re: "Is the United States a Militaristic Imperialists Nation?"

TOWNIE 76 at OP-FOR examined the continued usefulness of regional combatant commands.

Money quote(s):

"Several weeks ago, Tom Dispatch published an extended article on the shadow war in Africa. In part it questioned why the United States military has divided the world into six fiefdoms or Combatant Commands."

Note to State Dept. readers: don't click on any of the Tom Dispatch links since you'll just get one of those scary "wikileaks" warning notices.

"The short answer is they are a continuation of our division of the world during World War II into Theaters of War. In fact they are often referred to as Theaters by today’s military. But that is not the sole reason. The United States being the dominate Western partner in our Cold War against global communism required the ability to establish priorities for the employment of our military. Lastly, today’s Combatant Commands and the defined power of the Commander[1], is an outgrowth of the debacle that was Grenada and Lebanon in the early 80’s. In the case of Grenada it was each service Chief adding their forces to the mix resulting in a Cluster Firetruck. In the case of Lebanon it was the failure of United State European Command to accept responsibility of the bombing in Beirut that left countless Marines dead. As a result in the Goldwater-Nichols Act the power of the services over operational matters was severely constrained and the Combatant Commanders were ultimately responsible for determining which military capabilities were required for a specific operation."

Townie76 noted three consequences of the above, including these two:

"(T)he Combatant Commanders have become de Facto Pro Counsels (sic) for their respective Regional Commands. In many cases they are the representatives of the United States Government who have the most exposure in their particular Theater. As such Military Power has become the dominat (sic) element of the United States National Power (Diplomatic, Informational, Military, Economic.)

Second, the Department of Defense regional division of the world differs from the Department of State regional division of the world. Thus the Department of State Regional Director for Near East must coordinate diplomatic activities in two Combatant Commanders Areas of Responsibility (Africa Command and Central Command). More importantly, while attempted with Africa Command, there is generally no high ranking member of the Foreign Service within the Headquarters of the Regional Combatant Commands. The only presence in the Regional Combatant Commands is the Political Advisor who is a Senior Member of the Foreign Service but from my experience has little influence inside the State Department."

The morphing of military commanders into imperial proconsuls is a criticism that's been leveled before, going back many years. Combatant commanders used to be called commanders-in-chief until the point was made, forcibly, that under the Constitution there is only one commander-in-chief.

Political advisors, despite their relatively high rank within the Foreign Service (i.e., flag or general officer equivalents) encumber positions which are, not surprisingly, advisory. They exist within the combatant command's headquarters, without bringing any non-DoD resources to the table other than their own expertise, as staff officers.

(This is not meant as a criticism, only to realistically define their role.)

"The question that should be debated not only by the military but also by an informed citizenry is the organization of the Regional Combatant Commands making the United States imperialistic in the execution of its foreign policy?

I have believed for a long time that there is a need for a new National Security Act for the 21^st Century.[2] Among the provision I would like to see is the common alignment of Regions across the entire federal government. While there may be arguments for different divisions it seems that a whole government approach would benefit from all the players reading off the same script. I think it also time to consider rather than having the Department of Defense Combatant Commanders being the lead that perhaps it is time of the Department of State to take the lead."

7/29

re: "Budget axe may kill our military’s edge"

McQ at Blackfive ("the paratrooper of love") explained why defense cuts are fraught with peril.

Money quote(s):

"One of the things that concerns me with all of the talk about huge budget cuts to defense is the distinct possibility that such cuts will take away the edge our military now has and has enjoyed for decades.

That edge, or advantage, is something that has helped make our military successful in every sort of combat imaginable. But developing and maintaining that edge are both time consuming and expensive. Research, development, testing, field and support don’t come cheap.

Yet that seems to be what is being demanded in an increasingly technologically advanced and dangerous world. The edge we’ve developed technologically over the years is what makes our military so exponentially lethal. We’ve provided combat multipliers to our warriors and they’ve used them expertly.

But to maintain such an edge, we must also be willing to spend the money necessary to do so.

There are numerous examples of cuts being considered that are dangerous. They will not only make our military much less capable, but also threaten our national security. Not only that, the cuts could end up actually costing us more than they save by sticking the military with outdated equipment that requires more maintenance, has more down time and will need continued parts and support."

That last might seem counterintuitive, but really isn't. To those with any military experience whatsoever (which exempts most of Congress), it's obvious. Older stuff breaks more often, is offline or "deadlined" longer, and requires replacement of broken or wornout parts with greater frequency. It's why military logisticians go with 150 percent "redundancy": in essence, if you need two trucks, you'd better have three because one is always going to be "down" for maintenance.

McQ concluded:

"These are the things that should concern us all as we watch a group of politicians with vested interests in other areas, many of whom look at defense spending cuts as a way to pay for other programs they are interested in, get ready to swing the budget axe.

Do we keep and improve the technological edge which has made our military the most powerful and predominant military in the world for decades? Or do we refuse to pay the price necessary to keep our military’s edge and continue to make it the most powerful and flexible force in the world and risk our national security?

