re: "Blogger Agonizes Over Col. Momo Not Being Given a Fair Trial"

Emperor Misha I at the Anti-Idiotarian Rottweiler ("HQ of the Rottweiler Empire. An Affiliate of the VRWC.") was untroubled by Col Qadhafi's end.

Money quote(s):

"(W)e really don’t give a hoot how obviously guilty beasts like Momo get sent to hell.

You see, we tend to believe in “live by the sword, die by the sword”, just in the same way that our SympathyMeter™ doesn’t as much as register a twitch of the needle when people holier than us agonize over terrorists not being offered the full protections of the Geneva Conventions.

Momo died the way he chose to live. He had tyrannized, murdered and brutalized without ever giving a second thought to the “rights” of his victims and those victims, some of them we might add, chose to send him off to Satan in the same way."

&

"Was he given fair treatment by American standards? Of course he wasn’t, but he had deliberately chosen todisregard anything even resembling those standards for every year of his tyrannical, murderous regime, so why should he be treated differently? Because he “deserved” it?

We could think up at least four full pages of what he truly deserved, and we can assure you that the list would make even the most hardened barbarian savage vomit his guts out in fear.

His Imperial Majesty firmly believes that the only way you can convince somebody to play by the rules is to make it abundantly clear that if he disregards the rules, then the rules will be disregarded where he’s concerned too." (Emphasis in original text. - CAA.)

10/24

re: "Libya: Muslim law and secular dreams"

McQ at Blackfive ("the paratrooper of love") was unsurprised at anti-secular developments in Libya.

Money quote(s):

"If your hope for the latest version of “Arab Spring” to be found in Libya was a secular democratic state, you can quickly forget the secular part of the dream."

&

"I’d love to tell you this comes as a complete surprise, but then I’d be acting like some politicians I know.

I’m certainly not going to contend that keeping Gadhafi was the best thing we could do, but let’s be clear, what has happened darn sure doesn’t seem to be an outcome that we’d have hoped to see either. At least as it now seems to be shaking out.

In that area of the world, secular dreams seem to me to be the most foolish. How that particular dream manages to stay alive among the elite of the West is beyond me. It isn’t now nor has it ever been a probable outcome of any of these so-called “Arab Spring” revolutions. The revolutions are steeped in Islam because the governments being replaced were relatively secular for the area and the Islamic groups now rising were the ones being repressed."

Hope is still not a plan. (And it's not a very useful analytical tool either.)

10/24

re: "In post-Qaddafi Libya, there's still a lot of work to be done"

Dov Zakheim at Shadow Government ("Notes From The Loyal Opposition") contrasted post-Qadhafi Libya with post-Saddam Iraq, based upon remarks by Amb. Paul Bremer.

Money quote(s):

"It is noteworthy, and not a little bit ironic, that Ambassador Paul Bremer, he of the late and unlamented Coalition Provisional Authority, identified several criteria for ensuring that the departure of the dictator does indeed lead to a fundamental change in the governance of Libya. He argues, in bold typeface, that "the population must believe that the political change is real and lasting;" that "someone has to provide security;" that "a new political order must be established quickly."

It is difficult to argue with Bremer's main points."

&

"He adds that "unless some system is put in to demobilize the fighters, there is sure to be trouble." But who exactly should be the "someone" who provides security? What plans have been drawn up for a "system" to demobilize the fighters? And who will implement the plan for such a system. Surely not the United States, I hope. We have enough on our plate, both domestically and internationally. The military and financially exhausted Europeans? The Arabs? The United Nations?"

CAA doesn't see that happening, everyone's distracted by what's happening in Syria and what could happen in Iran.

"(W)ho will constitute that political order and what sort of political order will it be? There is no evidence that the current Interim Government has in mind the kind of democratic, pro-Western political order that Bremer seems to be calling for. Nor is it clear that, democratic elections notwithstanding, Iraq is pursuing policies that align with America's interests -- and that is before all American troops have left his country."

10/24

re: "Negotiations"

Dr. Jerry Pournelle at Chaos Manor (" The Original Blog and Daybook. ") posted some thoughts on the Middle East and the Occupy movement.

Money quote(s):

"The Israelis have traded 1,000 well treated prisoners for one mistreated sergeant.

I once told then Israeli President Weizman that I didn’t know how to govern his country. Of course that was preparatory to my suggestions on what I thought they were doing wrong. I still don’t know how to govern Israel, nor do I have the stake in the outcome that the Israeli government does, but that doesn’t stop me from suggesting a different course of action.

Were it up to me to negotiate for the return of a soldier kidnapped by Hamas, I would simply ask how many Hamas officials they wanted in exchange for my sergeant. “I need to know the number, because I have Mossad standing by to make up the list of Hamas officials we will have the IDF take as prisoners. The sooner I have the number the quicker Mossad and our special forces can do their work. We can then have the exchange. Please tell me the number.” "

I rather like the way Dr. Pournelle thinks.

