re: "The exit is the strategy"

Kori Schake at Shadow Government ("Notes From The Loyal Opposition") judged by actions, not words.

Money quote(s):

"(B)oth the White House and Pentagon had been repeatedly emphasizing that negotiations with Iraq were ongoing, that no decision had been made. In truth, the decision was made even before Barack Obama was president: he got elected campaigning that Iraq was the wrong war, not worth the lives and money.

He did what he said he was going to do. He set an end date for combat operations so that he could show "progress" before the midterm elections. Progress not toward consolidating our gains in Iraq, but toward being out of Iraq. Having appointed special envoys for every problem he considered important, there was no special envoy for Iraq, to help build fostering regional relationships and coordinate our policies. He appointed an ambassador who knew nothing about Iraq."

Knowing "nothing about Iraq" is quite an achievement in itself, given the circumstances.

"(T)he withdrawal of troops is a lagging, not a leading indicator of the administration's indifference.

Secretary of State Hillary Clinton continues to affirm our commitment to Iraq. The QDDR says "in Iraq, we are in the midst of the largest military-to-civilian transition since the Marshall Plan. Our civilian presence is prepared to take the lead, secure the military's gains, and build the institutions necessary for long-term stability." State grandiosely imagines a wholly civilian mission of 17,000 personnel most of whom will be "third country nationals" supporting 1,750 diplomats and other USG government personnel. Eighty percent of the mission will be contractors. Current plans call for them to operate at five consulates around the country, costing $6 billion a year.

The Commission on Wartime Contracting (including Shadow Government colleague Dov Zakheim), the Government Accountability Office and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee all take a dim view of State's plans for Iraq. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee assessed that "fundamental questions remain unanswered," including whether the scope of the mission in Iraq is compatible with the resources available, including State Department capacity. They question whether the State Department can sustain its proposed presence without military support and the cost effectiveness of consulates requiring 1,400 security and support personnel for only 120 diplomats. They recommended that if a complete withdrawal occurred, "given the prohibitive costs of security and the capacity limitations of the State Department, the United States should consider a less ambitious diplomatic presence in Iraq." This is likely to end badly."

CAA's formula for right-sizing the U.S. diplomatic presence in Iraq is akin to what most after-action-reviews of the RMS Titanic's sinking would include: only have as many passengers and crew as you have lifeboat capacity for.

"Members of Congress could be forgiven for wondering why should we provide $5 billion to Iraq in a time of austerity when the Iraqis are so ungrateful. The Wartime Contracting Commission's conclusion that "significant additional waste -- and mission degradation to the point of failure -- can be expected as State continues with the daunting task of transition in Iraq," will also tighten Congressional purse-strings, as it should."

10/22

re: "Working On That Baghdad Footprint"

TSB at The Skeptical Bureaucrat ("From deep inside the foundations of our Republic's capital city") examined remarks related to AmEmb Baghdad by DepSec Nides.

Money quote(s):

"Downsizing the U.S. Mission in Baghdad isn't really about rationing chicken wings in the embassy's dining hall after all, despite yesterday's New York Times story.

Instead, it's all about the reducing the footprint, according to remarks by Thomas Nides, Deputy Secretary for Management and Resources, at a press teleconference today. He said "footprint" seven times."

The chicken wing (and arugula) story was never really more than just another big-media club with which to pummel Americans serving their country in a warzone, uniformed or not.

"(I)f we replace enough third-country security contractors with Iraqis, buy our groceries in the local market, and always, always, always re-think our engagement (Deputy Secretary Nides also said "engagement" seven times) we will eventually fit into a more nearly normal shoe."

Thinking is good. Right-sizing an embassy is a useful activity, particular when it's a out- (notice I don't say "over-") sized as our diplomatic/reconstruction/development/democratication establishment in Iraq.

That being said, placing too much of our embassy security in the hands of essentially un-vettable Iraqis, to say nothing of surrendering our food security, is a recipe for disaster.

