re: "Heresy over defense, part 2"

Tom Mahnken at Shadow Government ("Notes from the Loyal Opposition") responded to Kori Schake.

Money quote(s):

"Kori Schake responded to my call for a debate over defense spending by firing a volley in defense of the new orthodoxy on defense spending. Specifically, she attempts to make the case that the federal debt is a national security threat that demands further defense cuts, that the United States has a large margin of superiority over potential adversaries, and we need to seek greater efficiency in defense.

I agree with Kori that our national debt is an important national security concern, but I also agree with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin Dempsey that it is not our most important one. In my view, it would be strategically unsound, even if it were economically possible, to balance the budget on the back of defense.

I agree that defense should not be "out of bounds" in budget matters. But the fact is that in a period that has witnessed a massive expansion of government spending, the Defense Department has already sustained several rounds of cuts, dating back to the first months of the Obama administration. As both Robert Gates and Leon Panetta have argued, additional cuts cannot help but affect U.S. security." (Bold typeface added for emphasis. - CAA.)

Entire departments, not to mention lesser agencies, have little-or-no Constitutional basis. Even Gov. Perry could probably name at least two.

"Some parts of the world (Europe, for example) are clearly safer and more secure than in decades past. But other parts of the world, such as Asia, are less secure. Of particular concern is China's ongoing military modernization, a portion of which is aimed at coercing U.S. allies and denying the United States access to the Western Pacific. As I have argued elsewhere, the United States has consistently underestimated the scope and pace of China's fielding of new weapons, including those designed to counter U.S. power projection forces. Moreover, over the past decade the weapons most needed to respond to such developments have received short shrift in the Pentagon budget. As a result, the United States faces an increasingly unfavorable military balance in the Western Pacific."

Europe, at least the central and western portions, are safer and more secure from threats posed by other central and western European states. And even, it seems, from Russia (hopefully). That still leaves non-state threats as well as NATO's seeming inability to manage, collectively, even their Libyan intervention without lots of heavy lifting by the U.S.

And by "heavy lifting" I mean logistics, ISR, and basic re-supply. Shiny fighter-bombers are just pretty paperweights once you can't re-arm them anymore.

"(T)he post-9/11 military buildup has produced few new weapon systems, and those that have been fielded over the past decade have been geared toward a particular kind of war against a particular kind of foe. For example, the United States fielded thousands of Mine-Resistant Ambush-Protected (MRAP) vehicles for Iraq and a sent a second generation to Afghanistan. Such vehicles are unlikely to be of much use in future wars, however. And the Unmanned Aerial Vehicles that have been crucial to U.S. success in combating insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan and targeting terrorists in Pakistan are unlikely to survive in a conflict with an adversary that possesses even a rudimentary air defense network.

Whole parts of the U.S. armed forces have been left out of whatever "rolling modernization" has taken place. U.S. Air Force aircraft are on average more than 23 years old, the oldest in Air Force history, and are getting older. Many transport aircraft and aerial refueling tankers are more than 40 years old, and some may be as old as 70-80 years before they retire. The U.S. Navy is smaller now than it was before the United States entered World War I, and is getting smaller. No "rolling modernization" will reverse these trends; only full-scale recapitalization of the U.S. armed forces will."

The Air Force, like the Navy, suffers from the huge per unit capital outlays needed to launch even a single ship or new airframe.

"(T)he ultima ratio of defense is effectiveness, not efficiency. That is, defense spending ultimately exists to provide security to the American people. Inefficient yet effective defense remains preferable to efficient yet ineffective defense."

10/14

re: "Overcoming Our Dearth of Language Skills"

Morgan Smiley at the Small Wars Journal blog ("facilitates the exchange of information among practitioners, thought leaders, and students of Small Wars, in order to advance knowledge and capabilities in the field") looked forward at meeting the foreign language requirements of the future.

While this is from a military perspective, this is of diplomatic readiness relevence as well.

Money quote(s):

"In order to fully appreciate any culture we are learning about, especially if we expect to conduct operations in that particular culture, it follows that learning the language will not only help one learn about that culture but be able to operate more effectively once immersed in it."

This so blindingly obvious to anyone who has ever served abroad, in uniform or out, as to seem fairly condescending when plainly stated. It's not. Not condescending, that is. Those of us who serve their country abroad at any time in our lives are a minority of Americans. Let's not fail to make a persuasive argument by not laying the logical foundation necessary.

".... the importance of culture and language training by the US military due to the changing nature of the global security environment in which state-on-state conventional wars have been supplanted by smaller scale regional conflicts, trans-national and non-state terrorist actions, and other irregular security challenges conducted among local populations and lasting several years if not decades."

