WALTER RUSSELL MEAD at The American Interest's Via Meadia ("Walter Russell Mead's Blog") really put his brain to work with this one.
Money quote(s):
"If you read recent statements by senior US officials on the relationship between Pakistan’s ISI and attacks on US and NATO interests, it is impossible to avoid the conclusion that a state of war exists between an agency of the government of Pakistan and the United States of America." (Bold typeface added for emphasis. - CAA.)
Remember, it can still be a war when one side isn't fighting back.
"One should be clear about this; attacks on embassies and on military personnel and positions are acts of war. They are not college pranks, they are not “signals”, they are not robust statements of policy disagreement and they are not bargaining chips in an extended negotiation. They are acts of force in violation of international law and they can legitimately be met by acts of force and war in return." (Bold typeface added for emphasis. - CAA.)
As I noted on Facebook yesterday (paraphrasing aeklus' "the phrase "act of war" is really a political, rather than legal distinction"):
"Casus belli denotes a political decision rather than a legal consequence. It's a reason to go to war only if we say it is."
"(R)etired senior officials of the ISI at different times, and they make no bones about their attitudes toward the United States. They are our enemies and they are not ashamed to say so. They believe they have grounds: the US in their view is a treacherous ally which has never fully backed Pakistan in what they believe to be an existential conflict with India, and that today the US is openly in India’s camp, supporting its nuclear program, its global ambitions, and pursuing an Afghan policy which increases Indian influence in direct opposition to Pakistan’s efforts to ensure a friendly government in Kabul when the Americans leave. Moreover they believe that America is a power that is fundamentally hostile to Islam, and that our invasion of Afghanistan was an act of wanton mayhem which threatens the sovereignty and security of Pakistan and which has cost Pakistan untold billions of dollars, far exceeding any US aid.
While these views are not universally held in the Pakistani military and government, they are prominent — perhaps central — in ISI strategy, and it is clear that the rest of the Pakistani government either cannot control the ISI or does not wish to." (Bold typeface added for emphasis. - CAA.)
Regardless of what they believe, from over here in the cheap seats it's obvious that the U.S. cares very little about Pakistan, certainly not enough to conspire against it with India, except insofar as Pakistan is necessary to our military efforts in Afghanistan. Period. Full stop.
(So just get over your bad selves.)
"The United States has generally also tried to run its Pakistan policy in ways that allow a split consciousness. On the one hand, we know much of what the ISI is up to while US forces seek to kill people that the ISI regards as colleagues and allies. On the other hand, we push the Pakistani military command to limit the space in which the ISI is permitted to operate and to collaborate with us on those areas where collaboration remains possible. There are, after all, some groups we both want to defeat. In a sense we try to exact the highest price possible for our willingness to turn a blind eye to ISI activities of which we disapprove.
This is the ugly logic of war." (Bold typeface added for emphasis. - CAA.)
Did no one ever tell you that war is an ugly thing?
"“Frenemies” are part of the international scene and have been for thousands of years.
But US-Pakistan relations seem to be moving past the “Bosom Buddy” stage to something sharper. When the nation’s most senior military official, a man who follows US-Pakistani relations closely and speaks frequently with the head of the Pakistani military, makes the kind of charges in a public forum that Admiral Mullen has done, it is no longer possible for either side to pretend that nothing is happening.
The United States is telling Pakistan that something must change. It is not, however, clear just how committed we are to this contest with the ISI. If the bottom line for the United States is that Pakistani cooperation is essential for our Afghan policy to work, the Pakistanis will play this card for all it is worth." (Bold typeface added for emphasis. - CAA.)
Y'know, when Adm. Mullins' made that statement I figured it was better than even odds that he'd was just about to retire in order to "spend more time with his family."
"The current tussle between the US and Pakistan involves an effort by the Americans to invoke the stated threat of a military aid cut off and the implied threat of a full-bore US realignment with India to force Pakistan to give up at least part of its fifth pillar: the links to terror and guerrilla groups and the use of these groups in Afghanistan.
There seems to be a genuine division in Pakistan about how to respond. There are some who see the present national strategy as suicidal (the Via Meadia view, by the way) and want to use the American threat as a way to force ISI hands off the levers of power and call a halt to activities in both India and Afghanistan that hurt rather than help Pakistan in their view. These are nice people, but there are not enough of them to swing the debate.
Then there are those who want to temporize: always in the past it has been possible to buy off the Americans with a few pretty gestures or even occasionally a real concession. Throw them a few more Al-Qaeda officials, give them a bit more help eradicating some rebel units you also don’t much like in the tribal areas, and guilt-trip the Americans into more aid.
There are those who think the Americans are bluffing: that America needs Pakistan so badly to get out of Afghanistan that Pakistan can safely defy the Americans at minimal cost.
And finally there are those who think that America is Pakistan’s enemy. Either for religious reasons (we are the leader of a global western and Christian assault against Islam as they see it) or national ones (we have decisively chosen to take India’s side) we are hostile to Pakistan and our cooperation and aid is intended to confuse Pakistanis, gain an intelligence edge and, quite probably, prepare ourselves for a strike to destroy or capture their nuclear weapons." (Bold typeface added for emphasis. - CAA.)
America is only Pakistan's enemy if Pakistan makes us one. It's that simple. Afghanistan itself didn't become our enemy until it became the sanctuary state for those who attacked us on 9/11, and stopped being treated like an enemy as soon as a non-Taliban government was established.
"One must then ask what Admiral Mullen and his colleagues (who surely understand the basic facts of Pakistani national security policy better than a humble blogger) hope to achieve by ratcheting up the pressure in this public and official way. The most likely theory: they believe the last group of Pakistanis who think of America as a strategic enemy (presumably the ones responsible for supporting the recent attacks) are not yet strong enough to dominate Pakistani policy making. Forcing a showdown will lead the other groups in Pakistan to clip the wings of the ISI-types who might welcome an open breach. That won’t be enough to stop the ISI from playing games, but it may limit how far they dare to go.
One hopes this calculation is correct, but it would be unwise to underestimate the degree to which many Pakistanis think they have the US in a trap, how deeply a culture of brinkmanship has embedded itself into Pakistani security thinking, and how much contempt many Pakistani decision-makers feel for many of their US counterparts.
The ISI and its allies just might not back down. At that point, the US would face some extremely difficult choices — although there are plenty of people in the US armed forces and diplomatic corps who are angry enough with Pakistan at this point to make and to implement those choices." (Bold typeface added for emphasis. - CAA.)