re: "The British Ambassador To Tehran Experiences a 1979 Flashback"

TSB at The Skeptical Bureaucrat ("Giving my fellow Americans the view from my cubicle") provides some professional insight into Amb. Chilcott's remarks.

Money quote(s):

"(T)he embassy staff assumed they would have sufficient warning of a 'serious' mob attack, as opposed to a 'normal' rock-and-bottle throwing demonstration, and that they could send the non-essential staff and dependents home where they would be safely out of the way. Stop me if you've heard this one before."

This is, IIRC, known to students of behavioral conditioning as "operant conditioning." Career intelligence officers know if for something somewhat different, but the goal is similar: condition your target to expect certain situations and conditions to play out a certain way. It's a form of intelligence deception, and the Iranians are good at it.

"Going to the windows is a very bad practice. I hope British embassies have technical means for seeing what's happening outside without needing to expose staff to bullets and flying glass."

U.S. foreign service staff know better than to run to windows when they hear scary noises outside; not to say someone won't do it anyway, but they've been trained not to do so.

Historically, the majority of casualties in an embassy attack have come from flying glass, particularly when blast effects shatter a window. However the majority of fatalities have come from catastrophic structural collapse.

"I am guessing that the residential compound was less well protected against mob attack than was the embassy office building. Bottom line: the non-essential staff and dependents were "rounded up" - i.e., captured and held hostage - unlike the staff who were locked down in the embassy. That's enough to make a reasonable man ask whether foreign missions in unstable places shouldn't protect their residential compounds to the exact same degree they do their office buildings."

Clearly, they've read our playbook and know that Western embassies put the emphasis of their security measures at their working facilities rather than their residences. And have adjusted their offensive strategies against them accordingly. We can expect to see this happen again.

12/5

re: "Almost the Ultimate Carter Moment in Damascus."

Moe Lane (Diary) at RedState ("the most widely read right of center blog on Capitol Hill") cautioned administration appointees:

"(I)f Syrian ‘loyalists’ follow up today’s attack against the US Embassy in Damascus…

…by actually seizing the embassy? If that happens, start updating your resumes. And don’t bother with sending them along to Democratic House Members (and any Democratic Senator up for re-election in 2012): we’ll be throwing them out of office, too."

Recent history only provides one example of the "if" side of this statement, but the "then" segment justifies 100 percent confidence in the political consequences.

7/11

re: "Tehran's embassies: Targets of popular rage since 1829"

Uri Friedman at PASSPORT ("A Blog By The Editors of FOREIGN POLICY") put the Iranian attack on the British embassy in its proper historical context.

Money quote(s):

"The storming of the British embassy in Tehran on Tuesday capped a week of diplomatic wrangling over the United Kingdom's decision to slap new sanctions on Iran in response to its nuclear program."

Just in case anyone actually believes this was the unsanctioned action of a "spontaneous mob," here's a link to some information that bears on that subject.

(Of course, if you equate, as I do, the term "spontaneous mob" to "state-sponsored assault team," then only the "unsanctioned" part of the above should be any bother.)

"(E)mbassy storming is a recurring phenomenon in Tehran, though Iran certainly isn't the only country to experience such attacks. The most infamous incident, of course, involves young Islamic revolutionaries seizing the U.S. embassy in 1979 and taking 63 Americans hostage for 444 days to demand that the United States hand over the recently ousted Shah. But there are other examples."

In addition to some post-Revolutionary examples, there's also this:

"Tehran also witnessed what may be the earliest instance of an embassy assault (if an earlier example comes to mind, please share it with us). In January 1829, Alexander Griboyedov, a famous Russian playwright tasked with imposing a humiliating peace treaty on the Persians, was murdered along with nearly his entire staff when a furious mob stormed the Russian embassy in Tehran following a series of disputes between Griboyedov and the Shah."

In addition to Britain closing its Tehran embassy and order Iran's diplomats out of London, France's mission will also be going on some sort of Ordered Departure.

11/29

re: "Are We Going to Do Anything to Those Who Kill Americans?"

Michael Ledeen at Faster, Please! looked at a decades-old problem (which the British will likely face very soon).