No one knows how many wars and conflicts our military has been able to avoid simply because we’re as powerful as we are. But if history is a teacher, as soon as we’re perceived to be in decline militarily, there are those who will test us. This is one area of the national budget with which we must be very careful. Budgetary fat is always fair game, but the systems that will be the heart and soul of our national defense capability for decades to come should not be cut heedlessly. To do so would be a tragic mistake."

10/26

re: "Dudes! Misinterpreting DoD's strategic guidance repeats mistakes, ignores emerging trends, and leads to failure"

Janine Davidson posted at Thomas E. Ricks' The Best Defense blog ("Tom Ricks' Daily Take on National Security"), read the "Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21^st Century Defense and Defense Budget Priorities and Choices" documents (so you don't have to).

Money quote(s):

"The fact is, whether we call it "COIN," "stability operations," "peacekeeping," or "irregular warfare," such frustrating, complex, population-centric, and increasingly urban operations against and among savvy and networked non-state actors are simply a modern version of an age-old phenomenon. And they are here to stay."

&

"(N)ot sizing the force for large-scale operations like Iraq and Afghanistan is a responsible and prudent strategic approach. As these two huge wars wind down, of course the force will be down-sized. This is what we do after every war, no matter the type. It would irresponsible, and in fact unconstitutional, to do otherwise. Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution of the United States clearly indicates the power of the Congress to "raise and support Armies..." but to "provide and maintain a Navy." This language is deliberate, as the founders did not want to maintain large expensive standing ground forces in peacetime. The Congress is empowered to appropriate money to expand the force as needed to fight wars. And that is exactly what happened during the past decade. Our force planning can and should account for our ability to do this again when needed.

For operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the army grew from just over 480,000 soldiers in 2001 to a peak of 570,000 just a couple of years ago. Likewise, the marine corp grew from approximately 170,000 to 210,000. Following redeployment from these wars, the new strategy calls for downsizing back to about 490,000 soldiers and 182,000 marines by 2017, (assuming we manage to disengage in Afghanistan) which is slightly larger than the what President George W. Bush inherited eleven years ago. And still, it is nearly four to five times the size of the ground forces of any of our NATO allies."

Strategy (as outlined in the document being reviewed by Prof. Davidson) is one thing: the meat ax of sequestration is another. The downsizing she posits may be the best case scenario.

"(L)et's not confuse size with competency. Not sizing for Iraqs or Afghanistans does not, and should not, mean forgetting how to conduct such missions -- no matter the size."

&

"Throughout its entire 250-year history, coin, stability operations, and nation building have been far from an "irregular" occurrence. The U.S. has conducted such missions -- on a large scale -- about every 25 years since the Mexican War in the 1840's. U.S. ground troops conducted nation-building, peace-keeping, and a series of counter-guerilla wars against American Indians on the western frontier throughout the 1800's. They conducted a bloody counterinsurgency in the Philippines (1898-1902), a number of "small wars" in the Caribbean (1930's), and occupation duty after the American Civil War and the two World Wars. Since the end of the Cold War, the U.S. has deployed every 18-24 months in response to complex crises of various size, with the average duration of these endeavors becoming increasingly protracted.

From the beginning, these missions have been frustrating and ill-defined, and they have always been controversial. Repeatedly, after each painful episode, the military has sought to avoid having to do them again by forgetting its doctrine and failing to plan, leaving the next generation to re-learn on the fly.

The U.S. army was so fed up with counterinsurgency after its bloody and protracted experience in the Philippines that it eagerly -- with the support of the secretary of War -- managed to turn the whole mission set over to the marines in the early 20^th century. While the army focused on "real" war, the marines were sent to the Caribbean for the "Banana Wars," where they had to re-learn all the hard-learned lessons from old U.S. army manuals that were being discarded. The marine corps did allow a small team of officers to capture this Caribbean experience in the 1940 Small Wars Manual; but the mainstream corps had little appetite for these missions and was already trying to reinvent itself as specialists in amphibious operations. Once WW II began, the marines discarded its doctrine, training, and education for small wars in order to focus intensely on amphibious operations. This left the Vietnam generation to re-invent relevant doctrine once again."

&

"Today we face a global environment characterized by transnational criminals, terrorists, insurgents, and myriad illicit and violent bandits and traffickers. Some of these "bad guys" are aligned with nation states, but most operate in the gray space between what we consider crime and war. Importantly, our future enemies have been paying attention to our struggles against low-tech, high-impact fighters in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere and have been sharing their own "lessons learned" across global social networks. One lesson is clear: Go asymmetric and "irregular" against the U.S. military, because taking it on head to head conventionally would be just plain stupid. " (Bold typeface added for emphasis. - CAA.)

&

"Demographic trends such as urbanization, the youth bulge, resource scarcity, and radicalization ensure that future conflicts requiring ground forces will occur in cities and slums and among populations, where differentiating friend from foe, and victim from "combatant," much less just trying to navigate through the crowded urban "battle space" will continue to plague traditionally-minded and conventionally trained ground forces."

&

"The military should continue to develop special operations and civil affairs capabilities as key components for security force assistance, conflict prevention, and crisis response. Army modularity, which allows ground units to be scaled and tailored for various operations should continue to be developed, and competencies in foreign languages, interagency coordination, and human intelligence collection and analysis should be sustained and enhanced." (Bold typeface added for emphasis. - CAA.)