The language requirements of the State Dept. are much more constant and diffuse. State is responsible for over 260 diplomatic and consular posts requiring staffing by U.S. personnel speaking scores of languages, and the need to reliably refresh those positions with language-proficient replacements every 2-3 years.

"(W)hat languages & regions to focus on given the changing security environment and our role in it. After all, conflicts affecting US and allied interests - whether they involve foreign internal defense, counterinsurgency, counter-terrorism, or post-conflict reconstruction efforts - could spring up most anywhere."

Language proficiency is a labor-intensive undertaking, and carries the opportunity costs, particularly for military personnel, of whatever training is forgone in favor of that gaining, and maintaining, that skill. It's also something of a long-lead-time item, resistant (up to a point) to surge procurement, since qualified language instructors don't just grow on trees either.

"Read Samuel Huntington's "Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order" and Thomas P.M. Barnett's "The Pentagon's New Map: War and Peace in the Twenty-First Century". In "Clash of Civilizations", Huntington talks of potential conflicts arising along cultural "fault lines", for example, where Christianity meets Islam (Central Asia/ Turkey/ Caucasus regions) or where Hindu culture meets Sinic culture (Himalaya/ Central Asian region). In "The Pentagon's New Map", Thomas Barnett posits that the world is divided between the "connected" (primarily Western) regions/ countries and the "disconnected" or "Gap" areas, with many of those "gap" regions being in Africa, the Middle East, Central Asia, etc. Given these two authors & ideas they put forth, the Army may want to look at educating Soldiers in Turkish, Persian, Hindi, and Chinese as well as focusing on those areas for cultural/ regional education." (Emphasis in original text. - CAA.)

Here Brother Smiley makes a mildly adventurous but intellectually-defensible leap about how to hedge one's future bets about where language training should be focused as a long-lead-time item, making an educated guess about where future conflicts are likely to be found.

"(W)e may want to revive the British concept of a "shooting leave" (we'll call it something else of course). During the period of British rule in India, both Company and Government, a "shooting leave" involved a British officer taking a few weeks or months of leave in order to travel through potentially hostile lands and gather information and intelligence, which involved the possibility of shooting or being shot at. For our purposes, our officers ought to be able to take a sabbatical, perhaps no more than 3 to 6 months, and embed themselves in non-governmental organizations (NGO) operating in one of the regions we are interested in (with Doctors Without Borders in Tajikistan for instance) so that he may use/ improve his language capabilities, learn first-hand information about the region he is in, and work with organizations that we may end up dealing with should we become involved in those areas."

Embedding military personnel, unless they are also medical personnel, in NGOs such as Doctors Without Borders is problematic, to say the least. There still seems to be something of a cultural wall between the two worlds, although perhaps a program of this nature would help in this regard.

"Building partner capacity has been identified as a key area of concern as we look for better, and cheaper, ways to assist friends and allies, and help others defend themselves as Mr. Gates put it. In order to do this effectively, we must field more leaders that can communicate with host-nations forces in their own languages which will allow us to better understand those host-nation environments since little will be lost in translation and cultural understanding will be enhanced. Improving our language skills may lead to more effective and efficient techniques for building the capacity of our current and future partners and reduce the need for deployments of robust US forces." (Bold typeface added for emphasis. - CAA.)

8/23

re: "Are We Going to Do Anything to Those Who Kill Americans?"

Michael Ledeen at Faster, Please! looked at a decades-old problem (which the British will likely face very soon).

Money quote(s):

"At first, I thought all the statements — about Iranian support for terrorists (in both Iraq and Afghanistan) who kill Americans — were parting messages from government officials on their way out, and therefore free to say such things. They knew the facts all along, but repeatedly soft-pedaled them and on occasion even denied having such evidence. So when Secretary of Defense Gates and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Mullen (finally) said “the Iranians are killing our guys,” I wasn’t impressed. “NOW you tell us!” was my gut reaction. “So how come we didn’t hear about this many years ago?”

And that’s still my reaction, up to a certain point."

As it happens, I visited wounded milblogger Lumberjack In A Desert during his stay at Walter Reed. He was in no doubt as to whom he owed his injuries. And that was back in 2006.

"But then came a similar statement from Ambassador Jeffrey in Iraq, and I had to say “whoa!” And then Panetta said the same thing. Those are different, those come from officials who are there right now, and their words count for a lot more than those of guys entering retirement. Indeed, I think we must now read the Gates and Mullen statements as part of an administration campaign to raise public consciousness."

Would that it were so.