"I have some sympathy for those who have a lifelong debt in exchange for some years of their lives acquiring an education that is in essence worthless. They learned no history, no economics, and little else of any real value, and they have little prospect of a job until the economy revives. They saw a $Trillion spent on stimulus and bailouts with not much result other than enormous bonuses paid to people whose contribution to the world is to move money around in circles. Not much of it seems to get down to the levels where they live.

Their view of the world is somewhat distorted but their education didn’t show them how to see it all more clearly."

A university education used to mean (correct me if I'm wrong) at least a core curriculum that should have been grounded in some basic humanities (English lit., composition, world history, Western civilization, &tc.) that would at the very least given college graduates the factual and analytical basis from which to think about things and make more-or-less rational decisions.

The proliferation of hyphen-studies courses crowding out the old-fashioned syllabi have lead to this.

"(I)t does seem a bit odd that the NATO air power including a US killer drone were waiting for the cavalcade out of Sirte. It’s unlikely that they stumbled on it, or that they were maintaining air patrols there. This appears to be a reasonably well planned kill operation. As to whether it conforms to the directive of protecting the civil population of Libya I have no idea. One wonders how the Presidents of Syria and Yemen understand the messages here.

Khaddafi’s body has been subjected to practices not permitted under the Quran, so it is clear that Sharia law does not yet govern Libya.

The execution of Qadafi was no more than he deserved, and the desecration of his body echoes that of the founder of united Libya, Benito Mussolini." (Bold typeface added for emphasis. - CAA.)

&

"Iraq will probably break up into its component provinces; almost certainly the Kurds will refuse to accept the sovereignty of Baghdad and the Shia. It is not likely that Baghdad has the means for the conquest of the Kurdish province, which may well proclaim its independence and apply for membership in the United Nations. Libya was united under the Italian rule under Mussolini. Just how strong the union between Cyrenaica and Tripolitania has been forged is not clear. There are plenty of reasons for conflict. The stakes are high, and the US has considerable interest in the matter, but it is not clear that the US has any strong influence over the outcome." (Bold typeface added for emphasis. - CAA.)

10/24

re: "Springtime for Islamists in Libya?"

Neo-Neocon (" slowly but surely leaving the fold and becoming that dread thing: a neocon ") is one of those who possess an Inigo Montoya-like sensibility regarding the meaning of words.

Money quote(s):

"The headline reads “interim [Libyan] ruler unveils more radical than expected plans for Islamic law.”

There’s that word again: expected. But those who thought they knew what to expect in Libya were either arrogant or daft, or both. And one of the many things that was clearly possible there was the ascendance of Islamist elements." (Emphasis in original text. - CAA.)

Wishful thinking, like hope, is not a plan. Nor is it a particularly useful analytical tool.

"David Warren contrasts the irony of the relatively orderly Bush-overseen judicial end of Saddam Hussein with Gaddafi’s extra-judicial lynching under forces promoted by Obama."

CAA has nothing but good things to say about Mr. Warren, one of our neighbors in the Great White North.

"Not unexpected at all. That’s why there is something to be said for what happened in Iraq, where—because we invaded and stuck around, despite the huge cost in blood and treasure—that country has at least a chance of coming out relatively well compared to others in the region."

From her keyboard to God's monitor.

10/24

re: "Khadafi's Box; Climate Change Experiment: anyone want to bet?"

Dr. Jerry Pournelle at Chaos Manor (" The Original Blog and Daybook. ") expressed his misgivings about the U.S., er, NATO waging of war against Libya.

Money quote(s):

"They are now displaying Khadafi laid out on a child’s mattress stuffed into a freezer in a mall. Sic semper tyrannis, and it couldn’t happen to a nicer guy, but it does raise some problems of International Law.

The UN mandate to NATO and the US strike forces was to protect the civilian population of Libya from Kadaffi and his sons and his mercenaries and his tribal supporters and the Libyan fascisti who found his rule congenial. I don’t understand how shooting up his 40 vehicle convoy fleeing his home town was any larger threat to the civilian population of Libya than the 42 vehicle cavalcade in which President Obama is riding. Surely Qadafi wasn’t driving through shooting everyone he saw. Surely he was no threat to the civilians?" (Bold typeface added for emphasis. - CAA.)

The "responsibility to protect" figleaf seemed to quickly transmute into acting as the rebel militia's air force (and navy) in order to perform decapitating strikes and otherwise disrupt the dictator's command, control, and communications capabilities.

Nothing disrupts one's C3 ability like being dead, of course.

"Now of course I do not mourn Khaddaffi and his sons. But I do mourn blows to the Constitution of the United States, which clearly gives the Congress the power to declare war. We understand that the war powers are and must be ambiguous – particularly so in the thermonuclear ear. During the Cold War the President had the power to order the release of thousands of nuclear weapons in retaliation for an incoming strike to the United States. One of the problems I worked on was how to structure the chain of command – now just organizationally but physically – so that the counterstrike could happen without putting the power to begin Armageddon into the hands of a bored Captains and Lieutenants sitting in concrete bunkers in bases out near the end of nowhere; and how to train those Captains and Lieutenants to make it credible that they would, at need, launch those birds at need."