"(M)ost of this footprint reduction will come about by hiring fewer foreign (i.e., non-Iraqi) security contractors and replacing them with local hires. That will help in at least two ways. First, it will eliminate a leading source of aggravation for the Iraqis. Second, the mission will not have to house and logistically support so many contractors, since our local hires will go home after their shifts are over, just like a normal local guard force does at a normal mission."

2/8

re: "State Department Fixing the Facts Based on Policy"

Say or think what you want about Peter Van Buren 's wisdom in tilting at State Dept.'s windmills, at We Meant Well ("How I Helped Lose the Battle for the Hearts And Minds of the Iraqi People") he made some on-target points about AmEmb Baghdad.

Money quote(s):

"The State Department can often times be so inward looking that it fixes the facts based on the policy need, making reality fit the vision whether that naughty reality wants to or not. Sometimes it’s funny, sometimes it can be tragic."

There is an institutional tendency at State to, as someone in the military might say, "fake it 'til you make it." Just keep talking the talk, and walking the walk, and perhaps others will follow.

(Other institutional tendencies include what I call "the full employment for ambassadors program" of opening or re-opening missions that we probably ought not, or at least not yet. Another is a forward-leaning bias towards making an agreement, signing a treaty, any agreement or any treaty, just to have something signed and on paper, irrespective of how good a deal it might be for the U.S.)

"(A)s the State Department rushes to replace all of the military support it needs to exist in still-dangerous Iraq without the Army, there are fears that the warping of reality may indeed endanger lives in Baghdad."

Brother Van Buren posted this in December (my apologies for the time-delay) so the previously-mentioned military support has vaporized. Gone. Pined for the fjords.

"Currently every item of food for the Embassy, from sides of beef to baby carrots, is procured in “safe” Kuwait and convoyed up to Baghdad. It is an expensive system, one that occasionally even entails the loss of life protecting boxes of Raisin Bran, but it has ensured the safety and cleanliness of the food for almost nine years.

The State Department, facing the crazy costs of this system without the nearly bottomless budget of the Defense Department, is once again swaying the facts to fit the policy. Undersecretary for Management Pat Kennedy told Congress in mid-November that seeking to cut costs in Iraq, State is looking to locally purchase some of the food its personnel will eat, breaking with the U.S. military’s practice of importing. Nothing has changed on the ground vis-a-vis food security, but to save money, State is warping that reality to fit its own needs."

Regular readers will note that this developing situation has already born somewhat bitter fruit (or lettuce) in terms of a tightening stranglehold on our Baghdad mission's logistics and support.

"Much has been made of State’s plan to hire over 5500 mercenaries as security guards for its Iraq-bound diplomats. However, while numbers do matter, the skills that those merc possess matter more. Currently in Iraq, with the US Army in place, a State Department convoy ambushed can call on a QRF, an Army quick reaction force. On standby 24/7, these soldiers are literally the cavalry that rides in to save the day."

"(M)ercenaries" is a bit of a loaded/pejorative term, which I believe is Br. Van Buren's intent. While technically correct on some levels, they might more accurately be called "auxiliaries" if the official terminology of "security contractor" seems to euphemistic.

That being said, he's quite correct in his larger point.

"There remain other concerns harder to nail down in an unclassified environment — security at the Baghdad Airport once control leaves U.S. hands, availability of a blood supply (another contractor, who will have to create a logistics schema with the Armed Services Blood Program) and proper trauma care for the diplomats (yet another contractor), particularly should someone suffer the horrific burns now too common in IED attacks. Under the military system, even during an attack, an injured soldier would receive first aid from a trained buddy, be helicopter evacuated from the site within minutes, stabilized at a specialized trauma unit and on a med flight to a hospital in Germany within an hour or two. While the danger on the ground in Iraq will remain the same (if not more dangerous given the lack of American troop presence), State in no way will be able to replicate the vast resources the military can bring to bear."