"It would be churlish to blame Obama and his minions for the ongoing Iranian-sponsored assault against Americans — it’s been going on for decades. And every president since Jimmy Carter has appeased the Islamic Republic, believing that a “grand bargain” was days away. But the other presidents’ search for rapprochement with Iran was, for the most part, conducted secretly, while Obama put himself in front of the appeasement bandwagon."

True enough. There's plenty of room at the bottom of this pile-on for presidents and prime ministers going back the past three decades.

"Does anyone remember the Iranian assault against our Tehran Embassy in 1979? When a mob attacked, the Marine Guards did not shoot. Indeed, they did not even have live ammunition in their weapons. The Embassy was overrun, hostages were taken, and the countdown for Jimmy Carter had begun.

The first rule is that self-defense is legitimate and important. Failure to actively defend Americans under assault will only multiply the number of assaults against Americans. Dithering encourages our enemies; we have to be decisive.

The second rule is that we must strike — politically in almost all cases, not militarily — directly at the heart of the regimes that organize the killing of Americans. We must support their enemies, who, in both Iran and Syria, constitute a clear majority of the Iranian and Syrian people.

The third rule is that those responsible for killing Americans must be held accountable. When the Quds Force killers appear in areas where we can operate, we should hunt them down. When their political leaders travel, we must demand that Interpol arrest them. And we should strike violently at the terrorist training camps from which the Iranian proxies emerge, as well as against the assembly points for the explosive devices and rockets that are used to kill and maim our men and women.

That means changing the intended recipient of the outstretched hand from the tyrants to the people, and brandishing a clenched fist at the tyrants." (Bold typeface added for emphasis. - CAA.)

Sounds like a plan to me.


______

Hat tip to Glenn Reynolds at Instapundit.


7/11

re: "Europe Does Not Need American Protection Anymore"

Joerg Wolf at Atlantic Review ("A Press Digest for Transatlantic Affairs") summarized like nobody's business.

Money quote(s):

"Secretary Gates' words have fallen on deaf ears in Europe, because we don't see a particularly productive use for our militaries. America has global aspirations and has the Pacific to worry about, whereas Europeans are just concerned about their neighborhood and don't feel the need to maintain strong militaries. This trends towards demilitarization is probably dangerous, but it is not a sign of decadence or free-riding. We don't want to be on the "ride" that has taken us into Iraq and Afghanistan."

6/28

re: "Gates to Europe/NATO: Pull it together, people"

David Kenner at The Cable ("Reporting Inside The Foreign Policy Machine") touched on some of SecDef Gates parting shots.

Money quote(s):

"Gates told an audience at the Security and Defense Agenda, a Brussels-based think tank, that there was a "dwindling appetite and patience" among American taxpayers to expend resources, especially during a time of extreme fiscal constraints, "on behalf of nations that are apparently unwilling to devote the necessary resources ... to be serious and capable partners in their own defense."

This prospect led the outgoing defense secretary, who spoke following a meeting of NATO defense ministers, to warn of "a dim, if not dismal future for the transatlantic alliance."

Gates has long griped about insufficient European contributions to NATO, though rarely in such a sharp words. In a February 2010 speech, he said the "demilitarization of Europe...has gone from a blessing in the 20th century to an impediment to achieving real security and lasting peace in the 21st." "

CAA loves him some NATO allies, both back in the bad old Cold War days and abroad in the MND-CS. Of course, some of the bad-guys on the Warsaw Pact side of the Iron Curtain had morphed into good-guys by the time we invaded Iraq. Which I appreciated, although I had occasional bouts of cognitive dissonance when I'd see former Soviet equipment rolling around and remind myself it was on our side now.

"Gates's frustrations stem from three issues: Europe's low defense spending, a lack of coordination of resources that encourage wasteful expenditures, and the inadequate contribution of some NATO members to the war in Libya.

Increases in European defense spending are likely off the table for the foreseeable future. With the continent still in the throes of a financial crisis, most countries are looking to make further cuts in their military budgets, not add to them. The British government, long considered the most robust U.S. ally in Europe, announced an 8 percent cut in defense spending over four years in October, and British officials have signaled that they are also considering further reductions. Germany also plans to slash the size of its army from 220,000 soldiers to 170,000.
Gates also criticized European countries, which spend a combined $300 billion on defense per year, for not better coordinating their acquisitions. "[T]he results are significantly less than the sum of the parts" when it comes to European defense spending, he said."

Planned British and German cuts come on top of over 20 years of "peace dividend" reductions. They are not a good thing.

