re: "We're taking the 2nd ausfahrt prior to the Friendship Bridge, it seems"

Phibian at Cdr Salamander ("PROACTIVELY “FROM THE SEA”; AN AGENT OF CHANGE LEVERAGING THE LITTORAL BEST PRACTICES FOR A PARADIGM BREAKING SIX-SIGMA BEST BUSINESS CASE TO SYNERGIZE A CONSISTENT DESIGN IN THE GLOBAL COMMONS, RIGHTSIZING THE CORE VALUES SUPPORTING OUR MISSION STATEMENT VIA THE 5-VECTOR MODEL THROUGH CULTURAL DIVERSITY.") evaluated Pres. Trump's plan for Afghanistan.

Money quote(s):

"(H)ere’s the Executive Summary: two of the best military minds of their generation, National Security Adviser McMaster and Secretary of Defense Mattis, helped develop a plan that they believe gives us a chance to salvage something in Afghanistan after seven years of dithering. Not a perfect plan, but a doable one. I am willing to give them the benefit of the doubt and fully support it. The major reason is that it returns to something I have written about for well over a decade, Conditions Based Planning, and throws away what remains of the Obama Administration's bollocked-up Calendar Based Planning."

As he stated later in his post, "with a calendar based plan, defeat is inevitable; it is only the timing and method that is in question"  

As a businessman, some of Pres. Trump's ventures have failed, gone bankrupt.  But no one should assume that was the intended goal.  Trump likes to win.  Any plan he attaches to his name-brand is, at the very least, intended to succeed.  Trump does not like losing.

"That is where Trump went Salamander. We are back to Conditions Based Planning – what military best practices tells us is the best path to success.

Another fundamental pillar of our new strategy is the integration of all instruments of American power — diplomatic, economic, and military — toward a successful outcome. Someday, after an effective military effort, perhaps it will be possible to have a political settlement that includes elements of the Taliban in Afghanistan. But nobody knows if or when that will ever happen.

Did you get that? All the traditional levers of national power. This is not just a military way forward. We are also willing to come to accommodation with SOME of the Taliban elements. Good to open that door."

Why ever might the phrasing "traditional levers of national power" ring a bell for even a larval student of strategy?  This might be why it's not always a bad thing to ex-generals and ex-admirals around the top levels of the national security apparatus, so long as you're very picky about the ex-generals and ex-admirals.  Not every problem is best treated as a nail, especially when you've got a whole toolbox to work with.

He concluded:

"For those looking for End States, Objectives, Decisive Points, Criteria for Success, etc – this isn’t the venue for that. This speech gives us approximately the Commander’s Intent and Initiating Directive. The Operational Planners can build a plan off that, and are."

The Hill - 6 ways to know if State Department reform is real or fake

Joseph Cassidy writing at The Hill makes some excellent points.

Money quote(s):

"A real reform plan would mobilize the department to confront the dangers of the 21st century. It would remedy organizational weaknesses and inefficiencies. It would clarify State’s role in formulating foreign policy and define its relationship with other U.S. government agencies. It would provide a sense of purpose to State’s dedicated but downtrodden employees. "

That right there looks like an pretty fair mission statement for departmental reform.

"In recent administrations, the State Department’s structure has been more hourglass than pyramid. Senior officials and their staffer remoras have been over-abundant and have consumed a disproportionate amount of the department’s workload. Real reform would cut senior positions and reduce the number of staff officers who don’t originate work product."

&

"There is widespread agreement that the weedy proliferation of special envoys (not just those with that specific title, but also other powerful single-issue envoys outside State’s regional and functional bureau chains of command) must be pruned. Real reform will substantially reduce their number but also ensure that important responsibilities are incorporated into other parts of the department (double-hatting officials with a special envoy title, when its termination would be politically or diplomatically problematic).

Envoy proliferation has had two pernicious consequences — disempowering regional bureaus (which should rather be reinforced) by removing important diplomatic issues from their control and ensuring regional bureaus don’t in practice follow “special envoy” issues as closely. Real reform will mainstream as well as streamline."

This.  The dozens of special envoys and such duplicating and tromping over the responsibilities of existing embassies and missions is overkill.  Even granting the half-dozen or so (seven?) actually mandated by law, the idea of dual-hatting some of those back into the fold, onto the worthy-brows of the officials already charged with those countries, regions, or issues is one well worth exploiting.

(Gotta love the use of "remoras" to describe the spear-carriers and special assistants attending to extraneous special envoys.)

"Too many otherwise smart people believe diplomacy is something separate from other elements of national power, e.g., that the James Mattis does national defense, the Treasury Department does international finance and sanctions, the Commerce Department helps U.S. business abroad, the Department of Justice does international law and State carries messages back and forth to other governments like an Amazon delivery drone.

Diplomacy without foreign policy content is irrelevant, and there’s no such thing as short-term strategy. Real reform would reassert State’s role as lead strategist and coordinator of U.S. foreign policy, including the current actions of other cabinet agencies and America’s role in the world over the next several decades. "

You can bet that Sec. Mattis knows very well the many aspects of national powers, DIMEFILS and similar mnemonics outlining the instrumentalities and elements of implementing national strategies and grand strategies.  State is a logical place for interagency coordination of national strategy although the National Security Council staff seems to have inherited that mantel of late.

