re: "Iranian bomb plot blows up deterrence theory"

Robert Haddick at the Small Wars Journal blog ("facilitates the exchange of information among practitioners, thought leaders, and students of Small Wars, in order to advance knowledge and capabilities in the field") examined the problem of applying deterrence to Iran.

Money quote(s):

"U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder revealed an Iranian plot to kill the Saudi Arabian ambassador to the United States by bombing a restaurant in Washington. Holder’s description of the plot – which allegedly involved a bungled attempt by Mansour Arbabsiar, a dual citizen, to recruit the notorious Zeta cartel from Mexico – appeared simultaneously brazen and inept. What should worry policymakers the most is how this incident undermines the theory of deterrence, which some hope to use against Iran after it acquires nuclear weapons and long-range ballistic missiles. If Iranian policy cannot be checked with Cold War-style deterrence, the prospect of an inevitable shooting war against Iran will go up."

Cold warriors like CAA will recall deterrence theories such as MAD and the like; the bottom line was that while it's unclear just how much of which theories actually worked, clearly something worked and the world did not end in nuclear fire, despite decades of bipolar international standoff.

"(T)he operation may have been authorized by the highest level of the Iranian government. This would indicate that top-level Iranian officials are not concerned with the possible retaliatory consequences of a mass casualty attack in downtown Washington, DC. Iran’s leaders would come to that conclusion either because they perceive the U.S. government to be self-constrained or because they perceive the maximum likely U.S. retaliation against Iran to be inconsequential to their interests. Either way, U.S. retaliation against Iran lacks credibility, something the U.S. government will have to fix if it is to usefully employ deterrence theory in the future."

U.S. retaliation against Iran has, ever since the 1979 revolution, amounted to sanction regimes of varying strictness. Why would the Iranian regime ever consider that a U.S. response to provocation would ever amount to anything more than that?

"(I)ntermediate-level Quds Force officers may have initiated the operation without authority from top-level decision-makers. If so, this too would undermine deterrence theory. Deterrence is not useful if those to be deterred don’t have complete control over their weapons, an assumption U.S. and Soviet leaders both correctly made during the Cold War. Alternatively, the organizational culture inside the Quds Force may reward mid-level officers who “freelance” their own operations. Once again, not a comforting conclusion for deterrence theory." (Bold typeface added for emphasis. - CAA.)

The theory of deterrence requires a target of that deterrence. If the target (i.e., top Iranian leadership) doesn't actually have full control over their WMD, then the situation is drastically destabilized.

"(I)t is hard to believe that there is some attainable level of financial and travel sanctions, even with the best possible international cooperation, that will change the behavior of either top-level Iranian leaders or officers inside the Quds Force. The U.S. is thus left with a deterrent strategy against Iran that lacks credibility and in any case may be unsuitable for the situation.

Washington should expect more provocations and thus more pressure to eventually display a retaliatory response that will impress Iranian leaders. What kind of display would impress Iranian leaders is a subject many in Washington would prefer to avoid."

Unlike, for instance, the kleptocratic leadership class of various south-of-the-border countries, attempting to put a crimp into the Miami/New York/Paris-bound shopping trips of the mullahs just doesn't register on the viable-threat-o-meter.

10/12

re: "This Week at War: Moral Hazard at NATO"

Robert Haddick at Small Wars Journal ("facilitates the exchange of information among practitioners, thought leaders, and students of Small Wars, in order to advance knowledge and capabilities in the field") foresees the end of the free ride.

Money quote(s):

"Europe may not be able to rely on America's free security guarantee forever."

Nothing is forever. That should be plain enough. But even in geopolitical terms, where a single lifetime approximates for "forever," alliances require constant tending, by all their members. Or they're not really alliances.

(Don't get me wrong, as an old "Cold Warrior," I think NATO, when it worked, was one of the greatest achievements of the 20th century.)

"In blasting NATO, Gates explains what moral hazard feels like

In what he termed his "last policy speech as U.S. defense secretary," Robert Gates ripped into his policymaking peers at NATO headquarters in Brussels last week for allowing "significant shortcomings in NATO in military capabilities, and in political will" to occur. Gates noted that although the non-U.S. alliance members have more than 2 million troops in uniform, these countries struggle to deploy 40,000 soldiers into an effective military campaign. Gates also pointed to NATO's embarrassing performance in Libya, noting that European members, despite having a multitude of officers collecting paychecks at frivolous staff billets, have failed to generate the intelligence support and command capabilities needed to wage an effective air campaign. Gates warned of a "dismal future for the transatlantic alliance."

Gates's frustration was no doubt sparked by the realization that his department has become the victim of moral hazard. The United States provides a free security guarantee to Europe. Europeans, meanwhile, have responded in an economically rational way by taking greater risk with their external defense. With the collapse of the Soviet Union removing the last plausible military threat, it was logical for European policymakers to avoid spending on expensive space, communications, and intelligence systems that the United States was largely providing for free. Gates and many other U.S. policymakers see an alliance with too many free riders"

This has always been the case, at least as long as I can recall. But at least before, when NATO as an alliance had as its primary military purpose the defense of Western Europe, even the smaller, less militarily-capable members knew, and planned for, a fight that would probably take place on, and above, their own territories. So even if they didn't have that many chips to put into the pot, they planned to ante-up with what they did have.