"(C)oordination has not been sufficient to allow European countries to play a significantly larger military role"

re: "Quote of the Day"

Andrew at Abu Muqawama ("dedicated to following issues related to contemporary insurgencies as well as counterinsurgency tactics and strategy") liked what SecDef Gates said recently.

Money quote(s):

"From the perspective of many U.S. legislators and tax-payers, one of the reasons the states of Europe enjoy such nice social welfare programs is because the United States has effectively subsidized the continent's defense spending since 1989. A few weeks back, I was in a meeting with some representatives from one of our NATO allies, who warned me that if the United States moved troops out of Europe, European states would respond by only developing military organizations capable of operating in Europe and North Africa.

I responded that would be a real improvement!

Currently, the European states seem unable to carry out mid-sized military operations independently."

One of the, at the time, touted advantages of the NATO military alliances was sort of an economy of scale. With all these different nations pooling their military resources, each didn't have to reinvent the wheel, so to speak, and were thus able to specialize somewhat, rather than suffer multiple duplications of effort so that each country had their own full range of military capabilities.

Unfortunately, what we have today is, rather than national specializations, is something more akin to a collection of boutique militaries, each expecting Big Sam to provide all those over-arching (and expensive) capabilities like reconnaissance, logistics, aircraft carrier battle groups, and the like.

"This kind of reckoning between the United States and the states of Europe has been long overdue. Some European states have proven themselves serious about both the alliance and their own national defense. (I'm looking at you, Denmark.) Others have not. If Germans complain with justification that their workers subsidize Greek hair-dressers taking early retirements, it's perfectly fair for the United States to complain German workers enjoy comfy state benefits in part because U.S. tax-payers underwrite their national defense."

re: "This Week at War: Moral Hazard at NATO"

Robert Haddick at Small Wars Journal ("facilitates the exchange of information among practitioners, thought leaders, and students of Small Wars, in order to advance knowledge and capabilities in the field") foresees the end of the free ride.

Money quote(s):

"Europe may not be able to rely on America's free security guarantee forever."

Nothing is forever. That should be plain enough. But even in geopolitical terms, where a single lifetime approximates for "forever," alliances require constant tending, by all their members. Or they're not really alliances.

(Don't get me wrong, as an old "Cold Warrior," I think NATO, when it worked, was one of the greatest achievements of the 20th century.)

"In blasting NATO, Gates explains what moral hazard feels like

In what he termed his "last policy speech as U.S. defense secretary," Robert Gates ripped into his policymaking peers at NATO headquarters in Brussels last week for allowing "significant shortcomings in NATO in military capabilities, and in political will" to occur. Gates noted that although the non-U.S. alliance members have more than 2 million troops in uniform, these countries struggle to deploy 40,000 soldiers into an effective military campaign. Gates also pointed to NATO's embarrassing performance in Libya, noting that European members, despite having a multitude of officers collecting paychecks at frivolous staff billets, have failed to generate the intelligence support and command capabilities needed to wage an effective air campaign. Gates warned of a "dismal future for the transatlantic alliance."

Gates's frustration was no doubt sparked by the realization that his department has become the victim of moral hazard. The United States provides a free security guarantee to Europe. Europeans, meanwhile, have responded in an economically rational way by taking greater risk with their external defense. With the collapse of the Soviet Union removing the last plausible military threat, it was logical for European policymakers to avoid spending on expensive space, communications, and intelligence systems that the United States was largely providing for free. Gates and many other U.S. policymakers see an alliance with too many free riders"

This has always been the case, at least as long as I can recall. But at least before, when NATO as an alliance had as its primary military purpose the defense of Western Europe, even the smaller, less militarily-capable members knew, and planned for, a fight that would probably take place on, and above, their own territories. So even if they didn't have that many chips to put into the pot, they planned to ante-up with what they did have.

"Gates fears that the United States will have to bail out the Libya operation. This week, Adm. Mark Stanhope, Britain's top naval officer, warned that budget limits and unit rotation requirements could force NATO combatants over Libya to soon have to choose between Libya and Afghanistan. Should a shortfall of European forces in either campaign result, Gates undoubtedly fears that the United States will have to make up the gap.

Over the longer term, the moral hazard issue extends beyond NATO into the Western Pacific, the South China Sea, and soon the Persian Gulf. For example, the United States has a great interest in signaling to China that it has strong security commitments to its partners in the region. Washington likewise wants those partners to share the defense burden and to also avoid provocative behavior. The stronger the signal it sends to China, the less incentive the partners have to do their part."

