re: "Libya Exit Strategy"

James Joyner at Outside the Beltway ("an online journal of politics and foreign affairs analysis") should know better than this.

Money quote(s):

"an elementary concept on war planning, the requirement for an exit strategy."

Actually, although it apparently took Sec. Rumsfeld until 2005 to say it, the Weekly Standard discussed it as early as 2003: you want a victory strategy, not an "exit strategy."

"It’s a fundamental precept of national security policy going back to at least the writings of Carl von Clausewitz that wars are fought to achieve political ends and it follows that military strategy must be tailored to achieve political ends. Indeed, countries can lose wars in which their armies are absolutely dominant on the field of battle–as American forces were in Vietnam–if the fighting does not achieve the sought political objectives.

In order for military planners to match tactics and strategy, they must know what the end game is. In the case of total war, such as we fought in World War II, that’s pretty simple: The unconditional surrender of the enemy. In the case of humanitarian interventions, counterinsurgencies, and stability operations, however, it’s much harder.

The concept of an exit strategy is designed to spotlight this dilemma. Simply put: How do we know when we’ve won the damn thing and can stop fighting?"

I'm as Clausewitzian as the next guy (perhaps more), and agree with Mr. Joyner about that. It's the notion of an exit strategy versus one for victory or even a set of objectives or goals, an end state that is worth all the trouble, blood, and treasure that vexes me.

Language is important. The very use of the word "exit" together with "strategy" messages our essential unseriousness about the dead serious business of warfare, and causes our allies many sleepless nights. It signals that our most important objective is to leave, to be uninvolved, even as we commit men and materiel to a conflict.

"The bottom line is that the colonels Ricks is hearing complaining about the lack of an exit strategy aren’t asking for all the answers, just the most important one: What are they fighting for?"

Here we agree. What is our strategic grand objective? From that all lesser operational and strategic issues must necessarily flow.

re: "Libya, Libya, Libya"

The Curmudgeon Emeritus at Eternity Road opines on strategy and national interests.

Money quote(s):

"The most consequential error a commander can make is erroneously assuming that he knows his enemy's objective. Indeed, the bulk of analysis during a ground engagement goes into deducing the enemy's objective from his tactics. The underlying principle is so fundamental that it's almost invisible: You're fighting specifically to deny the enemy his objective, and to misconceive it all but guarantees that he'll reach it despite you.

On the other side of the ledger is your objective: the specific goal you're trying to reach in the circumstances before you. Oftentimes, it's merely the negation of your enemy's objective. In simple, two-contestant actions, that's almost always the case. That implies that at the end, either one of you will win and the other will lose, or both of you will retreat from your campaigns, having thwarted one another."

A commander on the ground has to worry about both tactics and operational art. Americans are spectacularly good at this stuff, btw. However, those are just the first two rungs of the ladder; there's strategy and grand strategy. But knowing your own objectives is essential and figuring out your adversary's is nearly as important.

"There are many players in this game. They're not limited to the Qaddafist forces and the rebels opposing them. The situation entangles many of the nations of Europe and the Middle East, plus supra-national forces such as the Muslim Brotherhood. America's own objectives are highly muddled, as it's unclear what outcome would benefit us at all, much less more than all other possible outcomes."

I like the way he thinks. Nice and convoluted-y.

"(A) good guideline for messes such as Libya is to defer making any irrevocable decisions until clarity should arrive. That guideline will sometimes leave us sitting on our hands while a golden opportunity passes by...but it will always prevent us from expending American blood and treasure to no gain, or to our ultimate rue."

&

"For the present, it's best to watch and wait. Given our military power and the relative weakness of all the other participants, no configuration of circumstances is likely to arise that couldn't possibly be undone in the future. Let's have a little clarity before exposing more of our bravest citizens to flying lead and anti-aircraft fire."

re: "Ho hum."

Col. B. Bunny at Eternity Road is asking a couple of excellent questions.

Money quote(s):

"Are there any elected officials within 100 miles of Washington, D.C. with a sense of urgency about national security? I’d settle for Congressional majorities composed of people who’ve simply seen “The Longest Day” and “Saving Private Ryan.” Forget profound strategic insight."

It's increasingly unclear to me whether there are any officials, in or out of uniform, at the policy making level who can conceptualize the military art at above the Operational level.

America does quite well at the Operational level.

American troops are actually positive geniuses at the Tactical level.

But when you start to talk Strategy or, heavens forfend, Grand Strategy, it becomes apparent that nobody's reading their Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, or even their Mao.