Read the whole thing.

Foreign Policy Goals

Somewhere I recall, perhaps fallaciously, reading Russia described as being "Mexico with nukes."

(All apologies to Mexico.)

The main point apparently was that if Russia didn't have nuclear weapons, it's international significance would shrink accordingly to the purely regional powers, like Mexico.

As I observe what passes for foreign policy these days in Washington, I can't help but suspect that the over-arching strategic goal seems to be of reducing America's international significance to being something that could be summed up thusly:

Russia with precisions-guided munitions.

re: "Why Condi Rice doesn't 'inspire' me"

Stephen M. Walt at his eponymous blog, Stephen M. Walt ("A Realist in an Ideological Age"), found former-Sec. Rice's op-ed pretty uninspiring.

Money quote(s):

"Strategy is about relating ends and means, setting priorities, and manipulating critical global forces to one's own advantage. Even for a global superpower like the United States, an effective strategy depends on separating the vital from the trivial, and the realistic from the fanciful. It requires deciding which goals are most important, and then using the resources at one's disposal to try to achieve them. And most importantly, it often consists of figuring out how to get other countries to help, and maybe even inducing them to do most of the work. Indeed, getting other states to shoulder costly or difficult burdens is the hallmark of a smart strategy, because it helps you husband your own resources, stay out of costly quagmires, and focus on missions that are more critical. American leaders used to understand this basic principle before we started telling ourselves we were the "indispensable" nation and starting seeing it as some sort of foreign policy achievement when we got stuck with some intractable foreign problem."

That's a nice explanation of how to develop a strategy and set priorities pertaining there-to, even about why having a strategy is important.

"Rice will have none of this, however, so her piece mostly consists of the typical laundry list of regions and issues where she believes the United States must shoulder the main burden. In her view, it is mostly our job to build democratic institutions in the Middle East. She also thinks we need to "re-engage" with Iraq (whatever that means), and use our trade policy to "help democracies" in Latin America. She favors creating a Palestinian state but thinks it will only come about via negotiations with a secure Israel, never mind that she gave Israel unconditional support for eight years and got bupkis. She supports the recent "pivot" toward Asia but thinks we aren't doing enough to counter a Chinese economic offensive. She says we need to do more to build strategic partnerships with Turkey, India, and Brazil, without saying what we should do to bring about closer ties or explaining what these countries will then do for us. She invokes the perennial bogeyman of declining U.S. credibility and says America must do more to "reassure our friends across the globe." "

Many of these things are laudable goals, worth doing for one reason or another, but what is the over-arching theme that allows a strategist to prioritize among them?

Take your time.

"(A)lthough the American people occasionally succumb to ill-conceived foreign policy adventures, they usually have pretty good instincts about our global role. No mainstream politician is calling for isolationism today, and the American people aren't demanding it either. Americans want to remain the world's most powerful country for as long as possible, and they recognize that some foreign commitments are prudent and beneficial."

7/27

re: "The Definition of Insanity"

Deebow at Blackfive ("the paratrooper of love") found fault with the latest iteration of the "peace dividend."

Money quote(s):

"We did this after WWI, WWII and during the decade of Slick Willie and the Peace Dividend. Resurgent China, collapsing Norks, Nuclear Iran, unfinished Afghanistan; really, I probably could go on and on with people who would wish us ill."

&

"(D)id anyone consult any random first sergeant out in the motor pool or Infantry branch officer on what they learned at West Point?, I mean, besides the mandatory attendance at presidential speeches and diversity classes? You know, the strategy and tactics part, theatre logistics, air land battle? Have any of those mental midgets heard of being there "firstest with the mostest" to win the battle? The 82nd Airborne is built around the idea that we are not going to spend time in the mutual circle jerk of international diplomacy, we are going to put men on the ground to influence our enemies decision making process and get inside their OODA Loop. Ships and airplanes driven and flown by men can still not own the ground that young men in the mud will be forced to wrest from our nation's foes. We owe it to them to give them enough comrades to ensure it can be done.

And the last time I walked the battlefield, the only dude who owned the ground was not the pilot in the B-1B I invited to the party after I kicked it off with my own fireworks; it was me, and all the other dudes on the bad-ass list I brought with me; standing on the earth I wanted to own and kicking the stinking jihadis off of it in the nastiest, most lethal and final fashion I could come up with moment to moment."

These are serious subjects studied seriously by serious people. I'm not sure they fit in with the narrative.

"Wars are not something you can fight with a coupon or try to duck out on the cheap and my bet is that we could afford a poop ton more troops and equipment if we weren't making loans/campaign contributions to outfits like Solyndra and putting our debt at 100.3 percent of our GDP, along with all of the other Marxist crap that the OinC has decided is good for America.

This is bad voodoo and the sooner the amateurs in Foggy Bottom and the Puzzle Palace that are entertaining the whisperings of the Good Idea Fairy are on the rocket sled to irrelevance, the better."

&

"(T)his is the worst idea this administration has ever had, and the Libturds that thought this up better start studying up on their Chinese and getting familiar with the 12th Imam, because there may test questions at the re-education camp later."

This presumes that their new overlords will bother trying to re-educate them.

1/5

re: "Iraq Pullout - Not A Cause for Celebration"

LONGTABSIGO at Blackfive ("the paratrooper of love") commented on strategy.