&

"Gates concluded his speech by warning Europe's leaders that the next generation of U.S. leaders lacks nostalgia for the Cold War struggle and could walk away from the NATO alliance. In the future, Europe will undoubtedly have to do more for its external defense. That doesn't seem like a problem now since there is no apparent external threat. But should they have to more fully insure themselves, European defense planners should consider how they would rebuild their defenses. They should consider how much time it would take to mobilize political and budgetary authority to prepare for these threats and how long it would take to rebuild the required military forces. Most notable in this regard is the risk of losing both a defense industrial base and functioning military institutions, which once gone might never be restored, at least within a relevant time frame."

You're a member of the NATO alliance you have, not the one you wish you had.

(Or, alternatively you're not.)

A country which so degrades its military institutions to the point where there's not any there left, is likely to have to learn the harsh lesson that one doesn't reconstitute that institution by last-minute conscription notices. This is as true for our European (and other) allies as it is for the U.S.

re: "Tom Ricks Mistrusts Germany"

Joerg Wolf at Atlantic Review ("A Press Digest for Transatlantic Affairs") exposes a puzzling mindset.

Money quote(s):

"(M)ost US experts -- with the notable exception of Tom Ricks -- do not worry about a war with Germany or a return of militarism and Nazi ideology in Berlin. Instead they are concerned that Germany (and many other European countries) demilitarize so much that we are not of use to the US anymore."

SecDef Gates recent speech to this effect has been much remarked-upon.

"Tom Ricks, however, has a totally different view of Germany. Mr. Ricks worries about "Germany's resurgence" "

Yeah, that Kaiser could just be waiting around until our suspicions are lulled.

Seriously, any Mr. Ricks looked at Germany's current military strength. Has he missed to demographic meltdown that most Western European nations, including Germany, are undergoing? Ralph Peters thinks the Germans still have it in them (along with other Europeans) to put the boot to the colonizing underclass that's already within their borders, but Mark Steyn and Tom Kratman are less "optimistic" (for values of "optimism").

"It seems that Tom Ricks is of the opinion that Germany (or the German people, culture etc) have not substantially changed since 1945 and is still a threat."

By all accounts, Mr. Ricks is a very bright guy. His recent SF-1001 form was absolutely brilliant, parodying not only the American military's mania for checklists, the bureaucratic impulse to require a written form, and the demonstrated strategic ignorance of Washington policy and decision makers.

"There are still quite a few Germans, who use our violent history and crimes against humanity as an excuse for the lack of burden sharing in NATO missions. Tom Ricks' blog posts support their claim that our allies still don't really trust us and that we should therefore not support their military missions... "

re: "Need budget cuts? We probably can start by shutting the Air War College"

Thomas E. Ricks at The Best Defense ("Tom Rick's Daily Take on National Security") reviews some criticism of the Air War College.

Money quote(s):

"(T)he place is an expensive joke. Funny except that the taxpayer picks up the tab."

Happily, this does not jibe at all with my experiences regarding DoD's higher learning institutions, such as the other various war colleges and universities. Some of the issues raised by Hughes are certainly potential pitfalls for any institution of this type; the sponsoring organization has to value the institution (or, more importantly, its product) enough to send its best and brightest to be students and its very best and brightest to teach there. The way organizations send the message that an institution is important is by promoting those who excel there.

"Tom's bottom line: Hughes says it costs at least $300,000 a year to send an officer to the AWC. So this looks like a good place to begin budget cuts, Secretary Gates. Close the place and send the students out into the world of civilian academia, where they will be challenged intellectually and might learn something."

Pretty big black eye for the Air Force if it muffs running its own war college. Professional military education is an investment in a service's future top leaders, not a block to be checked off, particularly if that education is known by the other service's top leaders to be a joke.

re: "NATO: Hey, We'll Bomb The Rebels, Too"

Ace at Ace of Spades HQ just keeps getting smarter all the time.

Money quote(s):

"If America wants to enter other states and declare a monopoly on sanctioned violence, well, that's a good way to keep outrages against civilians low, but comes at the cost of using American troops for every damn fight in the world.

If you're going to go a different way -- supporting indigenous fighters with air capabilities and intelligence -- you have to accept that there are going to be some vicious slaughters of civilians by "freedom fighters," but certainly you want as few such massacres as possible. What do you do? You can threaten an end to air cover and supply. But that doesn't thwart a slaughter in progress.

I'm not sure a threat to attack the rebels we're supporting is necessarily a bad thing. We need them to keep it clean. The temptation in any war, especially a civil one, is to get dirty and vicious as soon as possible and then keep topping yourself. Our troops don't do that (except for the occasional psychopaths who are then court martialed), but we don't want to have to insert our troops into every situation where we might want to flex some military might.

