Please see Rajiv Chandrasekaran's Washington Post article.
Money quote(s):
"Carter Malkasian, who had been the State Department’s representative in Garmser until last month, is perhaps the only foreign official in the country to have been so widely embraced as a sahib, an Urdu salutation once used to address British colonial officials that Afghans now employ as a term of honor and respect.
The adoration stems from his unfailing politeness (he greeted people in the traditional Pashtun way, holding their hands for several minutes as a series of welcomes and praises to God were delivered), his willingness to take risks (he often traveled around in a police pickup instead of in an American armored vehicle with a squad of Marines), and his command of Pashto, the language of southern Afghanistan (he conversed fluently, engaging in rapid-fire exchanges with gray-bearded elders).
Afghan officials and U.S. commanders credit Malkasian with playing a critical role in the transformation of Garmser from one of the country’s most violent, Taliban-infested districts to a place so quiet that some Marines wish they had more chances to fire their weapons.
He was dispatched to this farming community in southern Afghanistan to provide political advice to U.S. troops, mentor the fledgling Afghan government and supervise reconstruction projects, all of which military leaders deem essential to their efforts to stabilize the country. The rail-thin 36-year-old was uncommonly effective, in large part because he was willing to forge his own job description, even if it meant bucking the State Department’s rules.
Seeing his role more as a proconsul than adviser, he single-handedly cajoled influential tribal leaders and mullahs to return to the district, correctly betting that it would lead others to follow. He won the trust of skeptical residents through countless meetings and roadside conversations, persuading them to reject the insurgency and support their government. And he provided vital institutional memory in a mission that has generally forced Afghans to build fresh relationships with new waves of Americans each year.
He also shaped the Marine campaign here in a way no civilian has in other parts of the country. He served as a counselor to each of the battalion commanders, influencing decisions about when to use force, and helping them calibrate it with a political engagement strategy. He built such credibility with the Marines — the result of spending so much time in Garmser — that if he urged a different course of action, they almost always complied."
Carter Sahib was different (see below) from the average State PRT or other embedded advisor in that he'd already had significant experience working these issues in both Iraq and Afghanistan. He didn't just pop out of a box; he was both educated, developed, and (essentially) groomed into this role. Which takes none of the credit away from his accomplishments; it merely points the way for how to get more of this.
"Malkasian was among a surge of civilians sent to increase the State Department’s presence in Afghanistan, which now stands at about 1,150 people. Many of them, including Malkasian, are temporary hires, not career diplomats.
But he was not like most others selected by State and the U.S. Agency for International Development — and that was a big reason he was regarded as so effective by the military and the Afghans. He asked to work in the field, not stay at the comfortable embassy compound in Kabul, which features a bar, a swimming pool and two-bedroom apartments with kitchens. He lived in a trailer on a dusty forward operating base, and his meals consisted of whatever fare was being served to the grunts, if he wasn’t eating goat with Afghans.
Because he was not vying for a cushy embassy posting in Europe as a reward for the privations of the gravel-strewn base, he did not feel compelled to toe the State Department’s line on war policy, which further endeared him to the Marines.."
People working "at the comfortable embassy compound in Kabul" have jobs in that embassy or that require they be based in or around Kabul. Of course, if you're going to do PRT or other field work outside of Kabul, then that's where you'll actually be most effectively based.
"What really set him apart, however, was his willingness to stay at the district level for two consecutive years — very few State personnel have done that — and his tendency to flout the department’s strict security rules, which mandate a near-zero tolerance for risk, as opposed to the military acceptance of some danger in pursuit of a mission’s objectives. Malkasian regularly ventured around the district with the police chief, placing his security in the hands of rifle-toting Afghans — a potential firing offense if his bosses in Kabul ever knew."
This (tour length) is a personnel/manning issue. In order to get a reliable supply of volunteers for Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan, the Department uses (among other incentives) a guaranteed "linked onward assignment." So if you were to decide, sometime during your twelve month assignment in country, that you'd really rather stay another year, for whatever reason, then someone else would have to be found to fill that (presumably desirable) next job, which would then become unobtainable to you for another three years.
Bear in mind that even the military tries to keep its combat zone assignments at (usually) no more than a year (sometimes extending them to 18 months).
"(H)e joined the Center for Naval Analysis, a military-affiliated think tank in Alexandria that offered the opportunity to visit U.S. forces in the field. That led to an assignment in Kuwait as the Iraq war was commencing, and then a year-long posting with the Marines in Anbar province starting in 2004. The job involved conducting research projects for Marine commanders into the performance of the Iraqi army and the outcome of various U.S. battalion-level operations.
He returned to Iraq for another tour in 2006, and the following year, he spent five months on a provincial reconstruction team in eastern Afghanistan’s Kunar province. That assignment was about not research, but action. He got to engage directly with Afghans and work with fellow Americans in solving problems. He resolved to return.
The opportunity arose in 2009 as more U.S. troops were deployed to southern Afghanistan."
As I noted above, Carter Sahib didn't just pop up out of a box. He had conflict-related postgraduate education, prior combat zone experience, and prior Afghanistan experience. Outside the military and/or intelligence community, is anybody growing professionals like this?
8/13
h/t Dave Carson (FB)
Showing posts with label Carter Malkasian. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Carter Malkasian. Show all posts
Monday, December 19, 2011
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)