Money quote(s):

"I must have been absent in strategy class the day they taught that you can declare a war over unilaterally."

Well, you can. But normally you destroy their ability to make war and occupy their capital first.

Oh wait, we did that.

At least one bright observer theorized that we've fought at least three wars in Iraq already, since invading in 2003.

So which war is that we won this time?

(Hint: Identify your enemy.)

(Take your time.)

(Another hint: Read the Max Boot quote towards the end of the linked post.)

"But the rationale is not even adversary-based. It is ostensibly because DOD and State Lawyers cannot work out an appropriate Status of Forces agreement such that US Troops would not be subject to the arbitrary whim of Iraqi law (even if taking an action deemed to be "in the line of duty" by US law/standards).

I've heard of "lawfare" as a check against offensive action out of fear of risk or possible bad press. But an inabilty to convincinly negotiate as a rationale for major troop reduction?" (Emphasis in original text. - CAA.)

10/21

re: "Chinese Dragons and Russian Bears"

"Sam Huntington" at Always On Watch ("Semper Vigilans") reviewed strategic issues involving our near-peer competitors.

Money quote(s):

"(A) far more dangerous situation is developing in Asia. No surprise, Americans are not hearing about any of this from the state-run media. Here are a few examples:

· China is claiming island territory within fifty miles of the Philippines.

· Chinese frigates regularly intruded Philippine territorial waters.

· Chinese ships fired upon Philippine fishing boats.

· Chinese naval vessels rammed Vietnamese fishing boats (See Note 1)

· Chinese accost Indian naval vessels operating off the coast of Vietnam, demanding to know why they are operating in Chinese waters.

· Chinese military aircraft intrude into Taiwanese air space.

· China intruded Japanese mainland territorial waters on 14 occasions.

· China intruded Okinawa territorial waters on 10 occasions.

· China created six major incidents with the US Navy at sea.

· Raise your hand if you aren’t aware that North Korea is China’s redheaded stepchild.

Note 1: Vietnam possesses one of the world’s largest armies: (China: 4.5 million, Vietnam: 5.9 million)."

You know the one about amateurs studying tactics and professionals studying logistics?

Well, in terms of international relations, geopolitics, and grand strategy, the professionals are studying China.

"Danger of a regional conflict is real. The consequence to China’s arrogance has been a dramatic increase in military spending among Southeast Asian countries. Australia, Japan, India, the Philippines, Vietnam, and Taiwan have all dedicated billions of dollars on new or upgraded military hardware. The United States is upgrading naval facilities in Guam —so much so that Representative Hank Johnson(D-GA) worries the island may capsize. Nevertheless, all of these countries recognize the wisdom of pooling their resources to keep China in check; Japan has taken the lead in establishing mutual defense cooperatives with Australia, South Korea, India, and the United States. Singapore has offered to provide bases for the US Navy."

CAA no longer worries that Guam will become overburdened, over-balanced, and capsize, having received assurances that Guam possesses a sufficiently sturdy keel and gyroscopic stabilizer.

"Owing to the fact that we don’t know what motivates Chinese behavior, the Australian General Staff worries that a mistake could lead to disastrous consequences —particularly when it is likely that China will attempt to use its military to enforce a Chinese Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).

The problem is that while demanding that other nations treat Chinese EEZs as its sovereign territory, China routinely refuses to acknowledge the EEZs of other nations. From the standpoint of international law, EEZs are not sovereign territory. We can therefore see how China might regard the US Navy’s mission to safeguard open sea-lanes as an intolerable trespass —a situation that could lead to deadly confrontation."

It's the old "what's-mine-is-mine-what's-yours-is-negotiable" attitude turned somewhat sideways: China will use existing international norms and fora to its own advantage and ignore those which infringe upon its own interests. That's what one does when one is the center of the Earth, after all.

"Some politicians argue that given China’s dependence on global trade, a deadly confrontation is unlikely. They may have forgotten that economic ties did not hinder German aggression at the beginning of the 20^th Century —a costly mistake for France. ....but here is where we find the real and present danger. Defense cuts may encourage China to challenge allied nations within the region of Southeast Asia —they are that arrogant."

Nor did close economic ties deflect World War I; for that matter, the United States' close economic ties with Saudi Arabia deter the 9/11 attacks.

(Marx notwithstanding, man is not solely, nor even primarily, an economic animal.)

"From Russia’s perspective, there couldn’t be a better time to threaten the United States and NATO with pre-emptive strikes unless we agree to cancel the so-called Missile Defense Shield, designed as a safeguard from Iranian ICBMs."

This seems a little over-the-top; threatening pre-emptive strikes is way more sabre-rattling than is necessary. Russia has far more effective economic and political levers to pull than jacking things up on the defcon meter.

"If one understands international relations, Russia’s timing couldn’t be better. We should anticipate this sort of behavior by an adversary whenever they perceive American leadership as weak, incompetent, ineffective, or confused."

Harsh words, but hardly unwarranted.

The "reset" button must have been like those ones installed near crosswalks: not really wired to anything but they give pedestrians something to do with their hands while waiting for the lights to change.