If we're going to fight in this limited fashion (and I think the old Cold War model of limited support is well worth revisiting), we do need to let our "freedom fighters" know that there are some things we just won't/can't countenance, and there's no way we can stay in a fight if our "freedom fighters" decide to unleash their inner Al Qaeda.

As for actually bombing them, though: I really can't think of a more preposterous situation than bombing both sides in a civil war.

Oh, and meanwhile, SecDef Gates said there won't be any ground troops in Libya as long as he's serving in his job. So, like, implicitly, he's threatening to walk."

&

"(O)f course, any time you have pilots in a war it means you're just one shoot-down away from a hostage situation."

re: "Our defense strategy"

Uncle Jimbo at Blackfive ("the paratrooper of love") is following SecDef Gates' debate with himself.

Money quote(s):

"When I took early retirement from Special Forces I served several years as a First Sergeant in the Wisconsin Guard and when asked in 1999, I told my troops "There is absolutely no way we will be in any land war that requires National Guard Infantry to be called up". It pays not to make absolute statements."

It's unclear to me how, as late as 1999, Uncle Jimbo could have thought this. We'd already been through Desert Storm, where, to be fair, no sizeable NG infantry formations were deployed, and through three years of Balkan involvement (Operation Joint Endeavor, IFOR, SFOR, &tc.) which had heavy reserve component involvement.

"MacArthur managed to limit his limiting of Presidential and Congressional authority to simply crossing Asia of the list of places we should do land war. Gates has upped the ante and eliminated two continents and the most volatile region on Earth. I think he was right the first time and that since we don't know who and where we may end up fighting then we should make sure to maintain our best deterrents and combat systems."

re: "Gates: Any DefSec Who Proposes Wars Similar to Iraq and Afghanistan "Should Have His Head Examined" "

Ace at Ace of Spades HQ reacts to SecDef Gates' recent West Point speech.

Money quote(s):

"He also talks about "reshaping" (that is, cutting) the Army's and Marines' budget because he thinks a large conventional mechanized-units-vs.-mechanized-units war is unlikely.

I don't know about that last part. I'd say we'll have few of those wars. And more of the smaller-unit/guerilla war. But I'd say the likelihood of either is pretty high. The former's at like 70% and the latter's at 100%. Just because most fights will be small-unit engagements doesn't mean large-scale warfare isn't going to happen."

There's a way to break down threats like this, into four quadrants, where you evaluate possible events in terms of both probability (i.e., likelihood) and risk (i.e., hazard or cost) as being either High or Low. So you get Low Probability - Low Risk, High Probability - High Risk, Low Probability - High Risk, and High Probability - Low Risk.

The probability that major mechanized combat is going to happen in any given year may be low, but the risk is so high that you have to prepare for it. After all, you can't just excrete a major mechanized force and the ability to project it globally on 11 months notice; it takes literally decades to build.

"After eight years of pacifying Iraq and Afghanistan, I'm not at all sure we were right to depart from the basic idea that nation-building was a bad idea.

This is less about Iraq and Afghanistan and more about the next war, which just might be Iran. Personally, I'd be on board for military action, but I would strongly prefer to leave the pacification and nation-building to the Iranians. Pay 'em, arm 'em, give them targeting lasers to paint targets for jet strikes, but I wouldn't support a massive, decade-long police action in a country with more than twice as many people as Iraq.

We used to do this a lot. We would arm indigenous fighters, train them, feed them intelligence, offer assistance. After 9/11, I think the decision was made that we had to show a very, very bright-line distinction between the real soldier -- professional, uniformed, acting under orders, scrupulously avoiding (to the extent possible) civilian collateral damage -- and the terrorist, and that led us to conclude, I think, that we couldn't just depart Iraq after smashing the Baathist state and let the Iraqis fight it out. Because there would be a whole lot of terrorist, civilian-targeting attacks, and we'd be on the hook for that."

"American troops are of course the most disciplined, ethical, and heroic in the world. So heroic, in fact, we typically expect them to put their own lives in danger for the purpose of reducing the chance of collateral damage. Few other troops would even consider such rules of engagement; our guys might complain about it, but in the end, they follow orders.

So if American troops are the primarily force in a country, we can expect the lowest possible number of civilian collateral casualties. But the question I'm asking myself now is: How much do I really care about the fewest number of civilian collateral casualties? In Iraq, if the deaths of 3000 American soldiers (in the later post-war campaign) saved, let's say, 60,000 Iraqi civilians -- was that a good trade? Or, more importantly, because the more important thing to me is the doctrine going forward: Would I be willing to make that trade in a hypothetical pacification campaign in Iran? Would I trade 3,000 US soldiers to make sure the fewest Iranian civilians died in the chaos that ensued after a decapitation of the state?