&

"So how then, do we size this new more enlightened and capable force to ensure success in future coin or stability operations missions? With 490,000 soldiers and 182,000 marines on active duty, plus the forces in the selected ready reserve (560,000 in the army and 39,000 in the marine corps), America's ground forces will arguably be large enough for stability operations of significant size even without needing to add to the force once a crisis hits. Still, there is no crystal ball to predict the exact scenario our military might face. Moreover, despite much debate, there is still no consensus over the question of how many ground troops are required to bring stability to a country of a given population. Clearly neither sizing the peacetime force for the largest imaginable stability operation, nor down-sizing and hoping we won't face another large-scale mission of this sort, is no way to plan. Because we have the demonstrated ability to grow the force and adapt once a war begins, the trick is to find the right size that allows us to conduct smaller and medium scale operations and to initiate an operation while scaling up for something larger if and when needed."

&

"(W)e need to be confident that we can access the capable and ready forces we need, when we need them. Being able to grow the force for large-scale missions if required means having a reserve component that is ready for mobilization and an active duty-training cadre that can deliver the expertise on demand. The DoD's plan to, "... leverage the operational experience and institute a progressive readiness model in the National Guard and Reserves in order to sustain increased readiness prior to mobilization," is aiming in the right direction. On the active duty side, the army and marine corps are both planning to retain a greater percentage of mid-grade NCO's and officers even as they downsize, reflecting their understanding that a slightly more senior force is not only required in the conduct of these complex missions, but is also the seed corn needed to train and grow a force if required."

.

Janine Davidson is assistant professor at George Mason University's Graduate School of Pubic Policy. From 2009-2012, she served as the deputy assistant secretary of Defense for Plans, where she oversaw the development of guidance for military campaign and contingency plans and the review and assessment of plans. Before all that she was a pilot in the air force.

7/27

re: "Iraq Pullout - Not A Cause for Celebration"

LONGTABSIGO at Blackfive ("the paratrooper of love") commented on strategy.

Money quote(s):

"I must have been absent in strategy class the day they taught that you can declare a war over unilaterally."

Well, you can. But normally you destroy their ability to make war and occupy their capital first.

Oh wait, we did that.

At least one bright observer theorized that we've fought at least three wars in Iraq already, since invading in 2003.

So which war is that we won this time?

(Hint: Identify your enemy.)

(Take your time.)

(Another hint: Read the Max Boot quote towards the end of the linked post.)

"But the rationale is not even adversary-based. It is ostensibly because DOD and State Lawyers cannot work out an appropriate Status of Forces agreement such that US Troops would not be subject to the arbitrary whim of Iraqi law (even if taking an action deemed to be "in the line of duty" by US law/standards).

I've heard of "lawfare" as a check against offensive action out of fear of risk or possible bad press. But an inabilty to convincinly negotiate as a rationale for major troop reduction?" (Emphasis in original text. - CAA.)

10/21

re: "Hitting nails on the head"

nmleon had responded to my earlier comment of Thursday, February 9th at 9:42AM EDT, responding to Jeff Emanuel's post at Redstate.

nmleon said:

"Having spent 3 of the last 5 yrs in Iraq (DoD contractor), I can say that Consul has it exactly right as far as he’s commented.

Nobody ate MREs on an extended basis, and the massively complicated logistics supply chain was until last Dec managed by DoD under the aegis of our SOFA (Status Of Forces Agreement). With the failure of the administration to negotiate a new or continuing SOFA, we had no option but to withdraw our military forces from Iraq.

Without a SOFA, the remaining USG organizations (and the contractors managing their logistics supply chain) HAD to be folded into DoS (with diplomatic status) or be essentially left as tourists, fully subject to Iraqi law even in the performance of their duties.

As to whether or not USAID etc should have missions there at all, I’m less than certain. While we had a continued (small) military presence I think it was a no-brainer. Iraq is a country with a lot of potential if sectarian strife can be ameliorated. Without our continued military presence I have doubts that will happen."

2/9

re: "How serious is the threat from Mexico?"

The Phibian at Cdr Salamander ("Proactively “From the Sea”; leveraging the littoral best practices for a paradigm breaking six-sigma best business case to synergize a consistent design in the global commons, rightsizing the core values
supporting our mission statement via the 5-vector model through cultural
diversity.") noted an assignment of significance.

Money quote(s):

"You can often judge the importance a nation sees things something in the world by who they send to keep an eye on it."

Mexico City got a new American defense attaché.

"Three time All-American wrestler, Navy SEAL, and married to an astronaut with whom he has had four children."

Interesting background. Wonder if someone in D.C.'s been reading their W.E.B. Griffin.

12/13

re: "Fort Hood massacre nothing more than “workplace violence” per DoD"

McQ at Blackfive ("the paratrooper of love") disagrees with the premise.

Money quote(s):

"What happened at Ft. Hood wasn’t a case of “workplace violence”, it was a case of a radicalized Islamist going on a murderous rampage because of his radicalization. It was also a total failure of leaders to recognize the threat and act on it well before it ended in the death of 13 at the Texas military installation.

Why facing up to this seems to be such a chore for DoD and this administration remains the mystery."

