re: "Showing contempt"

David Warren at DavidWarrenOnline ("Newspaper columns") wrote a column, the whole of which should be read.

Money quote(s):

"Perhaps we are all getting sick of the word "terrorism." The word is misused as if it represented an ideological faction, rather than a method for getting one's way; and at that, it is used evasively, to avoid naming one's enemy, which, under current strictures, counts as a faux pas." (Bold typeface added for emphasis. - CAA.)

Terrorism is a noun. It's not an enemy. Terrorism is how the U.S. was attacked on 9/11; terrorism isn't who attacked on 9/11.

"What the Iranian apostate Shia-Muslim revolutionary regime is accused of having plotted - an atrocity in a high-class Washington restaurant, whose focus would be the murder of the Saudi Arabian ambassador - was not exactly terrorism. It may never have been meant to work; it may have been meant to be discovered. In which case, it was pure diplomatic gesture, the meaning of which takes a moment to sink in." (Bold typeface added for emphasis. - CAA.)

It's basically flipping us (the U.S.) the bird, and doing it so the Saudis can't help but be forced to see it.

"We have to believe that Barack Obama's people are saner than Ali Khameini's people; or else, where would we be?"

By "people," our Canadian friend (Mr. Warren) seems to mean all of us in the federal departments and agencies, not just the White House or the Democratic Party.

(Which is quite correct, regardless of how individual civil (and foreign) servants may choose to vote.)

"Yet here was an unambiguous act of war, against both the U.S. and Saudi Arabia, that traces to Iran's "supreme leader" Khameini, according to State Department sources speaking anonymously but purposefully to the media. Perhaps not, they say, to the Islamic Republic's malicious clown of a president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (leaving an opening for one of their pet "Iranian factions" theories)." (Bold typeface added for emphasis. - CAA.)

As I read earlier today:

"the phrase "act of war" is really a political, rather than legal distinction."

Oh, and there are factions a-plenty in Iran, even within the Iranian government and power structure (which aren't quite congruent).

But evidence that any of these are particularly "moderate" (in Western terms) belongs primarily in the eyes of the beholders.

"(T)he U.S. is now showing the FBI evidence in foreign capitals; presumably to confirm what everyone long suspected: that Iran's leaders are (as we say in Persian) "Majnun."Unhinged they may be, but even a detached wooden door should understand the consequences of an unambiguous act of war. For that would be, war.

Did the Iranians think they wouldn't be caught, or did they think that, if caught, nothing would happen?

The first proposition is crazier than the second; for sad to say, "bad guys" all over the world have been learning that, since the last Stateside election, they can do anything they want to the U.S. with impunity. Unless, they are not actually heads of government, in which case they must watch out for drones." (Bold typeface added for emphasis. - CAA.)

This problem goes much further back than the last election; it ebbs and flows with the political vicissitudes. Even Pres. Reagan, he of sainted Conservative memory, isn't remembered for getting much in the way of payback for the Marine barracks bombing (Beirut 1983).

"When the ayatollahs learn that senior figures in their elite Quds force may be denied visas, I'm sure they laugh. They probably laughed harder when Susan Rice, America's UN ambassador, marched into their New York mission Wednesday to deliver a solemn letter. They know the U.S. has no leverage, short of military force, and that for the foreseeable future, force is off the table.

They even know that the U.S. military is about to be asset-stripped, when the current congressional budget-cutting exercise fails: for huge defence cuts automatically kick in when the Democrats decide they don't like the Republicans' alternatives. America has been quitting its thankless old job as "world policeman," with the whole world watching.

The greater risk is now being on the U.S. side, as the Saudis have been nervously discovering."

Denying visas to unsavory corruptocrats is a form of "soft power" that has legs in some parts of the world, but not-so-much in a country like Iran. And anybody who thought that it was a sort of "magic bullet" might consider tendering bids on a certain bridge.

"That Iran has international reach, through agents that can sometimes act competently, should be part of general knowledge. There is, for instance, an under-reported Argentine dimension of the plot."

Iran, or at least "factions" therein, has seen itself as the vanguard of a worldwide (Shia) Islamic revolution since their fundamentalist takeover in 1979. And parallels between their post-revolutionary behavior and that of the Bolsheviks are not accidental, they are deliberate, studied, and intentional. And that includes fielding a revolutionary "international" to do their dirty work abroad.