I think I'd say the Iranians will have to fight it out themselves."

Gates is only reprising MacArthur's (and Vizzini's) "never get involved in a land war in Asia" dictum. Odd how no one noticed both Iraq and Afghanistan are Asiatic countries before now.

The mathematics are a bit cold. Thinking the unthinkable is like that. But the calculus is necessary.

"I wouldn't support an Iraq-style American-troops-as-primary-combatants pacification.
And I don't even think that it matters what I think -- I don't think any President, Republican or Democrat or Tea Partier, is going to propose such a thing. Which makes this question very important, because unless the country can accept that arm-your-proxies style of limited warfare, I think we're going to have a Vietnam Syndrome going forward. Given the choice between no military action at all and full-scale invasion plus pacification/nation-building, I think the country will select, by large margins, "no military action at all," and I think that is very dangerous.

We will need to fight another country again, most likely sooner rather than later. We need a doctrine about such a war that can actually gain popular support.

I just don't believe the country will undertake another Iraq or Afghanistan you-break-it-you-bought-it plan, at least not for a long time. So I think those who believe that warfare must always be a possible tool available to us (even if only occasionally used) must formulate a doctrine in which the post-war pacification campaign is specifically ruled out and our goals in the post-war scenario are achieved by means other than heavy presence of American troops as primary combatants.

I just don't think the Iraq model of post-war pacification is an option in the next five to ten years, at least, for political reasons."

Frankly, I suspect we'll have U.S. troops, at some level of strength, in both Iraq and Afghanistan for at least five of those years, so I'd envision that, barring a catastrophic event that "resets" U.S. grand strategy, five to ten years is a very conservative estimate.

"(I)f we actually want to credibly threaten a country like Iran -- and do more than merely threaten, should it come to that -- we need a doctrine that has a chance of getting the nation behind it, and we have to begin conditioning the nation to realize what happens when disciplined, heroic American troops are not the primary combatants -- a lot of civilians are going to die, most likely, because only American troops (and some other professional Western-tradition troops) are brave enough to put the lives of civilians before their own."

re: "Today's Reading Assignment"

George Smiley at In From the Cold ("Musings on Life, Love, Politics, Military Affairs, the Media, the Intelligence Community and Just About Anything Else that Captures Our Interest") discusses a national asset in decline.

Money quote(s):

"(S)igns of our naval decline were on display in recent weeks, as the Libyan crisis began to unfold. Instead of sending a warship to rescue American citizens from that country (as the British did), the U.S. hired a commercial ferry. One reason: there was only one U.S. warship in the Mediterranean at the time, although a carrier battle group and an amphibious group were only three days away, in the Red Sea. Those assets have since re-deployed to the Med.

We neglect our Navy at our own peril."

Actually two warships, were in the Mediterranean but one was a command and control ship and the other was having, er, command climate problems.

"(I)n an era when federal spending must be reduced, it is very easy to say we have "no peer competitors" (to use Dr. Gates's phrase) and use that as an excuse to downsize the military. A modern Navy is expensive to build and expensive to operate. Yet, it represents an essential investment, not only for the United States but for the west as a whole.

Did we mention that China is currently building five fleet carriers which will join the PLAN by 2020? Beijing is building a Navy for the future, while ours continues to decline. We've been down this road before (think Japan in the 1930s) and paid dearly for our mistakes. The next time, we may not be as lucky."

I'm not a naval expert, but five "fleet carriers" sound like just the thing if you want to be a regional hegemon, and the region you have in mind is the Pacific Ocean.

re: "Muddy Boots"

Lex at Neptunus Lex ("The unbearable lightness of Lex. Enjoy!") noticed SecDef Gates' speech at West Point.

Money quote(s):

"Mr. Gates’ predecessor notably regretted having to “go to war with the army you have,” rather than the one he wished he had. To me that means having a ground combat element capable of the full-spectrum of military missions, from humanitarian assistance, to training foreign indigenous forces to combined arms mechanized maneuver.

This is not to say that you’d ever seriously contemplate another nation-building mission as we’ve attempted in Iraq and Afghanistan. But we ought to retain a nation-breaking power, and when it comes to enemy ground formations that cannot be done with air and naval power alone – someone has to hold the hill and plant the flag, even if only to haul it back down again once the enemy’s will to fight is broken.

To me the secretary’s speech sounds like we’re tailoring our missions to our budget, which is not in itself an irrational thing to do. But we might as well be honest about it, and admit that we’re voluntarily curtailing our ability to project power in traditional ways in favor of I’m not exactly sure what."

re: "Obama Administration: No Response to a Nuclear Iran"

DRJ guest-posting at Patterico's Pontifications ("Harangues that Just Make Sense") commented on the Gates memorandum.