Integrity. I'm sure that's a word that comes up at various times during the professional education of our top military leaders. That and oldies (but goodies) like "Loyalty Upwards and Downwards" and "Men first, Mission Always."


12/7

re: "Rewarding Failure at the DoD Policy Board"

The Phibian at CDR Salamander ("Proactively “From the Sea”; leveraging the littoral best practices for a paradigm breaking six-sigma best business case to synergize a consistent design in the global commons, rightsizing the core values supporting our mission statement via the 5-vector model through cultural diversity.") reviewed the DoD Policy Board's composition.

Money quote(s):

"(N)one of the members who used to wear the uniform have any combat leadership experience in over a decade of war."

Perhaps that's not considered a drawback, whereas combat experience (i.e., skin in the game) would be.

10/5

re: "Avoiding Armageddon with China"

Dan Blumenthal, Mark Stokes, and Michael Mazza at Shadow Government ("Notes From The Loyal Opposition") look at changing U.S. perception of China's intentions.

Money quote(s):

"It is good news that James Traub, a highly regarded journalist and writer, may be startled out of his belief that China is a "status quo" power, based in part on a paper we wrote.

We hope that more writers of Traub's caliber will be similarly startled by China's growing menace. The truth is that like every rising power in history (including the United States) China wants to change rules, territorial delineations, and laws written while it was weak."

CAA is by no means a China (or even an "Asia") "hand." Not my speciality. But for any practicioner or student of foreign, military, or intelligence affairs, China is simply too big to ignore.

Like unto Texas, there are (or should be) more than one China. Probably (again like unto Texas), there should be at least five Chinas. And that doesn't even include Formosa in the count.

"Throughout its history, China has lumbered into disaster after disaster, costing untold sums in lives and treasure (e.g. the Great Leap Forward, the Cultural Revolution, Beijing's war with Vietnam). Certainly as China re-emerged as a power it had its chance to "bide its time and hide its capabilities" as Deng Xiaoping instructed. But instead, it decided to build a highly destabilizing military (see the last decade of Department of Defense reports on China's military power, the latest of which is here) and has proceeded to rattle its saber against Taiwan, Japan, Vietnam, the Philippines, South Korea, and, most troublingly, the United States. It has now created the conditions for the encirclement is so fears."

There's this concept of imperial overreach. Make no mistake about it, any China larger than one-fifth of its current mass constitutes an empire and may be expected to behave (and misbehave) accordingly.

Hope for the best, but plan for the worst.

"Responding to years of Chinese harassment of U.S., Japanese, Vietnamese, and Philippine ships, last year Clinton broke new ground by declaring at a summit in Hanoi that "The United States, like every nation, has a national interest in freedom of navigation, open access to Asia's maritime commons, and respect for international law in the South China Sea." This is a diplomatic way of telling China that we will continue to exercise our forces inside its exclusive economic zone, consistent with international custom, and we will ensure that our partners in Asia are able to resist Chinese bullying.

This brings us to what seem to be Traub's biggest problem with the paper: that doing what Gates and Clinton proclaimed we need to do (respond with our own military programs and ensure freedom of navigation and open access to Asia's maritime commons) is expensive. True enough. National security is an expensive endeavor. But as our own history shows (pre-Pearl Harbor, pre-Korean War) military weakness in the face of new threats are more expensive still, in lives and in treasure."

Nothing I read in our nation's capital newspaper(s) give me any confidence that we are any less likely to re-commit our interwar and post-WW2 forefathers' mistakes with respect to military preparedness. And as my WW2 veteran grandfather rather chillingly put it to a much younger CAA, young men end up paying for that with "a bayonet in the guts."

"The Cold War is too simple a metaphor to describe Sino-U.S. relations. China is an economic partner, and Washington is deeply engaged in a diplomacy that tries to convince China to peacefully take its place as a great power. At the same time, we are balancing China's power and hedging against a more bellicose China."

Hope for the best, but prepare for the worst. China certainly is, expanding its military and naval capabilities at a rapid pace, becoming in fact the peer-competitor that theorists like to pontificate about.

"The idea of a self-fulfilling prophecy -- of turning China into an enemy by treating it as one -- is like a unicorn; it is a make believe creature that still has its believers. The United States has done more than any other country to "turn China into a friend" by welcoming it into the international community. Alas, China has not fulfilled this U.S. "prophesy of friendship." Instead China has built what all credible observers call a destabilizing military that has changed the status quo by holding a gun to Taiwan's head even as Taiwan makes bold attempts at peace, by claiming ever more territory in the South China Sea, and by attempting to bully and intimidate Japan."

Engagement works both ways. All the economic levers we attempt to work into our engagement with China run right back to us through our own economy and international economic institutions and arrangements. And China's military theorists aren't shy in their theorizing about the multidimensional nature of any future conflict with the U.S. Forewarned isn't necessarily fore-armed, but it's a start.

"(I)t is time for the United States to offer more serious assistance so that matters do not get out of hand. A strong U.S. presence and commitment to the region's security can help avoid a regional nuclear arms race, for example. The United States can be a force multiplier by providing the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance that only Washington possesses, and by training, and equipping our allies and friends.

This strategy is one way of beginning to put Asia back in balance as China changes the status quo. Not doing so, we fear, would lead to Armageddon."

