Living the Dream.





Monday, February 6, 2012

re: "The Miserable Failure's War in Libya May Result In Victory"

Ace at Ace of Spades HQ doesn't buy into the whole responsibility-t0-protect schtick, he's a bit more Jacksonian and punitive.


Money quote(s):


"The Bush model of war -- go in heavy, attempt to win the war on the backs of American (and allied) soldiers, attempt to establish a monopoly on the use of violence, and then continue that monopoly on the use of violence by acting as the nation's law enforcement/army for five, six, ten years -- doesn't work, or at least does not work at costs the American public is willing to pay.


I see no point agitating for a Full War Model against Iran, for example -- to urge such a thing is futile. I do not believe the American public has the appetite for such an endeavor. (At least-- not unless Iran uses its soon-to-be-built nukes.)


We didn't use to take care of these countries in this fashion. We used to arm and train rebels within those countries (they've all got them), fund them, provide intelligence, spread some bribe money around, and, when necessary, bring in the sort of Word of God that our air and naval forces issue from the air or sea." (Emphasis in original text. - CAA.)


Using auxilliaries is hardly a concept revolutionary in warfare, it's an economy-of-force move that makes sense for a global power concerned (as we should be) unnecessary U.S. casualties and an extended logistics chain.


"Colin Powell's ludicrous statement -- "You break it, you buy it" -- is a formula for nonstop, decades-long nation-building of exactly the same type that George W. Bush campaigned against in 2000, albeit on a much longer and much bloodier scale than we saw in, say, Haiti.
Why do we "buy" it if we break it?


Broken societies reassemble themselves. In fact, they seem to do so more quickly than people expect, even when faced with great devastation.


There is no need for American troops to hand-hold them through this process.


If a country thwarts or threatens the US enough to invite a decapitating military strike, one that takes out the ruling regime and renders the state without any force to impose order -- they broke it themselves." (Emphasis in original text. - CAA.)


And, if necessary, rinse and repeat. Sadly, we may be headed down this road whether we like it or not regarding Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, Pakistan....


"(W)hat there won't be in the model of warfare I am endorsing is a large body of American troops in the crossfire.


Yes, our troops are the best in the world, and not just the best at destroying the enemy -- they are the best at destroying the enemy while sparing noncombatants' lives. They are the most disciplined and most precise forces the world have ever seen, in addition to being the most lethal.


So yes, the presence of our troops can in fact spare any number of noncombatants in such a bloody civil war.


But... I have to say: Who gives a shit? How many foreign citizens in an country we've gone to war with do I need to save in fair exchange for one American soldier's life?" (Emphasis in original text. - CAA.)


Ace offers his own formulas for weighting that decision. It's a smarter way to evaluate strategic options than applying some sort of body count metric later on.


"These basket-case, broken, violent rogue countries have their own growing up to do. They have to go through their own spasms. They have to shed their own blood, and inflict their own massacres.


Yes, we can spare them some of this; but why should we? Someone is going to die in a war. I nominate foreign nationals.


American troops' heavy engagement is better for all parties in a war, except for the American troops themselves, and while they might be selfless enough to nobly volunteer for such missions, I'm a little too selfish to want to use them for such purposes any longer.


In some cases, we may need to fight a WWII style total war. Fine. In all other cases, we should go back to the 70s/80s model of backing indigenous fighters with the 90s/2000s addition of devastating airstrikes."


If we're not the world's policeman (as we claim not to be), then it might behoove us to be a bit more sparing in the application of our blood and treasure abroad.


"(T)he advantage of this style of warfare is that it is politically possible, which I no longer thing the Bush style is." (Emphasis in original text. - CAA.)


The man has a point.


"We have a strong interest in disarming Iran.


Do we have that strong an interest in rebuilding it and pacifying it? No, I don't think we do."


It's a valid point of discussion, and should be discussed, rather than assuming that Iran is a likely candidate for the Grand Fenwick model.



8/18

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