"This situation should once again remind us that American politicians and diplomats seldom learn important lessons of history. America cannot afford another war right now. Neither can we afford the perception of weakness, incompetence, or abject stupidity. We continue to live in a dangerous world"

Diplomats actually aren't slouches when it comes to learning their history lessons; however if you expand your definition of "diplomat" beyond those actually trained and experienced in it to those who practice it on our behalf at the highest levels....

"Rather than facing a deadly and costly regional conflict in Southeast Asia, it would be far less expensive to deter Chinese aggression vis-à-vis a strong military presence along the Pacific Rim. As for the Russian Bear, they understand but one thing: force or its promise."

5/4

re: "The graveyard of Empires"

Chuck at From my position... On the Way! ("These are my own poorly arranged thoughts. They usually come to me during periods of when I can’t sleep and when under great stress.") assessed goals in Afghanistan.

Money quote(s):

"Empires throughout history have fought in Afghanistan.

I think that is the key thing to understanding these people. Their cultural/genetic memory is
imprinted with the idea that everyone else in the world can come here and kick
their asses until they get bored and go home.

I think it's really their driving factor, and why they seem so unwilling (beyond cell phones) to pull themselves out of the 13th century. Granted, they realize (and use to tremendous effect) that the US will pay, and pay, and pay, for their ridiculous "projects" to make this a better place. They'll likely end up with the third world's best infrastructure by the time we leave--and given their insecurity, animosity towards each other, and general bat-shit insanity, they'll quickly devolve into internal warfare. Warlord vs. Warlord in a winner takes all
cataclysm.

The winner of course, will get to take over all this wonderful infrastructure--and will likely tear it out and sell it to the highest bidder."

Particularly if it hurts a rival tribe. Tribalism is a reality in Afghanistan; it's not too much of an overstatement that, outside of Kabul, there really aren't too many people who would self-identify as Afghans ahead of their tribal identity. Tribalism, and the inevitable zero-sum game perspective, of this sort goes hand in hand with the lack of a social contract necessary for modernity.

"I don't really think of this place as a graveyard of empires--not the kind of place where empires come and are destroyed. It's more like the kind of place that empires come, see what it's like, realize that the only real solution outside of outright genocide is to dump prozac in every source of water and wait twenty years, realize that probably wouldn't work either, and then try to figure out the best way to just leave.

Unfortunately, we aren't there yet. I think we're getting closer to the "What's the point?" point, though. Staying here won't stop the spread of terrorism. Staying here won't make Afghanistan a stable democratic republic. Staying here won't remove the corruption, crime, or poverty. Staying here has no benefit to the US that I can see, long-term. The question that keeps popping into my head is "What's in it for us?" And I just can't seem to find an answer."

Goals and objectives. They are necessary for the development of any sort of strategy, at least if you intend for success to be anything but pure accident. And that's pretty much where we are after a decade; if we're "successful" in Afghanistan at anything (or possibly including) more than a retreat-under-fire from there when we finally pull out, it'll be a complete accident rather than the success of any one strategy, doctrine, policy, or negotiation.

"The second question of "is it worth it?" is even harder to answer. How do we quanitfy that? Is it worth it in terms of cost to the taxpayer? That goes back to "What's the point" and "How does this benefit the US?" What, exactly, are our strategic goals here? If being here is rooting out terrorists, we're playing whack-a-mole."

Nothing wrong with whack-a-mole, up to a point. But it's not a strategy for anything but marking time.

12/14

re: "Counterinsurgency is not peeing on people…"

Peter Van Buren at We Meant Well ("How I Helped Lose the Battle for the Hearts and Minds of the Iraqi People") rated this event as unhelpful to the counterinsurgency mission.

Money quote(s):

"The world is awash in urine-soaked statements by various idiots defending the Marines who peed on the bodies of dead Taliban. The defense is either a) the Taliban deserved it because they are our enemies or b) well, the Taliban have done worse things to us."

Just because the two defenses are completely true doesn't make them useful.

"The Taliban aren’t fighting a counterinsurgency war.

We are.

We are the invading foreigners trying to win the support of the people. Pissing on them is not a good way to do that.

This is part of the whole losing proposition of such war– we have to get it right (almost) all the time to have a shot at winning."

And therein lies the rub.

Dave Schuler addresses the root of this problem here. Take a few minutes and give it a look.

(CAA will still be here when you get back.)

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Okay, back yet?

In the corporate world, in any business, you start with the basic question: what business are we in?

Sounds silly, doesn't it?

(It's not.)

It's the reason that lots of corporations (and government entities) have things called "mission statements." They're a good touchstone for determining if something you're considering attempting is something you should be attempting.

In questions of strategy, you face similar questions. What are our goals? What is the end-state we would like to see? What instruments of national power and influence can be brought to bear in support of this mission?

Mr. Schuler believes what CAA has long suspected: nation-building (and the related mission of counter-insurgency) in Afghanistan is not what the U.S. should have attempted there.

So while Brother Van Buren's points about the marine micturition incident (MMI) are on-point and well-taken, they may miss the larger targets. Indeed, much of U.S. policy over the past decade-plus may have done so.

1/13

re: "Dangerous Game"

Lex at Neptunus Lex ("The unbearable lightness of Lex. Enjoy!") described a strategic downside to China's EMP weapon strategy.