Not just captain and lieutenants, but staff sergeants and privates first class, as CAA has reason to recall.

"All those war and peace decisions in which a mistake could wipe out a significant portion of humanity — Herman Kahn asked, “Will the survivors envy the dead?” – all those decisions might have to be made in minutes. There wouldn’t be time for a Congressional debate or even to summon Congress into session. I do not believe that is true of Khadaffi, It seems to me that if we wanted to wage war on Khadaffi – and I certainly argue that shooting up his convoy, killing his sons and bodyguards, is close enough to war as to make no never mind – if we are to wage war on Qadhaffi then let the President go the Congress and explicitly say so. That is what the Constitution demands." (Bold typeface added for emphasis. - CAA.)

CAA doesn't believe in standing too much on ceremony when it comes to declarations of war; it's not like there's a "e-Form" that can be completed online and then sent electronically to Congress. Any format and font will suffice so long as Congress tallies the yays and nays.

"I do not mourn the tyrant, and he go not more than he deserved, and less than he meted out to others. His sons were not such rapacious monsters as the Sons of Saddam Hussein are reliably said to have been, and I know those who argue that had power passed from the Colonel to one of his sons the result would not only have been good for Libya, but better than the Libyans will now get; but I do not know that my opinion is worth much. I do know that the tyrant of Syria must be frantically casting about trying to buy at least one nuke from North Korea. If he isn’t, he hasn’t thought out the situation."

Countries with their own nukes get respect; said "respect" being defined as not-invaded-or-attacked-by-other-nuclear-powers.

10/21

re: "Gaddafi and the desecration of the dead"

Neo-Neocon ("slowly but surely leaving the fold and becoming that dread thing: a neocon") was troubled by the barbarity of barbarians.

Money quote(s):

"It’s hard to escape the grisly death photos and videos of Gaddafi. A flamboyant figure who was photographed often during his long and very public life, his well-earned enemies have made sure that his death has been especially well-documented, too."

It's called globalization, which, St. Thomas Friedman of Globalization notwithstanding, is not an unmixed blessing. Nowadays even barbarians can, and do, use cell phone cameras to record video of grisly torture and executions.

"My reluctance to gaze on Gaddafi’s dead face or to watch people mistreating his corpse has nothing to do with any admiration for the man. I have little doubt that he’s perpetuated many murders and kept the people of Libya under his brutal and capricious yoke for four decades, and that their rage at him is justified.

However, the moral stature of a culture and its people are judged by many things, and one of them is the way the bodies of the dead are treated, even the most hated and reviled dead on whom they understandably wish to wreak revenge."

So consider the "moral stature" of the culture of Libyan militiamen for a moment.

"This issue is not Gaddafi at all, nor anyone in particular—it’s about how a society behaves. There is a word for this sort of thing, and that word is “barbaric.”"

None of this bodes well for the "Arab Spring."

10/21

re: "Obama's Absolutely Unbelievable Press Conference"

DrewM. at Ace of Spades HQ had a laundry list of observations.

They included:

"First...who is defending Gadaffi? No one.

Second...Remember when Obama demanded that Democrats like himself stop criticizing Bush over Iraq lest it send something other than "a unified message" to Saddam or al Qaeda in Iraq?

And finally...standing up for the constitutional role of Congress in matters of war and peace is a "cause célèbre". This is how the President of the United States views the constitutional responsibilities of a co-equal branch of government."

Old news in terms of NATO's Libyan intervention, but the war-powers issue isn't going to go away. It transcends the current administration and the roots of the current Constitutional dilemna reach back beyond the Gulf of Tonkin all the way to the Korean War.

6/29

re "Are The French Backing Down On Military Action In Libya?"

DrewM. at Ace of Spades HQ made an interesting prediction.

Money quote(s):

"So after going to war (yes, that's what it is) because France badgered us into it, we might get left holding the bag? Who could have seen that coming?

I'd say that the odds are better than 50/50 that before this is all over France surrenders to Libya and cedes some territory to it."

Qadhaf senior: dead. Qadhafi juniors: dead or imprisoned. Still, this story has chapters more to go.


7/ 11

re: "State: Libyan rebels can have the embassy … but not the money"

Josh Rogin at The Cable ("Reporting Inside The Foreign Policy Machine") was following the money.

Money quote(s):

"The Libyan rebels, who are represented in Washington by former Qaddafi envoy Ali Aujali, have been working out of donated office space in northwest Washington for months. The State Department signed an order last week handing control of the Libyan embassy, located in the Watergate complex, over to the rebels."

The Watergate, as well as being famous as a Nixon administration crime scene and the onetime residence of Monica Lewinsky, is only a relatively short distance from Main State (i.e., "Foggy Bottom") and the rest of official Washington.

"There is probably only about $150 to $200 million of frozen Qaddafi money in U.S. banks, but even that money is affected by the U.N. sanctions. The rest of the $30 billion is held outside the U.S. banking system."

