re: "We're taking the 2nd ausfahrt prior to the Friendship Bridge, it seems"

Phibian at Cdr Salamander ("PROACTIVELY “FROM THE SEA”; AN AGENT OF CHANGE LEVERAGING THE LITTORAL BEST PRACTICES FOR A PARADIGM BREAKING SIX-SIGMA BEST BUSINESS CASE TO SYNERGIZE A CONSISTENT DESIGN IN THE GLOBAL COMMONS, RIGHTSIZING THE CORE VALUES SUPPORTING OUR MISSION STATEMENT VIA THE 5-VECTOR MODEL THROUGH CULTURAL DIVERSITY.") evaluated Pres. Trump's plan for Afghanistan.

Money quote(s):

"(H)ere’s the Executive Summary: two of the best military minds of their generation, National Security Adviser McMaster and Secretary of Defense Mattis, helped develop a plan that they believe gives us a chance to salvage something in Afghanistan after seven years of dithering. Not a perfect plan, but a doable one. I am willing to give them the benefit of the doubt and fully support it. The major reason is that it returns to something I have written about for well over a decade, Conditions Based Planning, and throws away what remains of the Obama Administration's bollocked-up Calendar Based Planning."

As he stated later in his post, "with a calendar based plan, defeat is inevitable; it is only the timing and method that is in question"  

As a businessman, some of Pres. Trump's ventures have failed, gone bankrupt.  But no one should assume that was the intended goal.  Trump likes to win.  Any plan he attaches to his name-brand is, at the very least, intended to succeed.  Trump does not like losing.

"That is where Trump went Salamander. We are back to Conditions Based Planning – what military best practices tells us is the best path to success.

Another fundamental pillar of our new strategy is the integration of all instruments of American power — diplomatic, economic, and military — toward a successful outcome. Someday, after an effective military effort, perhaps it will be possible to have a political settlement that includes elements of the Taliban in Afghanistan. But nobody knows if or when that will ever happen.

Did you get that? All the traditional levers of national power. This is not just a military way forward. We are also willing to come to accommodation with SOME of the Taliban elements. Good to open that door."

Why ever might the phrasing "traditional levers of national power" ring a bell for even a larval student of strategy?  This might be why it's not always a bad thing to ex-generals and ex-admirals around the top levels of the national security apparatus, so long as you're very picky about the ex-generals and ex-admirals.  Not every problem is best treated as a nail, especially when you've got a whole toolbox to work with.

He concluded:

"For those looking for End States, Objectives, Decisive Points, Criteria for Success, etc – this isn’t the venue for that. This speech gives us approximately the Commander’s Intent and Initiating Directive. The Operational Planners can build a plan off that, and are."

Service versus Sacrifice & Remembering someone I never met, FSO Anne Smedinghoff

This post, my first in some time, is going to ramble a bit, without much in the way of internal structure or logic.  Deal with it.  Or not.

-----

We lost another colleague the other day.

And we lost three comrades-in-arms at the same time.

They did not sacrifice their lives.

And if any of us sacrificed their lives, well, then we're doing it wrong.

Because that's not what it's about.

-----

Service members in (and out of) uniform do make sacrifices, let there be no misunderstanding.

They undergo stressful and difficult selection and training processes, go to uncomfortable places, deal with often hostile natives, get fed crappy food, miss children's/spouses'/parents' birthdays (and anniversaries, first-words/steps, &tc.), are under-compensated (no matter how you measure it), endure sub-standard housing and living conditions in unhealthy climates.... you get the idea.

(And that's not even mentioning all the shots and immunizations just to get out of the country in the first place.)

Sure, not all the time and certainly not in every assignment, on either the military or the FS sides of the ledger.  Still, those are the sacrifices you knowingly and willingly make for your country, for your comrades and colleagues, for the missions and causes America has committed itself towards.

But you do have a big bullseye painted on your back; you're representing, for good or ill, the United States of America.  So to America's enemies, you will always represent, at the very least, a target-of-opportunity.

-----

Uniformed service members know the risks.  So do diplomats.  But we take them because we believe in what we're doing.  We believe that, to our country, the missions on which we are sent are sufficiently important that taking those risks is justified.

The Foreign Service, FSOs and specialists combined, is only about the size of an Army (or Marine Corps) division, if that.  So when one of us gets killed, there's generally only one-or-two degrees of separation between us.  A second-tour entry-level officer like Anne Smedinghoff would have only been in the Foreign Service for three years or so; some initial training at the Foreign Service Institute, language training perhaps, two years at her first post (Caracas, Venezuela), perhaps some (more?) language training before going to Kabul, and most of a year there, so far.

