re: "National Security Part 3: The Role Of Economics"

The Curmudgeon Emeritus at Eternity Road reviewed the economic basis for military strength.

Money quote(s):

"The last thing any commander wants to do is take his men into an unwinnable war, especially a war unwinnable by reason of inadequate material resources"

Unfortunately, wars aren't always fought by two sides which chose to go to war against each other. It only takes on side to start a war. The enemy gets a vote.

"If a commander dislikes to go to war inadequately provisioned, a national command authority -- in the case of the United States, the president -- should dislike to send him there. Yet it's in the nature of nation-states that, as John Jay said most memorably, they'll go to war whenever there's a good chance of profiting thereby."

This pre-supposes that a commander-in-chief is sufficiently knowledgable, or sufficiently well-advised, that he (or she) knows the difference. Or cares.

(Yes, I'm still pissed about the whole "the army you have" crack.)

"Economic strength is both the precondition for military readiness and the requirement for military endurance. To be considered well defended, a nation must have both.

Analysts disagree on the extent to which a nation can endure various degrees of economic militarization. In the early years of the RAND Corporation, studies were submitted to the Pentagon that proposed that the United States could divert as much as 50% of its GDP to military expenditures, if that were necessary to meet some contingency. Needless to say, there was a wide spread of opinion on whether that was true, and if so, on how long the nation could remain in being under so large a military burden."

Full mobilization is something that the U.S. has never, not really, experienced. Nothing like what various European states, such as Britain, Russia, or Germany, experienced during World War II.

"(A)nnual military expenditures come to about $700 billion: 5% of GDP. Given that the armed forces are one of the seventeen enumerated powers of Congress, that doesn't seem disproportionate, especially considering the broadening of the military's missions and responsibilities in recent years."

Ah, but what about the penumbras!

"It must be said that we spend as much as we do on our military because our "allies" spend so little on theirs. Not only are we committed to their defense; we are all too frequently called in to handle crises they have disdained to address.

Yet despite all that spending and the large, capable military it supports, we are not secure."

There's no such thing as being completley secure, at least this side of the Pearly Gates. The writer discusses some of the ways in which he believes Americans perceive themselves to be insecure, which are worth reading, particularly with regards to the problems causing, and resulting from, illegal immigration.

"(N)ational security is affected by our willingness and ability to maintain mobilization bases: facilities from which we could rapidly develop new or previously rejected military capabilities, or greatly expand the ones we have.

Mobilization bases are important because few major wars begin as "bolts from the blue." There are normally clear indications that conflict is brewing well before the first exchange of fire. That would be so even in our present age, in which the interval between a firm decision and the ballistic nuclear bombardment of any point on the globe is no more than thirty minutes."

A firm decision should be made upon a basis of firm information. More than likely somewhat longer than 30 minutes would be required to assemble, to say nothing of developing, actionable intelligence.

"(S)uch mobilization bases cost money. Worse, it's money spent to remain flexibly poised against notional threats: possibilities that might never materialize. They're the first targets of budget-cutters in a time of austerity. Thus, we cannot be sanguine about building and maintaining such bases without maintaining our economic health and vitality. Even then, it would be necessary to keep unpleasant but yet unrealized possibilities in mind when the budget-cutters come to call."

Good advice for the strategic-minded, but the strategic-minded won't be calling the shots when the knives come out for budget cutting.

"America was not altogether ready for World War II. We had reduced our World War I Army to pre-war levels, and had retreated from most aspects of military production. Fortunately, the psychological response of Americans to the attack on Pearl Harbor left us ready and willing to endure a considerable degree of privation for the sake of the forces and materiel the war would require. Above all, America was rich enough, and free enough, to convert half of its productive sector to the making of weapons of war. It is unclear that we could do that today."

I'm a bit more optimistic about our ability to convert great swaths of our productive sector to war production, but I'm less sanguine about what of our productive sector actually remains within our own borders.

re: "Our defense strategy"

Uncle Jimbo at Blackfive ("the paratrooper of love") is following SecDef Gates' debate with himself.

Money quote(s):

"When I took early retirement from Special Forces I served several years as a First Sergeant in the Wisconsin Guard and when asked in 1999, I told my troops "There is absolutely no way we will be in any land war that requires National Guard Infantry to be called up". It pays not to make absolute statements."

It's unclear to me how, as late as 1999, Uncle Jimbo could have thought this. We'd already been through Desert Storm, where, to be fair, no sizeable NG infantry formations were deployed, and through three years of Balkan involvement (Operation Joint Endeavor, IFOR, SFOR, &tc.) which had heavy reserve component involvement.

"MacArthur managed to limit his limiting of Presidential and Congressional authority to simply crossing Asia of the list of places we should do land war. Gates has upped the ante and eliminated two continents and the most volatile region on Earth. I think he was right the first time and that since we don't know who and where we may end up fighting then we should make sure to maintain our best deterrents and combat systems."