Money quote(s):

"Planning to toss around nukes in the event of a local conflict – even low-yield nukes – would be a hilariously bad idea, were it not for the fact that it lacks any trace of hilarity. The risk of miscalculation in proportionate response is significant.

Strategic weapons, as the Chinese ought to know, are designed to guarantee national survival, and the distinction between a tactical nuke and a strategic weapon is chiefly one of perspective: If yours lands on him, it’s tactical. When his reply lands on you, it’s strategic."

Also bear in mind China's published strategies for waging multi-dimensional warfare, to overwhelm or paralyze response by major allied powers. The risk of strategic overreach is stunning.

7/22

re: "Libya, Iowa, and F22 View 20110814"

Dr. Jerry Pournelle at Chaos Manor ("The Original Blog and Daybook") is good at looking at some big picture and on-the-horizon issues, at the same time.

Money quote(s):

"Libya and Syria

According to Aquinas, it is just to go to war to defend the innocent. There are restrictions, but this is not an unfair statement. Presumably that is why Obama considers it just to continue to break things and kill people in Libya. And recently Qaddaffi used helicopters, which once again put him in violation of the UN resolution, and thus required that the US kill some more Libyans and break some more Libyan property in the name of NATO acting for the UN." (Emphasis in original text heading. - CAA.)

Obviously, this linkery and quite have been idling awhile in my queue, waiting for my limited time and attention to get a "round tueit."

But the point still stands with regards to just war theory.

"One necessary condition for a war to be just is that there is a reasonable expectation of success. Success is defined in many ways, but you might sum it up by saying that in the end there would be more justice in the world after the war ends than there would be if it never started.

If we continue the intervention in Libya, do we expect that when it is all over there will be more justice in North Africa than there is now? And if we intervene in Syria, is there a reasonable expectation that what comes after the end of the thugocracy in Syria will be better than before we went in? I ask this seriously. Iraq is certainly better off without Saddam and his thuggish sons, but there were probably better ways to accomplish that than a lengthy occupation.

Republics seldom do Imperialism with any great competence. Competent Empire requires long term commitments, and a number of subtleties including the use of silver bullets, puppet regimes, auxiliaries and foreign legions, and other devices that do not win popularity in free elections. Incompetent Empire can leave both patron and client worse off than before. Washington warned us not to become involved in the territorial disputes of Europe. It is not isolationism to understand that we don’t know how to achieve some otherwise desirable results; and it is unjust to go to war without a battle plan under which we can realistically expect the world to be better off after our intervention than it would be if we did not undertake it." (Bold typeface added for emphasis. - CAA.)

Part of strategic thinking (see the bolded passage above), involves knowing what sort of end state, what kind of strategic objective, you have in mind.

Now, I think the bar should be adjusted quite a bit when it comes to waging a defensive war, a war for national survival; since it's quite lofty thinking to expect national leaders to intellectually accept that because they have no "realistic" chance of success, they must not fight in self-defense.

"The Chinese have launched an aircraft carrier. Carriers are the force projection system par excellance. Viet Nam has reinstated conscription. Japan is considering expansion of its self-defence forces. Few others in the world are made joyful by the news. Taiwan announced a sale on missiles that can kill aircraft carriers."

The Chinese re-launced an aircraft carrier, the Varyag. The Kiev apparently did in fact become some sort of hotel/casino.

As Dr. Pournelle correctly states, aircraft carriers (and their associated battle groups) are the defining force projection systems of our time, along with ICBMs. One could make a similar argument in favor of amphibious or other long-ranch ground expeditionary capabilities.

CAA has, in writing, made the academic argument that the aircraft carrier, along with ICBMs, are the strategic military capabilities that make a superpower "super." That was CAA's essential thesis when writing a "one-hour essay" the first time taking the FSWE (back during the late pre-Cambrian period when the "written exam" involved actual writing.)

CAA stands by that argument, by the way.



8/14

re: "Cut The Defense Budget..And Get Others To Do More"

Christopher A. Preble at Big Peace questioned some basic strategic assumptions.

Money quote(s):

"The debt crisis is likely to force a reckoning between these two diametrically opposed positions. How it is resolved remains an open question.

Cutting military spending without changing our foreign policies will put additional burdens on a force strained by a decade of war. Sticking with the status quo will translate into heavier burdens on U.S. taxpayers. If the powers-that-be inside the Beltway decide that we should continue to discourage wealthy allies from defending themselves, then they should explain that to the American people.

So far, they have been unwilling to do that. Politicians claim that U.S. security requires us to act as the linchpin of the international order, that U.S. global economic interests require the U.S. military to be deployed to the four corners of the globe. Some believe that Americans are obligated to spread the blessings of liberty to others denied basic human rights.

These are ambitious goals. Achieving them costs a lot of money. The average American spends two and a half times more than the British or the French on national security, five times more than Germans, and seven and a half times as much as the average Japanese." (Bold typeface added for emphasis. - CAA.)

CAA happens to agree heartily with the bold portion of the passage quoted above.

America is not only a continental power, it is also a maritime power whose prosperity depends greatly upon open sealanes and international trade.

"(M)many Americans ask why they should accept cuts in domestic spending, and be saddled with more military spending, so that our allies can continue to spend on their domestic priorities, and, in many cases, cut defense spending."

Some of our allies are rather grudging about our overseas basing, other less so; except, of course, when they need their Libyan sources of petroleum and natural gas secured for them.