Money quote(s):

"At first, I thought all the statements — about Iranian support for terrorists (in both Iraq and Afghanistan) who kill Americans — were parting messages from government officials on their way out, and therefore free to say such things. They knew the facts all along, but repeatedly soft-pedaled them and on occasion even denied having such evidence. So when Secretary of Defense Gates and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Mullen (finally) said “the Iranians are killing our guys,” I wasn’t impressed. “NOW you tell us!” was my gut reaction. “So how come we didn’t hear about this many years ago?”

And that’s still my reaction, up to a certain point."

As it happens, I visited wounded milblogger Lumberjack In A Desert during his stay at Walter Reed. He was in no doubt as to whom he owed his injuries. And that was back in 2006.

"But then came a similar statement from Ambassador Jeffrey in Iraq, and I had to say “whoa!” And then Panetta said the same thing. Those are different, those come from officials who are there right now, and their words count for a lot more than those of guys entering retirement. Indeed, I think we must now read the Gates and Mullen statements as part of an administration campaign to raise public consciousness."

Would that it were so.

"It would be churlish to blame Obama and his minions for the ongoing Iranian-sponsored assault against Americans — it’s been going on for decades. And every president since Jimmy Carter has appeased the Islamic Republic, believing that a “grand bargain” was days away. But the other presidents’ search for rapprochement with Iran was, for the most part, conducted secretly, while Obama put himself in front of the appeasement bandwagon."

True enough. There's plenty of room at the bottom of this pile-on for presidents and prime ministers going back the past three decades.

"Does anyone remember the Iranian assault against our Tehran Embassy in 1979? When a mob attacked, the Marine Guards did not shoot. Indeed, they did not even have live ammunition in their weapons. The Embassy was overrun, hostages were taken, and the countdown for Jimmy Carter had begun.

The first rule is that self-defense is legitimate and important. Failure to actively defend Americans under assault will only multiply the number of assaults against Americans. Dithering encourages our enemies; we have to be decisive.

The second rule is that we must strike — politically in almost all cases, not militarily — directly at the heart of the regimes that organize the killing of Americans. We must support their enemies, who, in both Iran and Syria, constitute a clear majority of the Iranian and Syrian people.

The third rule is that those responsible for killing Americans must be held accountable. When the Quds Force killers appear in areas where we can operate, we should hunt them down. When their political leaders travel, we must demand that Interpol arrest them. And we should strike violently at the terrorist training camps from which the Iranian proxies emerge, as well as against the assembly points for the explosive devices and rockets that are used to kill and maim our men and women.

That means changing the intended recipient of the outstretched hand from the tyrants to the people, and brandishing a clenched fist at the tyrants." (Bold typeface added for emphasis. - CAA.)

Sounds like a plan to me.


______

Hat tip to Glenn Reynolds at Instapundit.


7/11

re: "Triumphs Of Smart Diplomacy: #28,764"

MikeM. at Confederate Yankee ("Because liberalism is a persistent vegetative state.") noted the failure of a host nation to protect an embassy.

Money quote(s):

"The seizure of the embassy of a foreign nation is normally considered an act of war."

Sure, when a government does it.

On the other hand, when a government fails to protect a diplomatic mission, it fails in its obligations under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. It's less clear to me that this can/should be considered an act of war.

Lots of things can be considered to be causus belli, but if every government went to war every time something that could be considered an act of war happened, then there'd be a lot more wars.

9/9

re: "Empower Iranians vs. Tehran"

Daniel Pipes at DanialPipes.Org ("a fast way to comment on many topics") has news from and about Iran.

Money quote(s):

"How should Western governments deal with the Islamic Republic of Iran, which Washington labels "the most active state sponsor of terrorism"?

Iranian aggression began in 1979, with the seizure of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, and the holding of some of its staff as hostages for 444 days. Major subsequent attacks included two bombings in Beirut in 1983: at the U.S. embassy, killing 63, and at a U.S. Marine barracks, killing 241."

And that's just hitting some of the high spots. Essentially, they have been waging war against the U.S., albeit mostly at a lowish sort of intensity, since 1979 to the present time (and presumably more to follow).

(My apologies to those whose personal experiences with, por ejemplo, explosively formed projectiles, were undoubtedly highly intense.)

"American responses fall into two main camps: tough and diplomatic."

"The diplomatic camp, which generally controls U.S. policy, accepts the permanence of the Islamic Republic of Iran and expects Tehran to respond to diplomatic overtures.

