service college. Frankly, CAA was stunned at the bright lights that were hidden under that particular bush. And if we're being credentialist, even the serving military members had advanced (graduate or higher) degrees from civilian universities.

(One secret about the stars in the PME constellation: vanishingly few of them are accredited by anyone other than the Department of Defense itself. So while the diplomas look nice in a frame, good luck getting much credit for them at civilian-accredited institutions.)

"The 'core curriculum' at our service colleges should be restructured with a singular focus on training officers for the command and/or staff responsibilities they are about to assume. This is largely the case now, but the focus should be similar to what occurs at the pre-command courses, where senior leaders rotate in to provide insights, mentorship, and current operational perspectives. At CGSC this would mean that commanders and their staffs at the brigade and battalion levels would be the ones rotating in to instruct and to facilitate scenario-driven staff exercises. This would ensure that students received the most relevant training available while reinforcing to the officer corps the importance of taking the time and effort to properly train the next generation."

The point about bringing in operational commanders and staffs as instructors is an interesting one, particularly if training is the objective.

As for scenario-driven exercises, CAA used to live-and-breath them, and is a huge(if closeted) believer there in.

"As for the elective portion of PME, at least at CGSC, the list of offerings should be considered an outright embarrassment. Again, because of not understanding the difference between training and education, valuable time -- that could be spent broadening -- is instead spent on 'courses' that are mere recitations of doctrinal manuals or job descriptions and are about as far as you can get from anything broadening or academically rigorous ('Logistics for the Battalion XO', etc.). This is not to say that there are not great instructors and courses out there (the history departments are indeed strong, and I'd be remiss not to tip my hat to Don Connelly for carrying the torch for the study of civil-military relations). But, as Kuehn notes, these few good courses are drowned out in a curriculum that could only charitably be described as vo-tech for field grades. So long as we aren't kidding ourselves that this is a broadening experience or equivalent to education, fine, but if we are serious about the need to get officers to think critically and out of their comfort zone than it is this portion of PME that needs the most restructuring."

Frankly, CAA always thought that C&GSC was all about "vo-tech for field grades" in the first place, although my recent reading of World War I history gave me a somewhat different understanding of how and where American general staff training originated.

But for much of its history, C&GSC has been more than the sum of its parts that way, going beyond "vo-tech" into actual and broadening (professional military) education.

_____

* "Lt. Col. Jason Dempsey is a career infantry officer and a graduate of a couple levels of PME, including the infantry officers basic course, the amphibious warfare school at Quantico, and CGSC. He also holds a PhD from Columbia University and is the author of Our Army: Soldiers, Politics and American Civil-Military Relations."

6/4

re: "T.E. Ricks' Parallel Universe"

The Phibian at CDR Salamander ("PROACTIVELY “FROM THE SEA”; LEVERAGING THE LITTORAL BEST PRACTICES FOR A PARADIGM BREAKING SIX-SIGMA BEST BUSINESS CASE TO SYNERGIZE A CONSISTENT DESIGN IN THE GLOBAL COMMONS, RIGHTSIZING THE CORE VALUES SUPPORTING OUR MISSION STATEMENT VIA THE 5-VECTOR MODEL THROUGH CULTURAL DIVERSITY.") explained why Mr. Ricks was wrong about bringing back the draft.

Money quote(s):

"No, no, no, no, and no. I can sympathize with how he got here - but just no."

Points for avoiding any ambiguity.

"I have served with those who are in a military with a draft (Germans). It is random, expensive, unfair, and an unnecessary burden. On top of that, it is inefficient in both blood and treasure.

The only time you need a draft is in a general mobilization - otherwise too few are brought in and it becomes a lottery of suck; not a draft as Ricks think as you never get a critical mass of people to make a difference and as a result, you rely even more on the professionals. No, the draft is not something we either want or need. In any event - unless it faces an existential threat; a free nation does not force servitude on its citizens. A free nation also does not do well with a large standing Army with little to do. Move our land forces to National Guard if you want more buy in - but don't turn a free republic in to something it shouldn't be"

4/24

re: "Fixing the Army (By Ruining It)"

JAMES JOYNER at Outside the Beltway ("an online journal of politics and foreign affairs analysis") gave a learned dissection of a Tom Ricks post.(which wasn't actually written by Tom Ricks, btw.)