"Gates fears that the United States will have to bail out the Libya operation. This week, Adm. Mark Stanhope, Britain's top naval officer, warned that budget limits and unit rotation requirements could force NATO combatants over Libya to soon have to choose between Libya and Afghanistan. Should a shortfall of European forces in either campaign result, Gates undoubtedly fears that the United States will have to make up the gap.

Over the longer term, the moral hazard issue extends beyond NATO into the Western Pacific, the South China Sea, and soon the Persian Gulf. For example, the United States has a great interest in signaling to China that it has strong security commitments to its partners in the region. Washington likewise wants those partners to share the defense burden and to also avoid provocative behavior. The stronger the signal it sends to China, the less incentive the partners have to do their part."

&

"Gates concluded his speech by warning Europe's leaders that the next generation of U.S. leaders lacks nostalgia for the Cold War struggle and could walk away from the NATO alliance. In the future, Europe will undoubtedly have to do more for its external defense. That doesn't seem like a problem now since there is no apparent external threat. But should they have to more fully insure themselves, European defense planners should consider how they would rebuild their defenses. They should consider how much time it would take to mobilize political and budgetary authority to prepare for these threats and how long it would take to rebuild the required military forces. Most notable in this regard is the risk of losing both a defense industrial base and functioning military institutions, which once gone might never be restored, at least within a relevant time frame."

You're a member of the NATO alliance you have, not the one you wish you had.

(Or, alternatively you're not.)

A country which so degrades its military institutions to the point where there's not any there left, is likely to have to learn the harsh lesson that one doesn't reconstitute that institution by last-minute conscription notices. This is as true for our European (and other) allies as it is for the U.S.

re: "re: "This Week at War: Rise of the Irregulars" "

Robert Haddick at Small Wars Journal ("facilitates the exchange of information among practitioners, thought leaders, and students of Small Wars, in order to advance knowledge and capabilities in the field") turns a frequent criticism on its head.

Money quote(s):

"Last week, the Washington Post's David Ignatius discussed how the line between the Central Intelligence Agency's covert intelligence activities and the Pentagon's military operations began blurring as George W. Bush's administration ramped up its war on terrorism. In his column, Ignatius took some swipes at former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld for exceeding his authority by encroaching on turf legally reserved to the CIA. The Defense Department also was criticized for taking on too many diplomatic and foreign aid responsibilities as well. Ignatius expressed concern that without clearer boundaries separating covert intelligence-gathering from military operations, "people at home and abroad may worry about a possible 'militarization' of U.S. intelligence."

Ignatius missed the larger and far more significant change that continues to this day. In order to survive and compete against the military power enjoyed by national armies, modern irregular adversaries -- such as the Viet Cong, Iraq's insurgents, the Taliban, and virtually all other modern revolutionaries -- "civilianized" their military operations."

Read the whole thing here.

re: "This Week at War: Send in the Lawyers?"

Robert Haddick at Small Wars Journal ("facilitates the exchange of information among practitioners, thought leaders, and students of Small Wars, in order to advance knowledge and capabilities in the field") answers the question "Why the president's legal advisors are in no hurry to justify the bin Laden raid."

Money quote(s):

"Osama bin Laden's fourth son Omar along with some of his brothers have called for an international investigation into the killing of their father. A statement written by the sons and published in the New York Times calls for President Barack Obama to cooperate with their demand for a U.N. inquiry into the question of "why our father was not arrested and tried but summarily executed without a court of law." Should there be no response within 30 days, the sons have pledged to assemble a "panel of eminent British and international lawyers" to pursue legal action against the U.S. government and its officials."

This is called lawfare.

"Bin Laden's sons as well as other analysts outside the United States view the raid in the context of the procedures of criminal law. By contrast, Holder and most observers inside the United States view the raid as a military mission with bin Laden just another combatant. Enemy military personnel are not subject to the rights due a suspect under criminal procedure but rather are at risk of ambush and sudden lethal attack without warning. In the military context, it doesn't matter if the combatant is not holding a weapon, is not in a military uniform, or is in an "unthreatening" posture (such as asleep). The only circumstances under which military forces are required to "give quarter" is after an enemy combatant has completed a surrender or is too wounded to resist, something very unlikely to have occurred in the bin Laden compound given the aggressive rules of engagement issued to the assault team. Bin Laden's sons reject this interpretation, viewing bin Laden as a criminal suspect deserving the rights of legal process."

Those inclined to take the criminal law/enforcement model seriously (Sen. Kerry, call your office) will do so. All young Omar and his ilk deserve from the U.S. Government is, perhaps, the traditional telegram notification sent to next-of-kin.