(9/6)

re: "How We Became a Nation of Warriors"

Stephen Glain published a condensed version of his new book at Salon ("the award-winning online news and entertainment Web site").

Bottom Line Up Front (BLUF):

"State vs. Defense, the century-old competition between those who would confront America's overseas challenges through diplomatic means and those who would subdue them by force of arms, is all but decided. The economic and political resources commanded by the latter group are vast and powerful, while the former has been reduced to a cadre of supplicants forced to beg before the lavish table of the national security state. Such a lopsided state of affairs has been abetted by a citizenry generally uninterested in the policies carried out in its name and unwilling to share in the burden of their prosecution. Only now, with the specter of bankruptcy looming over the national accounts, are some in Washington daring to contest the bill for, if not the value of, unchecked global hegemony."

_____

Hat tip to The SWJ Editors

re: "Ties that bind Defense, State"

Michael Clauser at Politico ("published every day that Congress is in session") get this mostly right.

Money quote(s):

"(A) key Washington budget debate: the proportionality of military spending relative to nonmilitary international affairs spending.

The U.S. spends roughly 20 cents of every tax dollar on defense, compared with slightly more than a penny for nonmilitary-related international affairs activities.

Advocates of soft power bemoan Washington’s overly militarized approach to the world, while conservatives are critical of what they view as an ineffective bureaucracy run by establishment elites in Foggy Bottom. Yet of all national budget debates, the fratricide for funds between State and Defense is most puzzling as their roles are so intrinsically complementary."

As Mr. Clauser notes, SecDef Gates didn't exactly take a parochial approach to this dichotomy. He knew that there were some things that the military shouldn't do, at least not in more than a supporting role.

"Deficit and debt reduction are necessary, but not sufficient, to ensure long-term U.S. strength and well-being. And the price should not be forfeiture of essential hard or soft U.S. national security capabilities or America’s leadership role in the world."

Usually we wait until a war is over before cashing in on a peace dividend. The Clinton administration crippled the military services doing this, while shrinking our diplomatic force multipliers just when they should have been growing them.

What' do you call doing this when the wars are still ongoing?

"U.S. leadership requires both hard and soft power working in concert.

The past 10 years of unconventional conflict have reminded the military and its congressional overseers of the inherently political nature of war and the importance of nonkinetic capabilities — like civil affairs teams, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, rule of law educators, development and reconstruction specialists, counter-drug personnel and police trainers. These capabilities are as vital to contemporary conflict as some major weapons systems. Cutting funding for them is, therefore, a kind of unilateral disarmament."

Preach it. "(U)nilateral disarmament." And he doesn't see that as a feature; be secure in your appreciation that it is indeed a bug.

USAID (and the former USIA) need to be re-established as more than contracting and out-sourcing entities, and as independent agencies. The stealth assimilation of USAID into State is just as bad an idea as absorbing USIA was.

"(F)ederal and nongovernmental aid groups are coming to realize how much they rely on the military to provide security for aid workers in pre-, post- and active conflict zones. Human rights watchers admit that the use of force, as in Libya, can stave off grave human rights atrocities. U.S. diplomats know that their ability to “speak softly” hinges on the presence of “a big stick.” " (Bold typeface added for emphasis. - CAA.)

Being a superpower means people return your calls in a timely manner. Which is nice.

They don't need to necessarily fear you, just respect that you're big enough that you can squash them by accident if you're not careful.

"Federal budget politics remain the quintessential zero-sum game. As Congress considers where to identify savings, it must acknowledge that defense, diplomacy and development cannot be devolved to state or local-level government. Instead, Congress should redirect its scalpel to departments and agencies whose missions are not as intrinsic to the federal government and to key drivers of long-term debt."

Yeah, good luck with that.

"Granted, this is far easier said than done.

With so many domestic political constituencies benefiting from federal programs in housing, health, education, labor, pensions and agriculture, it is all the more important for advocates of strong and balanced U.S. leadership in the world to work together — and work harder to be mutually reinforcing about the importance to each other’s roles."

Defense and State lack domestic constituencies for their missions except in time of war or international crisis, when American citizens are forced to look beyond their normal everyday lives to the wider world. And State lacks the big ticket items like large domestic bases, expensive procurement programs, and the like that make it a cash cow for legislators looking for a little pork.

Being a continental power that is in fact continent-wide, America is fortunate to be so large that for many of us the outside world is just so far away it hardly seems real. You just have to drive across too many states to even reach an international border for other countries to seem more than something you watch on National Geographic.

_____

Hat tip to the Editors at Small Wars Journal ("facilitates the exchange of information among practitioners, thought leaders, and students of Small Wars, in order to advance knowledge and capabilities in the field").

re: "Our Dangerous Commander-in-Chief"

Michael Angley at Big Peace explores the intersection of inexperience and sycophancy.

Money quote(s):

"Lately, in his interactions with key individuals (military leaders, top advisors, and members of Congress, for example), he’s had a tendency to ignore their advice and make decisions on his own. He’s entitled to do that; of course, but given the man’s lack of any military experience – and shallow credentials outside of community organizing – one would think he’d stop and listen to his Generals, at the very least.

