OldAFSarge at Chant du Départ ("The musings, rants, and dissertations of 3 retired military guys and 1 chick.") accurately described frequent fate of my bookstore purchases:
"I should mention that I purchased that book 17 years ago. This is the first time I've read it. It was on the "To Read" pile which The Missus Herself translated as the "Needs to be put away" pile and bingo, I read it 17 years later. How do I know it was 17 years ago? The receipt was still in the book."
Friday, August 18, 2017
Thursday, August 17, 2017
Politico - State Department's No. 2 tries to buck up staff morale ahead of reorganization
Nahal Toosi at Politico ("We reach the most influential people in the country") spoke with two unnamed sources about a town-hall meeting held by the new deputy secstate.
Money quote(s):
"Sullivan also urged diplomats and other employees to take media reports on the department's woes with a grain of salt."
Ain't that the truth! That might even have been one of CAA's very points on his own input to the employee survey, but with the point that the new management shouldn't believe everything it reads in the media about the Department and the people in it.
"When asked how seriously the Trump administration is taking a proposal that the State Department's consular services be transferred to the Department of Homeland Security,Sullivan indicated that the leadership at State intends to keep the division under its umbrella. He acknowledged, however, that all options remain on the table."
Well, he pretty much has to say that. What would be the point of all the working groups and their recommendations if major decisions like these have already been made by top management?
Money quote(s):
"Sullivan also urged diplomats and other employees to take media reports on the department's woes with a grain of salt."
Ain't that the truth! That might even have been one of CAA's very points on his own input to the employee survey, but with the point that the new management shouldn't believe everything it reads in the media about the Department and the people in it.
"When asked how seriously the Trump administration is taking a proposal that the State Department's consular services be transferred to the Department of Homeland Security,Sullivan indicated that the leadership at State intends to keep the division under its umbrella. He acknowledged, however, that all options remain on the table."
Well, he pretty much has to say that. What would be the point of all the working groups and their recommendations if major decisions like these have already been made by top management?
Wednesday, August 16, 2017
The Hill - 6 ways to know if State Department reform is real or fake
Joseph Cassidy writing at The Hill makes some excellent points.
Money quote(s):
"A real reform plan would mobilize the department to confront the dangers of the 21st century. It would remedy organizational weaknesses and inefficiencies. It would clarify State’s role in formulating foreign policy and define its relationship with other U.S. government agencies. It would provide a sense of purpose to State’s dedicated but downtrodden employees. "
That right there looks like an pretty fair mission statement for departmental reform.
"In recent administrations, the State Department’s structure has been more hourglass than pyramid. Senior officials and their staffer remoras have been over-abundant and have consumed a disproportionate amount of the department’s workload. Real reform would cut senior positions and reduce the number of staff officers who don’t originate work product."
&
"There is widespread agreement that the weedy proliferation of special envoys (not just those with that specific title, but also other powerful single-issue envoys outside State’s regional and functional bureau chains of command) must be pruned. Real reform will substantially reduce their number but also ensure that important responsibilities are incorporated into other parts of the department (double-hatting officials with a special envoy title, when its termination would be politically or diplomatically problematic).
Envoy proliferation has had two pernicious consequences — disempowering regional bureaus (which should rather be reinforced) by removing important diplomatic issues from their control and ensuring regional bureaus don’t in practice follow “special envoy” issues as closely. Real reform will mainstream as well as streamline."
This. The dozens of special envoys and such duplicating and tromping over the responsibilities of existing embassies and missions is overkill. Even granting the half-dozen or so (seven?) actually mandated by law, the idea of dual-hatting some of those back into the fold, onto the worthy-brows of the officials already charged with those countries, regions, or issues is one well worth exploiting.
(Gotta love the use of "remoras" to describe the spear-carriers and special assistants attending to extraneous special envoys.)
"Too many otherwise smart people believe diplomacy is something separate from other elements of national power, e.g., that the James Mattis does national defense, the Treasury Department does international finance and sanctions, the Commerce Department helps U.S. business abroad, the Department of Justice does international law and State carries messages back and forth to other governments like an Amazon delivery drone.
Diplomacy without foreign policy content is irrelevant, and there’s no such thing as short-term strategy. Real reform would reassert State’s role as lead strategist and coordinator of U.S. foreign policy, including the current actions of other cabinet agencies and America’s role in the world over the next several decades. "
You can bet that Sec. Mattis knows very well the many aspects of national powers, DIMEFILS and similar mnemonics outlining the instrumentalities and elements of implementing national strategies and grand strategies. State is a logical place for interagency coordination of national strategy although the National Security Council staff seems to have inherited that mantel of late.
Read the whole thing.
Money quote(s):
"A real reform plan would mobilize the department to confront the dangers of the 21st century. It would remedy organizational weaknesses and inefficiencies. It would clarify State’s role in formulating foreign policy and define its relationship with other U.S. government agencies. It would provide a sense of purpose to State’s dedicated but downtrodden employees. "
That right there looks like an pretty fair mission statement for departmental reform.
"In recent administrations, the State Department’s structure has been more hourglass than pyramid. Senior officials and their staffer remoras have been over-abundant and have consumed a disproportionate amount of the department’s workload. Real reform would cut senior positions and reduce the number of staff officers who don’t originate work product."
&
"There is widespread agreement that the weedy proliferation of special envoys (not just those with that specific title, but also other powerful single-issue envoys outside State’s regional and functional bureau chains of command) must be pruned. Real reform will substantially reduce their number but also ensure that important responsibilities are incorporated into other parts of the department (double-hatting officials with a special envoy title, when its termination would be politically or diplomatically problematic).
Envoy proliferation has had two pernicious consequences — disempowering regional bureaus (which should rather be reinforced) by removing important diplomatic issues from their control and ensuring regional bureaus don’t in practice follow “special envoy” issues as closely. Real reform will mainstream as well as streamline."
This. The dozens of special envoys and such duplicating and tromping over the responsibilities of existing embassies and missions is overkill. Even granting the half-dozen or so (seven?) actually mandated by law, the idea of dual-hatting some of those back into the fold, onto the worthy-brows of the officials already charged with those countries, regions, or issues is one well worth exploiting.
(Gotta love the use of "remoras" to describe the spear-carriers and special assistants attending to extraneous special envoys.)
"Too many otherwise smart people believe diplomacy is something separate from other elements of national power, e.g., that the James Mattis does national defense, the Treasury Department does international finance and sanctions, the Commerce Department helps U.S. business abroad, the Department of Justice does international law and State carries messages back and forth to other governments like an Amazon delivery drone.
Diplomacy without foreign policy content is irrelevant, and there’s no such thing as short-term strategy. Real reform would reassert State’s role as lead strategist and coordinator of U.S. foreign policy, including the current actions of other cabinet agencies and America’s role in the world over the next several decades. "
You can bet that Sec. Mattis knows very well the many aspects of national powers, DIMEFILS and similar mnemonics outlining the instrumentalities and elements of implementing national strategies and grand strategies. State is a logical place for interagency coordination of national strategy although the National Security Council staff seems to have inherited that mantel of late.
Read the whole thing.
Tuesday, August 15, 2017
Politico - Interest in U.S. diplomatic corps tumbles in early months of Trump
Daniel Lipplman and Nahal Toosi at Politico ("We reach the most influential people in the country") discussed plunging recruitment numbers.
"This June, the number of Americans who took the Foreign Service exam to start the process of joining the prestigious State Department ranks fell 26 percent from the same month a year earlier to 2,730, according to data obtained by POLITICO. The June tally marked the lowest number of test-takers in nearly a decade."
That's a big dip. Unfortunately the article doesn't specify when the previous low-point, sometime about 10 years ago, was. Arithmetic suggests that it was during Pres. Obama's first term, which is interesting given this next set of figures.
"Since 9/11, annual hiring for FSOs has ranged from about 300 to just above 700.
The exam is usually given three times a year. The number of applicants spiked to almost 9,000 in June 2009 and was mostly around 4,000 to 7,000 for tests during the Obama years."
Reading between the lines, there was a big influx of exam-takers just after Pres. Obama took office and then, sometime not too long after, the lowest number of applicants until this latest figure. At a guess, there was a lot of enthusiasm and interest so more people took the exam early in Obama's first term, which left a smaller pool of potential applicants just afterwards, since test-takers have to wait 12 months to re-take the examination.