And in that time she had A-100 classmates and FSI instructors, colleagues in two countries; it quickly adds up to hundreds of people within the State Department.  And there aren't that many more than 13,000 Foreign Service Officers (i.e., "generalists") and Foreign Service Specialists altogether.  So if you're currently in the Foreign Service, you either knew Anne (I didn't), know people who knew her (several), or know people who know people who knew Anne (dozens and scores, at least).

Going back to the parallel I made above, about the entire Foreign Service being only about the size of a division, when a fellow soldier in your division dies you know about it.

Maybe you didn't know him or her but you know you trod a lot of the same ground.  Your families shopped in the same stores.  You probably ate in the same fast food joints, cafeterias, or restaurants.  To say nothing of frequenting the same bars.  A death at that level of contrasting proximity and distance gives you pause, gives your spouse some added stress and tears, and makes you hug your kids a little tighter.

-----

Of Madam-at-Arms' words on the subject, the less said the better.  For all my perverse pride in in being a plain-talking, straight-shooting consular officer, she's much more of a plain-speaker than I am.

-----

Since I didn't know Anne Smedinghoff personally (it's possible we passed in the hallways at FSI or elsewhere, or sat at the same cafeteria table in either of those places), I'm not going to spend a lot of time extolling her dedication, fine qualities, and such.  By all reports (and you should read them), she had all of that in full measure and I'm proud to have been her (distant) colleague.  My sympathies go out to her family, not least because when I think of them I think of my own family back home, and what they would go through in similar circumstances.

-----

One FSO out of a Foreign Service of only 13,400 (more-or-less) put into the context of a military comprising roughly 1.4 million uniformed personnel means 100 deaths being an equivalent loss.

One hundred dead.  I don't think we've had that many losses on a single day of warfare since 9/11.  (Someone will correct me if I'm wrong.)

For those unhappy with the amount of press this one death has gotten by comparison to most individual military deaths, well, I get it.  I truly do.  It made me a little angry, as a veteran (and I'm an FSO as well).  But for the press it is a novelty, it's someone who the media's Kabul contingent will likely have known personally.

Add to that the kind of elite education Anne Smedinghoff had (which I'm not criticizing, it's a good thing that we have well-educated diplomats and I think rather well of Johns Hopkins' international relations programs) makes her someone whom our media elites feel just a little more kinship to compared to most of our uniformed folks, for good or ill.

In case I was being opaque, this is much more a criticism of our national press and editorial corps than of any of our country's services, military or un-military.

-----

Unlike Benghazi (four dead), there's a lot more clarity about how these four deaths happened, at least from the macro level.  Bad guys (most likely Taliban, even though they're taking credit for it and trusting their press releases is a sucker's game) hit a convoy (or two convoys converging or passing one another) that was taking books to donate them to a school.  FSO Smedinghoff was the assistant public affairs officer going along to deliver the books and probably make sure some good photography or video of the handover got in the can.

Because while the fact of the books themselves is important, it's just as important to let people know that books are getting to schools, and that it's the United States (and allies) that is making this happen.

No, I'm not kidding.  Good media coverage of accomplishments multiplies the good you accomplish; it's as simple as that.  If we're going to do this sort of thing in a place like Afghanistan, we have to make every success count, in as many ways as we can.

I don't have a problem with the United States providing books to an Afghan school, far from it, granting for the sake of argument that the books themselves are useful ones.  And you shouldn't have a problem with that either.  (If there's a country out there that could use more help educating its next generation than Afghanistan, I'd like to hear about it.)

I'm generally quite open (being a fairly skeptical sort of contrarian) to discussions about whether the U.S. ought to be in the business of nation-building in general, or whether (and how) that ought to be done (by us) in Afghanistan, but not today or even for the rest of the week.

This week, more than usual, it's just a little too personal a question.  Just as it is the other 51 weeks of the year when people talk about supporting the troops but not believing in the mission (whether that's Afghanistan or Iraq or Vietnam or Franistan).

Military members (and their families) have, as the saying goes, "skin in the game."  U.S. diplomats (and their loved ones) do too.

Marking 9/11

CAA's observances of the eleventh anniversary of 9/11 began much like that fateful day itself. It was a normal, pleasant, sunny September day in Washington begun with the usual morning routine and ablutions, followed by a fairly typical commute involving sluggish traffic and/or crowded Metrorail cars.

That day, as did today, a brand-spanking-new A-100 class had just commenced the day before at the Foreign Service Institute: the 169th today and the 104th back in 2001. So the not-particularly-cloistered hallways and common spaces, not to mention the over-burdened parking lot and cafeteria, at the Schultz Center were clogged with the shiny, smiling faces of the newly-annointed.

By the end of today's workday, reports from two of our Middle Eastern posts, in Libya and in Egypt, would bring news of angry mobs, damaged or looted buildings, and casualties.