Money quote(s):

"My strong guess is that the author is a non-commissioned officer, probably a Sergeant First Class, with minimal familiarity with Google, much less the Army above the batallion (sic) level."

("Batallion" is the correct spelling, but only if you're writing in German. - CAA.)

"If I were holding a contest to see who could come up with the dumbest idea for reforming the Army, I’d stop it and declare a winner. This would set the Army back two decades, ruining hard fought gains in achieving a Total Force.

Now, twenty years ago, I’d have given this a big Hell Yes and a Hooah or three. The National Guard was an embarrassment and seeing these fat yahoos in sore need of a haircut running around in my uniform made my blood boil. But a hell of a lot has changed since then. We’ve integrated the promotion system so that Guardsmen have to earn it in the same way that active force soldiers do. And many Guardsmen have seen more combat time than their active duty counterparts owing to the vagaries of the force structure. These people are every bit the soldier as the guys on active duty now and it would be a slap in the face to label them as second class citizens."

This responded to a suggestion that since the National Guard now has a four-star seat on the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that the NG be split off as a "sixth service." Several specific (and wrong) recommendations are made in this connection.

Mr. Joyner has the right of this one.

"I did plenty of D&C as a cadet but can’t imagine when you’d find time to do this at a unit. Especially with the current opstempo, there’s just too much to do. And, frankly, most soldiers would see spending a lot of time practicing for parades to be degrading, not just a colossal waste of time. We’ve cut out shining boots and pressing fatigues; let’s go ahead and keep this gone, too."

"D&C" means "drill and ceremonies." In other words, marching around and stuff. It's taught (and learned) in basic training, and our NCOs learn how to teach it at the first level of NCO academy training. As Pvt. Winger once said of it: "Especially that "marching in a straight line" business."

Soldiers already know how to do this and use the techniques when appropriate. If they need to brush up for a specific ceremony or event, well, that's why practices are held.

"The old battle dress uniform that I wore finally gave up the ghost during the Iraq War, when the Army decided that it just made no sense to have multiple camouflage patterns and went to one standardized one. The hasty replacement, the Army Combat Uniform (ACU) turned out to have multiple problems–most notably that the “universal” camouflage pattern not only isn’t universal but doesn’t even work in the main theater it’s being worn, Afghanistan–so they’re looking to replace it. It’s a bit frustrating.

Getting rid of the polyester green uniforms with the lime green shirt as a garrison dress uniform and making the dress blue uniform the standard service uniform again was something I campaigned for back in the late 1980s. They’ve finally done it. The problem is that, rather than going back to the old tradition of khakis or some other substitute uniform for hot weather, they decided to have a “class B” version of the uniform that consists of the light blue trousers with a white dress shirt and all the ribbons and skill badges on it. This makes soldiers look like shopping mall security guards." (Bold typeface added for emphasis. - CAA.)

The "universal" ACU digital pattern works if you're in an environment consisting of (recently) dead grass. Otherwise, it simply tries to be too much at once. While it's understandable that the Army didn't think it was cost-effective to field four sets of each camoflage pattern to every soldier, there could probably have been a way around it; issuing only desert pattern uniforms to soldiers at Fort Hood and (other Southwestern U.S. forts) for instance and woodland-suitable patterns only to soldiers in temperate locations (East Coast, Germany, Pacific Northwest, &tc.).

As for the Paul Blarts (i.e., "mall cop" Class B uniforms), I'm with Mr. Joyner (as well as Petronius); they're garish. A khaki shirt would have made a lot more sense, even if the light (actually medium) blue trews were retained. CAA has never been all that fond of the mint (and polyester) green "Shade 44" Class A/B uniforms. Something a bit drabber, closer to the brown/green of World War II army (and current USMC) service uniforms would have been better.

11/19

re: "What's Wrong and What's Right With the War Colleges"

Dr. George E. Reed at Defense Policy ("a non-partisan forum for news, opinions, viewpoints, blogs, commentary, analysis, and debate from America’s defense and national security community") has a great round-up of recent kerfuffles surrounding the war college system, and has his own ideas about it.

Money quote(s):

"A cascade of withering criticism has recently been leveled at the war colleges– those venerable institutions that represent the pinnacle of the hierarchy of professional military education. Each service maintains a war college or equivalent designed to prepare lieutenant colonels and colonels for the highest levels of responsibility, and while they have different cultures in many respects they also share some common attributes and challenges."