"(M)most Americans are fed up with building other people’s countries and fighting other people’s wars. Americans want security, but they doubt that we have to pay for everyone else’s to achieve our own.

Those who simply assume that others would not do more to defend themselves and their interests often ignore the extent to which U.S. actions have discouraged them from doing so. Just as some welfare recipients are often disinclined to look for work, foreign countries on the generous American security dole do not see a need to obtain military power. Our great power, and our willingness to use it, even when our own interests are not at stake, has allowed others to ignore possible threats, always confident that the United States will be there to rescue them."

CAA harbors grave doubts about our more outlandish ambitions with regards to some of our current nation-building assumptions. What is, for instance, the end state desired for all our development aid in Afghanistan? Do we expect Switzerland to come out of all this?

Similarly, CAA has noted with approval certain writers who've inserted the "free-rider" issue into their works of popular fiction.

"The National Security Strategy, published in May 2010, declares “There should be no doubt: the United States of America will continue to underwrite global security.” Taking their cue, U.S. allies have proved understandably disinterested in military spending.

If we are serious about sharing the burdens of global security with other countries, we must change course. Washington should be more reticent to send our troops into harm’s way when our own vital interests are not at stake. And we should shape our military to reflect the fact that we expect to be less involved militarily over the next two decades than we have been in the last two. A leaner, more focused U.S. military can no longer be in the business of defending other countries that can and should defend themselves." (Bold typeface added for emphasis. - CAA.)

The U.S. should not be sending our troops into harm's way unless our own vital interests are at stake.

Clearly and realistically identifying those vital interests is what a "National Security Strategy" is supposed to be doing. Instead we get open-ended twaddle like:

"There should be no doubt: the United States of America will continue to underwrite global security."

10/4

re: "Is Obama doubling down on a risky gamble in Iraq?"

Peter Feaver at Shadow Government ("Notes from the Loyal Opposition") had questions about that murky interface between military and national strategy, where political leaders do their decision-making.

Money quote(s):

"According to several unnamed sources, military commanders are "livid" with President Obama's decision to authorize a plan that is resourced at a fraction of the level that the military considered to be the minimum -- and even that minimum would only work "in extremis." Obama's approach appears to involve several multiples of risk beyond what the military consider prudent. Reportedly, even Secretary of State Hillary Clinton argued for a level of resources above what Obama appears to have authorized.

Reasonable people can disagree whether it makes national security sense for Obama to adopt such a risky path. For my part, I wish he had invested more effort in the Iraq file, especially working more closely with Prime Minister Maliki to push the process towards an outcome that is more favorable to American (and, I would argue, Iraqi national) interests.

The part that mystifies me is why his team thinks it makes political sense to have taken this course. His administration has already pocketed as much political benefit as there is to be wrung from Bush's surge -- and the media has generously refrained from pointing out that whatever positive developments came in Iraq came because of policies Obama and Biden tried strenuously to thwart in 2007. Given that the administration has already claimed Iraq as a great achievement, why take so risky a course now, one that could result in a great unraveling during the presidential campaign?"

The subtext here is the assumption that elected political leaders (or at least this elected political leader) make their big decisions based upon their personal calculus of electoral politics; rather than, say, the national good.

"The cost savings of denying the military the resources they say they need is trivial compared to the stakes. For that matter, the amount of time and effort it would have taken Obama to invest in Iraq policy so as to achieve greater progress with Maliki was probably trivial, too. Yet it seems that when it comes to Iraq, Obama is determined to do whatever is less than the minimum. "

Bug? Or feature?

9/7

re: "Unhappy Medium: The Perils of Annoyance as Your Strategic Default"

Joseph Fouche at Chicago Boyz examined some intellectual sandtraps to which American strategic thinkers are irresistably drawn.

Money quote(s):

"In its nineties heyday, techno-opiates promised a future where U.S. forces moved freely like network packets across an antiseptic information battlespace. These force “packets” would be effectively omniscient since enemy forces would continue to unheedingly mass Soviet style forces in large formations across flat, treeless, and unpopulated terrain. There the enemy could be anesthetized in detail with precision, with laser-guided fluffy down pillows lulling enemy soldiers gently to sleep. The American military would simply interpret resistance “as damage and route around it“. The result of such thinking was an American military that could deter a large country, destroy a medium-sized country, or occupy a small country.

This policy shift from the mass armies of mid-century America to its smaller and more élite just-in-time replacement assumed a strong ability to accurately see the future. This is understandable: part of any defense plan is building the force you want that lets you do what you want to create the future you want. Unfortunately, the most neglected yet important part of a defense plan is building the force you need to survive what you don’t want to do in a future you don’t want. Building a magic bullet force assumes you’ll always enjoy the luxury of fighting whoever, whatever, wherever, whenever, and however you want, protected by an all-seeing eye so powerful and so pervasive that it provides perfect predictive power. The power of prophecy will free you from the margin of safety supplied by the quantitative outputs of the 20th century with just-in-time margins supplied by the qualitative outputs of the 21st.

If the last decade should have taught Americans anything, it should have taught them that contemporary American can’t predict the future. However, the correct solution (stop treating false prophecy as gospel) has been widely ignored in favor of the wrong solution (bet everything on false prophecy, only this time more aggressively)." (Emphasis in original text. - CAA)

In the era of specialization (and over-specialization), military capabilities are best kept across a range of generalizations. To do otherwise creates opportunities for an assymetric opponent.