"(T)heir primary target was the Saudi ambassador. That is the key. The fact this mission was to be carried out on U.S. soil, was meant as a gesture of contempt for American power."

10/15

re: "The British Ambassador To Tehran Experiences a 1979 Flashback"

TSB at The Skeptical Bureaucrat ("Giving my fellow Americans the view from my cubicle") provides some professional insight into Amb. Chilcott's remarks.

Money quote(s):

"(T)he embassy staff assumed they would have sufficient warning of a 'serious' mob attack, as opposed to a 'normal' rock-and-bottle throwing demonstration, and that they could send the non-essential staff and dependents home where they would be safely out of the way. Stop me if you've heard this one before."

This is, IIRC, known to students of behavioral conditioning as "operant conditioning." Career intelligence officers know if for something somewhat different, but the goal is similar: condition your target to expect certain situations and conditions to play out a certain way. It's a form of intelligence deception, and the Iranians are good at it.

"Going to the windows is a very bad practice. I hope British embassies have technical means for seeing what's happening outside without needing to expose staff to bullets and flying glass."

U.S. foreign service staff know better than to run to windows when they hear scary noises outside; not to say someone won't do it anyway, but they've been trained not to do so.

Historically, the majority of casualties in an embassy attack have come from flying glass, particularly when blast effects shatter a window. However the majority of fatalities have come from catastrophic structural collapse.

"I am guessing that the residential compound was less well protected against mob attack than was the embassy office building. Bottom line: the non-essential staff and dependents were "rounded up" - i.e., captured and held hostage - unlike the staff who were locked down in the embassy. That's enough to make a reasonable man ask whether foreign missions in unstable places shouldn't protect their residential compounds to the exact same degree they do their office buildings."

Clearly, they've read our playbook and know that Western embassies put the emphasis of their security measures at their working facilities rather than their residences. And have adjusted their offensive strategies against them accordingly. We can expect to see this happen again.

12/5

re: "Tehran's embassies: Targets of popular rage since 1829"

Uri Friedman at PASSPORT ("A Blog By The Editors of FOREIGN POLICY") put the Iranian attack on the British embassy in its proper historical context.

Money quote(s):

"The storming of the British embassy in Tehran on Tuesday capped a week of diplomatic wrangling over the United Kingdom's decision to slap new sanctions on Iran in response to its nuclear program."

Just in case anyone actually believes this was the unsanctioned action of a "spontaneous mob," here's a link to some information that bears on that subject.

(Of course, if you equate, as I do, the term "spontaneous mob" to "state-sponsored assault team," then only the "unsanctioned" part of the above should be any bother.)

"(E)mbassy storming is a recurring phenomenon in Tehran, though Iran certainly isn't the only country to experience such attacks. The most infamous incident, of course, involves young Islamic revolutionaries seizing the U.S. embassy in 1979 and taking 63 Americans hostage for 444 days to demand that the United States hand over the recently ousted Shah. But there are other examples."

In addition to some post-Revolutionary examples, there's also this:

"Tehran also witnessed what may be the earliest instance of an embassy assault (if an earlier example comes to mind, please share it with us). In January 1829, Alexander Griboyedov, a famous Russian playwright tasked with imposing a humiliating peace treaty on the Persians, was murdered along with nearly his entire staff when a furious mob stormed the Russian embassy in Tehran following a series of disputes between Griboyedov and the Shah."

In addition to Britain closing its Tehran embassy and order Iran's diplomats out of London, France's mission will also be going on some sort of Ordered Departure.

11/29

re: "Empower Iranians vs. Tehran"

Daniel Pipes at DanialPipes.Org ("a fast way to comment on many topics") has news from and about Iran.

Money quote(s):

"How should Western governments deal with the Islamic Republic of Iran, which Washington labels "the most active state sponsor of terrorism"?

Iranian aggression began in 1979, with the seizure of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, and the holding of some of its staff as hostages for 444 days. Major subsequent attacks included two bombings in Beirut in 1983: at the U.S. embassy, killing 63, and at a U.S. Marine barracks, killing 241."

And that's just hitting some of the high spots. Essentially, they have been waging war against the U.S., albeit mostly at a lowish sort of intensity, since 1979 to the present time (and presumably more to follow).

(My apologies to those whose personal experiences with, por ejemplo, explosively formed projectiles, were undoubtedly highly intense.)