Foreign service officers above a certain rank have the opportunity to attend most (if not all) of these colleges, as well as some others. It broadens both the FSO and the student body of which they become a part, giving military and naval officers a chance to see past the stereotypes (which works both ways).

If you read (as I do) the published biography sheets of our most senior diplomatic appointees, you'll often notice that they are graduates of one or more of these institutions.

"The most widely read and vitriolic criticism came from a series of Foreign Policy.com blogs by former Washington Post writer Thomas Ricks. Ricks actually called for closure of the war colleges calling them both expensive and second-rate."

There are several of these colleges, run by both the individual services and by various parts of the DoD itself, so individual mileage may vary widely.

"Ricks made some good points that we are likely to see again as defense spending decreases and tough decisions are made about where to get most bang out of a much smaller budget.

Daniel Hughes published a chapter, “Professors in the Colonels’ World” in a 2010 book entitled Military Culture and Education edited by Douglas Higbee that examined the divide between military and academic cultures. His depiction of the Air War College pointed out a nasty strain of anti-intellectualism, ultra conservativism, Christian nationalism and a largely disinterested student body. While some might reject the observations of an outsider like Ricks, Hughes served for eighteen years at the Air War College providing an insider view, albeit from the perspective of an underappreciated academic imbedded in military culture. Some might be inclined to dismiss him as a disgruntled former employee."

Dismiss away, but disgruntled former employees were often disgruntled during their employment, and with good reason.

"(P)articularly insightful from a systemic perspective, was an article published in Proceedings Magazine by Robert Scales, retired two-star general and former commandant of the Army War College. He did not address the war colleges specifically, except for noting that the average age of attendees has increased from 41 to 45 making an expensive educational experience more of a preparation for retirement than a platform for leadership at higher levels. He lamented the possibility that the military is becoming “too busy to learn.” He decried the wane of experienced officers as instructors in the system of professional military education and suggested that a bias for action over learning and organizational malaise in the schools have made them an “intellectual backwater.” His solution is to change the military’s reward system to elevate soldier scholars rather than denigrate them. He advocates a return to the day when uniformed officers rather than civilian instructors and contractors are assigned to the schoolhouse to teach, not because their careers are dead-ended, but as career enhancing assignments on the way to even higher levels of responsibility."

It's difficult, especially during wartime, to balance the competing needs to reward and promote proven combat leaders, not disadvantaging their warzone service by favoring promotion of those who stayed behind in staff or educational assignments. The military (correctly) took a boot in the behind during the early years of Iraq and Afghanistan for pulling out military officers from their deployments in order to get them into their scheduled military educational assignments on time. Which led to deferment, sometimes indefinitely or permanently, of useful military education for exactly those upcoming leaders who should get it.

There's no (to my understanding) perfect solution to this problem. Real leaders want to be with their troops, to be in the fight, to win the fight. Taking a year or more at a time for "book learning" can seem pointless. But unless you want your generals and admirals to all be staff weenies, you need to get your gunslingers into the schoolhouse too.

"An increasing number of officers are deferring attendance. Allen points out that over the last five years 50 percent of those initially selected will choose to defer attendance leading him to assert that it is becoming more important to be selected for senior level schooling than to actually attend. Combat arms officers are apparently going elsewhere, perhaps to fellowship programs or joint service colleges that are viewed as more career enhancing." (Bold typeface added for emphasis. - CAA.)

Both the fellowship programs and joint service colleges are all good programs, but if the service's war colleges are perceived as being second-rate in comparison, then they will get neither first-tier students or faculty. And become tempting targets for the budget axe.

