Vonclaustrophobia

Karlchen (“Little Carl”) Von Claustrowitz warned large states from undertaking adventurism in small states, inspiring the term “Vonclaustrophobia” (an irrational fear or aversion to military involvement in small or limited wars).

Described small wars as “the continuation of inter-office politics and bureaucratic in-fighting by violent means.”

Also coined under-appreciated terms like “the drizzle of war,” “abrasion” or "chafing" (which takes Friktion a logical step further to describe the damage that small, limited wars inflict even upon a military victor).

Admonitions include: “If you start to take Liechtenstein, take Liechtenstein.”

Karlchen (sometimes Charlotte) Von Claustrowitz was the sole heir of a family of Imperial knights in the Schwalmish foothills of Hessen’s Westerwald.

Born on the family Rittergut and educated the Academia Nassauensis in Herborn, during the Napoleonic period he participated in many small, unproductive military campaigns, eventually gaining command of his own field desk and camp stool.

Recently re-discovered in a dusty suggestion box in Marburg, his writings were nearly forgotten and lost to history as a result of parchment mold issues in the Hessian State Archives .

re: "Barno on Afghanistan; Exum still in his pajamas"

Abu Muqawama ("a blog dedicated to following issues related to contemporary insurgencies as well as counterinsurgency tactics and strategy") is clearly a "coffee achiever."

Money quote(s):

"Federal employees are supposed to arrive to work two hours late today, so taking my cue from them, I'm going to have that extra cup of coffee this morning before walking to the Metro in what will look like a scene out of Napoleon's retreat from Russia."

"Barno was one of those rare commanders in Afghanistan who actually put some thought into a little thing called "strategy," so his words are always valuable. Why we let this guy retire I have no idea. Perhaps it was because Barno made the mistake of spending too much time in the suspect 75th Imperial Ranger Regiment rather than that secretive and elite group of war-fighters known as the "U.S. Military Academy Department of Social Sciences." (Which, as we all know, is running the wars. That's right. The nerds you used to beat up in high school are now colonels and generals in the U.S. Army. No, I'm not sure how it happened either.)"

&

"This article really underlines the importance of partnering every combat operation with effective information operations in Afghanistan. If you don't have a plan to craft a narrative for what you're doing and to explain your actions to the population, you simply do not have a plan for success. This article illustrates precisely what happens when you let the other side run its information operations unopposed."