A few hundred million here, a few hundred million there; pretty soon you're talking about real money.

"(T)he State Department continues to communicate privately to the TNC that the investigation into the killing of their military commander, Abdel Fatah Younis, last month is crucial to maintaining the TNC's credibility and reputation.

Publicly, Nuland portrayed the killing and the reorganization of their cabinet as a watershed moment in the TNC's evolution into a functioning, democratic organization ‘So, frankly, while the killing was an awful event, the fact [is] that the TNC has not just stood pat but has really taken this as an opportunity for internal reflection, for renewal," she said.

One of the State Department press corps members responded to her, "I'm not sure I've ever heard a glass-half-full explanation better than that one in a long time." "

Mr. Rogin originally posted this back in August. That's a lifetime (several, actually; especially if your family name is Qadhafi) in terms of the Libyan civil war. Does anyone even remember this particular murder? Does anyone, in light of the late dictator's fate, think the TNC got any valid "lessons learned" from Younis' assassination?

(Other than that they could get away with it?)

(8/9)

re: "Foreign Policy Technique"

Charles Crawford at Blogoir ("This website makes available to the general public interesting episodes and insights from Charles Crawford's eventful diplomatic career, and aims to explain in a open-minded, reasonable way how diplomacy works in practice.") tells you more of what you need to understand about diplomatic realities and engagement.

Money quote(s):

"Over at Commentator is my latest piece on UK engagement with Libya, in which I argue that what happened in recent years was principled, smart and mainly effective."

The following is a short passage from the longer excerpt he provided.

"there are only two basic choices available to democracies when it comes to dealing with odious regimes: Isolation, or Engagement. And that both can have perverse consequences, because it is impossible to deal with perverse regimes without some perverse outcomes"

Pithy, and to the point.

"(T)aking for granted that a 'Western' democratic system with a strong legal system is just 'better' than a cruel torturing dictatorship. What should the democracy do about the dictatorship?

One option is to do nothing. Faraway wicked foreigners oppress each other - what's new?

That option is in fact quite often used, even if there is a busy pretence of 'doing something'. Saudi Arabia is the classic example of a system which in most respects imposes odious unfair apartheid-like restrictions on its citizens, and which we studiously treat as a 'factor of stability'. Communist China used to be far worse, murdering millions. As did the USSR.

In all these cases the hard fact that these systems are powerful, ruthless and/or rich compels a certain caution. But does the fact that we 'tolerate' (say) the Saudi system demolish any claim by us to moral superiority? Double standards, they shriek.

No. Any good policy has to be realistic as well as consistent. If you can't stop all killers, it's right to stop those you can stop. To that extent there is solid intellectual and moral territory between 'double standards' and 'no standards'." (Emphasis in original text. - CAA.)

You can only do what you can do; which doesn't mean you can't do anything, just that you can't do everything.

"The default position of Western democracies these days is that change should be 'peaceful'. The implication of this position (never discussed) is that enslaved people are better off if their slave-drivers reform slavery gradually, rather than get abruptly toppled even at the cost of many human lives. Slave-drivers need dialogue! A lot of dubious moral philosophy lurking behind that proposition.

What if we think that there are possibilities for more or less peaceful change? Egypt in some ways is a good current example. NB South Africa is always presented as a triumph for peaceful change but of course wasn't.

Libya might have been too, had the Gaddafi elite not reverted to stupidity instead of using its new improved relations with Western democracies to negotiate ." (Emphasis in original text. - CAA.)

We tend to forget, at a distance of more than two centuries, just how bloody our own two revolutions (if you count the American Civil War as a second revolution, the one that liberated the rest of us) were. For the British, their bloody revolutions are even more distant, with less dramatic (to us) conclusions.

"In each individual case the options range far and wide, as does the prospect of getting allies and building successful coalitions for change.

Let's not forget too that Western political leaders' main focus is what their voters want. And voters (with rare exceptions) do not put changing the ways of revolting foreign regimes far up their priorities list. Or much taxpayers' money to be spent on the problem."

Some voters. Others are quite willing for their government to very meddlesome, with the treasure and blood coming from their fellow citizens.

"So in the real world of foreign policy it makes no sense to take a stark 'no compromise' position of substance with dictatorships. They exist, they have UN and other votes, they can export trouble, they probably have Ambassadors in London. Your aircraft may need to fly over their territory, or they may agree with you on various international technical issues. It's complicated.

You almost always end up with some form of 'engagement'. But the fact of matter-of-fact exchanges and opportunistically looking for areas to build some common ground is not the same thing as having a policy of Engagement aimed at deliberately using a range of options (openly or otherwise) to bring out reforms." (Emphasis in original text. - CAA.)

In the real world, you make compromises. You make the best ones you can, but they're still compromises. Americans were cautioned early in their history against going abroad in search of dragons needing slaying.

Which doesn't mean you don't ever take fire and branch overseas to put an end to some odious regime which takes the ill-considered trouble of making themselves your enemy, just that you don't go looking for trouble.