About a quarter to a fifth of test-takers are selected to move forward in the selection process from this first hurdle.
" “The Foreign Service is like the military — if you don’t bring in lieutenants now, you don’t have the majors you need in 10 years and don’t have the colonels you need in 20,” said Ronald E. Neumann, president of the American Academy of Diplomacy"
Preach it. The Foreign Service suffered for years from the lack of hiring under the Clinton administration (when there were years the FS exam wasn't even offered). Several hiring initiatives, beginning under Sec. Powell's "Diplomatic Readiness Initiative," have turned that around over the past decade or so.
"(T)he secretary of state, has already suspended the use of prestigious fellowship programs and otherwise severely restricted hiring as he ponders ways to reorganize the department, a process that could take many more months to complete."
This is troublesome. It's particularly galling to see a Republican administration repeat a Democratic administration's mistakes in hiring new officers at below the rate of attrition.
"14,000 Foreign Service employees carry out U.S. diplomacy around the world, interacting with people from other countries while helping Americans overseas."
We interact with foreigners so you don't have to. And helping Americans overseas is one of the most worthwhile and satisfying functions of a U.S. consular officer.
"Devika Ranjan, president of the student Academic Council of the Georgetown School of Foreign Service this past year, said many of her recent fellow graduates, who earlier would have followed a storied tradition of the school’s grads going into State, are choosing to focus their attention instead on think tanks, nonprofits and further education. “They’re concerned about representing the United States abroad when they don’t necessarily agree with the decisions of the administration,” she said.
There are still more than enough applications to fill the limited number of open slots in the Foreign Service, an intensely competitive program in which only 1.8% of Foreign Service applicants get hired. The State Department expects to hire 222 new Foreign Service officers by the end of fiscal year 2017, according to a State Department official. "
Two-hundred plus officers is barely two (perhaps three) orientation or "A-100" intake classes. That's better than nothing but what perhaps explains the drop in test-takers is that that number means nearly all of the new-hires will be from one of the special hiring tracks like Rangel or Pickering fellows.
This means only a handful will be from the normal accession channels, i.e., taking the Foreign Service exam. In other words, test-takers opting out of the process at this time are being perfectly rational, since only a literal handful or dozen of them will get a job offer, rather than several hundred.
Harrumph. This too shall pass but at what cost?
"This June, the number of Americans who took the Foreign Service exam to start the process of joining the prestigious State Department ranks fell 26 percent from the same month a year earlier to 2,730, according to data obtained by POLITICO. The June tally marked the lowest number of test-takers in nearly a decade."
That's a big dip. Unfortunately the article doesn't specify when the previous low-point, sometime about 10 years ago, was. Arithmetic suggests that it was during Pres. Obama's first term, which is interesting given this next set of figures.
"Since 9/11, annual hiring for FSOs has ranged from about 300 to just above 700.
The exam is usually given three times a year. The number of applicants spiked to almost 9,000 in June 2009 and was mostly around 4,000 to 7,000 for tests during the Obama years."
Reading between the lines, there was a big influx of exam-takers just after Pres. Obama took office and then, sometime not too long after, the lowest number of applicants until this latest figure. At a guess, there was a lot of enthusiasm and interest so more people took the exam early in Obama's first term, which left a smaller pool of potential applicants just afterwards, since test-takers have to wait 12 months to re-take the examination.
About a quarter to a fifth of test-takers are selected to move forward in the selection process from this first hurdle.
" “The Foreign Service is like the military — if you don’t bring in lieutenants now, you don’t have the majors you need in 10 years and don’t have the colonels you need in 20,” said Ronald E. Neumann, president of the American Academy of Diplomacy"
Preach it. The Foreign Service suffered for years from the lack of hiring under the Clinton administration (when there were years the FS exam wasn't even offered). Several hiring initiatives, beginning under Sec. Powell's "Diplomatic Readiness Initiative," have turned that around over the past decade or so.
"(T)he secretary of state, has already suspended the use of prestigious fellowship programs and otherwise severely restricted hiring as he ponders ways to reorganize the department, a process that could take many more months to complete."
This is troublesome. It's particularly galling to see a Republican administration repeat a Democratic administration's mistakes in hiring new officers at below the rate of attrition.
"14,000 Foreign Service employees carry out U.S. diplomacy around the world, interacting with people from other countries while helping Americans overseas."
We interact with foreigners so you don't have to. And helping Americans overseas is one of the most worthwhile and satisfying functions of a U.S. consular officer.
"Devika Ranjan, president of the student Academic Council of the Georgetown School of Foreign Service this past year, said many of her recent fellow graduates, who earlier would have followed a storied tradition of the school’s grads going into State, are choosing to focus their attention instead on think tanks, nonprofits and further education. “They’re concerned about representing the United States abroad when they don’t necessarily agree with the decisions of the administration,” she said.
There are still more than enough applications to fill the limited number of open slots in the Foreign Service, an intensely competitive program in which only 1.8% of Foreign Service applicants get hired. The State Department expects to hire 222 new Foreign Service officers by the end of fiscal year 2017, according to a State Department official. "
Two-hundred plus officers is barely two (perhaps three) orientation or "A-100" intake classes. That's better than nothing but what perhaps explains the drop in test-takers is that that number means nearly all of the new-hires will be from one of the special hiring tracks like Rangel or Pickering fellows.
This means only a handful will be from the normal accession channels, i.e., taking the Foreign Service exam. In other words, test-takers opting out of the process at this time are being perfectly rational, since only a literal handful or dozen of them will get a job offer, rather than several hundred.
Harrumph. This too shall pass but at what cost?
re: "Fullbore Friday"
Phibian at Cdr Salamander ("PROACTIVELY “FROM THE SEA”; AN AGENT OF CHANGE LEVERAGING THE LITTORAL BEST PRACTICES FOR A PARADIGM BREAKING SIX-SIGMA BEST BUSINESS CASE TO SYNERGIZE A CONSISTENT DESIGN IN THE GLOBAL COMMONS, RIGHTSIZING THE CORE VALUES SUPPORTING OUR MISSION STATEMENT VIA THE 5-VECTOR MODEL THROUGH CULTURAL DIVERSITY.") unleashed the power of a fully-operational battle quip in a recent "Fullbore Friday" feature:
"In a day where the national "elite" hide from service like cockroaches from the light, you know what Buckley did before the war? He was a graduate of Harvard and Harvard Law and left his practice at the outbreak of WWII."
"In a day where the national "elite" hide from service like cockroaches from the light, you know what Buckley did before the war? He was a graduate of Harvard and Harvard Law and left his practice at the outbreak of WWII."
Monday, August 14, 2017
National Review - Boots to Suits: Reforming the State Department
The National Review's The Corner hosted a recent article by Jim Hanson (of Blackfive fame) and Brad Patty ruffled a few feathers among my colleagues.
Money quote(s):
"The State Department needs people who know how to do direct diplomacy under fire, and who are comfortable in muddy boots."
How much national-level diplomacy can actually be accomplished "under fire," as it were? Read on.
"Tillerson is right to take a hard look at the culture of the institution. For more than a decade, State has failed to address cultural challenges its leadership has acknowledged.
The two of us have seen this cultural failure in the field. Jim was a Special Forces weapons sergeant in First Group. Brad spent long parts of three consecutive years in Iraq, including working closely with “State Department” Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). We put that in scare quotes because almost all State employees stayed in the embassy. Aside from a handful of Provincial Reconstruction Team leaders, State sent contractors out to the field in boots. The PRTs and the USAID presence were both made up almost exclusively of contractors because State simply could not get its people to volunteer for such hazardous and unpleasant duty."
We heard about something called "expeditionary diplomacy" for awhile. Was that before (or after) "transformational diplomacy"?
(Buzzwords make CAA's head hurt.)
Why might, do you suppose, a federal agency engage contractors to fill positions on Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT)? Might it be because the particular hard skill needed on that team was one not maintained in any abundance on-the-shelf at that agency? DOS team leaders, unless I'm wrong, on PRTs were full-time "Direct Hires" in most cases, whereas specialists of various sorts on those teams might represent skill-sets outside the scope of traditional diplomacy but which State nonetheless was responsible for staffing.
