re: "A Kind Word For Fortress Embassies, From A Surprising Source"

TSB at The Skeptical Bureaucrat (" In the words of Dr. Evil, "the details of my life are quite inconsequential." However, I will say that I work in a small branch office of the foreign affairs department of the Washington DC area's largest employer. ") was surprised by support for robust embassy security (from an unlikely source).

Money quote(s):

"The Washington Diplomat had an article on embassy architecture versus security the other day (America’s Embassy Building Boom Fortifies Diplomacy, Security Abroad), which I thought was only mildly interesting until I got to the obligatory quote from Jane Loeffler. She is our foremost - only? - historian of diplomatic architecture, and premier critic of Fortress Embassies, and no article on the subject would be complete without her remarks.

Normally in an article of this sort, Dr. Loeffler provides unrelenting criticism of defensive embassy architecture, and then it's left to some poor Department spokesman or project architect to put up a weak rebuttal about the need for security. But this time, Dr. Loeffler played for the other team."

CAA has Dr. Loeffler's book. She raises perfectly valid points about the tension between wanting attractive architecture, suitable for the day-to-day working of diplomacy, and the onerous needs for security measures.

There will always be a tension between the ideal, which would be, I suppose, a sort of park-like campus without walls, and what's necessary to hinder bad actors from murdering our staff and guests.

"(T)he risks of terrorism can be high even in purportedly low-threat countries such as Latvia and Malta. For example, that new secure embassy in Malta replaced one that was located inside a multi-tenant commercial office building, a type of property in which it would never have been able to achieve satisfactory security.

If we are serious about moving our people out of high-risk situations and into better and more secure buildings, then our new embassies will inevitably have to have certain fortress-y characteristics. I'm not saying we need to go medieval and do the whole castle-on-an-island, but our embassies will need features such as setback distance from surrounding streets if they are to be reasonably well-protected against physical attack."

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re: "UN's Compound In Mazar-i-Sharif Was Not Well Protected "

TSB at The Skeptical Bureaucrat ("Giving my fellow Americans the view from my cubicle") gives a professional evaluation of the site security at the scene of this massacre.

Money quote(s)

"(T)he UN Mission relied on the presence of local police and their own (third country national) armed guards to deter mobs. They evidently did not put up the kinds of physical barriers - high perimeter walls and gates, entry control facilities, protected guard booths and police fighting position, etc., - that would have delayed and channeled the mob, and made it more feasible for the armed presence to prevent anyone from entering.

Without that element of physical delay, guards and police can't be fully effective."

"Inside the UN compound, the headquarters building likewise lacked physical security relevant to a mob attack."

"While most people will assume that any wall, door, or window that was built to resist bomb blast will also resist small arms fire and forced entry, that is not at all the case. In order to protect people against a prolonged mob attack that uses small arms and improvised hand tools ("hammers or whatever they could find") you need products that were specifically designed for that purpose, like the ones that U.S. embassies use.

FYI, for a detailed description of how those embassy products are tested, and I do mean detailed, see this article in an old issue of a construction trade journal."

&

"(T)he international community might want to take a lesson from our Fortress Embassies"

This last might be more difficult than you'd think, since it would require a mental shift from the "we're the UN, everyone loves us" to "some of our ungrateful public may try to kill us" mindset.

Also, there's a reason for all those security features we saddle ourselves with, they're really not there just to employ hardware manufacturers in favored congressional districts.

re: "New Design for London Embassy"

Digger at Life After Jerusalem ("The musings of a Two-Spirit American Indian, Public Diplomacy-coned Foreign Service Officer") is willing to accept the risks of diplomatic service overseas, but doesn't counsel foolishness either.

Money quote(s):

"So much of the debate of "fortress embassies" has portrayed the issue as either-or. We can either keep our diplomats safe or we can have attractive, inviting embassies. And much of what I have seen has fallen on the side of "we are really being paranoid...we need to be more inviting." Sorry, but since I don't get a gun or bullet-proof vest, and since terrorists DO like to target diplomats overseas, I like safe embassies."

Too much of the criticism of our "fortress embassies" comes from those who will never work in them nor ever deploy overseas with the proverbial bullseye of U.S. government service emblazoned on their backs.

"(L)ike our soldiers, I know that serving my country is dangerous. And like them, I want to be able to control the amount of danger as much as possible."

re: "Quickie: That Fortress Embassy in Haiti Stood Up to Quake's Shaking"

Domani Spero at DiploPundit ("just one obsessive compulsive observer, dipomatic watcher, opinionator and noodle newsmaker.... monitoring the goings on at Foggy Bottom and elsewhere in the worldwide available universe") reports that it's not all bad to have a "fortress embassy."