"My time as a student at the Army War College resulted in an intellectual awakening. Before attending I was so busy doing things like commanding a battalion that I had little time to reflect on larger issues affecting my profession. Reflection is the essential bridge between experience and learning. The Army War College gave me opportunities to delve deeply into national security issues and other aspects of my profession that I never would have had in a civilian academic institution. Comparing war colleges to traditional civilian graduate institutions is an “apples to oranges” exercise. The very best graduate program at a top tier university would, in many respects, be a poor substitute for what should happen at the war colleges. The model for the War Colleges is much more akin to that of a professional school (e.g., law or medicine) where sophisticated craft knowledge is blended to a lesser degree with disciplinary forays more common to where I now teach. I loved my time at the Army War College both as a student and a teacher. The adult learning model, seminar method, use of case studies contextually appropriate to a unique group of experienced practitioners, and the many opportunities to engage in no holds barred professional discussions with a parade of flag officers and civilian officials are bright spots that should not be underestimated for their positive impact on future senior military leaders. It is important to have a place where military officers can delve deeply into the nuances of their profession, and most importantly plumb the tensions, intricacies, and limitations of operating a large standing military in a democracy. If done properly that very process can serve as an important protection of the republic. Uninformed and undereducated officers who control vast amounts of military power can fall, or be led, to serious mischief."

That paragraph should be required reading for all military and naval officers at all ranks.

FSOs too.

Military and foreign service officers spend a lot of their careers in training assignments, getting ready for their next jobs. This is not a bug, it's a feature. If anything, FSOs need more of that, not less, although since Sec. Powell's tenure the gap seems to be narrowing in comparison to our military colleagues' career patterns. This is a good thing. But there's a difference between training and education.

The war colleges bridge the difference between training and education and offer the opportunity to take officers to that next level, where they're thinking those deep thoughts about big issues, stuff that you expect generals and admirals (at least American ones) to understand, that go beyond the (expected) technical and tactical proficiency in the profession of arms.

"The war colleges may be the only institutions of higher learning that have such paltry control over who attends them. Boards comprised of officers from the field select attendees who have not necessarily expressed any interest at all in attending. No writing samples are required and there’s no graduate record exam or any other testing considered for admission."

This is not completely true. But it will suffice as a general qualification.

&

"The war colleges really should be, and indeed could be, intellectual centers of excellence with a mix of the best and brightest military and civilian faculty members. They have the potential to serve as incubators of big and even disruptive ideas fueled by cutting edge research on important and relevant questions and dedicated to preparing high potential senior military officers for the great challenges of our age. In return for the investment of national treasure that goes into operating the war colleges, the American people and indeed the service members who will serve under their graduates deserve far better than mediocre."

_____

Hat tip to the editors at Small Wars Journal ("news and commentary on the goings on across the broad community of small wars practitioners, thought leaders, and pundits").

re: "Tom Ricks Mistrusts Germany"

Joerg Wolf at Atlantic Review ("A Press Digest for Transatlantic Affairs") exposes a puzzling mindset.

Money quote(s):

"(M)ost US experts -- with the notable exception of Tom Ricks -- do not worry about a war with Germany or a return of militarism and Nazi ideology in Berlin. Instead they are concerned that Germany (and many other European countries) demilitarize so much that we are not of use to the US anymore."

SecDef Gates recent speech to this effect has been much remarked-upon.

"Tom Ricks, however, has a totally different view of Germany. Mr. Ricks worries about "Germany's resurgence" "

Yeah, that Kaiser could just be waiting around until our suspicions are lulled.

Seriously, any Mr. Ricks looked at Germany's current military strength. Has he missed to demographic meltdown that most Western European nations, including Germany, are undergoing? Ralph Peters thinks the Germans still have it in them (along with other Europeans) to put the boot to the colonizing underclass that's already within their borders, but Mark Steyn and Tom Kratman are less "optimistic" (for values of "optimism").

"It seems that Tom Ricks is of the opinion that Germany (or the German people, culture etc) have not substantially changed since 1945 and is still a threat."

By all accounts, Mr. Ricks is a very bright guy. His recent SF-1001 form was absolutely brilliant, parodying not only the American military's mania for checklists, the bureaucratic impulse to require a written form, and the demonstrated strategic ignorance of Washington policy and decision makers.

"There are still quite a few Germans, who use our violent history and crimes against humanity as an excuse for the lack of burden sharing in NATO missions. Tom Ricks' blog posts support their claim that our allies still don't really trust us and that we should therefore not support their military missions... "

re: "Military-Academic Conflict"

James Joyner at Outside the Beltway ("an online journal of politics and foreign affairs analysis") discusses the contradictions in military higher education.

Money quote(s):

"Thomas Ricks has had a series of blog posts over the academic quality and integrity of the Air War College and its parent Air University in Montgomery, Alabama. It was sparked by a book chapter written by disgruntled retired AU professor named Daniel Hughes, which prompted Ricks to argue for closing the college."