And as for the "almost all State employees stayed in the embassy" crack, that might just have something to do with travel and security restrictions imposed on them by risk averse chiefs-of-mission and by Diplomatic Security representatives, no matter what personal preferences might have been.
"The State Department traditionally hires academically inclined people who come from a fairly narrow collection of universities and think tanks. This makes sense as many of the skills and knowledge necessary to be a successful Foreign Service officer are nurtured in these circles. The department, however, could also use the kind of people who know how to do direct diplomacy under fire, and who are comfortable in muddy boots. A perfect collection of those have served in U.S. Army Special Forces."
Like much of the federal government, there's a hiring preference for veterans with the result that a higher percentage of the Foreign Service (just like the Civil Service) are veterans than are present in the general population. These days that means in most cases that they are veterans of combat deployments to one or multiple theaters of operations.
Unfortunately, with current FSO hiring almost entirely coming from Pickering and Rangel fellows due to the self-imposed hiring freeze, I expect those percentages to slip steadily. I have yet to meet a Pickering or Rangel fellow who was a combat veteran. I would be very happy to learn that I am wrong in my sense that nearly all of these highly-credentialed folks have taken an academic career track that completely avoided military service.
Might State be well-served to recruit (once it resumes a recruiting effort that involves actual hiring) highly-qualified ex-SF personnel? Certainly. There was a pilot "mustang" program not that long ago open to non-State federal personnel not so many years ago that could be revived to good effect.
Money quote(s):
"The State Department needs people who know how to do direct diplomacy under fire, and who are comfortable in muddy boots."
How much national-level diplomacy can actually be accomplished "under fire," as it were? Read on.
"Tillerson is right to take a hard look at the culture of the institution. For more than a decade, State has failed to address cultural challenges its leadership has acknowledged.
The two of us have seen this cultural failure in the field. Jim was a Special Forces weapons sergeant in First Group. Brad spent long parts of three consecutive years in Iraq, including working closely with “State Department” Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). We put that in scare quotes because almost all State employees stayed in the embassy. Aside from a handful of Provincial Reconstruction Team leaders, State sent contractors out to the field in boots. The PRTs and the USAID presence were both made up almost exclusively of contractors because State simply could not get its people to volunteer for such hazardous and unpleasant duty."
We heard about something called "expeditionary diplomacy" for awhile. Was that before (or after) "transformational diplomacy"?
(Buzzwords make CAA's head hurt.)
Why might, do you suppose, a federal agency engage contractors to fill positions on Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT)? Might it be because the particular hard skill needed on that team was one not maintained in any abundance on-the-shelf at that agency? DOS team leaders, unless I'm wrong, on PRTs were full-time "Direct Hires" in most cases, whereas specialists of various sorts on those teams might represent skill-sets outside the scope of traditional diplomacy but which State nonetheless was responsible for staffing.
And as for the "almost all State employees stayed in the embassy" crack, that might just have something to do with travel and security restrictions imposed on them by risk averse chiefs-of-mission and by Diplomatic Security representatives, no matter what personal preferences might have been.
"The State Department traditionally hires academically inclined people who come from a fairly narrow collection of universities and think tanks. This makes sense as many of the skills and knowledge necessary to be a successful Foreign Service officer are nurtured in these circles. The department, however, could also use the kind of people who know how to do direct diplomacy under fire, and who are comfortable in muddy boots. A perfect collection of those have served in U.S. Army Special Forces."
Like much of the federal government, there's a hiring preference for veterans with the result that a higher percentage of the Foreign Service (just like the Civil Service) are veterans than are present in the general population. These days that means in most cases that they are veterans of combat deployments to one or multiple theaters of operations.
Unfortunately, with current FSO hiring almost entirely coming from Pickering and Rangel fellows due to the self-imposed hiring freeze, I expect those percentages to slip steadily. I have yet to meet a Pickering or Rangel fellow who was a combat veteran. I would be very happy to learn that I am wrong in my sense that nearly all of these highly-credentialed folks have taken an academic career track that completely avoided military service.
Might State be well-served to recruit (once it resumes a recruiting effort that involves actual hiring) highly-qualified ex-SF personnel? Certainly. There was a pilot "mustang" program not that long ago open to non-State federal personnel not so many years ago that could be revived to good effect.
re: "Immigration (Again)"
The DiploMad 2.0 ("Wracked with angst over the fate of our beloved and horribly misgoverned Republic, the DiploMad returns to do battle on the world wide web, swearing death to political correctness, and pulling no punches.") is mostly positive about the latest proposed immigration reform.
Money quote(s):
"I see that the Trump Administration, apparently, will make an effort to reform radically our immigration system. That's good. I also notice that there seems to be an emphasis on merit and extra points for speaking English and having a skill (ABBA does well on both!) Those are also good things. I see, also, the beginning of a debate, very quiet one for now, on the key issues I raised above, to wit, do we need immigration, how much, and what kinds? This is all good. I continue to believe that the President should suspend all or nearly all immigration for a period of time until we draft a new immigration code."
Money quote(s):
"I see that the Trump Administration, apparently, will make an effort to reform radically our immigration system. That's good. I also notice that there seems to be an emphasis on merit and extra points for speaking English and having a skill (ABBA does well on both!) Those are also good things. I see, also, the beginning of a debate, very quiet one for now, on the key issues I raised above, to wit, do we need immigration, how much, and what kinds? This is all good. I continue to believe that the President should suspend all or nearly all immigration for a period of time until we draft a new immigration code."
Saturday, August 12, 2017
Friday, August 4, 2017
First glance at the proposed RAISE Act.
RAISE = Reforming American Immigration for a Strong Economy
You can read the proposed legislation at Sen. Cotton's web page.
A couple of things caught my notice beyond the obvious things which are summarized, also by Sen. Cotton, here.
First, the obvious:
- Diversity Visa (DV) program eliminated;
- Refugees capped at 50,000 per annum;
- Spouses and minor children still eligible to immigrate but not other extended family members;
- New non-immigrant visa category, renewable every five years, for elderly parents;
- Grandfathers pending immigrant visa cases for eliminated categories but only if applied for before the introduction of this bill and scheduled to travel within one year of the bill's passage;
- Introduces a points-based system to replace current employment-based visa categories;
- Makes naturalization of an immigrant conditional on the immigrant's sponsor having reimbursed any benefits received by the immigrant during the sponsorship.
There are a bunch of little editorial points, basically housekeeping and neatening-up the existing statute, plus replacing "Attorney General" with "Secretary of Homeland Security" in a few places where this should already have happened since INS (among other things) moved from DOJ to DHS.
CAA is agnostic about eliminating the DV visa. It's probably served its purpose if its purpose was to, er, diversify the flow of immigrants to the U.S., given how long it's been running. So declare it a success and move on. Since immigrant communities now exist (shout-out to Minnesota!) from lots of places (shout out to Somalia!) where few-to-no immigrants used to come from, "chain" immigration from those places will undoubtedly continue, although significantly diminished due to the elimination of non-immediate relative visa categories.
The number of refugees the U.S. takes-in is at the discretion of the president, under current law. Fifty-thousand is at the high end of the numbers the U.S. has tended to receive over time and, frankly, if there should be a time and situation where president decides a number exceeding that should be admitted then he or she can always ask Congress for a higher number that year (and or succeeding years), and make the case for it. It's not like trying to pass a Constitutional amendment, and if the need is compelling perhaps even congressmen and senators can be persuaded.
Eliminating the family-based visa categories beyond spouses and minor children is a big deal. It will drastically clamp-down on "chain immigration" over time, which I think is the point. I think there's room for improvement on how it's implemented, purely on the basis of fairness, which I'll address below.
Something I noticed in the bill which I haven't seen commented upon elsewhere is changing the age for minor children from 21 to 18 years. It's a fair point, we consider children in most respects to be adults and on their own, more-or-less, at age 18. It also doesn't shut the door to the 18+ year-old children from applying for student visas and coming over when the rest of their family immigrates; in fact, that would make a lot of sense, assuming the families have the resources to support it. They would then, as they finished their higher (and higher) education be free to apply to stay under the points-based system being introduced by this bill.