Back on that fateful day, the trouble came much closer to home.

Even at this decade-plus remove, it is still difficult to put the 9/11 attacks into a bloodless, intellectual perspective. It's just too soon, the wounds are perhaps scabbed or scarred over but remain all too fresh.

So we remember our fallen, remember that many of them did not fall but had to jump to their deaths rather than burn alive, and are thankful for the many who survived. We remember the fire fighters and other first-responders, the police, the veterans-turned-private-citizens, and the passengers and crew of Flight 93 and while we mourn their loss we also celebrate their sacrifice and count ourself fortunate that such men and women yet live among us.

We also look at the last eleven years and marvel at the hundreds of thousands of American and allied soldiers, sailors, marines, airmen, and others who rallied to their colors and fought (and still fight) the wars their countries asked them to fight. CAA will take quiet (okay, sometimes not-so-quiet) pride in having once been among their number.

Are there lessons we should have learned from our experiences of the last 11 years? Almost certainly. But today the lesson that's over-shadowed my every interaction has been rage.

CAA isn't done being angry. While that's undoubtedly a huge personal failing on my part and something I should pray upon to Jesus most sincerely, it's not simply that I'm stuck somewhere between denial, grief, and acceptance. There's a bit more there that the subconscious is trying to get the intellect to comprehend.

America's enemies are still trying to hurt, humiliate, and if they can manage it, kill us. That much is clear.

What's also clear is that our enemies have a really hard time managing that anywhere close to our home shores and cities. Our enemies best efforts seem to be possible only in those places where we're trying to make nice with Janus-faced local government whose most impressive accomplishments seem to be their marvelously exact calculation of just how much mayhem they can plausibly get away with perpetrating against us.

CAA reads the news every day and wonders how anyone not blindered by wishful thinking can imagine the war is over yet. That's yet another reason he's so angry today.

re: "Its (sic) all political now"

Bouhammer at Bouhammer's Afghan and Military Blog (" A blog about Military Issues, Afghanistan, and everything in between ") provided a reminder of why we fight.

Money quote(s):

"Back in 2001 when we went into Afghanistan, it was for a noble cause. We were attacked as a country and lost thousands of our citizens because Afghanistan allowed the terrorist to train and thrive there. After we eliminated the enemy we began the process of rebuilding the country. It has been decimated starting with the Soviet occupation and then after that as the Taliban took control.

From 2001-2012 we have lost thousands of America’s sons and daughters there, 1891 to be exact. They fell giving their lives for the security of our country and for the good of the Afghan people and the world. The cause of this war was just and appropriate. Regardless of what people feel about why we went to war with Iraq, the war in Afghanistan was warranted." (Bold typeface added for emphasis. - CAA.)

&

"(W)ith SecDef Panetta’s slip of the tongue the other day stating that we are going to end the “combat’ role a year early in 2013, it really smells like our war strategy is now completely political. This screw up by the SecDef shocked many around the world, from the Afghans to Panetta’s own staff."

2/3

re: "Your masters are not in Brussels, Gen. Dempsey"

Pundita ("US foreign policy for the 21st Century") cautioned the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Money quote(s):

"If you think a person is crazy, what use is it to attempt to reason with him? However, I don't know whether the chairman is actually crazy, or just doing a good imitation whenever he discusses Pakistan -- a mental blip that seems to manifest in all ranking members of the U.S. military who hold forth on Pakistan whenever they get in front of a microphone.

But despite my discomfort I should like to point out that while the U.S. military is under civilian control, this doesn't mean it's supposed to be under the control of civilians in foreign nations, even NATO ones." (Bold typeface added for emphasis. - CAA.)

And yet.... going all the way back to World War I, the U.S. has had to learn to work within alliances, with its allies, even when it's leading said alliances.

Having said that, prior to NATO, all of the United State's alliances were fairly short-term ones.

Perhaps such long-term familiarity blurs our own clarity of mission.

"I can't find a sound rationale for U.S. commanders basing their war planning on the geopolitical machinations and business concerns of European, Turkish and Canadian governments. This, in my view, is taking the 'You gotta have a gang' mentality too far.

I confess I've been particularly concerned about the gang mentality since February 2010, when AFP reported that NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasumssen had floated the idea of NATO becoming "the hub of a network of security partnerships and a centre for consultation on international security issues -- even issues on which the alliance might never take action." "

&

"(Y)ou know how it is, when people seek to assure you about something that hadn't even occurred to you before. Not to be unkind, but NATO demonstrated in Afghanistan that it can't fight its way out of a paper bag. All that NATO seems to excel at in the military sphere is carpet bombing. So I certainly hope it's not entertaining the idea of becoming a global constabulary -- one that takes its political guidance from Brussels, no less."