"American responses fall into two main camps: tough and diplomatic."

"The diplomatic camp, which generally controls U.S. policy, accepts the permanence of the Islamic Republic of Iran and expects Tehran to respond to diplomatic overtures.

A main battleground in this dispute is the question of whether or not the most prominent Iranian opposition group, the Mujahedeen-e Khalq (MeK), should remain on the U.S. government's terrorism list. The tough camp generally views the MeK, founded in 1965, as a lever against the mullahs and (with a minority dissenting) wants it delisted. The diplomatic camp argues that delisting would anger the Iranian leaders, hampering efforts to improve relations, or (contradictorily) would limit Washington's ability to reach out to the Iranian street.

The pro-MeK side argues that the MeK has a history of cooperating with Washington, providing valuable intelligence on Iranian nuclear plans and tactical intelligence about Iranian efforts in Iraq. Further, just as the MeK's organizational and leadership skills helped bring down the shah in 1979, these skills can again facilitate regime change. The number of street protestors arrested for association with the MeK points to its role in demonstrations, as do slogans echoing MeK chants, e.g., calling Supreme Leader Ali Khamene'i a "henchman," President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad a "dictator," and shouting "down with the principle of Velayat-e Faqih" (that a religious figure heads the government)."

There are merits to both arguments. Since the PMOI doesn't even own up to its past terrorist record against U.S. targets (i.e., murdered U.S. servicemen in 1970's Iran), they don't get a pass from me on this.

"The anti-MeK faction does not address the benefits of delisting but argues that the U.S. government must continue the listing on the basis of allegations of terrorism. Their indictment notes that the MeK killed six Americans in the 1970s. Whether or not these allegations are accurate, a terrorist incident must have occurred within two years to continue with the terrorist-group designation—rendering discussion of the 1970s completely irrelevant."

The "two years" rules is news to me. I followed the link and, admittedly, didn't read the whole Public Law, but when I went to the 8 U.S.C. section that appeared to be amended, the only "two years" that seemed to apply were purely procedural in nature (having to do with a petition period that occurs two years after an organization is designated for the list) and had nothing to do with the length of time since an organization last committed a terrorist act.

"The pro-MeK side points to three main U.S. terrorist databases—the RAND Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents (RDWTI), the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), and the Worldwide Incidents Tracking System (WITS) -- and notes that in each one the MeK comes up clean since 2006 or earlier."

See above. If they won't even admit to what we know they did against us in the past, why would we trust them in the future?

"(C)apabilities and intentions? The State Department's 2006 "Country Reports on Terrorism" accused the MeK of maintaining "capacity and will" for terrorist acts but the 2007, 2008, and 2009 reports omitted this statement. Britain's Court of Appeal derided proscription of the MeK as "perverse," and the group was removed from the U.K. terrorist list in 2008. The European Union cleared the group of terrorism charges in 2009. The French judiciary dismissed all terrorism-related allegations against the group in May 2011."

This is where Mr. Pipes makes some sense. The West and the U.S. specifically are very much not the PMOI's enemies and have not been so for years. In fact, their military arm at Camp Ashraf is very much dependent upon the U.S. for protection.

He concludes:

"In brief, the argument to maintain the MeK's terrorist designation is baseless."

Nah, there's still a base, it's just not getting any younger; just like the families of the U.S. servicement killed by PMOI assassins in Iran all those years ago. An admission of responsibility, an apology, and some reparations to the families would go a long way in cementing the PMOI's credibility.

"Following a court-mandated review of the MeK's terrorist designation, the secretary of state must soon decide whether to maintain this listing. With one simple signature, the Obama administration can help empower Iranians to seize control over their destiny—and perhaps end the mullahs' mad nuclear dash."

For more on that, see Lex's latest here.

re: "A Gutsy Post"

Frank J. at IMAO ("Unfair. Unbalanced. Unmedicated.") analyzes the gutsy call.

Money quote(s):

"(T)he left has decided the word for Obama’s is “gutsy.” That’s kind of weird since he made a call that most Americans would have made, so what’s gutsy about it? If you told a regular American, “So, do you want to get Osama or not get Osama?” they would think that’s a trick question. But for Obama, going with the obvious answer was gutsy."