For those cases where the families don't have the resources to put their children into colleges and universities, what I'd like to see is a conditional status created that would allow the 18-21 year-old children, assuming they were otherwise qualified, to enlist in the military or naval services so they could qualify for citizenship on their own efforts. Just a suggestion.
The five-year renewable non-immigrant visa for elderly parents makes a lot of sense and I'm not going to rake it over here. CAA has issued immigrant visas to plenty of people who would fit into this category. It's certainly an interesting idea and open to debate.
The points-based immigration system designed to replace our existing employment-based petitions is a system similar to that used by both Canada and Australia, two immigrant-friendly countries much like our own in many respects. There's lots of room for haggling over how the points might be allocated, but there's also no reason it couldn't be revisited in the future to adjust how points are earned.
The issue of grandfathering pending immigrant cases where the visa category is being eliminated touches a nerve for me. The numbers of visas for non-immediate relatives has an annual numeric cap, apportioned by country. There are some countries (Mexico and Philippines spring readily to mind) where the wait is decades long. These are people who, dutifully complying with our laws, have been patiently waiting to legally immigrate to the U.S., sometimes literally dying before their "number" comes up. The way I read the draft bill, the first cut-off is that they have to have filed their petition no later than the when this bill was introduced. The second cut-off is that they have to be scheduled arrive in the U.S. no later than one year after (or the day before one year) after the bill is passed into law.
What I don't see is the elimination of the numerical limitation, so that those waiting all these years for their turn, actually get their turn. Perhaps I missed it?
CAA is all about legal immigrants lawfully complying with our immigration laws. So it goes down sideways for us on the implementing side of the equation to be breaking faith with those who have been earnestly attempting to comply with our laws. CAA is a big fan of people who comply with U.S. immigration laws; CAA believes people who start out by complying with U.S. immigration laws are more likely to continue being law-abiding than people who begin by ignoring or violating our laws. Just sayin'.
CAA would like to see those waiting to obey the law get their chance to do so. Let the bill be amended to let DHS and USCIS estimate annually how many of the pending cases they can process, irrespective of what the annual numerical limit has been, and then let USCIS and the State Department process those cases, until the backlog is gone. Finished. Finito. Fertig.
You can read the proposed legislation at Sen. Cotton's web page.
A couple of things caught my notice beyond the obvious things which are summarized, also by Sen. Cotton, here.
First, the obvious:
- Diversity Visa (DV) program eliminated;
- Refugees capped at 50,000 per annum;
- Spouses and minor children still eligible to immigrate but not other extended family members;
- New non-immigrant visa category, renewable every five years, for elderly parents;
- Grandfathers pending immigrant visa cases for eliminated categories but only if applied for before the introduction of this bill and scheduled to travel within one year of the bill's passage;
- Introduces a points-based system to replace current employment-based visa categories;
- Makes naturalization of an immigrant conditional on the immigrant's sponsor having reimbursed any benefits received by the immigrant during the sponsorship.
There are a bunch of little editorial points, basically housekeeping and neatening-up the existing statute, plus replacing "Attorney General" with "Secretary of Homeland Security" in a few places where this should already have happened since INS (among other things) moved from DOJ to DHS.
CAA is agnostic about eliminating the DV visa. It's probably served its purpose if its purpose was to, er, diversify the flow of immigrants to the U.S., given how long it's been running. So declare it a success and move on. Since immigrant communities now exist (shout-out to Minnesota!) from lots of places (shout out to Somalia!) where few-to-no immigrants used to come from, "chain" immigration from those places will undoubtedly continue, although significantly diminished due to the elimination of non-immediate relative visa categories.
The number of refugees the U.S. takes-in is at the discretion of the president, under current law. Fifty-thousand is at the high end of the numbers the U.S. has tended to receive over time and, frankly, if there should be a time and situation where president decides a number exceeding that should be admitted then he or she can always ask Congress for a higher number that year (and or succeeding years), and make the case for it. It's not like trying to pass a Constitutional amendment, and if the need is compelling perhaps even congressmen and senators can be persuaded.
Eliminating the family-based visa categories beyond spouses and minor children is a big deal. It will drastically clamp-down on "chain immigration" over time, which I think is the point. I think there's room for improvement on how it's implemented, purely on the basis of fairness, which I'll address below.
Something I noticed in the bill which I haven't seen commented upon elsewhere is changing the age for minor children from 21 to 18 years. It's a fair point, we consider children in most respects to be adults and on their own, more-or-less, at age 18. It also doesn't shut the door to the 18+ year-old children from applying for student visas and coming over when the rest of their family immigrates; in fact, that would make a lot of sense, assuming the families have the resources to support it. They would then, as they finished their higher (and higher) education be free to apply to stay under the points-based system being introduced by this bill.
For those cases where the families don't have the resources to put their children into colleges and universities, what I'd like to see is a conditional status created that would allow the 18-21 year-old children, assuming they were otherwise qualified, to enlist in the military or naval services so they could qualify for citizenship on their own efforts. Just a suggestion.
The five-year renewable non-immigrant visa for elderly parents makes a lot of sense and I'm not going to rake it over here. CAA has issued immigrant visas to plenty of people who would fit into this category. It's certainly an interesting idea and open to debate.
The points-based immigration system designed to replace our existing employment-based petitions is a system similar to that used by both Canada and Australia, two immigrant-friendly countries much like our own in many respects. There's lots of room for haggling over how the points might be allocated, but there's also no reason it couldn't be revisited in the future to adjust how points are earned.
The issue of grandfathering pending immigrant cases where the visa category is being eliminated touches a nerve for me. The numbers of visas for non-immediate relatives has an annual numeric cap, apportioned by country. There are some countries (Mexico and Philippines spring readily to mind) where the wait is decades long. These are people who, dutifully complying with our laws, have been patiently waiting to legally immigrate to the U.S., sometimes literally dying before their "number" comes up. The way I read the draft bill, the first cut-off is that they have to have filed their petition no later than the when this bill was introduced. The second cut-off is that they have to be scheduled arrive in the U.S. no later than one year after (or the day before one year) after the bill is passed into law.
What I don't see is the elimination of the numerical limitation, so that those waiting all these years for their turn, actually get their turn. Perhaps I missed it?
CAA is all about legal immigrants lawfully complying with our immigration laws. So it goes down sideways for us on the implementing side of the equation to be breaking faith with those who have been earnestly attempting to comply with our laws. CAA is a big fan of people who comply with U.S. immigration laws; CAA believes people who start out by complying with U.S. immigration laws are more likely to continue being law-abiding than people who begin by ignoring or violating our laws. Just sayin'.
CAA would like to see those waiting to obey the law get their chance to do so. Let the bill be amended to let DHS and USCIS estimate annually how many of the pending cases they can process, irrespective of what the annual numerical limit has been, and then let USCIS and the State Department process those cases, until the backlog is gone. Finished. Finito. Fertig.
Wednesday, August 2, 2017
Driving the Train
It is a source of some annoyance, from time to time, that in this age of automation and data processing there is this manifest tendency by those closest to the automation to lose sight of the bigger picture.
What am I talking about? What bigger picture?
By way of example, the big picture is that the logistical and administrative tail of an organization exists primarily not to support itself (although that is certainly a necessary component of its priorities) but rather its deployed or "frontline" activities. For an army or navy, that means its ships and troops in harm's way. For the State Department, that means that all the various bureaus, both geographic and functional, are there to support the operations of our embassies and consulates abroad (also sometimes in harm's way) rather than the other way around.
But that's just the big picture. From a more elevated perspective, the bigger picture is indeed that the tail-end and the front-line activities exist to support the principals. For State Department, that means our new SecState and President. But not personally supporting them, really, rather instead supporting them in their Constitutional and legislatively-mandated roles.
But that's not really what I'm exercised about today.
There is this tendency, this drift, this proclivity that whenever a system is established, whether it be software or something more physical and/or procedural, that the care and feeding of that system becomes an aim and end to itself. That propensity extends to the system beginning to compete for resources with the very activity or mission it is intended to support, to impeding or even restricting the success of the supported mission.
