Money quote(s):
"CENTCOM headquarters normally had about 900 people assigned on PCS orders, but because they were running the wars in both Afghanistan and Iraq they'd been augmented with about 3000 people on six month TAD orders. I got assigned to the Iraq Coalition Coordination Center and got put in charge of handling the financial aspects of supporting the Polish-led Multi-National Division (Central South) that was just arriving in country. The fact that I got assigned a job for which I had no training, and my turnover was spending a day with my predecessor who gave me his E-mail cache and a folder with a 2 page memo from Condi Rice saying we had $500 million in unbudgeted money to play with, a 4 page standard boilerplate agreement between the U.S. and Poland, and a 17 page agreement with no specifics between Poland and the other 22 countries involved -- none of which contained any mechanism for actually carrying out what they'd agreed to -- gave me my first inkling that the people running the war at the higher levels had no idea what they were doing. This was kind of a shock to me, because I'd always assumed that the Big Bosses knew what they were doing. It turns out that it was only the pockets of competence that existed at the O-4/O-5 level that enabled the war effort to function as well as it did from a staff perspective." (Bold typeface added for emphasis. - CAA.)
Bubblehead's account only confirms what became apparent at the lower, operational levels within OIF 1. No real plan for "Phase IV" other than the victory parade (but don't fly any U.S. flags) and the rose-petal "liberator" greeting.
Right.
(Oh, and I'd have to add the herculean competence that existed at the O-3 and E-8 levels that made all the O-4 & O-5's efforts worthwhile.)
"Despite having no training in finance, I set up the mechanisms for providing funding for the logistics support for the division of 10,000, got additional force protection set up less than a week before an unsuccessful suicide attack on an MND-CS base that probably would have caused extensive casualties had I not cut through the red tape, and realized that the Spaniards are among the most unreliable "allies" in the world. I came to understand that while you have to be pretty smart to make flag, there are no real intelligence requirements to make O-6" (Bold typeface added for emphasis. - CAA.)
Let me offer a belated thanks for helping to make that suicide attack an unsuccessful one, since I remember that morning quite well (and always will).
(Oh, and as for the Spaniards; the troops were great, the government that sent them not-so-much.)
"I realized that the American military really was trying to do what was best for the Iraqi people, and the higher-ups really did have no plans for a permanent occupation -- they had no real plans at all. I saw the original plans for the invasion that showed that Turkey's refusal to let the 4th ID move in from the north negated what would have otherwise been a brilliant encirclement campaign that would have closed the big hole in the lines north of Baghdad, through which most of the future insurgent leaders escaped. Hanlon's Razor was confirmed: "Never attribute to conspiracy that which can be adequately explained by incompetence"." (Bold typeface added for emphasis. - CAA.)
Given that, aside from the actual invasion of Iraq itself, everything to do with Iraq was either done as an improvisation, it's amazing things went as well as they did. Apparently, making things up "on the fly" is an American strength.
Still, it's not wise to rely upon this as a plan.
12/15