7/30

re: "Damn, Ogabe Must Be in Need of a Distraction"

Emperor Misha I at the Anti-Idiotarian Rottweiler ("HQ of the Rottweiler Empire. An Affiliate of the VRWC.") posted with his characteristic frankness and clarity.

Money quote(s):

"Joe on the Taliban:

Look, the Taliban per se is not our enemy. That’s critical.

The sound you hear is from thousands of U.S. troops shouting from Afghanistan: “Then who in the holy FUCK are those haji bastards shooting at us, you drooling, dimwitted dickheaded shitbird?”

We don’t know about the rest of you fine citizens (actually we do), but in our book assholes trying to kill U.S. troops are the very textbook definition of “enemies”"

Perhaps this will refresh the memory. I'm fairly certain the VP was in the room, if not as VP, when this speech was given.

"(Y)et another pretzel of illogic:

If, in fact, the Taliban is able to collapse the existing government, which is cooperating with us in keeping the bad guys from being able to do damage to us, then that becomes a problem for us.

Enough of a “problem” to qualify as an enemy and threat to our interests which, if we remember correctly, count among them “not having the fundamentalist swine who harbored bin Laden while he plotted to murder 3,000 of our countrymen and refused to hand him over afterwards become the government of Afghanistan again?”

Because, and once again correct us if we’re wrong, that is their declared goal and exactly what they’ve been trying to do every fucking last day since we kicked them out of government.

So let’s see if we get this straight: The Taliban are not our enemy unless they continue to do what they’ve been doing for the last ten years and show no signs of stopping to do ever, but right now, while they’re doing just that, they’re not the enemy?" (Emphasis in original text. - CAA.)

12/21

re: "Bolton: Biden's Statement that Taliban Not Our Enemy Was No Gaffe"

Pamela Geller at Atlas Shrugs (" Evil is made possible by the sanction you give it. Withdraw your sanction. ") agreed with Amb. Bolton's characterization.

Money quote(s):

"The Taliban does not share Western values, goals, objectives. The Taliban's playbook is the qur'an and its stated aims.

The whole idea of a moderate Taliban or a moderate Islam is false"

Reasonable people can disagree whether or not there can be a moderate Islam.

(CAA believes in it on alternating days, himself.)

"Never mind their role in 9/11. Never mind their hosting al-Qaeda camps and working with al-Qaeda.

It amounts to surrender, to prostration before the jihadist enemy.

Now, we know old Joe is none too bright, but here Bolton explains: this was no gaffe."

And here's why:

"Former U.N. Ambassador John Bolton said Tuesday that Joe Biden’s statement that the Taliban is not America's enemy in Afghanistan was not a gaffe, but instead the vice president was “articulating what the White House strategy is.” Biden made his remarks in a recent Newsweek interview, but the Obama administration is saying they were taken out of context

“I don’t think this is a gaffe by Joe Biden — I think he is articulating what the White House strategy is — I think they know exactly what they are trying to do,” Bolton told Fox News’ Greta Van Susteren. “They are trying to redefine the terrorist threat to be a limited group of al-Qaida people along the Afghan-Pakistan border.

“They are going to redefine Taliban away from that — they are going to ignore Taliban in the Arabian Peninsula, and al-Qaida in Iraq, and al-Qaida in North Africa,” Bolton said. “And they’re going to say it’s just that one little thing: We’ve killed Osama bin Laden — the war on terror is over.”"

Based upon my own sporadic observations regarding Vice Pres. Biden's tendency to "gaffe," I wouldn't urgently disagree with Amb. Bolton's assessment.

VP Biden sometimes says things that suggest he's regurgitating, in his own words, the substance of things about which he's been briefed. Specifically, I'm thinking about his remarks a few years ago about the H1N1 flu virus and air travel.

He seems to speak uncomfortable truths, as he understands them and based upon some frank and factual briefings (i.e., not for public distribution), and wholly without regard for the political, economic, or diplomatic fallout. Indeed, he says them without any apparent consciousness that there could be, even should be, such repercussions.

"Bolton said the Taliban treats anyone who does not agree with them horribly."

Word.

""It reminds me of Vietnam. Remember Sen. George Aiken, the Republican of Vermont? It was clear to him that we didn’t have the stamina to go on and actually win,” Bolton said. “So the George Aiken strategy: We’ll declare victory and get out — that is what the administration is going to do in the war on terror. Having redefined who the terrorists are and having said the Taliban is not our enemy, they’re going to say we have won and the war is over.""

And, if we'd put some of our HVT Taliban officials on the other side of a conference table, gotten them to publicly disavow Al Qaeda and UBL, and made it clear that if we ever had to come back to Afghanistan it would not be with gentle words and reconstruction budgets....

