Robert Haddick at the Small Wars Journal blog ("facilitates the exchange of information among practitioners, thought leaders, and students of Small Wars, in order to advance knowledge and capabilities in the field") examined the problem of applying deterrence to Iran.
Money quote(s):
"U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder revealed an Iranian plot to kill the Saudi Arabian ambassador to the United States by bombing a restaurant in Washington. Holder’s description of the plot – which allegedly involved a bungled attempt by Mansour Arbabsiar, a dual citizen, to recruit the notorious Zeta cartel from Mexico – appeared simultaneously brazen and inept. What should worry policymakers the most is how this incident undermines the theory of deterrence, which some hope to use against Iran after it acquires nuclear weapons and long-range ballistic missiles. If Iranian policy cannot be checked with Cold War-style deterrence, the prospect of an inevitable shooting war against Iran will go up."
Cold warriors like CAA will recall deterrence theories such as MAD and the like; the bottom line was that while it's unclear just how much of which theories actually worked, clearly something worked and the world did not end in nuclear fire, despite decades of bipolar international standoff.
"(T)he operation may have been authorized by the highest level of the Iranian government. This would indicate that top-level Iranian officials are not concerned with the possible retaliatory consequences of a mass casualty attack in downtown Washington, DC. Iran’s leaders would come to that conclusion either because they perceive the U.S. government to be self-constrained or because they perceive the maximum likely U.S. retaliation against Iran to be inconsequential to their interests. Either way, U.S. retaliation against Iran lacks credibility, something the U.S. government will have to fix if it is to usefully employ deterrence theory in the future."
U.S. retaliation against Iran has, ever since the 1979 revolution, amounted to sanction regimes of varying strictness. Why would the Iranian regime ever consider that a U.S. response to provocation would ever amount to anything more than that?
"(I)ntermediate-level Quds Force officers may have initiated the operation without authority from top-level decision-makers. If so, this too would undermine deterrence theory. Deterrence is not useful if those to be deterred don’t have complete control over their weapons, an assumption U.S. and Soviet leaders both correctly made during the Cold War. Alternatively, the organizational culture inside the Quds Force may reward mid-level officers who “freelance” their own operations. Once again, not a comforting conclusion for deterrence theory." (Bold typeface added for emphasis. - CAA.)
The theory of deterrence requires a target of that deterrence. If the target (i.e., top Iranian leadership) doesn't actually have full control over their WMD, then the situation is drastically destabilized.
"(I)t is hard to believe that there is some attainable level of financial and travel sanctions, even with the best possible international cooperation, that will change the behavior of either top-level Iranian leaders or officers inside the Quds Force. The U.S. is thus left with a deterrent strategy against Iran that lacks credibility and in any case may be unsuitable for the situation.
Washington should expect more provocations and thus more pressure to eventually display a retaliatory response that will impress Iranian leaders. What kind of display would impress Iranian leaders is a subject many in Washington would prefer to avoid."
Unlike, for instance, the kleptocratic leadership class of various south-of-the-border countries, attempting to put a crimp into the Miami/New York/Paris-bound shopping trips of the mullahs just doesn't register on the viable-threat-o-meter.
10/12