See my earlier post on this topic.

"The war colleges simply have to be hybrid institutions, blending the best cutting edge scholarship with practical training. Each of the services now sends a large number of promising mid-career officers to civilian universities and Washington think tanks (including my own) to broaden their horizons. And that’s great! But the vast number of young colonels and captains need to learn to be strategic thinkers in today’s environment. That means being around really smart scholars who’ve had the luxury of thinking really hard about Iraq, Afghanistan, counterinsurgency, military interventions, and a host of related issues. There just aren’t many institutions in the country with more than one or two of these people on staff.

Now, here’s where my own bias comes in: Anders’ arguments for having most of the faculty at the war colleges consist of active duty officers are well taken. While almost by definition they’re less accomplished scholars than some of their civilian peers–it’s not their chosen career after all–it’s perfectly reasonable to have senior officers training the next generation at these institutions.

But, as Anders notes, Congress stepped in two decades ago and mandated that a certain percentage of the faculty at the various professional military education (PME) schools and the service academies (West Point, Annapolis, and Air Force) be civilian academics. The rationale was obvious: leaven the faculty with professional scholars to move the education-training balance further in the direction of the former while at the same time broadening the perspectives to which students are exposed."

Read the whole thing.

re: "Need budget cuts? We probably can start by shutting the Air War College"

Thomas E. Ricks at The Best Defense ("Tom Rick's Daily Take on National Security") reviews some criticism of the Air War College.

Money quote(s):

"(T)he place is an expensive joke. Funny except that the taxpayer picks up the tab."

Happily, this does not jibe at all with my experiences regarding DoD's higher learning institutions, such as the other various war colleges and universities. Some of the issues raised by Hughes are certainly potential pitfalls for any institution of this type; the sponsoring organization has to value the institution (or, more importantly, its product) enough to send its best and brightest to be students and its very best and brightest to teach there. The way organizations send the message that an institution is important is by promoting those who excel there.

"Tom's bottom line: Hughes says it costs at least $300,000 a year to send an officer to the AWC. So this looks like a good place to begin budget cuts, Secretary Gates. Close the place and send the students out into the world of civilian academia, where they will be challenged intellectually and might learn something."

Pretty big black eye for the Air Force if it muffs running its own war college. Professional military education is an investment in a service's future top leaders, not a block to be checked off, particularly if that education is known by the other service's top leaders to be a joke.

re: "Libya Exit Strategy"

James Joyner at Outside the Beltway ("an online journal of politics and foreign affairs analysis") should know better than this.

Money quote(s):

"an elementary concept on war planning, the requirement for an exit strategy."

Actually, although it apparently took Sec. Rumsfeld until 2005 to say it, the Weekly Standard discussed it as early as 2003: you want a victory strategy, not an "exit strategy."

"It’s a fundamental precept of national security policy going back to at least the writings of Carl von Clausewitz that wars are fought to achieve political ends and it follows that military strategy must be tailored to achieve political ends. Indeed, countries can lose wars in which their armies are absolutely dominant on the field of battle–as American forces were in Vietnam–if the fighting does not achieve the sought political objectives.

In order for military planners to match tactics and strategy, they must know what the end game is. In the case of total war, such as we fought in World War II, that’s pretty simple: The unconditional surrender of the enemy. In the case of humanitarian interventions, counterinsurgencies, and stability operations, however, it’s much harder.

The concept of an exit strategy is designed to spotlight this dilemma. Simply put: How do we know when we’ve won the damn thing and can stop fighting?"

I'm as Clausewitzian as the next guy (perhaps more), and agree with Mr. Joyner about that. It's the notion of an exit strategy versus one for victory or even a set of objectives or goals, an end state that is worth all the trouble, blood, and treasure that vexes me.

Language is important. The very use of the word "exit" together with "strategy" messages our essential unseriousness about the dead serious business of warfare, and causes our allies many sleepless nights. It signals that our most important objective is to leave, to be uninvolved, even as we commit men and materiel to a conflict.

"The bottom line is that the colonels Ricks is hearing complaining about the lack of an exit strategy aren’t asking for all the answers, just the most important one: What are they fighting for?"

Here we agree. What is our strategic grand objective? From that all lesser operational and strategic issues must necessarily flow.