(Which doesn't exactly jibe with this new-fangled "responsibility to protect" doctrine begin shopped around currently.)

"My point today is simple. British foreign policy and leadership can make positive changes in unpropitious foreign situations. But simply wanting to make a difference does not get results. Making that happen requires a powerful combination of strong policy determination, operational nimbleness and fine professional technique, an area where the FCO obviously declined under Labour. Plus some money." (Emphasis in original text. - CAA.)

Airbrush out the specifically British elements in that last and you've got some bood advice worthy of wide application by a democracy seeking to use its diplomatic strengths wisely and justly.

re: "The ‘First Fruits’ Of Our Support Of The Arab Spring Endeavor In Libya"

John Bernard, 1st Sgt. USMC (ret.), at Big Peace doubts that Libya's Arab Spring will amount to an improvement.

Money quote(s):

"(B)oth the United States and France have reached out to the Libyan National Transitional Council (NTC) and predictably, the NTC turned it’s back on those very same nations that came to their rescue.

The US State Department reached out to our “new friends” in Libya, hoping to retrieve Abdel Basset Ali al-Megrahi, the mastermind behind the 1988 Lockerbie airline bombing and the NTC said no. The no was neither tentative nor was it contingent on some prerequisite understanding or action. They said no with emphasis. The NTC spokesman said; ” [We] will not give any Libyan citizen to the West…”. So much for thanks, the spirit of cooperation, any understanding of right and wrong or any semblance of a common understanding of human rights, just; no."

Followed by a mention of disappointment regarding France's expections about Libyan oil production.

(One begins to suspect that "no blood for oil" doesn't parse well into French.)

"For those who choose to immediately dismiss these as the “growing pains” of a new regime protecting it’s interests, let me say that this continued naïveté toward the Islamic mind and their collective vision of the west and all non-compliant nations, is delusional! These are not the actions of righteous people whose vision includes a belief that all men are created equal. These are the actions of a people who deem all men are either submitted to Allah or they are not; and there are consequences for non compliance.

Naïve or not, the United States and our NATO friends, embarked on a mission to help secure freedom for the Libyan people, as though freedom is a universally understood concept. The US Constitution generally defines freedom as every individual’s God given inalienable right to self determination."

What about the Libyans' definition?

"What the Koran teaches is anathema to any constructive understanding of personal freedom. Rather it teaches submission and it’s adherents, to propagate, by the sword if necessary.

This is not a new revelation, this is an age old truth as defined in the Koran, the Hadith and the very words of the Islamic Scholars. So what continues to give hope to our western minded “leadership” that what these various rebellions are seeking is indeed, freedom? And what gives them the idea that supporting their efforts will in the end support our unilateral interests to defend these shores, and our Constitution?"

Change is not always for the better. And some do not see their interests, even while in national office, as being unilateral.

"Let me be clear; the world will be no worse off with Ghadaffi’s head on a pike but supporting a gaggle of 7th century thugs who would have Al Qaida in their number never mind in a position of leadership, will set us all back two decades."

1st Sgt Bernard is specific in just what kind of U.S. leadership there was two decades ago, and cites an example in U.S.-Libyan relations to make his point.

re: "Campaign Design and Strategy in Libya"

Andrew at Abu Muqawama ("a blog that focuses on small wars and insurgencies in addition to regional issues in the Middle East") reviews U.S. strategy for Libya.

Money quote(s):

"The U.S. and allied military campaign in Libya is an embarassment. From the very beginning, U.S. and allied political and strategic objectives have been unclear, and thus U.S. and allied military forces have been asked to carry out military operations without a clear commander's intent or end state. Out of all the operations orders that have been issued by the U.S. military for operations in Libya, in fact, only one -- the order to carry out the evacuation of non-combatants -- included an end state. None of the other orders issued to and by the U.S. military included an end state, in large part because senior military and civilian leaders either could not or chose not to explicitly articulate what the end state might be. The U.S. and allied military intervention is thus the very definition of an open-ended military intervention -- the kind in which most U.S. decision-makers swore we would never again engage after Iraq and Afghanistan." (Empasis in original text. - CAA.)

This has been, in turn, alternately and simultaneously an aggravation, an infuriation, and an embarrassment. WTF, over?

If I have to say this again; I will shed no tears on the day Col. Qadhafy is confirmed dead. None. He's been a long-time resident on my better-off-dead roster for decades now.

That being said, I'm clueless as to how going after Col. Qadhafy is intended, in a foreign policy objective sense, to disincentivize rogue statesmen from pursuing their own WMD proliferation.

"The U.S. Army, in response to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan (in which the military was asked to operate in a complex environment with often unclear policy guidance), developed commander's appreciation and campaign design (.pdf) to help officers properly frame and understand the problems in front of them."

That's an interesting TRADOC product linked therein.

"Campaign design is a great tool for commanders, but it is also the reflection of a bigger problem -- one identified and described most eloquently by Hew Strachan in this essay in Survival. It is what happens when you leave military commanders to figure out strategy and policy for themselves."