"In the wars of the 21st century, thousands died and trillions were spent based merely on the authority of prophecy that was little more predictive than the steely glint of Donald Rumsfeld’s bespectacled eyes and the firmness of his jaw. The result was a force that manfully struggled its way to relative operational success despite the obstacles the Pentagon put in its way. The military danced dreadfully close to the edge but escaped operationally unscathed. Strategically, however, the military’s combat forces are depleted by repeat overseas visits, its hospitals are packed with lifelong (patients), and its weaponry has a decade of wear and that will be expensive to replace if it ever is replaced. Such is the fate of a magic bullet force that found itself in wars that were more manpower and resource intensive than anticipated by Pentagon prophets."

Remember going "to war with the army you have"? And that bit of wisdom came from someone who'd had some considerable time to design and develop the sort of army he should have, rather than continuing on his pre-war quest for transformation.

( I was hotly furious when I first heard that soundbite from Sec. Rumsfeld and remain at least coldy so even today.)

" It may turn out that alternative forms for applying social violence like the mass participatory conscript armies that dominated between the American Civil War and Vietnam and the mass participatory electorates that coalesced to sustain them are obsolescent in today’s political economy as the Mongol hordes or the Greco-Macedonian phalanx.

The general principle remains: Master Sun wisely advised the warring kings of the late Spring and Autumn period to mix orthodox and unorthodox to produce victory. However, he would have never advised them to be all unorthodox all the time. The emphasis on élite formations on the scale envisioned by America’s most enthusiastic magic bulletheads seeks to institutionalize the unorthodox. Master Sun would have scoffed at this long-nosed red-headed Eastern barbarian idiocy. He knew that the unorthodox, when overemployed, ceases to be unorthodox and becomes orthodox." (Emphasis in original text. - CAA.)

7/9

re: "Unhappy Medium: The Perils of Annoyance as Your Strategic Default"

Joseph Fouche at Chicago Boyz discussed some pitfalls of U.S. strategizing.

Money quote(s):

"This policy shift from the mass armies of mid-century America to its smaller and more élite just-in-time replacement assumed a strong ability to accurately see the future. This is understandable: part of any defense plan is building the force you want that lets you do what you want to create the future you want. Unfortunately, the most neglected yet important part of a defense plan is building the force you need to survive what you don’t want to do in a future you don’t want. Building a magic bullet force assumes you’ll always enjoy the luxury of fighting whoever, whatever, wherever, whenever, and however you want, protected by an all-seeing eye so powerful and so pervasive that it provides perfect predictive power. The power of prophecy will free you from the margin of safety supplied by the quantitative outputs of the 20th century with just-in-time margins supplied by the qualitative outputs of the 21st.

If the last decade should have taught Americans anything, it should have taught them that contemporary American can’t predict the future. However, the correct solution (stop treating false prophecy as gospel) has been widely ignored in favor of the wrong solution (bet everything on false prophecy, only this time more aggressively)." (Emphasis in original text. - CAA.)

The application of business concepts to military organizations has been a U.S. characteristic since at least the U.S. mass mobilization of World War II. War on an industrial scale invited industrial engineering solutions. The over-influence of corporate business concepts on America's conduct of the Vietnam War need not be further discussed, except when/where lessons-learned are stubbornly resisted.

"In the wars of the 21st century, thousands died and trillions were spent based merely on the authority of prophecy that was little more predictive than the steely glint of Donald Rumsfeld’s bespectacled eyes and the firmness of his jaw. The result was a force that manfully struggled its way to relative operational success despite the obstacles the Pentagon put in its way. The military danced dreadfully close to the edge but escaped operationally unscathed. Strategically, however, the military’s combat forces are depleted by repeat overseas visits, its hospitals are packed with lifelong, and its weaponry has a decade of wear and that will be expensive to replace if it ever is replaced. Such is the fate of a magic bullet force that found itself in wars that were more manpower and resource intensive than anticipated by Pentagon prophets." (Bold typeface added for emphasis. - CAA.)

(7/9)

re: "Preparing for Defense Budget Cuts"

Herschel Smith at The Captain's Journal ("dedicated to the dissemination of conservative views, based on a solidly and consistently conservative world view, on matters political and military") ponders defense spending and America's geo-strategery.

Money quote(s):

"I have always been a proponent of wise defense spending, and cutting where there is no reasonably feasible return on investment"

Congressional pork-barrelling notwithstanding, defense spending really isn't about spending money in everyone's district, or shouldn't have been (but is).

"Defense Secretary Leon Panetta has indeed warned against sweeping defense cuts"

Note the caveats with which Mr. Hershel follows that statement.

"(I)f we fail to stop Iran’s increased hegemony in the Middle East, if we fail to prevent Iran from going nuclear, if our military power and resolve isn’t sufficient to prevent Russia from invading Georgia again, if we relinquish the Pacific to growing Chinese Naval provocations, if we fail to deal a decisive blow to the Taliban and al-Qaeda aligned fighters in the AfPak region, there will be war. Israel cannot allow Iran to develop a nuclear weapon. Eastern Europe is looking to the U.S. for direction, and our abandonment of a missile defense shield was indication that we aren’t serious about their security, much less entry into NATO. Russia is back up to their dirty tricks, and is poised to conduct yet another assault into Ossetia, and the Chinese still want Formosa."

