WP - Nuclear weapon reductions must be part of strategic analysis

Henry A. Kissinger and Brent Scowcroft at the Washington Postissued an arms control caution.

Money quote(s):

"A New START treaty reestablishing the process of nuclear arms control has recently taken effect. Combined with reductions in the U.S. defense budget, this will bring the number of nuclear weapons in the United States to the lowest overall level since the 1950s. The Obama administration is said to be considering negotiations for a new round of nuclear reductionsto bring about ceilings as low as 300 warheads. Before momentum builds on that basis, we feel obliged to stress our conviction that the goal of future negotiations should be strategic stability and that lower numbers of weapons should be a consequence of strategic analysis, not an abstract preconceived determination." (Bold typeface added for emphasis. - CAA)

Measure first, then cut. Pre-determined outcomes are subobtimal, to say the least. They may possibly be disastrous. Keep reading.

"Strategic stability is not inherent with low numbers of weapons; indeed, excessively low numbers could lead to a situation in which surprise attacks are conceivable."

Excessively low numbers of weapons available for a second strike (i.e., retaliation) translates into an excessively low number of targets necessary for a successful first strike (against us).

"The precondition of the next phase of U.S. nuclear weapons policy must be to enhance and enshrine the strategic stability that has preserved global peace and prevented the use of nuclear weapons for two generations."

In other words, something seems to be working, so let's not just dissassemble it because we've got a nice, shiny new (old/unproven) theory.

Frankly, despite decades of nuclear theoretizing and "thinking about the unthinkable," nobody really knows why deterrence has worked (if, in fact, it's "deterrence" that's been operative theory) or whether MAD worked or what.

(But something's kept the wheels from falling off since 1945.)

"(S)trategic stability requires maintaining strategic forces of sufficient size and composition that a first strike cannot reduce retaliation to a level acceptable to the aggressor."

The U.S. has depended upon the "triad" doctrine for its strategic nuclear forces, resting upon three "legs": ICBMs, strategic bombers, and nuclear-armed submarines. Undercutting one (or more) of these legs is something that should only be attempted after considerable forethought.

(Other nuclear capabilities have been developed and deployed over the years, especially in the realm of theatre [or tactical-level] nuclear forces such as artillery, intermediate-range missiles, and ADMs.)

"(I)n assessing the level of unacceptable damage, the United States cannot assume that a potential enemy will adhere to values or calculations identical to our own. We need a sufficient number of weapons to pose a threat to what potential aggressors value under every conceivable circumstance. We should avoid strategic analysis by mirror-imaging."

Mirror-imaging is just one of the analytic traps to be avoided at all costs, but un-trained analysts do it all the time.

"(T)he composition of our strategic forces cannot be defined by numbers alone. It also depends on the type of delivery vehicles and their mix. If the composition of the U.S. deterrent force is modified as a result of reduction, agreement or for other reasons, a sufficient variety must be retained, together with a robust supporting command and control system, so as to guarantee that a preemptive attack cannot succeed."

See my remarks about the nuclear triad.

And read the whole thing.



Henry A. Kissinger was secretary of state from 1973 to 1977 and national security adviser from 1969 to 1975. Brent Scowcroft was national security adviser from 1975 to 1977 and 1989 to 1993.

4/22

re: "How To Get Out Of Debt And Cut Defense…Without Hurting Security? Build More Nukes!"

Niccolo Machiavelli at Big Peace took us back to an old idea (whose time had passed during the Eisenhower administration).

Money quote(s):

"Adam Lowther, a research professor at the Air Force Research Institute, thinks he knows how we can get the federal budget under control and dramatically cut defense spending–without compromising our security. His solution? Look to the past, namely President Eisenhower’s New Look Policy which moved America away from relying on conventional military power and instead focused on nuclear weapons as the source of our security. In Lowther’s words, ”the nuclear weapons complex is a bargain” compared to conventional forces. Of course, Lowther is exactly right. He points out that nuclear weapons account for fewer than 1 in 10 defense dollars we spend. When it comes to bang for the buck, its hard to do better than nukes. Lowther recognizes that this will also mean dramatically less involvement in regional wars, or conflicts is places such as Iraq."

In terms of national security strategy, this is the if-your-only-tool-is-a-hammer-all-your-problems-look-like nails fallacy writ large. It's like a car with only two gears: park and 100 mph. Either you "go big" (i.e., nuclear) or let it slide.

"(T)this strategy strikes me as totally unrealistic. I mean, really, which US President is going to initiate the use of nuclear weapons to protect us from a conventional threat? Are we going to nuke a terrorist sponsoring state? Ike’s strategy fell down for the same reason. It was just not credible by the end of his term in office, if not before."

It's one thing to not take the nuclear option off the table. It's quite another to have no other options on the table.

8/13