When presented recently with options for scaling back military operations in Afghanistan, Obama ignored the recommendations his Generals made and decided to withdraw all surge troops by September 2012. The courses of action the Department of Defense suggested came after careful analysis of the military mission and its requirements. The President’s decision, in contrast, was based upon an election in November 2012. This kind of self-centered decision making is dangerous, and likely to get troops killed."

I'm not sure if there's anyone who believes this decision, and related ones in Iraq, are driven by anything other than electoral political considerations. Anyone? Bueller? The generals aren't fooled, although they'll salute smartly and (perhaps) consider re-reading McMasters book. The troops sure as Hell aren't fooled, and neither are their families.

It remains to be seen how many of the voting public will buy this as the calm, deliberative, decision of a man weighing all the facts and choosing the best course for the Republic as a whole.

(No, seriously. Stop laughing.)

"When I was on active duty in the Air Force, there was something we called “Butter Bar Syndrome.” Newly-minted Second Lieutenants, fresh from their service academies, ROTC programs, or other sources of commissioning, often hit the pavement hard in their first assignments. Eager to demonstrate leadership and to flex their new gold bar rank insignia, they would bark orders to seasoned E-8s and E-9s. Instead of calling them “Chief Jones,” or “Sergeant Smith,” they were called “Stan” or “John.” They would feign listening as these men or women of considerable experience made recommendations, only to take a course of action vastly different from anything they had just heard.

Butter Bar Syndrome resulted from insecurity. Calling a Chief Master Sergeant by his or her first name kept the Lieutenant elevated in status (in the LT’s mind). Ignoring the Chief’s advice showed he was decisive, apt to be recognized by higher command for his leadership acumen, or so the LT hoped. Most Lieutenants learned fairly quickly that all the chest puffing was unnecessary. Oftentimes it took a no-nonsense Chief giving the young officer some closed-door, fatherly counseling to get him on the right track.

Unfortunately, with our current Commander-in-Chief, there appear to be no Chief Master Sergeant types willing to grab him by the scruff of the neck and knock some sense into him."

This is a hazard of our modern spoils system of political appointments. Nobody at that level is going to comment on the transparancy of the emperor's wardrobe.

re: "re: "This Week at War: Rise of the Irregulars" "

Robert Haddick at Small Wars Journal ("facilitates the exchange of information among practitioners, thought leaders, and students of Small Wars, in order to advance knowledge and capabilities in the field") turns a frequent criticism on its head.

Money quote(s):

"Last week, the Washington Post's David Ignatius discussed how the line between the Central Intelligence Agency's covert intelligence activities and the Pentagon's military operations began blurring as George W. Bush's administration ramped up its war on terrorism. In his column, Ignatius took some swipes at former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld for exceeding his authority by encroaching on turf legally reserved to the CIA. The Defense Department also was criticized for taking on too many diplomatic and foreign aid responsibilities as well. Ignatius expressed concern that without clearer boundaries separating covert intelligence-gathering from military operations, "people at home and abroad may worry about a possible 'militarization' of U.S. intelligence."

Ignatius missed the larger and far more significant change that continues to this day. In order to survive and compete against the military power enjoyed by national armies, modern irregular adversaries -- such as the Viet Cong, Iraq's insurgents, the Taliban, and virtually all other modern revolutionaries -- "civilianized" their military operations."

Read the whole thing here.

Learning Leadership

One of CAA's loyal readers is a new FSO stationed somewhere in The Great Abroad. He or she really liked something I had posted, specifially:

"For all the great stride the Department has made towards improving State's traditionally dismal leadership culture, we're just not there yet. New officers are getting leadership training from the very beginning, with reinforcements throughout their careers. It's still not inculcated the way the uniformed services do it (and they have their own,
recurrent, problems) but we're getting there. It's the more senior folks, both on the Civil Service as well as the Foreign Service sides, who sometimes fail to get leadership isn't just one of those management fads that comes along periodically, like Six Sigma, just-in-time-inventory, or TQM."

She or he provided the following words by email, posted here with kind permission:

"I couldn't agree more. Having been in the military, I am finding myself feeling at times like a fish out of water here at State; chafing at some folks' inability (or outright refusal) to deal with problem employees, as well as make unpopular but necessary decisions. Earlier this week I was grousing with a colleague about the EER process, recalling how in the military evaluations were a top-down process. Your supervisor or CO tells you what's right with you and what's wrong with you, and that's it. The EER at State is like the grown-up version of zero-outcome soccer. Everybody's a winner, just some people are bigger winners than others. Everything is a collaborative effort, even when you are being evaluated. Given the amount of time I have spent so far on my first EER, I would much prefer to receive an assessment based on my supervisor's impression of me, and not something that I have cooked up myself. The whole process seems to have been born of a reluctance to criticize.

I did see eval inflation in the military also, though- but your eval and how your CO dealt with you on a daily basis were two different things. One of my old skippers ripped me a new one so many times I thought I was a knob back in college, but come eval time he made me look like the best thing since sliced bread. I think that is the difference between DoS and DoD. It's rainbows and puppy dogs all the time at State. At Defense, your CO will generally tell you when you are screwed up, but won't depth charge you on your eval if you fix your problems after they are pointed out."

re: "How to save money in Iraq? Withdraw the troops, send in the diplomats ... and get ready with the fire hoses"

Domani Spero at Diplopundit ("Just one obsessive observer, diplomatic watcher, opinionator and noodle newsmaker monitoring the goings on at Foggy Bottom and the worldwide available universe.") sees some contradictions inherant in the Iraq changing-of-the-guard.