Mr. Strachan's essay is well worth reading.

"(T)he United States has now been applying force in Libya for over two months without explaining why. What is the political end we are trying to achieve? The United States needs to be honest with both its allies and its military. Because we should expect the U.S. military to go to great lengths to understand the environment and the enemy, but what makes the military intervention in Libya so embarassing is that the U.S. military is once again in the position of laboring to divine the intent of its own elected and appointed leaders." (Emphasis in original text. - CAA.)

Somewhere out there, not even in uniform yet, is a young man or woman who will write, for the Libyan intervention, what H.R. McMasters wrote for the Vietnam war.

re: "The Rocket's Red Glare of the Occasional Sortie...."

Deebow at Blackfive ("the paratrooper of love") is following U.S. war news in the foreign press (which means he receives information, not cheer-leading).

Money quote(s):

" "KABLUEY!" in a bad way would be the way I would describe how the current president is experiencing his military successes, particularly in Libya, where the rocket's red glare and the bombs bursting in air are currently giving way to Qaddafi's flag still being there."

Way back when Gulf War I was being televised on CNN, there was talk of how it all looked like a video game: grainy and detached, bloodless and antiseptic.

This also fostered an illusion of military omnipotence.

Sure. Our guys, and their gizmos, are good. But they're not all-powerful. And sometimes the biggest bang, even if properly applied, isn't going to result in the outcome you want.

Back when dinosaurs (and Soviets) roamed the Earth, your humble scribe learned a bit of wisdom working with nuclear weapons systems: There is a proper tool for every task.

Maybe NATO airstrikes aren't the perfect tool for this task. Oh, and what exactly are this task's objectives?

"(W)ith more word games from the State Department, and diplomats don't run combat operations for a very good reason, the bombs bursting in air is likely to continue" (Bold typefaced added for emphasis. - CAA.)

No offense taken, at least not by me, and I'm a lot closer by temprament and training to actually being able to run combat operations than most of my diplomatic peers. After all, it's not what diplomats are either trained or selected/promoted to do. Nor should they be.

"(T)here is no such thing as a "passive" exchange of fire, if you don't believe me, look it up in your PIO reference guide or your protocol handbook, but since you might not have time because you are tying yourself in knots trying to explain this, I will clear it up for you; anytime you are dropping bombs on someone, you are "actively" exchanging fire. Just because they don't shoot back, it doesn't change the nature of the transaction..."

Good point. Valid point, simply put. (Perhaps this isn't something covered in law school.)

"This is what happens when you lead from the rear, and if our mission continues to be murky and gets continually redefined between noninformative press conferences, then all of the two bit, tin pot dictators in the world will know that they are safe for at least the next 16 months, because we can't seem to kill the one in Libya, if that is our mission.

And what does this say about our word in the world? Qadaffi did what he is supposed to by coming forward and admitting his WMD programs and cooperating with the US during the last administration, and for that he was rewarded by having bombs dropped on him once per day, maybe. Kind of like teaching your dog to sit and then when he does it, you beat him for it. Any of you egghead diplo-dummies over at State want to explain to me how this perverted form of carrot/stick theory works?" (Bold typeface added for emphasis. - CAA.)

CAA apparently lacks sufficient egg-headedness to tackle the writer's request. From my obviously under-informed and inexperienced perspective, this last seems like precisely the reverse of the message we should be sending to governments thinking about a little (or a lot) bit of nuclear proliferation, like, for instance, Iran.

The phrases "counter-intuitive" and "designed to fail" come to mind.

Of course, not being a Middle East-specialist, I can make assertions like "we're doing it exactly wrong" (and not be taken seriously).

"The debate over whether the WPA applies or doesn't apply or whether it passes constitutional muster is something that will continue to go on, but as I have talked about before, consistency is a habit of the successful and makes your leadership believable. If the president says he needs Congress to buy off on attacking Iran, then he better say the same damn thing about attacking anywhere else as well."

This is true only if consistency is valued by leaders. Consistency will be valued by leaders only if they are rewarded for it. If they are rewarded despite inconsistency, then the opposite outcome will result.

re: "Will the White House ignore the War Powers Resolution?"

Josh Rogin at The Cable ("Reporting Inside The Foreign Policy Machine") asked some questions in May that are starting to get answers.

Money quote(s):

"(T)he Obama administration will reach the 60-day limit on how long it can wage war in Libya without congressional authorization, as spelled out in the War Powers Resolution of 1973. But does the administration, or for that matter Congress, even care?"

&

"(A)ny one senator can invoke the War Powers Resolution, which would force the Senate to debate the issue. Several Senate offices are scrambling now to figure out exactly how the law would be invoked, but the most likely scenario would be for one senator to raise a budget point of order, which would seek to cut off all funding for war operations in Libya immediately, thus kicking off the debate."

This is now all starting to come to a head, despite assorted punditry claiming that nothing would come of it, that Congress would just roll over, and that the War Powers Act is a dead letter.