....all of that before we'd spent a decade nation-building and taking casualties, then this would have been a reasonable, if limited, outcome for our intervention there.

"The jihad against the U.S. will continue all over the world, not just in Afghanistan."

12/21

re: "Burned Korans & Riots & Feeding the Delusions of the Delusional"

Ace at Ace of Spades HQ offered a helpful suggestion.

Money quote(s):

"If someone's having a panic attack, the worst possible thing to do, as someone trying to help, is to play into it. To pay too much attention. To act very concerned.

People do that, thinking it's helpful. In fact, in exacerbates the situation.

My point is this: To what extent have we played into and exacerbated this absurd Muslim psychopathy over the Koran?

And to what extent would it be defeated if we simply stopped playing into it, and actually routinized the destruction of Korans (or other shows of disrespect, or, more accurately, "refusing to treat the Muslim religion as the officially sanctified state religion of America")?

To what extent are we encouraging these little spells by playing along with them? By treating the Koran as scared, most of the time, to what extent are we writing our own tragic ending when some stupid book gets burned?

Isn't it dangerous to feed the delusions of the deluded? Isn't the right course of action to insist on a more grounded view of reality?

Shouldn't we set the default, routine, expected mode of behavior as "we are not a Muslim nation and furthermore are forbidden by the Constitution from treating one religion as sacrosanct"?"

&

"(O)ur current policy also seems to not help, and is furthermore repellent."

3/2

re: "Iraq, Libya, and Imperialism"

Dr. Jerry Pournelle at Chaos Manor (" The Original Blog and Daybook. ") shared his thoughts on NATO's Libyan intervention.

Money quote(s):

"Qaddafi was likely executed by one or another militia faction, or even by a militiaman, possibly for his possessions. He was shot by rebels, which may have been merciful compared to what they might have done with him. It’s hard to say that beating him to a pulp then shooting him out of hand wasn’t justice. Qaddafi wasn’t quite the monster that Uday Hussein was, but he’d done enough to earn his fate, and indeed the US Air Force tried to kill him with TFX fighter-bombers in the 1986 Operation El Dorado Canyon. They didn’t get him, but it wasn’t for lack of trying. It was an old fashioned harbor bombardment from the old days of Great Powers diplomacy. Reagan acted in retaliation for Libyan terrorist activities after consultation with the Congressional leadership of both parties. Had Gaddafi been killed in the raid the history of North Africa would have been considerably different.

In any event, NATO has brought the tyrant down, which must have been the mission. The official authorization for air NATO air strikes (including US acts of war) in Libya was a UN resolution mandating the protection of civilians from a Khaddafi massacre, but it’s very difficult – for me impossible – to connect an air strike against a convoy fleeing a city just before it falls to the rebels with the mission of protecting civilians. Even assuming that most of those in the convoy were military – and surely some were not since it was a chief of state and his entourage – there were likely to be civilian casualties from the air strikes, not to mention possible massacres in the looting that followed the convoy’s defeat.

And that does raise the question of whether the President of the United States has the authority to order such acts on his own authority. The UN cover mandate didn’t authorize regime change or execution of the chief of state of Libya. The President did tell Ghadaffi to get out (but apparently wasn’t willing to let him get out alive)." (Bold typeface added for emphasis. - CAA.)

&

"The Constitution empowers Congress to declare war. The President has the authority to protect and defend the Constitution, but unlike the King of England he has not the power to make war on whomever he pleases (a right that remains with the Ministers who act for the Crown to this day). In England you must go to Parliament to get the financing to pay for a war, but the King along can declare it. That right was specifically and intentionally taken from the President and given to Congress (along with the power of the purse). Franklin Delano Roosevelt, who passionately believed that the US ought to be involved in the War in Europe that began in September 1939, understood this very well. He could promise Churchill that the US would come to Britain’s aid, but that was restricted to support until December of 1941 when Germany honored the Axis alliance and declared war after the US and Japan were at war. In those days war was considered a serious event.

The problem with going to the rescue of the Libya rebels without any declaration of war is that the US has little say in what happens next. Perhaps we shouldn’t have any say.

On the other hand, we have spent about $1 Billion on our Libyan adventure, and we don’t know what we have put into power in Tripoli. We do know that one faction claiming to speak for the rebels has said that the basis of law in Libya will be Sharia. It is clear that had we not spent the $1 Billion, Libya would either remain unified under Khaddafi or be partitioned, probably at Marble Arch. Whether that would be a better outcome than unified under Sharia law is not clear to me. It is also not at all clear that the White House thought this through before committing us to borrow a billion dollars from the Chinese in order to intervene in the Libyan civil war. Was this outcome worth the cost?"