Consular officers get stuff done. We've got a lot of tools in our kit to do this. Some are legislative in nature, the authority (within certain defined limits) to adjudicate citizenship, visa, and passport decisions for instance. Others are in the nature of hardware or software; everything from the computers and printers we use to issue travel documents and the software that makes them work properly, to a system of name-checking, photo-recognition, and other security software that is so amazingly fast compared to what it was in the pre- and immediately-post 9/11 era. We have accountability software to keep track of our inventory and the money we collect in consular fees. We even have, in addition to self-inking stamps and notarial seals for which we are notorious, a certain amount of honest-to-God red tape and sealing wax for a few certain obscure tasks that ever-so-occasionally demand it.
But there's this thing, this drift, this bent, this proneness whenever a support system is devised, that conflicts with the flexibility consular work demands. When someone tells me I can't do something in the way of providing perfectly legal services in support of U.S. citizens because the tracking or accountability or other support-management system doesn't have a way to track it or account for it or to support it, that's when I start to get annoyed. The system exists to support the lawful activity, or it should, not the other way around. When the system impedes the lawful activity, the answer isn't "you can't do that, the system doesn't let you." But oftentimes that's exactly the answer.
What am I talking about? What bigger picture?
By way of example, the big picture is that the logistical and administrative tail of an organization exists primarily not to support itself (although that is certainly a necessary component of its priorities) but rather its deployed or "frontline" activities. For an army or navy, that means its ships and troops in harm's way. For the State Department, that means that all the various bureaus, both geographic and functional, are there to support the operations of our embassies and consulates abroad (also sometimes in harm's way) rather than the other way around.
But that's just the big picture. From a more elevated perspective, the bigger picture is indeed that the tail-end and the front-line activities exist to support the principals. For State Department, that means our new SecState and President. But not personally supporting them, really, rather instead supporting them in their Constitutional and legislatively-mandated roles.
But that's not really what I'm exercised about today.
There is this tendency, this drift, this proclivity that whenever a system is established, whether it be software or something more physical and/or procedural, that the care and feeding of that system becomes an aim and end to itself. That propensity extends to the system beginning to compete for resources with the very activity or mission it is intended to support, to impeding or even restricting the success of the supported mission.
Consular officers get stuff done. We've got a lot of tools in our kit to do this. Some are legislative in nature, the authority (within certain defined limits) to adjudicate citizenship, visa, and passport decisions for instance. Others are in the nature of hardware or software; everything from the computers and printers we use to issue travel documents and the software that makes them work properly, to a system of name-checking, photo-recognition, and other security software that is so amazingly fast compared to what it was in the pre- and immediately-post 9/11 era. We have accountability software to keep track of our inventory and the money we collect in consular fees. We even have, in addition to self-inking stamps and notarial seals for which we are notorious, a certain amount of honest-to-God red tape and sealing wax for a few certain obscure tasks that ever-so-occasionally demand it.
But there's this thing, this drift, this bent, this proneness whenever a support system is devised, that conflicts with the flexibility consular work demands. When someone tells me I can't do something in the way of providing perfectly legal services in support of U.S. citizens because the tracking or accountability or other support-management system doesn't have a way to track it or account for it or to support it, that's when I start to get annoyed. The system exists to support the lawful activity, or it should, not the other way around. When the system impedes the lawful activity, the answer isn't "you can't do that, the system doesn't let you." But oftentimes that's exactly the answer.
Wednesday, July 26, 2017
re: "State Dept. in ‘Open War’ With White House"
Pamela Geller at The Geller Report ("a foremost defender of the freedom of speech against attempts to force the West to accept Sharia blasphemy laws, and against Sharia self-censorship by Western media outlets") is highly critical of the new SecState. For that matter, she clearly has no great love for the State Department or Foreign Service themselves.
"Foreign Service is a different kind of animal. Most get subsumed by the culture at State and the snakes in Foreign Service. Condi was consumed by them, and Kerry was completely and utterly out of his depth."
Her recommendation:
"Amateur hour is over. Send in the cavalry. It’s time for a pro. It’s time for John Bolton."
"Foreign Service is a different kind of animal. Most get subsumed by the culture at State and the snakes in Foreign Service. Condi was consumed by them, and Kerry was completely and utterly out of his depth."
Her recommendation:
"Amateur hour is over. Send in the cavalry. It’s time for a pro. It’s time for John Bolton."
re: "Thoughts on Moving Consular Affairs to Homeland Security"
Dan Cadman at the Center for Immigration Studies ("an independent, non-partisan, non-profit, research organization") evaluated the proposed transfer from the standpoint of 30 years of INS/ICE experience.
Money quote(s):
"Insigniam had conducted a review and issued a report for Secretary of State Tillerson suggesting that Department of State functions having to do with issuance of visas and passports should be transferred from the Department of State (DOS) to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The recommendation was made after surveying thousands of employees online.
Such functions are now performed at embassies and consulates throughout the world by Foreign Service officers (FSOs) within DOS's Bureau of Consular Affairs."
It's got to be said; CIS punches above its intellectual weight when it comes to debates about immigration reform and illegal immigration. They are forthrightly in favor of legal immigration but demand that existing laws be enforced and, where necessary, strengthened. At least, that's my considered opinion having observed them from afar for some years now.
"I'm not sure that there are huge benefits to such a transfer, other than perhaps helping Secretary Tillerson meet his goal of massive budget reduction at the State Department."
Definitions matter. Transferring the visa and passport functions out of State Department also means transferring about $3 billion per annum in fee receipts for those services. They pay for the accomplishment and delivery of those services as well as underwriting a lot of other expenses involved in maintaining a worldwide diplomatic presence and operations. Cutting off that revenue stream without getting Congress to appropriate some level of replacement funding would definitely reduce the DOS budget while bloating that of DHS.
Is reducing the size of State's budget the sole foreign policy goal of this Administration? What are the consequences, intended or otherwise?
Mr. Cadman concludes:
"(W)ould consular decisions be any better? Certainly not. Would DHS take its new mission seriously enough to re-think how it is going about its business where aliens are concerned? Don't know. Have they shown any proclivity in the last 15 years to involve themselves (despite the authority granted them via the section of law I quoted) in the always busy and often messy environment of visa issuance and consular affairs, even though it directly impacts upon their work domestically? Absolutely not."
Money quote(s):
"Insigniam had conducted a review and issued a report for Secretary of State Tillerson suggesting that Department of State functions having to do with issuance of visas and passports should be transferred from the Department of State (DOS) to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The recommendation was made after surveying thousands of employees online.
Such functions are now performed at embassies and consulates throughout the world by Foreign Service officers (FSOs) within DOS's Bureau of Consular Affairs."
It's got to be said; CIS punches above its intellectual weight when it comes to debates about immigration reform and illegal immigration. They are forthrightly in favor of legal immigration but demand that existing laws be enforced and, where necessary, strengthened. At least, that's my considered opinion having observed them from afar for some years now.
"I'm not sure that there are huge benefits to such a transfer, other than perhaps helping Secretary Tillerson meet his goal of massive budget reduction at the State Department."
Definitions matter. Transferring the visa and passport functions out of State Department also means transferring about $3 billion per annum in fee receipts for those services. They pay for the accomplishment and delivery of those services as well as underwriting a lot of other expenses involved in maintaining a worldwide diplomatic presence and operations. Cutting off that revenue stream without getting Congress to appropriate some level of replacement funding would definitely reduce the DOS budget while bloating that of DHS.
Is reducing the size of State's budget the sole foreign policy goal of this Administration? What are the consequences, intended or otherwise?
Mr. Cadman concludes:
"(W)ould consular decisions be any better? Certainly not. Would DHS take its new mission seriously enough to re-think how it is going about its business where aliens are concerned? Don't know. Have they shown any proclivity in the last 15 years to involve themselves (despite the authority granted them via the section of law I quoted) in the always busy and often messy environment of visa issuance and consular affairs, even though it directly impacts upon their work domestically? Absolutely not."
Tuesday, July 25, 2017
re: "SFRC Grills D/S Sullivan About @StateDept FY18 Reauthorization Bill and Reorganizational Plans"
Domani Spero at Diplopundit ("an obsessive compulsive observer, diplomatic watcher, and opinionator") reviewed the SFRC testimony of the new "D" (DepSec Sullivan).