Money quote(s):

"At the highest level of the Iraq war which happened during the surge, the average monthly DOD obligations in Iraq peaked at $11.1 billion in FY2008. Note -- monthly obligations. Just roughly the same amount Congress plans to cut from the State Department annual, yearly, 12 month budget in FY2012.

In the infinite wisdom of our elected representatives, given that we will "save" tons of money from the withdrawal of our troops in Iraq, we will "save tons more" by slashing the budget of the State Department -- because why not? Instead of DOD completing the job over there, we'll now have DOS doing the job for a lot less. A lot less money and a lot less people and a lot less of everything!

Obviously, given the history of that made up controversy about the Iraq recruitment in 2007, State is anxious to show the flag. It will have personnel for Iraq, ready or not. If it does not have enough folks, it will hire 3161 limited appointees to staff up the place. It will have its own private army to protect our diplomats. It will have its own air fleet to shuttle our personnel from one end of the country to another. It will have its own life support personnel, presumably all contractors. It will be starting close to scratch on just about everything, from how to bring in food and other supplies, aircraft mechanics for its new air fleet to pest control guys.

But this is a gig set up to fail.

Congress holds the purse strings and the folks over there have never been particularly fond of these foreign affairs officers, as they are with the soldiers in their voting districts. One senator is opposed to the State Dept getting any of DOD's equipment or creating its own mini-army. Others are not happy about the projected growth of contractors working for State. What, you want our diplomats in Iraq armed with toothpicks? Make up your minds, dammit!

The State Department has never taken on a responsibility like this; there will be lots of hiccups even as demands for quick results go off the roof. Um, okay, hiccup is an understatement.

Personnel will continue to rotate on short-term, one year deployments, on voluntary basis. At some point, this repeated deployments of an agency small enough its FSOs can all fit in an aircraft carrier, will have institutional consequences and personal repercussions. Bench strength? What's that?

Iraq as a democracy in our own image is a foolish dream. The State Department will now be expected to be the firewall against its descent back into chaos."

Not a lot to add to what she's said. She's right.

re: "Last Men Out"

Lex at Neptunus Lex ("The unbearable lightness of Lex.") notes the difficulties of a withdrawal under fire.

Money quote(s):

"The Status of Forces agreement George Bush negotiated with the government of Iraq expires in December, in anticipation of a withdrawal of US troops. The USG has dropped heavy hints over the last six months that the Department of Defense was amenable to leaving behind some significant military forces in Iraq to safeguard the country’s borders and continue the training and logistical support of the Iraqi Army."

That's not going to be politically possible, in either the U.S. or Iraq, even if there was a will to do it in Washington. Is there?

"$120K per “friendly” tribal chief per year may be cheap against the cost of a $400K MRAP, not to mention the human cost.

But .50 cal ammunition is pretty cheap too."

_____

It seems very unlikely that a U.S. military member will be the United States' "last man out" of Iraq.

Why?

Stay tuned.

re: "Too Many White Guys "

Spook86 at In From the Cold ("Musings on Life, Love, Politics, Military Affairs, the Media, the Intelligence Community and Just About Anything Else that Captures Our Interest") addresses military diversity.

Money quote(s):

"The U.S. military has a problem, according to a DoD advisory panel.

And no, we're not referring to the demands of two on-going wars (and the toll on those who serve); escalating personnel costs, a shrinking fleet, aging nuclear forces and combat aircraft that are equally long-in-the tooth. The group wasn't asked to address those pressing concerns.

Instead, the panel was asked by Congress to look at diversity in our military. In fact, the Military Leadership Diversity Commission spent two years looking at the issue and released their final report earlier this week. You can probably predict their findings without reading this Associated Press article."

No real surprises. Just like recent recommendations about, for instance, DADT.

"It's tempting to dismiss the report as little more than PC drivel. But the commission's chairman, retired Air Force General Lester Lyles, has a reputation as a straight-shooter and an outstanding leader. It's hard to imagine that he would simply compile the usual rot and sign off on it. If General Lyles is willing to stake his reputation on the report, then it's probably worth a look."

"The armed forces need to train and promote the best and brightest, regardless of their ethnic background or gender. The advancement of minority and female officers has been slow, but no one can dispute that more members of those groups are reaching senior ranks in the U.S. military.

Which leads us to another point: the commission (and elected officials) say they want an officer corps that reflects America. That's a worthy goal, but are you willing to trade mission effectiveness to achieve it? Among its various recommendations, the panel urges DoD to "open additional career fields and units involved in 'direct ground combat' to qualified women."

Trouble is, the vast majority of military women will never qualify to serve in such positions, the result of physiology--not discrimination.

Almost 20 years ago, columnist Fred Reed published results of an Army study, comparing fitness levels among male and female soldiers. The data reaffirms that most women simply lack the upper body strength and endurance required by an Army infantryman, a Marine rifleman, or most special forces MOS's."

Insert obligatory blather about how many jobs don't require upper body strength and enduranc (ignoring the fact that we're talking about some specific jobs that actually do).