Allowing for the OBE ("overcome by events") nature of his observation (which is my fault, not his), these are all potentially fatal (and I mean that quite literally) vulnerabilities of our diplomatic mission in Iraq.

Whatever you might personally think of the wisdom of current (or past) U.S. policies in Iraq or of just how good an idea it is to have an embassy of this (or any) size there, or your possibly prejudiced views about diplomats in general, the ground truth there is that the U.S. has stationed civilian personnel overseas on its behalf, on your behalf, to be about America's business. The diplomats and other staff assigned in Baghdad (and other places in Iraq) are there because our elected government determined they must be there.

"State’s responses have been weak. Can’t travel safely outside the Green Zone? “The Embassy will attempt to mitigate the loss of tactical intelligence by establishing closer working relationships with the Government of Iraq.” Although Embassy medical plans do not currently include the capability for handling a mass casualty event, Embassy officials magic-wanded the problem away by stating that “even the US military’s current combat support hospital can be overwhelmed by a large enough number of casualties.” Meanwhile, State “will continue to explore possibilities for mitigating the impact of a mass casualty event.”

In other words, again the policy seems to be warping the reality on the ground. Only this time, it’s not politics, it’s personal, or maybe, without irony, personnel, at stake."

12/7

re: "State Department Seeks Advisors for South Sudan Armed Forces Transformation"

Domani Spero at Diplopundit ("Just one obsessive observer, diplomatic watcher, opinionator and noodle newsmaker monitoring the goings on at Foggy Bottom and the worldwide available universe.") shared a State Dept. solicitation for a job overseas.

Money quote(s):

"Not only has the State Department got itself a new private army in Iraq, we now will also be training and mentoring the Ministry of Defense of the world’s newest country.

I’m sure we’re all relieved to learn about this."

Calling what AmbEmb Baghdad has in the way of security contractors a "private army' is a bit of a stretch, but let that lie for now.

8/18

re: "State Department war lords"

Uncle Jimbo at Blackfive ("the paratrooper of love") commented on some alarmist hyperbole.

Money quote(s):

"(T)he State Department is getting into the Army business in Iraq. Since we have agreed to move all of our combat forces out of the country the remaining folks need some kind of security and State is taking the lead with a force of some 5,000 private security guards. We have built a gargantuan embassy there and while it is no longer the most dangerous place on Earth, it is hardly a shangri la. I have reservations about the idea of that many armed folks under the command and control of a non-military agency, but is this really a major problem?"

It's a valid concern. While DS (the Bureau of Diplomatic Security) has considerable experience managing local guard forces at embassies and consulates around the world, the shear scale of the security effort required to support our diplomatic establishments and missions in Iraq represents a non-trivial upscaling of scope and span of control.

"I guess he is down with the whole calling security guards a mercenary army idea. As I said there is room to question whether this is a good idea, but characterizing like this is hardly fair and he goes on to blame the shootings in Nisoour Square, where 17 Iraqis were killed, on poor oversight."

CAA takes this opportunity to condemn the labeling of legitimate contractors, even security contractors, as a mercenary army.

(Of course, CAA used to be a security contractor, although not one of this type.)

"This incident, while tragic, was a case of mistaken intention not poor control as I wrote about extensively based on information from a State Department employee with direct knowledge of the case. His main concern is that the State Department IG with responsibility for Iraq has not been given the access he feels he needs to the process of fielding this force. OK that may be a problem, but all of the over kill calling them a combat brigade and hired guns and a mercenary army is a tad bit excessive eh?"

Just to be clear, CAA is not the "State Department employee" to whom Uncle Jimbo is referring.

Also, while numerically a combat brigade is in the neighborhood of having 5,000 personnel, little things life organization, command & control, equipment, training & doctrine, and mission make this security force (or forces) a horse of a different tincture.