Apparently not.

Let me state for the record that I support the idea of Col. Qadhafi leaving his self-annointed and self-appointed office as Libya's maximum leader, either feet first or otherwise.

Col. Qadhafi is no friend to the United States, to peace, or even to civilization as we know it. The blood of Americans is on his hand, has been for years, and may very well be again. Upon his head be the consequences.

I have my doubts about the wisdom of the timing and about the foreign policy aspects of how U.S. participation in NATO's current intervention came about, but that's all within the president's purview as the president (and thus America's chief diplomat). He gets to decide these things, it's in the job description and everything.

If you don't like it, the only way you get a (lawful) say in the matter is if you vote in the next presidential election (assuming you're a U.S. citizen and a registered voter) or if you're a member of the U.S. House of Representatives.

I've never been that big a fan of the War Powers Act. Bad cases make bad law, as they say, and the Vietnam War left the United States with the War Powers Act as a legal legacy.

The War Powers Act attempts to square the circle and allow us to believe two impossible things before breakfast. It's arguably unConstitutional, but that argument has never been tested (to destruction?) in the courts. President's have given it enough backhanded respect to avoid a Constitutional crisis over Congress' war-declaring authority; until now.

re: "Diplomats: Loyal to Whom/What?"

Charles Crawford at Blogoir ("A digital hybrid of blog and memoir presented on a daily basis, or not.") self-quotes from DIPLOMAT magazine.

Money quote(s):

"(T)he Libya case has given rise to a spectacular number of high profile diplomatic changes of side, with one Libyan ambassador after another announcing support for the opposition forces struggling to bring down the Gaddafi regime.

Whereas host governments might or might not commend the high principle shown by such a defection, unwelcome problems quickly arise if some diplomats in an embassy switch sides but others don’t. Who is running the local Libyan embassy for the purpose of carrying on routine diplomatic business? Who gets invited to which functions? Does a Libyan diplomat who has announced a switch of loyalty still get diplomatic immunity? What about the official embassy car?

What if the uprising fails and Gaddafi wins – must we throw these people out of the Libyan Embassy?"

From a perspective of diplomatic visa issuance (and cancellation), what happens when a Libyan diplomat defects from his embassy, thus invalidating his legal reason for being present in your country?

"Could a worst-case scenario unfold, namely a de facto or even de jure partition of Libya, with unfathomable complications for Libya’s diplomatic representation at the UN and around the world? In short, the Libya drama exemplifies the greatest challenge to any diplomat’s loyalty to his/her country: what to do if the country slumps into civil war or even disappears altogether?

This problem was faced in acute form by Soviet diplomats when the USSR disintegrated in 1991. They had represented one massive state – what to do when the 15 former Soviet republics had each become a new country? For most diplomats born and raised in Russia, the choice was simple: stick with the new Russian Foreign Ministry.

But those diplomats born and raised elsewhere in the Soviet Union had a painful choice. Better to stay on in powerful Moscow as a Russian diplomat, or return to one’s home republic and hope for a role in the nascent and disorganised Foreign Ministry there? If the latter, would they be trusted by the new leadership?

Many chose to stick with the Russian Foreign Ministry. Thus in 1995 when Russia and Ukraine were haggling over the fate of the Black Sea Fleet, the negotiating team representing Russia included plenty of ethnic Ukrainian expert diplomats."

Which didn't work out so well for Ukraine.

He concludes with an excellent question.

"Could we see a tumultuous test of British diplomatic loyalties in the coming years if Scotland holds a referendum and opts for independence? Recent SNP gains show the country may well be heading in this direction.

Will the FCO’s sizeable tartan army of Scottish diplomats vote to stay in London representing a reduced UK or will they go north en masse to help Scotland set up its new diplomatic service?

In either case, who will trust them?"

Are they trusted now?

A related question attaches to those European diplomats who leave their own service for the EU's External Action Service. Does anyone trust them now? Will anyone trust them afterwards?

re: "The Problem is Not the War Powers Act"

Howie at The Jawa Report ("sand people; get it?") does some crystal-ball gazing.

Money quote(s):

"Gadhafi is making Obama and NATO look like a bunch of damned fools."

&

"The Libyan rebels are obviously melting away, waiting on NATO to do the dying for them. At this rate this will go on forever. And I'm getting damn tired of figuring out how to spell Momar's name every day.

So its all that and the War Powers Act. Without the congress Gadhafi can hang like a millstone around Obama's neck through Nov. 2012."

re: "White House’s ‘Libya Isn’t A War-War’ Defense Not Going Over Well In Congress"

Doug Mataconis at Outside the Beltway ("an online journal of politics and foreign affairs analysis") describes the push-back by Congress.

Money quote(s):

"(T)he Obama Administration responded to Congressional demands for more information regarding the mission in Libya by saying that the War Powers Act doesn’t apply because American forces are not engaged in hostilities in or near Libya. Not surprisingly, that explanation has not gone over well among Congressional critics of the Administration’s policy"

"(T)he House may consider cutting off funding for the Libya mission if the Administration does not further clarify its position"

IIRC, that's kind of what the Constitution envisions in a situation like this.