"The U.S. view is that the 9/11 attacks sparked an "armed conflict" between the United States and al Qaeda, a legal status that both the Congress and the United Nations quickly affirmed. The "armed conflict" status has allowed the United States to use its military power and the international laws of war to permit such techniques as lethal drone attacks and commando raids against combatants -- legally delivered without warning or legal process.

All modern conflicts involve irregular non-state actors as combatants. These combatants and their fellow travelers seek to emphasize their status as civilians when useful, both for defense against modern military technology and in an attempt to take advantage of legal rights. Conversely, the United States government will seek, when necessary, to achieve an international recognition of armed conflict status against its irregular adversaries in order to take advantage of the military and legal advantages it gains from such a status. The government's challenge will be justifying the particular circumstances that warrant unsheathing the government's armed conflict powers against specific adversaries."

Considering that UBL had issued his own declaration of war against the U.S. as early as the 1990s, plus all those fairly damning video diatribes, it's difficult to imagine a more clearcut case of an irregular non-state actor qualifying as a combatant (unlawful or otherwise).

re: "A really bad day for bin Laden - and for Pakistan"

Robert Haddick at Small Wars Journal ("news and commentary on the goings on across the broad community of small wars practitioners, thought leaders, and pundits") cuts right to the essentials.

Money quote(s):

"The killing of Osama bin Laden is a satisfying triumph for Americans and the U.S. government. It would have been even more satisfying had it occurred in the weeks and months after the September 2001 attacks. But the fact that it took a decade to finally kill bin Laden should be warning to any who doubt the long memories and persistence of the U.S. government’s counterterrorism forces. They didn’t forget and they never stopped working on the problem.

The Joint Special Operations Command, presumably the command responsible for the mission, should get credit for demonstrating its ability to successfully raid targets virtually anywhere in the world. The CIA also gets credit for patiently developing the required intelligence and for reminding everyone of the value of battlefield captures, interrogations, and human intelligence." (Bold type added for emphasis. - CAA)

It was a job well done.

More than that, it was years of jobs well done and literally decades of capacity building from the disaster that was Desert One to today's robust and diverse special operations capacity.

"(T)his raid is a black day for Pakistan and its relationship with the United States. As the White House background briefing on the raid makes clear, the United States kept the raid completely concealed from the Pakistani government. Combine this with the fact that bin Laden was found in a highly protected compound in a wealthy town near Pakistan’s capital, and a stone’s throw from a Pakistani military academy. Americans will be right to conclude that Pakistan was bin Laden’s long-time friend and not America’s. What little support Pakistan still enjoys in Washington will now likely melt away. Pakistan will have to look to China, its last friend, for the support it will need to survive."

The political fallout from this will play out over the coming several years. Pakistan, as a unitary state, may not survive it; the hazards it faces are too numerous to mention.

re: "Digital security problem is bigger than Assange and PFC Manning"

Robert Haddick at Small Wars Journal ("facilitates the exchange of information among practitioners, thought leaders, and students of Small Wars, in order to advance knowledge and capabilities in the field") gives an excellent analysis.

Money quote(s):

"Prior to September 2001, administrators within the U.S. government had their reasons for stubbornly hoarding their agency’s secrets. In the wake of the latest Wikileaks episode involving classified State Department cables, some of those reasons are again apparent. The 9/11 Commission concluded that insufficient cross-agency sharing was partly to blame for the disaster. But we are now reminded that sharing brings its own risks. With a million people thought to have access to U.S. Secret-level correspondence and over 800,000 cleared for Top Secret access, the only surprise is that there are not more leaks. The problem of digital security extends beyond Mr. Assange and PFC Manning. Digital transmissions through the existing internet "cloud” will continue, but will increasingly consist of only the most inconsequential data and reports. The transmission of anything really sensitive will revert (if it hasn’t already) to pre-Internet methods – a hand-delivered document, a telephone call, or a face-to-face conversation in a secure room.

The fact that there have been so few surprises in the latest Wikileaks data dump is the best evidence that State Department cable-drafters, consciously or not, knew that these cables would have a very large audience. And the wider the audience becomes, the greater the incentive to be careful with secrets in the drafting. With so few differences between the content of these cables (admittedly classified no higher than Secret) and the content in the news media, we should conclude that U.S. diplomacy is already remarkably open and transparent."

&

"We should expect “Balkanization” of digital communications, with those needing high security dropping out of the existing system and setting up their own. The Defense Department’s SIPRNet has been an inadequate attempt at this answer, as the Wikileaks affair has revealed. DARPA (ironically the original inventor of the internet) now recommends that the Defense Department establish its own network hardware and software, a system that would emphasize security and would presumably be incompatible with the existing internet.

Users who need high security but who can’t afford their own custom network would be wise to revert to the pre-Internet age of the courier, the telephone, and for the most sensitive of thoughts, the face-to-face meeting. This should not be much of an adjustment for those possessing either suspicious minds or experience."