That paragraph is a good a brief statement of America's current strategic challenges as any I have seen and is arguably better than some of the multipage national strategic papers with which the defense and intelligence communities have saddled themselves with.

"America has benefited from the defense doctrine of fighting our battles away from the homeland rather than allowing the threat to land on our own shores before we confront it. Troops are currently deployed in more than 100 countries, and while it may be a tantalizing prospect to withdraw from the entire world and focus inward, we should be careful what we advocate. It will be much more difficult to recreate that military presence and deterrent that it was to dismantle it, regardless of how much money we throw at the problems once they have become obvious.

Cuts are coming. That which cannot continue, won’t. That which cannot be sustained will fall by the wayside. The question is whether America will address the growing entitlement state, however painful, or retreat from the world, also painful, just in a completely different ways, and perhaps permanently."

Writers of speculative fiction such as John Birmingham have already started to make oodles of cash by considering just what a world without America, as a metaphor for American engagement in the world, would be like. Entertaining reading, but quite ghastly in long stretches.

re: "Obama's Afghanistan strategy and the right to be wrong"

Peter Feaver at Shadow Government ("Notes From The Loyal Opposition") considered the U.S. civil-military relationship.


Money quote(s):


"(F)rom the parochial perspective of civil-military relations theory, Obama is within his rights to make the decision in the way that he did, and so far, the senior military have behaved in an exemplary fashion."

That's a good BLUF ("bottom line up front"). Mr. Feaver then ratchets up his granularity a bit.


"(N)ot only will the coalition have fewer forces than the generals believe they require to implement the overall strategy effectively -- probably much fewer, as our allies respond to the dog whistle "retreat" sounding from the president's decision and accelerate their rush to the exits -- but those forces will be facing an enemy that has good reason to believe that time is on its side. The military brass report that the new course just might work, but it will be a very close run thing."

Nobody, least of all our allies, wants to be the last ones on the ground within a shrinking operational footprint. Still, we have the best troops in the world, capable of winning even when resourced to fail.

"Since the military logic of the move is so weak, one naturally looks for some other explanation, such as a political angle. The president's decision to interrupt next summer's fighting season makes no military sense whatsoever; better to let the troops finish the fighting season and come home in the late fall or winter. But that would be after the election. So far as I have been able to determine, that is the only explanation of the timeline that makes sense, but I am open to hearing a convincing counterargument. I am very reluctant to charge a president with elevating domestic political interests over national security ones because I remember how unfairly Democrats made that charge against President George W. Bush -- and that was on a much more flimsy evidentiary basis."

Civility. Accusing a sitting president of playing politics with U.S. soldier's lives is serious business. Sadly, better presidents than this one have done it before.

"(T)here is one aspect of the decision that is legitimate and one that may even warrant praise. The legitimate aspect is that, notwithstanding a torrent of leaks, the decision-making process seems to have conformed more or less to democratic civil-military norms. The military presented a range of options, including options that it did not want to execute; it would have been inappropriate of Gen. David Petraeus to tie Obama's hands by only providing a narrow range of options, minor variants of the military's preferred plan. He didn't do so; instead, he and the rest of the military leadership have saluted and are obeying, and such professionalism is very definitely worthy of praise. To be sure, the military gave its best personal judgment as to the risks inherent in those plans. Obama was fully aware of the military's judgment, and the public, through Congress, is also aware of that judgment. But it is the president's job to balance the risks of battlefield failure against other risks. The military gets to say this is a high-risk plan. The president gets to say that he will accept this risk and impose it on them.

Accept it and impose it he did. That has important political consequences. Before, one could say that he merely chose General Stanley McChrystal and General Petraeus's strategy. Now it is unmistakably President Obama's strategy. It is his war. But he will be ordering others to fight his war, which brings me to one bit of unfinished civil-military business."

So there's ownership of the outcome here, however it turns out. And we should all wish our commander-in-chief's plan every success in the world.

"I have been thinking of the troops that will remain. They are locked in the fight of their lives, and they (or at least their commanders) probably paid more attention to the president's speech than did most other Americans. Did the president give them a convincing rationale for continuing to risk their lives? Did he convince them that the stakes were worth it, that the prospects for lasting success good enough? Do they believe that their commander in chief is as committed to the war effort as he is asking them to be? Only when those answers are answered satisfactorily will Obama have fulfilled the dictates of democratic civil-military theory."

That's a real question asked by real troops on the ground. I know I asked it myself and, during the previous administration, I often found various civilian and military officials to be, shall we say, insufficiently serious about their commitment.

"From a civil-military perspective, the president has the right to be wrong. He might well be wrong this time, and if so, that may be evident to all by next fall. In that case, democratic theory points to the duty of others: the voters."

In the democratic model of civil-military relations, the voters get the final word on a commander-in-chief's fitness to lead the nation, to say nothing of the military. However it should never be forgotten that in other lands, at other times, a commander-in-chief's errors have been so serious as to take the civil-military relationship right out of the democratic context. The history or literary-minded will recall "It Can't Happen Here" was a warning, not a promise.