On the face of it, Frank's assessment is valid. But let's drill down a little bit. You see, approving the operation is a little bit more than just deciding to take down UBL. And I'm not even talking about the diplomatic and political repercussions involved in going into Pakistan in order to do it.

A few short decades ago there was this thing called "Desert One." Google it, if you don't already know. The president is of an age, as I am myself, to remember Desert One from late-adolescence/early-adulthood. Desert One was where Operation Eagle Claw went wholly pear-shaped and the predecessors of what became "Delta Force" took a number of casualties. And that was before they'd even gotten to their objective in Tehran.

So there are consequences to be considered. Missions are not always assured of success, even if things don't go disasterously wrong (as they did at Desert One); what if the intelligence is wrong? What if UBL picks that particular night to sleep over at a friend's house? The list of what-ifs and what-could-go-wrongs is limited only by the imagination.

So I'm un-troubled, upon reflection, by those who give props to the commander-in-chief for making a "gutsy" call. The call was his to make, he made it, and it went well for the troops who executed it, went well for the president, and went quite badly for UBL.

"Obama will get a little bit of a bounce and deservedly so for taking out Osama, but I wouldn’t expect too much of it."

TS - American hikers captured in Iran could face charges of spying

From my archive of press clippings:


The Star


American hikers captured in Iran could face charges of spying

Trio charged with entering the country illegally as neighbour Iraq says they 'simply made mistake'

Aug 05, 2009 04:30 AM

Nasser Karimi Jason Keyser Associated Press

TEHRAN–Iranian authorities were deciding yesterday whether three American hikers who were caught inside the country near the Iraqi border will be charged with spying, a lawmaker said.

Read the whole article here.

re: "Embassy Security in Iran - The Lesson Not Learned"

Fred at Fred Fry International ("Citizen Journalist and Observer of Human Nature") just finished reading Guests of the Ayatollah. He draws some lessons-learned (or not).

Money quote(s):

"One thing that is clear by the end of the book is that the best way to deal with Iran is to keep ourselves isolated from them. Negotiations for the release of the hostages was an ongoing joke as the Iranians constantly changed their demands, always demanding more once the US Government demonstrated that it was willing to deal in order to win the freedom of the US Embassy staff being held hostage."

"(C)onfirmed recently was the Iranian people's ability to still act as agents of their Government while at the same time acting in a way that the Government can deny any involvement. This happened at the end of December when protesters stormed a UK Diplomatic compound in Tehran. This is exactly how the US hostage crisis started. The only reason this did not turn into a hostage situation was because it did not appear to be their goal, but it certainly could have been.

In short, the Iranians are the same thugs and are capable of the same acts as thirty years ago. Unfortunately, the US, UK and other Western Governments still have yet to adapt to deal with them. There was even recent talk of re-establishing diplomatic relations and re-opening the US Embassy in Iran."

&

"Iran is not the only place where US Embassies are at risk of a similar occupation. Another question is whether or not the US is prepared to use lethal force the next time five, ten, a hundred 'protesters' come jumping over an Embassy wall."

Two points.

First, there is what I sometimes cynically call the "full employment for ambassadors" program. There's what seems to me sometimes to be an unseemly haste to open or re-open embassies in places where perhaps we have no business being, or before it's reasonable and prudent or perhaps not really best in U.S. interests to do so. And there's always a reluctance to close (temporarily or otherwise) an embassy when things start to go to Hell. While Churchill was right ("jaw-jaw is better than war-war"), first questions should be asked first, to wit: Is it in the best interests of the United States to open/re-open its embassy in Country X at this time and why?

Second, with only very few exceptions, U.S. diplomatic facilities really aren't designed to function as fire bases, holding off human waves of attackers using cleared fields of fire, &tc. Neither are their security staffs; even where we have U.S. Marines ("No better friend, no worse enemy.") there simply aren't enough of them. Under the Vienna Conventions, the host nation is responsible for ensuring the safety and security of foreign diplomatic missions. Our own security arrangements, both physical and otherwise, are intended only to delay or obstruct an attack to allow the host nation time to respond and increase its protective measures.

What should be obvious (but is apparently not) is that when the host nation uses "spontaneous demonstrations" as a means of communicating its displeasure with the United States (countries like Iran, China, Syria, and Serbia come immediately to mind) then this system breaks down. Hell, it's not really broken in such cases, it's being used against us in a form of international lawfare. That's when you've got to constantly be re-visiting your first questions (see above).