"(W)hat's a chief diversity officer supposed to do (don't laugh--the commission recommends creation of that very post, reporting directly to the SecDef). Water down the standards so more women will qualify for combat service, removing that "barrier" to reaching the flag ranks? Or create some sort of double-standard, allowing females to punch their resumes in the right places and continue their climb to the stars. Either approach is unacceptable, yet some sort of "modification" is inevitable, to open up more combat billets to women."

The goal is apparently to allow women to become chair-person of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, no matter the "unintended" consequences. This caters to the roughly one-percent of female military members who are trade-school types (i.e., military academy grads) resentful of a presumed glass ceiling.

"General Lyles insists that military performance and effectiveness remain the real bottom line, but if the commission's recommendations are fully implementing, the armed forces will be walking a very fine line.

No one disputes the benefits of more flag officers who are women or members of minority groups. But the real emphasis should be on demanding excellence from all who aspire to flag rank, and promoting those who meet--and exceed--a very high bar. Some of the "remedies" outlined in the Lyles report seem closer to social engineering, particularly when you introduce the notions of "measurement" and "metrics." "

re: "Defense Budget Cuts"

James Joyner at Outside the Beltway ("an online journal of politics and foreign affairs analysis") takes Stephanie Guttman to school, batting her "low-hanging fruit" out of the park.

Money quote(s):

"(M)ost of the low hanging fruit has been plucked at this point. The only way to achieve real savings is to cut back on the operational tempo. If we expect our military to be able to deploy anywhere, any time and stay for years on end performing counterinsurgency or stability operations, then we’re going to have to expect to continue pouring absurd amounts of money into Defense."

re: "Digital security problem is bigger than Assange and PFC Manning"

Robert Haddick at Small Wars Journal ("facilitates the exchange of information among practitioners, thought leaders, and students of Small Wars, in order to advance knowledge and capabilities in the field") gives an excellent analysis.

Money quote(s):

"Prior to September 2001, administrators within the U.S. government had their reasons for stubbornly hoarding their agency’s secrets. In the wake of the latest Wikileaks episode involving classified State Department cables, some of those reasons are again apparent. The 9/11 Commission concluded that insufficient cross-agency sharing was partly to blame for the disaster. But we are now reminded that sharing brings its own risks. With a million people thought to have access to U.S. Secret-level correspondence and over 800,000 cleared for Top Secret access, the only surprise is that there are not more leaks. The problem of digital security extends beyond Mr. Assange and PFC Manning. Digital transmissions through the existing internet "cloud” will continue, but will increasingly consist of only the most inconsequential data and reports. The transmission of anything really sensitive will revert (if it hasn’t already) to pre-Internet methods – a hand-delivered document, a telephone call, or a face-to-face conversation in a secure room.

The fact that there have been so few surprises in the latest Wikileaks data dump is the best evidence that State Department cable-drafters, consciously or not, knew that these cables would have a very large audience. And the wider the audience becomes, the greater the incentive to be careful with secrets in the drafting. With so few differences between the content of these cables (admittedly classified no higher than Secret) and the content in the news media, we should conclude that U.S. diplomacy is already remarkably open and transparent."

&

"We should expect “Balkanization” of digital communications, with those needing high security dropping out of the existing system and setting up their own. The Defense Department’s SIPRNet has been an inadequate attempt at this answer, as the Wikileaks affair has revealed. DARPA (ironically the original inventor of the internet) now recommends that the Defense Department establish its own network hardware and software, a system that would emphasize security and would presumably be incompatible with the existing internet.

Users who need high security but who can’t afford their own custom network would be wise to revert to the pre-Internet age of the courier, the telephone, and for the most sensitive of thoughts, the face-to-face meeting. This should not be much of an adjustment for those possessing either suspicious minds or experience."

S&S - Congressmen look to pressure DOD to act on Japan child abductions

From my archive of press clippings:

Stars and Stripes

Congressmen look to pressure DOD to act on Japan child abductions


By Charlie Reed, Stars and Stripes

Pacific edition, Friday, May 7, 2010


YOKOTA AIR BASE, Japan — A congressional resolution introduced Tuesday is calling on the secretary of defense to alter the status of forces agreement with Japan to assist servicemembers whose children have been kidnapped and taken to Japan.

Read the whole article here.

Snippet(s):

"The proposed resolution also calls for the United States to enact agreements with Japan to resolve the mounting cases of parental child abduction involving U.S. citizens, who now have few legal options in Japanese courts."

"Kidnapping your own child is not a crime in Japan, and the country’s family law is based on the tradition of sole-custody divorce, leaving noncustodial parents without legal recourse to pursue visitation rights."

&

"The United States and seven other countries are pressuring Japan to sign a treaty that would help resolve the cases by obligating Japan to comply with provisions that protect the rights of both parents.

But even if the country adopts the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction it would not apply to the current cases, a caveat American lawmakers and diplomats aim to shore up with side agreements such as the one proposed Tuesday.

More than 100 American-Japanese children are considered abducted, 2009 State Department records show.

The U.S.-Japan Status of Forces Agreement defines how the U.S. military operates within Japan, including legal consequences for troops who break Japanese laws while stationed here."