Money quote(s):
"He was also asked about the idea floated by the WH of moving CA and PRM functions to DHS. He told the panel that it is not the intent of the Department to move these functions. He told the senators that it is something that if it were raised, they would consider it but that it would be from a position that the two are vital to the mission of the State Department."
(Cue muted applause.)
Money quote(s):
"He was also asked about the idea floated by the WH of moving CA and PRM functions to DHS. He told the panel that it is not the intent of the Department to move these functions. He told the senators that it is something that if it were raised, they would consider it but that it would be from a position that the two are vital to the mission of the State Department."
(Cue muted applause.)
re: "Post-Trexit: A Blueprint for Restoring Foreign Policy & the State Department After Trump is Gone"
Retired FSO James Bruno at Diplo Denizen ("Author and ex-diplomat comments on foreign affairs & writing") is planning ahead.
Money quote(s):
"The Trump/Tillerson debasement of the State Department comes on the heels of eight years of Obama/Clinton marginalizing the department through patronage bloat, dilution of mission and concentration of foreign policy making in the White House. And, of course, all administrations sell around a full third of (the most important) ambassadorships to campaign contributors. Under Trump/Tillerson, the nation's foreign ministry is a ghost ship aimlessly meandering through perilous seas (see: Trump's Zombie Ship of State), with senior positions glaringly unfilled and little contact between SecState Tillerson and the career bureaucracy."
Debasement is a pretty strong word, but six months into the new Administration is not too short a time to be critical. Certainly, six months after the end of the previous Administration isn't too short a time as well, and Mr. Bruno is not over-stating those legacy problems from the last eight years.
"With no concrete justification, Insigniam adopts whole cloth a fevered night dream of the Bannon Sturmabteilung set: move all consular, refugee, population and migration functions out of State and into that model of bureaucratic coherence and efficiency, the Department of Homeland Security. Why? Your guess is as good as mine."
Insigniam is the contractor which conducted a volunteer survey, complete with word clouds, of State Department employees. CAA participated.
Parts of DHS' many agencies function quite well. But it's a sprawling department with many independent and interlocking missions.
"(T)he Heritage Foundation last year produced, "How to Make the State Department More Effective at Implementing U.S. Foreign Policy." While rebutting assertions by State that it is under-resourced, Heritage also makes a solid case for re-establishing lines of authority, reducing the operational role of the NSC, curtailing the use of special envoys, halting the selling of ambassadorships and cutting back bloat. "
State is under-resourced in parts and perhaps over-resourced in others. No Department is free to simply move money around on its own authority and contrary to how Congress has appropriated and allocated it.
Money quote(s):
"The Trump/Tillerson debasement of the State Department comes on the heels of eight years of Obama/Clinton marginalizing the department through patronage bloat, dilution of mission and concentration of foreign policy making in the White House. And, of course, all administrations sell around a full third of (the most important) ambassadorships to campaign contributors. Under Trump/Tillerson, the nation's foreign ministry is a ghost ship aimlessly meandering through perilous seas (see: Trump's Zombie Ship of State), with senior positions glaringly unfilled and little contact between SecState Tillerson and the career bureaucracy."
Debasement is a pretty strong word, but six months into the new Administration is not too short a time to be critical. Certainly, six months after the end of the previous Administration isn't too short a time as well, and Mr. Bruno is not over-stating those legacy problems from the last eight years.
"With no concrete justification, Insigniam adopts whole cloth a fevered night dream of the Bannon Sturmabteilung set: move all consular, refugee, population and migration functions out of State and into that model of bureaucratic coherence and efficiency, the Department of Homeland Security. Why? Your guess is as good as mine."
Insigniam is the contractor which conducted a volunteer survey, complete with word clouds, of State Department employees. CAA participated.
Parts of DHS' many agencies function quite well. But it's a sprawling department with many independent and interlocking missions.
"(T)he Heritage Foundation last year produced, "How to Make the State Department More Effective at Implementing U.S. Foreign Policy." While rebutting assertions by State that it is under-resourced, Heritage also makes a solid case for re-establishing lines of authority, reducing the operational role of the NSC, curtailing the use of special envoys, halting the selling of ambassadorships and cutting back bloat. "
State is under-resourced in parts and perhaps over-resourced in others. No Department is free to simply move money around on its own authority and contrary to how Congress has appropriated and allocated it.
Monday, July 24, 2017
re: "Doomed to Failure"
Dave Schuler at The Glittering Eye identified a key flaw in our Grand Strategy for GWOT:
"We don’t win because we don’t want to win. The psychological, political, and cultural implications of what we’d need to do to win are just too devastating."
"We don’t win because we don’t want to win. The psychological, political, and cultural implications of what we’d need to do to win are just too devastating."
WP - "Consular officers do far more than just adjudicate visas"
Retired consular officer Brian McNamara wrote to The Washington Post.
Highlights:
"I take exception to the White House proposal to move the Bureau of Consular Affairs from the State Department to the Department of Homeland Security"
&
"Consular officers adjudicate visas, issue reports of birth and death of Americans overseas, adjudicate U.S. passport applications and assist Americans who get into trouble in foreign countries (get arrested, get sick, etc.). This requires every staffer, from the lowest worker to the highest, to have a good knowledge of the host country and thorough knowledge of the geography (are people from a particular neighborhood more or less likely to stay in the United States?). Consular officers, as do all Foreign Service officers, liaise with local officials, but for consular officers, those local officials include police officers, jailers, doctors and those in the foreign ministry.
In other words, consular officers have a much wider span of duties than merely adjudicating visas."
Ain't it the truth.
The fact of the matter is that adjudicating visas (which involves more than merely 'stamping passports,' as the expression goes), while a very significant part of the consular workload, is nonetheless only a part.
For most Americans, that doesn't mean much. But for those of you who have found yourselves or a family member far away from home and the victim of a crime, injured in an accident, missing, arrested, or who simply lost their passport, the fact that there was someone at the embassy whose professional responsibility it was to help you is, as the commercial says, priceless. You don't quickly forget it. And you're very welcome. On our side of it, it can be the most fulfilling part of the profession. For many of us, it's the reason we do what we do.
Highlights:
"I take exception to the White House proposal to move the Bureau of Consular Affairs from the State Department to the Department of Homeland Security"
&
"Consular officers adjudicate visas, issue reports of birth and death of Americans overseas, adjudicate U.S. passport applications and assist Americans who get into trouble in foreign countries (get arrested, get sick, etc.). This requires every staffer, from the lowest worker to the highest, to have a good knowledge of the host country and thorough knowledge of the geography (are people from a particular neighborhood more or less likely to stay in the United States?). Consular officers, as do all Foreign Service officers, liaise with local officials, but for consular officers, those local officials include police officers, jailers, doctors and those in the foreign ministry.
In other words, consular officers have a much wider span of duties than merely adjudicating visas."
Ain't it the truth.
The fact of the matter is that adjudicating visas (which involves more than merely 'stamping passports,' as the expression goes), while a very significant part of the consular workload, is nonetheless only a part.
For most Americans, that doesn't mean much. But for those of you who have found yourselves or a family member far away from home and the victim of a crime, injured in an accident, missing, arrested, or who simply lost their passport, the fact that there was someone at the embassy whose professional responsibility it was to help you is, as the commercial says, priceless. You don't quickly forget it. And you're very welcome. On our side of it, it can be the most fulfilling part of the profession. For many of us, it's the reason we do what we do.
Friday, July 21, 2017
WP - "Five myths about the Foreign Service"
Retired FSO Leon Weintraub addresses some of the most-popular fallacies of the U.S. Foreign Service for the readers of The Washington Post. He nails it.
Some tidbits:
"(D)iplomats who represent the United States government and help U.S. citizens abroad, have long been the target of jibes from lawmakers, pundits and the public. Often portrayed in films as elitist dilettantes"
It's a stereotype. Most people will never meet one of their country's diplomats so they'll never know the difference between the portrayal and the reality. After all, diplomats tend to be working overseas about two-thirds of the time and the rest of the time they're likely to be working in the D.C. area. Only a relative few will, at any given time, be consular officers working at one of the passport centers or, if they are Diplomatic Security agents, at a field or resident office somewhere around the country.