It certainly was for someone, but not necessarily the U.S. taxpayers who'll have to pay back the Chinese. With interest.

"I am not much in favor of imperialism as a policy for the United States, but I do favor competent imperialism over the present policies. If we must have an empire, should we not be competent at it? Of course there is the problem that Afghanistan has little to nothing that we want.

I was opposed to extending our Afghan adventure beyond the punishment of the Taliban for harboring out enemies; left to me we’d have been out as soon as Kabul fell to the anti-Taliban forces, with perhaps a billion dollars in bribe money squirreled away to be spent at the discretion of whomever we left behind as resident. Our policy in Afghanistan should have been simple: don’t harbor our enemies, don’t let your country be used as a base for attacks on the US, and apply to the Ambassador if you need anything. Been good to know you. A policy, by the way, that would have been as welcome to the Afghans as to the Legions." (Bold typeface added for emphasis. - CAA.)

CAA rather likes Dr. Pournelle's punitive expeditionary model for Afghanistan. Of course, it's much too late for that now.

"There is no way that we could leave US troops in Iraq subject to the tender mercies of the Iraqi courts. US troops are not going to be subject to Iraqi law. But can you imagine the Japanese making that sort of demand as part of their surrender in 1945?

The result of the Iraqi war? We have removed Iran’s worst enemy. We have installed a Shiite government in Iraq. We have succeeded in changing the Middle East beyond Iran’s fondest and wildest dreams. This is the result Iran has worked toward since we invaded Iraq. They have their goals. Now we go home." (Bold typeface added for emphasis. - CAA)

10/23

re: "Would the U.S. pay Pakistan's military to help murder American troops if the U.S. had military conscription?"

Pundita (" US foreign policy for the 21st Century ") isn't actually in favor of bringing back the draft, but is angry enough to ask the question.

Money quote(s):

"Through it all -- throughout all the deceptions, denials, evasions, rationalizations and insultingly useless advice given over the years by Americans in civilian government, the military and academia -- there is one question relating to U.S. tolerance for Pakistan's proxy war against NATO and Afghanistan that towers above all others. And yet it's the one question that has never been asked of a public figure. So in the title of this post I've put the question to the public."

She continued:

"I don't mean to shift blame to Americans at large, nor am I arguing to restore conscription. I'm simply pointing out that if service in the U.S. military was compulsory, there would have been such a large number of Americans personally involved in the outcome of the Afghan War that there would have been no 'dark' or 'lost' years in the war while the U.S. was fighting in Iraq.

Combine this with the instant era in global communications, and I think the outcome would have been that factions in Washington that managed for the better part of a decade to hide Pakistan's proxy war from the American public would have found their machinations quickly overwhelmed by the volume of complaints from conscripted Americans and their parents -- many of those parents veterans of the Vietnam War, I might add."

CAA questioned, at the time, both the timing and utility of our Iraq intervention back in the 2002-3 timeframe, both before and during his deployment there to.

While the 23 writs of the Iraq War Resolution sufficed as justification for the invasion, whether Afghanistan should have been put on a back burner (as opposed to a more general mobilization, if both campaigns were so urgently needful) is a good set of questions.

"I'm not arguing for conscription but I am asking whether it's possible for the United States to field an all-volunteer fighting force that's not treated as a mercenary army. The question needs to be answered."

Americans, as a people, have not (since Vietnam, when it was even less true) treated the AVF as mercenaries.

That privilege seems reserved to the inside-the-beltway folks, big picture thinkers, whose connections to the folks who do the deploying, fighting, and dying, are tenuous at best.

(The crocodile tears of the national media elite remain wholly unconvincing.)

"If you want to run with the fiend thesis, it's possible the entire problem of the U.S. approach to Pakistan could be solved by deploying a contingent of exorcists around various civilian government and military buildings, lobbying firms and academic institutions in Washington and Brussels.

But if you pooh-pooh the idea that Hell somehow got loose in those two seats of power you might want to opt for the only other proposition I can see that covers all the bases. This is that U.S. soldiers wouldn't be treated with such contempt if they weren't considered disposable; i.e., as mercenary hirelings. And as corollary that this treatment wouldn't occur if U.S. military service was compulsory."

The "fiend thesis" seems to have been that our decision-makers and strategy-setters have come under actual demonic and diabolical influence.

(CAA can neither confirm nor deny that.)

As touched as CAA is by Pundita's solicitousness on behalf of the troops and their welfare, sometimes an army has to be used. That puts men (and women) at risk. Troops understand that, they just ask that their risks be justified and not wasted.

When an army is used in an expeditionary fashion, as a furtherance of some national policy or another, the risks multiply.