7/22

GE - Expanding mission of State's Diplomatic Security Bureau concerns lawmakers, GAO

From my archive of press clippings:

Government Executive

Expanding mission of State's Diplomatic Security Bureau concerns lawmakers, GAO

By Elizabeth Newell enewell@govexec.com

December 9, 2009

Both the Government Accountability Office and lawmakers are concerned about how the State Department's Diplomatic Security Bureau is handling a rapid acceleration of responsibilities during the past decade.

Read the whole article here.

Snippet(s):

"At a hearing of the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the Federal Workforce and the District of Columbia on Wednesday, GAO presented the results of a recent audit showing the security service faces significant challenges as a result of the considerable growth in its mission since 1998."

"(T)he bureau's presence in an increasing number of dangerous posts overseas requires additional resources, even though Diplomatic Security's budget has grown almost tenfold during the past 10 years."

"(E)xtra resources have not guaranteed the bureau's readiness, particularly given Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's recent statement that the number of American civilians in Afghanistan will triple by early next year."

"(M)ost pressing is the second challenge GAO identified -- staffing shortages and challenges such as language deficiencies and experience gaps. According to Voinovich, 53 percent of special agents do not speak or read at the foreign language level their position requires."

&

"(T)he bureau must do more to balance the increasing reliance on contractors and properly manage them. Almost 90 percent of Diplomatic Security's workforce needs are met by contractors, and GAO found that some employees are not prepared to manage such a large private sector workforce."

re: "Contractors Tied to Effort to Track and Kill Militants"

Herschel Smith at The Captain's Journal ("dedicated to the dissemination of conservative views, based on a solidly and consistently conservative world view, on matters political and military") cuts to the heart of this: money.

Money quote(s):

"So the story line is that Jordan and his cohorts were hired to build and maintain a web site similar to Iraq Slogger, except for Afghanistan. I don’t believe that charging for content on Iraq Slogger worked out very well, and they apparently worked a deal with the DoD to fund this new web site with tax dollars. Some of “their” money got diverted to use in actually developing real intelligence and killing the enemy, and they went to The New York Times, complaining and moaning about lost revenue.

Since I have gone on record demanding a covert campaign to foment an insurgency inside of Iran (as well as advocated targeted assassinations of certain figures such as Moqtada al Sadr and others), it should come as no surprise that I have no problem with dollars being spent wherever they are best utilized. It’s amusing that a government official said “no legitimate intelligence operations got screwed up.” No, to the contrary, these dollars redounded to success. There is a lesson in this."

&

"(T)here is the moralistic element to this account. It’s an outrage: his information was “being used to kill people,” intoned the flabbergasted Pelton. This is the same preening, holier than thou, sanctimonious crap that we heard from the anthropologists who weighed in against the use of human terrain teams – as if war isn’t a legitimate application for anthropology. Every enlisted man and officer in war practices anthropology every day."

re: "Progressive twit beclowns himself"

Uncle Jimbo at Blackfive takes a journalist to the woodshed.

Money quote(s):

"A resident fellow traveler at The American Prospect manages to attempt an Uncle J style snarky beat down about security contractors. Unsurprisingly he manages to include zero facts, his assumptions are all literally wrong and even his snarky comments are false and not even funny."

"I will let his voluminous knowedge of military and security affairs speak (silently) for itself, and simply squash his weaselly commentary. This may pass for clever among the pantywaists he represents, but c'mon this is the reality-based community little fella. We deal with real bad guys and real bullets here, although I'm sure you kick ass at Halo while being blissfully ignorant of what HALO even means."

"The idea that you would consider security contractor a euphemism for mercenary shows immediately your lack of serious knowledge or interest in the topic at hand."

"Since the most dangerous situation you have likely found your punk ass in is a slap fight at a frat house, I will deny your attempt to judge the professionalism of your betters. You so blithely discount the fact that no one Blackwater was protecting in the most dangerous area on Earth has been killed"

&

"(T)he type of specialized security Blackwater does is something only a tiny handful of military folks do. Mostly because it is not their job to be bullet sponges for diplomatic weenies. Their job is to make dead tangos"