"There was a time when members of the Foreign Service almost exclusively came from well-heeled families of American patrician society and were educated in one of the Ivy League bastions of privilege, part of an “old boys’ ” network (sarcastically referred to as “pale, male, and Yale”).
These days, though, Foreign Service officers look like America. They come from every state, from rural and small-town as well as urban areas, and from state and small private colleges as well as the Ivy League."
Nowadays, the old-money Northeast establishment WASPs don't much go in for public service at the working level. There are a few still around, bless them, quietly living way below their means; you won't even know they're there! But that demographic tends to show up later and higher up the ladder as political appointees if they're interested in diplomacy at all.
"Gingrich suggested in Foreign Policy in 2003 that President George W. Bush’s State Department was purposefully undermining his objectives abroad. But this mistrust mistakes specialized knowledge, which may not reflect what administrations believe, with rogue agendas.
We also, however, are responsible for advising the secretary of state or the president when we believe differently than they do, especially when it comes to advancing the nation’s best interests."
FSOs take that oath seriously. They enter the Service smarter than the average picnic basket, with nice diplomas from lots of different schools (Go State!), buckle-down to learn obscure (and not-so-obscure) languages before going forth to mostly un-glamorous locales to perform often unpleasant duties (morgue visit anyone?). When they disagree with a particular administration's world-view, strategic vision, or foreign policy goals, it's not out of disloyalty to the country but quite the opposite. The marvelous thing is how few, from administration to administration, actually throw up their hands, say they just can't do it, and resign. Most put their shoulders to the wheel and do their level best to make the policy-maker's policies work.
Read the whole thing.
Some tidbits:
"(D)iplomats who represent the United States government and help U.S. citizens abroad, have long been the target of jibes from lawmakers, pundits and the public. Often portrayed in films as elitist dilettantes"
It's a stereotype. Most people will never meet one of their country's diplomats so they'll never know the difference between the portrayal and the reality. After all, diplomats tend to be working overseas about two-thirds of the time and the rest of the time they're likely to be working in the D.C. area. Only a relative few will, at any given time, be consular officers working at one of the passport centers or, if they are Diplomatic Security agents, at a field or resident office somewhere around the country.
"There was a time when members of the Foreign Service almost exclusively came from well-heeled families of American patrician society and were educated in one of the Ivy League bastions of privilege, part of an “old boys’ ” network (sarcastically referred to as “pale, male, and Yale”).
These days, though, Foreign Service officers look like America. They come from every state, from rural and small-town as well as urban areas, and from state and small private colleges as well as the Ivy League."
Nowadays, the old-money Northeast establishment WASPs don't much go in for public service at the working level. There are a few still around, bless them, quietly living way below their means; you won't even know they're there! But that demographic tends to show up later and higher up the ladder as political appointees if they're interested in diplomacy at all.
"Gingrich suggested in Foreign Policy in 2003 that President George W. Bush’s State Department was purposefully undermining his objectives abroad. But this mistrust mistakes specialized knowledge, which may not reflect what administrations believe, with rogue agendas.
Like military officers, Foreign Service officers have commissions from the president and take an oath to protect and defend the Constitution. We serve the president elected by the people of the United States, as well as the officials appointed and confirmed to help formulate and execute our country’s foreign policy and international relations.
FSOs take that oath seriously. They enter the Service smarter than the average picnic basket, with nice diplomas from lots of different schools (Go State!), buckle-down to learn obscure (and not-so-obscure) languages before going forth to mostly un-glamorous locales to perform often unpleasant duties (morgue visit anyone?). When they disagree with a particular administration's world-view, strategic vision, or foreign policy goals, it's not out of disloyalty to the country but quite the opposite. The marvelous thing is how few, from administration to administration, actually throw up their hands, say they just can't do it, and resign. Most put their shoulders to the wheel and do their level best to make the policy-maker's policies work.
Read the whole thing.
re: "LEAVE THE BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFFAIRS IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT"
Mark Stout at War On The Rocks ("people who know what they are talking about") provided a well-reasoned argument for his conclusion.
Money quote(s):
"The question of who gets a visa to visit the United States has been a security issue at least since the country was seized by the fear of infiltration by German spies during World War I. In this era of terrorism and Trump, it has come to be one of the foremost security issues of our day. For a century now, the State Department has been at the center of the process, in coordination with various U.S. intelligence services. Recently, however, the Trump administration floated the idea of moving the State Department’s Bureau of Consular Affairs to the Department of Homeland Security as part of the overall effort to restructure the federal government. Given the present political climate and the fact that Carl C. Risch, the person soon to be nominated to head the Bureau of Consular Affairs, once proposed moving the visa function to the Department of Homeland Security, the change seems to be a serious possibility. However, this move is a bad idea. It would endanger services vital to the protection of Americans abroad while doing nothing to protect Americans at home against terrorists or other malefactors."
Dr. Stout backs up that strong introduction with strong arguments.
"To begin with, there is no reason to expect that the Department of Homeland Security could do any better job overseeing the granting of visas than could the State Department. Consular officials take their role seriously and are not known for their flexibility with regard to the rules. Moreover, under an inter-departmental Memorandum of Understanding dating to 2002, the Department of Homeland Security already establishes visa policy, reviews implementation of said policy, and has final say over State Department regulations implementing that policy. So it is not clear why the Department of Homeland Security would do any better adjudicating visas than Foggy Bottom. It is true that there are occasional cases of State Department consular officers being bribed and issuing visas to people who should not have had them. However, the Department of Homeland Security has had corruption problems, too, as has pretty much every other government agency.
In addition, the State Department draws on and contributes to the same watchlist and intelligence databases that the Homeland Security Department does. In fact, the State Department has been working with those databases since before the Department of Homeland Security even existed."
The division of labor at present plays to the two department's respective strengths: DHS deals with things from within the U.S. and DOS handles the overseas parts. That's not to imply that those DHS officials who are posted to some of our embassies and consulates don't do superlative and important work, because they absolutely do and we (the U.S.) are lucky to have DHS folks willing to take those assignments. But that points to the difficulties DHS would be assuming along with the responsibilities of a suddenly worldwide workforce, as Dr. Stout addresses.
"(M)oving Consular Affairs to the Department of Homeland Security would guarantee major problems in recruiting, training, and retaining the necessary people. For starters, the department would have to find a new labor force. Much of Consular Affairs’ work is done by foreign service officers in the consular “cone,” the State Department term for a career field. However, almost all foreign service officers, whatever their particular field, do a consular tour (usually their first) at an embassy or consulate overseas. A Bureau of Consular Affairs at the Department of Homeland Security will not be able to continue to benefit from that ready State Department labor pool. "
Consular officers are generalist Foreign Service Officers (FSO) with a specific career-track or "cone." But they are not limited to doing only consular work during their careers, just as FSO generalists in other career tracks/cones (Political, Economic, Management, & Public Diplomacy) sometimes take consular assignments or perform consular duties long after their initial vice consul assignments as junior officers.
CAA, by way of example, has worked outside of his career track during domestic assignments and, while working consular assignments abroad, has covered other portfolios (e.g., Public Diplomacy) in an acting capacity, when a colleague's position was vacant or they were away from post.
Moving the consular functions and personnel to another department eliminates that flexibility and, more importantly for recruiting, evaporates much of the attraction and, for lack of a better word, glamour of the profession.
"I’d expect the Department of Homeland Security to have a hard time staffing the visa lines, let alone protecting Americans. In fact, the State Department itself is having trouble keeping up with rapidly increasing demand for visa adjudicators. Moving Consular Affairs will just dig that hole deeper and make the U.S. government look feckless and disorganized.
Over the longer term, the Department of Homeland Security would face daunting training challenges. Consular officers presently serve two- to three-year tours abroad and require some training before most new postings overseas, which sometimes takes months or even years. This includes language training and area training and familiarization, all functions presently performed by the State Department’s Foreign Service Institute. The Department of Homeland Security would have to duplicate these functions, likely at great cost, or try to negotiate another Memorandum of Understanding with the State Department to buy its students back into the Foreign Service Institute."