12/17

re: "Losing a war and a peace"

UNCLE JIMBO at Blackfive ("the paratrooper of love") explained some quite simple concepts.

Money quote(s):

"We are making a deal with the Taliban, a losing one. Our Commander in Chief fundamentally misunderstands the way wars must be fought, and I am not talking about strategy or tactics. I am talking about winning or losing."

There is, for those who haven't been following along at home, quite a difference between the two, and the consequences will echo into eternity.

He goes on to admonish the president:

"You can't end wars Mr. President; They are won or lost. Afghanistan has been lost."

In all fairness, he also notes:

"I am not certain at all that the war in Afghanistan could have been won."

Not as it's been fought; it seems reasonable to question whether the proper action in Afghanistan should have been simply a punitive expedition to schwack a sufficient number of alligators, rather than attempting to drain, and subsequently gentrify, the swamp.

"We will now cede the field of battle, where so much US blood has been shed, to the enemy. And we will sue for something less than peace from the very people who hosted the planning and execution of 9/11."

I suppose the inevitable question, should this proceed as it appears envisioned, is how long before Taliban-sponsored and sheltered embark on their offensive against the U.S.

That and how much money we will pay in tribute, er, development assistance during the interim.

"It has been a long decade of war and we are all tired, none more so than the troops who have marched to the sound of gunfire over and over again. They, with the steadfast support of a real Commander in Chief George W. Bush, won the war in Iraq."

1/5

re: "Getting to Zero"

Andrew Exum at Abu Muqawama gave a short statement of the long view.

Money quote(s):

"(W)ars, like history, do not stop when America decides it no longer wants to be involved. This is worth remembering, both in terms of what is taking place in Iraq today as well as what might take place in Afghanistan in 2014. So by all means, say U.S. involvement in the war has ended. But think carefully before saying the war has ended."

Conflict in Iraq is multilateral and the co-belligerents are both internal and external. Taking just one side (ours) off the battlefield means only that we no longer have much influence over what occurs there.

10/21

re: "Writing off Afghanistan, too"

Kori Schake at Shadow Government ("Notes from the Loyal Opposition") saw the writing on the wall.

Money quote(s):

"The evident confusion among senior policy makers in the administration prefigures the administration's cratering commitment to win the war in Afghanistan. The White House has narrowed its war aims from defeating all threats to only defeating al Qaeda. The Director of National Intelligence, James Clapper, testified to Congress this week that the deaths of senior al Qaeda leadership have brought us to a "critical transitional phase for the terrorist threat," in which the organization has a better than 50 percent probability of fragmenting and becoming incapable of mass-casualty attacks.

The White House appears set to use progress against al Qaeda as justification for accelerating an end to the war in Afghanistan. Since the president has concluded that we aren't fighting the Taliban, just al Qaeda, no need to stick around Afghanistan until the government of that country can provide security and prevent recidivism to Taliban control. The president will declare victory for having taken from al Qaeda the ability to organize large scale attacks, and piously intone that nation building in Afghanistan is Afghanistan's responsibility.

This policy will not win the war in Afghanistan. It will not even end the war in Afghanistan. It will only end our involvement in that ongoing war. Because arbitrary timelines do not translate into having achieved the objectives that cause enemies to throw down their weapons. And it is the enemy ceasing to contest our objectives that constitutes winning. Interrogations with prisoners in Afghanistan have caused the American military to conclude that "Once ISAF is no longer a factor, Taliban consider their victory inevitable."" (Bold typeface added for emphasis. - CAA.)

2/2

re: "From 2004: Blackfive's Exit Strategy from Iraq and Afghanistan"

Blackfive ("the paratrooper of love") re-posted some cartographic excellence:

re: "Afghanistan: America's Willful Deception"

John Bernard at American Thinker (" a daily internet publication devoted to the thoughtful exploration of issues of importance to Americans ") had harsh words for our wartime national political and military leadership.

Money quote(s):

"The battlefield is as fluid as diplomatic efforts to shape the outcome are convoluted. While diplomacy during peacetime can be described as the efforts between two national representatives to overcome obstacles to a good, healthy, and mutually productive relationship, diplomacy during hostilities cannot. "Diplomatic efforts" during an ongoing conflict are at best an oxymoron. The failure of two parties to work out problems with one another is what leads to war, and if war is the ultimate outcome of a failure of diplomacy, then it stands to reason that the successful outcome of the war can be defined only when one warring nation capitulates to the battlefield prowess of the other." (Bold typeface added for emphasis. - CAA.)

War is sometimes described as the failure of diplomacy, and there's more than little truth in that. Diplomacy has also been described as the continuation of warfare by other means, and vice versa.

