re: "The graveyard of Empires"

Chuck at From my position... On the Way! ("These are my own poorly arranged thoughts. They usually come to me during periods of when I can’t sleep and when under great stress.") assessed goals in Afghanistan.

Money quote(s):

"Empires throughout history have fought in Afghanistan.

I think that is the key thing to understanding these people. Their cultural/genetic memory is
imprinted with the idea that everyone else in the world can come here and kick
their asses until they get bored and go home.

I think it's really their driving factor, and why they seem so unwilling (beyond cell phones) to pull themselves out of the 13th century. Granted, they realize (and use to tremendous effect) that the US will pay, and pay, and pay, for their ridiculous "projects" to make this a better place. They'll likely end up with the third world's best infrastructure by the time we leave--and given their insecurity, animosity towards each other, and general bat-shit insanity, they'll quickly devolve into internal warfare. Warlord vs. Warlord in a winner takes all
cataclysm.

The winner of course, will get to take over all this wonderful infrastructure--and will likely tear it out and sell it to the highest bidder."

Particularly if it hurts a rival tribe. Tribalism is a reality in Afghanistan; it's not too much of an overstatement that, outside of Kabul, there really aren't too many people who would self-identify as Afghans ahead of their tribal identity. Tribalism, and the inevitable zero-sum game perspective, of this sort goes hand in hand with the lack of a social contract necessary for modernity.

"I don't really think of this place as a graveyard of empires--not the kind of place where empires come and are destroyed. It's more like the kind of place that empires come, see what it's like, realize that the only real solution outside of outright genocide is to dump prozac in every source of water and wait twenty years, realize that probably wouldn't work either, and then try to figure out the best way to just leave.

Unfortunately, we aren't there yet. I think we're getting closer to the "What's the point?" point, though. Staying here won't stop the spread of terrorism. Staying here won't make Afghanistan a stable democratic republic. Staying here won't remove the corruption, crime, or poverty. Staying here has no benefit to the US that I can see, long-term. The question that keeps popping into my head is "What's in it for us?" And I just can't seem to find an answer."

Goals and objectives. They are necessary for the development of any sort of strategy, at least if you intend for success to be anything but pure accident. And that's pretty much where we are after a decade; if we're "successful" in Afghanistan at anything (or possibly including) more than a retreat-under-fire from there when we finally pull out, it'll be a complete accident rather than the success of any one strategy, doctrine, policy, or negotiation.

"The second question of "is it worth it?" is even harder to answer. How do we quanitfy that? Is it worth it in terms of cost to the taxpayer? That goes back to "What's the point" and "How does this benefit the US?" What, exactly, are our strategic goals here? If being here is rooting out terrorists, we're playing whack-a-mole."

Nothing wrong with whack-a-mole, up to a point. But it's not a strategy for anything but marking time.

12/14

re: "Libya, Libya, Libya"

The Curmudgeon Emeritus at Eternity Road opines on strategy and national interests.

Money quote(s):

"The most consequential error a commander can make is erroneously assuming that he knows his enemy's objective. Indeed, the bulk of analysis during a ground engagement goes into deducing the enemy's objective from his tactics. The underlying principle is so fundamental that it's almost invisible: You're fighting specifically to deny the enemy his objective, and to misconceive it all but guarantees that he'll reach it despite you.

On the other side of the ledger is your objective: the specific goal you're trying to reach in the circumstances before you. Oftentimes, it's merely the negation of your enemy's objective. In simple, two-contestant actions, that's almost always the case. That implies that at the end, either one of you will win and the other will lose, or both of you will retreat from your campaigns, having thwarted one another."

A commander on the ground has to worry about both tactics and operational art. Americans are spectacularly good at this stuff, btw. However, those are just the first two rungs of the ladder; there's strategy and grand strategy. But knowing your own objectives is essential and figuring out your adversary's is nearly as important.

"There are many players in this game. They're not limited to the Qaddafist forces and the rebels opposing them. The situation entangles many of the nations of Europe and the Middle East, plus supra-national forces such as the Muslim Brotherhood. America's own objectives are highly muddled, as it's unclear what outcome would benefit us at all, much less more than all other possible outcomes."

I like the way he thinks. Nice and convoluted-y.

"(A) good guideline for messes such as Libya is to defer making any irrevocable decisions until clarity should arrive. That guideline will sometimes leave us sitting on our hands while a golden opportunity passes by...but it will always prevent us from expending American blood and treasure to no gain, or to our ultimate rue."

&

"For the present, it's best to watch and wait. Given our military power and the relative weakness of all the other participants, no configuration of circumstances is likely to arise that couldn't possibly be undone in the future. Let's have a little clarity before exposing more of our bravest citizens to flying lead and anti-aircraft fire."