"The White House, meanwhile, has basically said it doesn’t intend to respond any further to the House"

Yeah, ignoring Congress is a win-win of a strategy. (Oh wait: I meant just the opposite.)

"(W)e may be headed for some kind of real confrontation between the House and the White House over the mission in Libya. Frankly, it’s already gone further than I expected. Usually, Congress just rolls over and plays dead on these sorts of things but it’s clear that the hyperpartisan atmosphere in Washington, combined with the fact that the Libya mission remains decidedly unpopular, have emboldened Boehner and others to actually take a stand here.

If that’s the case, I’m glad to see it. It’s been far too long, since the passage of the War Powers Act really, that Congress has acted in any decisive manner to try to reign in the Executive Branch’s power grabs in the war making department. Regardless of the outcome of this particular policy dispute, the fact that Congress, or at least part of it, is acting with some backbone here is a welcome sight, especially in light of the specious reasoning that the Administration uses in its report."

Not to be too hung-up on process when results do matter, but since the only oaths or vows I've ever publicly sworn have been (in order) to the Constitution and to Madame-At-Arms, I take Constitutional processes pretty seriously. (That's just how I roll.) But let's look at results as well:

Qahdafi has been on my better-off-dead list since at least the 1980's. He's just that bad of a "blackhat." But realities of international politics and diplomacy have meant that we've let him stay alive lo all these intervening decades.

Pres. Bush (#43) even managed to get the guy, after publicly naming Libya as part of the Axis of Evil and then taking down Saddam's Iraq in about a week, to give up his WMD programs and start playing responsible adult (as much as the murderous tyrant was capable of portraying, anyhow).

So going on the warpath and trying to take out Qahdafi (while saying we're doing something else, but that's another argument) just doesn't make sense to me from an American perspective. Does. Not. Compute. Arab Spring or no, we had Muammar Qahdafi in the box we wanted him in, not troubling us and not looking to trouble us.

And now, any other dictator with WMD has got to wondering how it's to his benefit to give that up.

So how does this make sense?

"(T)he idea that the President can engage in hostilities with a nation that has not attacked us and poses no threat to our interests, and then fund the military war without Congressional appropriations seems to defy any reasonable reading of the Constitution."

I'm pretty good at reading comprehension (less so reading-between-the-lines) and I concur with Mr. Mataconis' assessment

re: "BREAKING: NATO Airstrike On Gaddafi Home Kills Son But Not Colonel Crazy"

DrewM. at Ace of Spades HQ questions the targeting.

Money quote(s):

"So, I'm still unclear if the purpose of the NATO mission is to topple the regime and/or kill Gaddafi or just protect civilians. I'm not a military expert but I'm not clear on how bombing someone's home protects civilians hundreds of miles away. Actually, I do (no Gaddafi, no danger) but I was told by the President that killing Gaddafi wasn't part of our military strategy. It's almost like Obama and the rest of the NATO leaders are saying one thing but acting very differently."

&

"Now suddenly talking out of your ass about policy and military goals is a good thing, Smart Diplomacy one might say.

Let's just be honest...we want this guy dead and we're going to kill him. Is that so hard?"

_____

Interestingly, the casualty list from this attack needs an update:

"Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi revealed that Col. Muammar Qaddafi’s son was not really killed by a NATO attack on the Gheddafi family compound. He says that intelligence information indicates that Khadafi fils was not even in Libya at the time of the attack, and that the Colonel’s grandchildren were also unharmed."

_____

Hat tip to Baron Bodissey at Gates of Vienna ("At the siege of Vienna in 1683 Islam seemed poised to overrun Christian Europe.We are in a new phase of a very old war.").

re: "Random Bits"

Andrew Exum at Abu Muqawama ("dedicated to following issues related to contemporary insurgencies as well as counterinsurgency tactics and strategy") has his head screwed the right way on and his priorities in order.

Money quote(s):

"I was not too angry about the fact that the United States is conducting clandestine operations in Libya. Frankly, I support liaising with the rebels (though not arming them), and I also support observing air strikes. Air strikes are generally more effective at doing what you want them to do -- and not doing what you do not want them to do, like kill civilians -- when they are observed. What makes me mad is the inability of officials to understand that clandestine operations are no longer clandestine after you blab about them to Mark Mazetti and Eric Schmitt. Now, if officials in the administration leaked this information as part of a carefully planned, tightly coordinated information operation designed to hasten Gadhafi's departure from Libya, I take back all my criticism and indeed salute the administration. If, by contrast, this information was leaked because of domestic political pressure and in response to complaints the administration was not doing enough to support the rebels, then I know of a circle of hell Dante forgot in which the leakers will someday find themselves residing. These kinds of leaks -- which involve disclosing the presence and activities of men in harm's way -- are the kind that make me want to run around Washington, DC kicking "officials" in their sensitive parts."