A main battleground in this dispute is the question of whether or not the most prominent Iranian opposition group, the Mujahedeen-e Khalq (MeK), should remain on the U.S. government's terrorism list. The tough camp generally views the MeK, founded in 1965, as a lever against the mullahs and (with a minority dissenting) wants it delisted. The diplomatic camp argues that delisting would anger the Iranian leaders, hampering efforts to improve relations, or (contradictorily) would limit Washington's ability to reach out to the Iranian street.

The pro-MeK side argues that the MeK has a history of cooperating with Washington, providing valuable intelligence on Iranian nuclear plans and tactical intelligence about Iranian efforts in Iraq. Further, just as the MeK's organizational and leadership skills helped bring down the shah in 1979, these skills can again facilitate regime change. The number of street protestors arrested for association with the MeK points to its role in demonstrations, as do slogans echoing MeK chants, e.g., calling Supreme Leader Ali Khamene'i a "henchman," President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad a "dictator," and shouting "down with the principle of Velayat-e Faqih" (that a religious figure heads the government)."

There are merits to both arguments. Since the PMOI doesn't even own up to its past terrorist record against U.S. targets (i.e., murdered U.S. servicemen in 1970's Iran), they don't get a pass from me on this.

"The anti-MeK faction does not address the benefits of delisting but argues that the U.S. government must continue the listing on the basis of allegations of terrorism. Their indictment notes that the MeK killed six Americans in the 1970s. Whether or not these allegations are accurate, a terrorist incident must have occurred within two years to continue with the terrorist-group designation—rendering discussion of the 1970s completely irrelevant."

The "two years" rules is news to me. I followed the link and, admittedly, didn't read the whole Public Law, but when I went to the 8 U.S.C. section that appeared to be amended, the only "two years" that seemed to apply were purely procedural in nature (having to do with a petition period that occurs two years after an organization is designated for the list) and had nothing to do with the length of time since an organization last committed a terrorist act.

"The pro-MeK side points to three main U.S. terrorist databases—the RAND Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents (RDWTI), the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), and the Worldwide Incidents Tracking System (WITS) -- and notes that in each one the MeK comes up clean since 2006 or earlier."

See above. If they won't even admit to what we know they did against us in the past, why would we trust them in the future?

"(C)apabilities and intentions? The State Department's 2006 "Country Reports on Terrorism" accused the MeK of maintaining "capacity and will" for terrorist acts but the 2007, 2008, and 2009 reports omitted this statement. Britain's Court of Appeal derided proscription of the MeK as "perverse," and the group was removed from the U.K. terrorist list in 2008. The European Union cleared the group of terrorism charges in 2009. The French judiciary dismissed all terrorism-related allegations against the group in May 2011."

This is where Mr. Pipes makes some sense. The West and the U.S. specifically are very much not the PMOI's enemies and have not been so for years. In fact, their military arm at Camp Ashraf is very much dependent upon the U.S. for protection.

He concludes:

"In brief, the argument to maintain the MeK's terrorist designation is baseless."

Nah, there's still a base, it's just not getting any younger; just like the families of the U.S. servicement killed by PMOI assassins in Iran all those years ago. An admission of responsibility, an apology, and some reparations to the families would go a long way in cementing the PMOI's credibility.

"Following a court-mandated review of the MeK's terrorist designation, the secretary of state must soon decide whether to maintain this listing. With one simple signature, the Obama administration can help empower Iranians to seize control over their destiny—and perhaps end the mullahs' mad nuclear dash."

For more on that, see Lex's latest here.

re: "When Will The Islamic Republic Apologize?"

Robert at Expat Yank ("one American Living in the South of England") is still waiting, as are the rest of us.

Money quote(s):

"(T)he U.S. had diplomatic relations with the Islamic Republic at its inception. Those ceased when the Islamic Republic made relations impossible. How?

Americans are still waiting to hear “sorry” from the Islamic Republic for its having orchestrated the overrunning of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran on November 4, 1979 in complete rejection of centuries-long diplomatic practices. The staff were taken hostage, threatened with death, and 52 of them were imprisoned in Iran until January 1981.

Iran was lucky, then, that the U.S. only broke off relations six months later, and did not declare war on the regime. U.S. restraint at that time was remarkable, and demonstrated how “slow to war” is the country."