There are lots of nuts-and-bolts issues like this that decrease the feasibility of making a move like this, without much in the way of a counter-weighting increase in either efficiency or security.
"(I)t is important to know that the Bureau of Consular Affairs does not just issue visas to non-American visitors and passports to Americans. It is also responsible for “the welfare and protection of U.S. citizens abroad.” This involves a wide variety of functions that require experienced and internationally engaged personnel and institutions. For instance, if an American is thrown in prison abroad, consular officers visit that person regularly to check on his or her welfare, ensure access to legal counsel, attend trials, and provide other services, some of which involve detailed knowledge of the legal and political systems in the country in question. In fiscal year 2015, consular officers made 9425 prison visits. If an American goes missing abroad, consular officers respond to queries from worried family members and work with authorities, media, the Peace Corps, and diplomats from third countries to find the person. Consular officers work with family members to handle those unfortunate cases where Americans die overseas. There were 10,589 such cases in FY15. Children who have been abducted abroad and Americans who get robbed overseas also benefit from the work of this bureau."
Consular officers do all these things. CAA has done all these things in countries around the world. Would DHS assume these responsibilities as well or would State retain responsibility for them, only without any longer having the trained staff to perform them? Would some number of consular officers remain at State as a vestigial Consular Service? Bear in mind that nearly all of these responsibilities are provided without U.S. citizens having to pay any sort of consular fee, unlike visa, notarial, passport, and other consular services. The welfare & whereabouts and prison visits, the death and missing persons cases; all of those come out of overhead. Without the some $3 billion (roughly) in consular fee receipts coming to Consular Affairs, what overhead is that going to come out of and who is going to do it?
Dr. Stout concluded:
"(I)f the Department of Homeland Security takes over the Bureau of Consular Affairs, it will inherit a wide array of tasks that are related to protecting Americans abroad but not protecting the homeland per se. Many of these duties involve expert knowledge of the country and tasks in question. Defending “the welfare and protection of U.S. citizens abroad” is a mission that at best sits uneasily with the idea of “homeland security” in an agency that has far less particular expertise with overseas affairs."
Money quote(s):
"The question of who gets a visa to visit the United States has been a security issue at least since the country was seized by the fear of infiltration by German spies during World War I. In this era of terrorism and Trump, it has come to be one of the foremost security issues of our day. For a century now, the State Department has been at the center of the process, in coordination with various U.S. intelligence services. Recently, however, the Trump administration floated the idea of moving the State Department’s Bureau of Consular Affairs to the Department of Homeland Security as part of the overall effort to restructure the federal government. Given the present political climate and the fact that Carl C. Risch, the person soon to be nominated to head the Bureau of Consular Affairs, once proposed moving the visa function to the Department of Homeland Security, the change seems to be a serious possibility. However, this move is a bad idea. It would endanger services vital to the protection of Americans abroad while doing nothing to protect Americans at home against terrorists or other malefactors."
Dr. Stout backs up that strong introduction with strong arguments.
"To begin with, there is no reason to expect that the Department of Homeland Security could do any better job overseeing the granting of visas than could the State Department. Consular officials take their role seriously and are not known for their flexibility with regard to the rules. Moreover, under an inter-departmental Memorandum of Understanding dating to 2002, the Department of Homeland Security already establishes visa policy, reviews implementation of said policy, and has final say over State Department regulations implementing that policy. So it is not clear why the Department of Homeland Security would do any better adjudicating visas than Foggy Bottom. It is true that there are occasional cases of State Department consular officers being bribed and issuing visas to people who should not have had them. However, the Department of Homeland Security has had corruption problems, too, as has pretty much every other government agency.
In addition, the State Department draws on and contributes to the same watchlist and intelligence databases that the Homeland Security Department does. In fact, the State Department has been working with those databases since before the Department of Homeland Security even existed."
The division of labor at present plays to the two department's respective strengths: DHS deals with things from within the U.S. and DOS handles the overseas parts. That's not to imply that those DHS officials who are posted to some of our embassies and consulates don't do superlative and important work, because they absolutely do and we (the U.S.) are lucky to have DHS folks willing to take those assignments. But that points to the difficulties DHS would be assuming along with the responsibilities of a suddenly worldwide workforce, as Dr. Stout addresses.
"(M)oving Consular Affairs to the Department of Homeland Security would guarantee major problems in recruiting, training, and retaining the necessary people. For starters, the department would have to find a new labor force. Much of Consular Affairs’ work is done by foreign service officers in the consular “cone,” the State Department term for a career field. However, almost all foreign service officers, whatever their particular field, do a consular tour (usually their first) at an embassy or consulate overseas. A Bureau of Consular Affairs at the Department of Homeland Security will not be able to continue to benefit from that ready State Department labor pool. "
Consular officers are generalist Foreign Service Officers (FSO) with a specific career-track or "cone." But they are not limited to doing only consular work during their careers, just as FSO generalists in other career tracks/cones (Political, Economic, Management, & Public Diplomacy) sometimes take consular assignments or perform consular duties long after their initial vice consul assignments as junior officers.
CAA, by way of example, has worked outside of his career track during domestic assignments and, while working consular assignments abroad, has covered other portfolios (e.g., Public Diplomacy) in an acting capacity, when a colleague's position was vacant or they were away from post.
Moving the consular functions and personnel to another department eliminates that flexibility and, more importantly for recruiting, evaporates much of the attraction and, for lack of a better word, glamour of the profession.
"I’d expect the Department of Homeland Security to have a hard time staffing the visa lines, let alone protecting Americans. In fact, the State Department itself is having trouble keeping up with rapidly increasing demand for visa adjudicators. Moving Consular Affairs will just dig that hole deeper and make the U.S. government look feckless and disorganized.
Over the longer term, the Department of Homeland Security would face daunting training challenges. Consular officers presently serve two- to three-year tours abroad and require some training before most new postings overseas, which sometimes takes months or even years. This includes language training and area training and familiarization, all functions presently performed by the State Department’s Foreign Service Institute. The Department of Homeland Security would have to duplicate these functions, likely at great cost, or try to negotiate another Memorandum of Understanding with the State Department to buy its students back into the Foreign Service Institute."
There are lots of nuts-and-bolts issues like this that decrease the feasibility of making a move like this, without much in the way of a counter-weighting increase in either efficiency or security.
"(I)t is important to know that the Bureau of Consular Affairs does not just issue visas to non-American visitors and passports to Americans. It is also responsible for “the welfare and protection of U.S. citizens abroad.” This involves a wide variety of functions that require experienced and internationally engaged personnel and institutions. For instance, if an American is thrown in prison abroad, consular officers visit that person regularly to check on his or her welfare, ensure access to legal counsel, attend trials, and provide other services, some of which involve detailed knowledge of the legal and political systems in the country in question. In fiscal year 2015, consular officers made 9425 prison visits. If an American goes missing abroad, consular officers respond to queries from worried family members and work with authorities, media, the Peace Corps, and diplomats from third countries to find the person. Consular officers work with family members to handle those unfortunate cases where Americans die overseas. There were 10,589 such cases in FY15. Children who have been abducted abroad and Americans who get robbed overseas also benefit from the work of this bureau."
Consular officers do all these things. CAA has done all these things in countries around the world. Would DHS assume these responsibilities as well or would State retain responsibility for them, only without any longer having the trained staff to perform them? Would some number of consular officers remain at State as a vestigial Consular Service? Bear in mind that nearly all of these responsibilities are provided without U.S. citizens having to pay any sort of consular fee, unlike visa, notarial, passport, and other consular services. The welfare & whereabouts and prison visits, the death and missing persons cases; all of those come out of overhead. Without the some $3 billion (roughly) in consular fee receipts coming to Consular Affairs, what overhead is that going to come out of and who is going to do it?
Dr. Stout concluded:
"(I)f the Department of Homeland Security takes over the Bureau of Consular Affairs, it will inherit a wide array of tasks that are related to protecting Americans abroad but not protecting the homeland per se. Many of these duties involve expert knowledge of the country and tasks in question. Defending “the welfare and protection of U.S. citizens abroad” is a mission that at best sits uneasily with the idea of “homeland security” in an agency that has far less particular expertise with overseas affairs."
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)