Money quote(s):

"Republican Presidents have enough to worry about without being responsible for their Democratic successor’s foul-ups."

re: "Doing Nothing"

Nikolas at The (Ex) Washington Realist ("The blog of Nikolas Gvosdev--thoughts on U.S. foreign policy and world affairs--as observed from Newport, RI") touches on priorities amongst U.S. military commitments overseas.

Money quote(s):

"Secretary Gates and others talk about balance, about setting priorities--and yet, the policy process still ends up making everything a priority. I remember at a magazine event a few years back where a speaker was asked whether he could prioritize the countries where the U.S. has a military presence--and he said that they were all important (some 144 countries!)."

I commented:

"Everything is, in fact, a priority.The key is to prioritize, to judge the weight of the competing priorities and assign available resources accordingly."

re: "An honest politician"

Richard at EU Referendum ("To discuss issues related to the UK's position in Europe and the world") has praise for SecDef Gates.

Money quote(s):

"(T)he mettle of the man is tested when he gets a question on a very specific defence capability. The question does not matter so much as the answer. Gates says: "I think the honest answer to your question is I haven't addressed that yet. I don't know." It actually takes an enormous amount of courage and self-confidence for a politician to say, "I don't know", instead of delivering yards of pre-formed, extruded verbal material. And the point about this man is that, in due course, he will know, and when he does, he will tell people what he thinks."

S&S - U.S.-Poland pact to bolster forces and boost role in NATO

From my archive of press clippings:

Stars and Stripes

U.S.-Poland pact to bolster forces and boost role in NATO


By Mark Abramson, Stars and Stripes


European edition, Sunday, February 22, 2009


The U.S. and Polish militaries have signed an agreement that is intended to bolster Poland’s special forces and enhance how it operates within the NATO military command structure.

Read the whole article here.

Snippet(s):

"The deal was signed Thursday by U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and his Polish counterpart, Defense Minister Bogdan Klich, according to a press release from the American Forces Press Service, part of the U.S. Department of Defense.

The document, signed in Krakow, Poland, is the only official memorandum of understanding the U.S. Special Operations Command has."

&

"(T)he pact will: help increase the size of the Poles’ special operation forces from 1,500 to 3,500 by 2012; help it create a senior staff headquarters; and improve its English-speaking capabilities."

S&S - Air Force investigators: Most European bases with nukes lacking in security

From my archive of press clippings:

Stars and Stripes

Air Force investigators: Most European bases with nukes lacking in security

By Scott Schonauer, Stars and Stripes

European edition, Saturday, June 21, 2008

KAISERSLAUTERN, Germany — An internal Air Force investigation has found that most military bases in Europe that store nuclear bombs do not meet the most basic Defense Department security regulations.

Read the whole article here.

Snippet(s):

"The report reveals some startling deficiencies in nuclear security in Europe in the wake of nuclear safety concerns and a historic Air Force leadership shake-up.

The report stated that each site had "unique security challenges." "

Inconsistencies in personnel, facilities, and equipment provided to the security mission by the host nation were evident as the team traveled from site to site," the study reads. "

Examples of areas noted in need of repair at several of the sites include support buildings, fencing, lighting, and security systems."

"At some places, the duty of protecting nuclear weapons fell upon foreign conscripts with as little as nine months of military experience, the report said."

&

"Defense Secretary Robert Gates fired the Air Force’s top uniformed and civilian leaders for allowing nuclear safety to slip."

S&S - Analysis: Are Air Force firings about more than nuclear weapons?

From my archive of press clippings:

Stars and Stripes

Analysis: Are Air Force firings about more than nuclear weapons?

By Lisa Burgess, Stars and Stripes

Mideast edition, Sunday, June 8, 2008

ARLINGTON, Va. — Defense Secretary Robert Gates forced the resignations of the Air Force secretary and its top general for reasons much deeper than nuclear accountability, ones that reflected his increasing displeasure with the direction the two were taking the service, according to reported comments from one military analyst and a senior military official.

Read the whole article here.

Snippet(s):

"Gates said his decision to demand the resignations Thursday of Air Force Secretary Michael W. Wynne and Chief of Staff Gen. T. Michael Moseley was based entirely on a classified Pentagon finding that cited what he called "a chain of failures" in the Air Force’s safeguarding of the U.S. nuclear arsenal.

The decision marked the first time any secretary of defense had fired both the service secretary and top officer of any branch of the military at the same time."