"What is truly amazing is that the level of morale in the ranks of our war-fighting community has remained as high as it has. High morale is not, however, an accurate indicator of how our military views our successes on this battlefield, especially at this point in history. The reason it does not is because this is one of the only times in our history when a draft has not been used to maintain numbers in the ranks. Those who have served both in Iraq and Afghanistan have done so willingly, and their overall perception of time served is generally more positive than that of conscripts." (Bold typeface added for emphasis. - CAA.)

The result, although we are now engaged in disassembling and dispersing it, is the most experienced and professional army, in all components (regular, guard, and reserves) since World War II.

Granted, the army we had at the end of the (first) Gulf War was the product of both the Reagan build-up and the officer corps that overcame the post-Vietnam hangover, but we disassembled and dispersed much of that as well.

"(T)he lexicon has morphed. While success on the battlefield has historically been defined as victory, even the word "battlefield" has been carefully expunged from the public dialogue. Success has been co-opted by "compromise" and victory remanded to the dustbin of unacceptable words and phrases. Enemy prisoners of war (EPW) are now future leaders in the new coalition government envisioned by the luminaries in D.C. General grade officers have been carefully selected for their willingness to capture the vision and then translate it into conduct on the battlefield that reflects the intent of their commander in chief.

The American population have been exposed to military jargon they don't understand as well as historically incorrect details about Afghan society and Islam, and they have been force-fed these carefully manicured stories of successful encounters with Afghan society for at least eight years." (Bold typeface added for emphasis. - CAA.)

Damning assertions one and all, and none of them incorrect.

It was an American general, once upon a time, who said "There is no substitute for victory."

We've come a long way from that time, but not all progress necessarily represents an improvement.

"(W)e have had further confirmation of an ongoing effort by U.S. representatives to reconcile with the Taliban and to release battle-hardened Taliban fighters back to Afghan society. While we have chosen to abandon the battlefield in a quest for a magic potion to make the Taliban like us, they, are doing their level best to "explain" to us that they have no interest in peace, an example of which is the killing an Afghan "peace negotiator." They are also exploiting our weakness on the battlefield due to our apparent unwillingness to bring the fight to them!"

&

"(M)any questions are raised by all of this, but none is as important as this one: why did we ever let this government convince us that rebuilding Afghanistan was somehow better for the United States? This question is important simply because there are those of us who are serving in that part of the world who have been led to believe they are there for the security of the United States. Regardless of the apparent inanity of the mission, the overwhelming evidence of IED placement, VBIED traffic, the obvious lack of measurable support from the local population, and the incessant stories of moral and ethical failure in the Kabul government, these war fighters press on. The government that has compelled them to serve in a hostile environment owes them at least the ability to defend themselves when fired upon. The ROE, however, denies them use of the basic tools of the trade: artillery, close air support, use of organic weapons systems like the 60mm mortar, and even small arms fire if their proximity to civilians cannot absolutely guarantee safety for the civilians."

This is a legitimate question: Is rebuilding Afghanistan necessarily to the advantage of the U.S. and, if so, in what way? Simply making the assertion doesn't make it so.

"(T)he conditions in Afghanistan are hardly normal, and no matter how much the general grade officers and their counterparts in D.C. want Afghanistan and Afghans to reflect their vision for them, it isn't going to happen. One thing is certain: as the number of service members in Afghanistan is drawn down, the real threat to our war fighter community will grow exponentially." (Bold typeface added for emphasis. - CAA.)

&

"The truth is, in spite of the narrative, the actual evidence suggests that things in Afghanistan are turning in favor of the Taliban. The danger to our forces will not only continue, but will grow in intensity as more and more control of the battle space is handed to the Taliban. And this giving over of control is a direct consequence of our having chosen not to hold the Taliban accountable on the battlefield -- a battlefield created by a failure on the part of al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and other like-minded Islamic cells to choose peaceful coexistence with the rest of the world. It is also a complete failure of the remainder of the so-called peaceful Muslim ummah to denounce the violence perpetrated by these groups." (Bold typeface added for emphasis. - CAA)

A negotiated withdrawal with a Taliban-dominated (or coalition government which includes them), with the kind of exposed lines of supply and communications we endure in Afghanistan, is a recipe for catastrophe, subject to the meagre mercies of one history's most merciless foemen.

"Those in the highest levels of governance in this country and appointed to highest echelons of authority in the DOD have willingly rendered their consciences and their minds incapable of considering the threat, the motivation, and the determination of this enemy, and the proper response to the threat. Instead, they have done what too many men in this age have done. They have been seduced by a lie that allows their weakened character to take the less painful road rather than the road that would have led to victory.

And in so doing, they have purposefully deceived a nation and a nation's most valuable asset: its war-fighting community."

5/16