re: "Libya: Military Science 101 at work"

McQ at Blackfive ("the paratrooper of love") shows how the enemy gets a vote in how the best-laid plans go aft agley. (We're not the only ones with a learning curve, after all.)

Money quote(s):

"I noted the other day to someone that once Gadhafi’s forces figured out how to adapt to the coalition presence and tactics, they’d probably begin to swing the momentum back to their side. Why? Because they’re better trained and equipped than the “rebels”. "

The Libyan rebels are, almost by definition, a "rag tag band." In other words, they're a "pick-up" team. No hard winter at Valley Forge drilling under Von Steuben for them. To their detriment.

"Think about it - what is the hardest thing to distinguish? Whether or not a civilian vehicle is occupied by good guys or bad guys – or neither. Make your side pretty much identical from the air to the other side or just regular civilians and it makes the job the coalition has undertaken much harder. That’s precisely what the Gadhafi troops have done."

The enemy gets a vote in how your plan (assuming you have a plan developed somewhat beyond the "Underpants Gnome" stage) and will be doing whatever they can manage to foul up and interfere with its successful implementation.

That why the call them "the enemy."

"I hear a lot of talk about the US (or others) arming the rebels and how that will make the difference. Nonsense. While not having the weaponry that the other side has is indeed a disadvantage, it isn’t the rebel alliance’s biggest problem. Their biggest problem is they’re an untrained and undisciplined rabble. And an untrained and undisciplined rabble confronting even marginally trained troops with at least a modicum of discipline are going to lose if all else is equal."

In political terms, this is why the odds favor the Muslim Brotherhood coming out on top of the tweeters and Facebookers in Egypt: the Ilkwan are organized and prepared for violence, just like the Bolsheviks and Khomeini's "revolutionaries" were.

re: "Libya Exit Strategy"

James Joyner at Outside the Beltway ("an online journal of politics and foreign affairs analysis") should know better than this.

Money quote(s):

"an elementary concept on war planning, the requirement for an exit strategy."

Actually, although it apparently took Sec. Rumsfeld until 2005 to say it, the Weekly Standard discussed it as early as 2003: you want a victory strategy, not an "exit strategy."

"It’s a fundamental precept of national security policy going back to at least the writings of Carl von Clausewitz that wars are fought to achieve political ends and it follows that military strategy must be tailored to achieve political ends. Indeed, countries can lose wars in which their armies are absolutely dominant on the field of battle–as American forces were in Vietnam–if the fighting does not achieve the sought political objectives.

In order for military planners to match tactics and strategy, they must know what the end game is. In the case of total war, such as we fought in World War II, that’s pretty simple: The unconditional surrender of the enemy. In the case of humanitarian interventions, counterinsurgencies, and stability operations, however, it’s much harder.

The concept of an exit strategy is designed to spotlight this dilemma. Simply put: How do we know when we’ve won the damn thing and can stop fighting?"

I'm as Clausewitzian as the next guy (perhaps more), and agree with Mr. Joyner about that. It's the notion of an exit strategy versus one for victory or even a set of objectives or goals, an end state that is worth all the trouble, blood, and treasure that vexes me.

Language is important. The very use of the word "exit" together with "strategy" messages our essential unseriousness about the dead serious business of warfare, and causes our allies many sleepless nights. It signals that our most important objective is to leave, to be uninvolved, even as we commit men and materiel to a conflict.

"The bottom line is that the colonels Ricks is hearing complaining about the lack of an exit strategy aren’t asking for all the answers, just the most important one: What are they fighting for?"

Here we agree. What is our strategic grand objective? From that all lesser operational and strategic issues must necessarily flow.