Security Decisions, part the second

This earlier post discussed the application of security standards to existing buildings in terms of some of the limitations that reality imposed.  That is, that along with prohibitive expense, the practicality of such endeavors rests firmly somewhere in the range between Extremely Difficult and Bliddy Impossible.

Diplomacy, like politics, is an art of the possible.  Diplomatic security must matrix both the imperative to provide security, to protect, with the need to carry out  the diplomatic mission itself.  Sometimes that means that the security situation is so dire that the diplomatic mission must be abandoned; other times the diplomatic mission will be considered so imperative that security measures take a backseat.  Or are adapted to fit the situation.  Thus we have active and ongoing diplomatic missions, and have for years, in countries where we would otherwise have shuttered our embassies and evacuated our staff.  E.g., Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan.

Libya might be considered a reasonable addition to that list.

States are responsible, under the Vienna Conventions and customary international law, for providing the protection necessary to secure those diplomatic and consular facilities which it has accepted within its territory.  Not being an area expert on Libya specifically or the Mahgreb generally (but not being completely ignorant of those regions either), the question of just how much control the new, post-Qhadafi, central government of Libya has beyond the city limits of Tripoli seems fairly relevent with respect to how much the U.S. should have relied upon them to provide adequate security to our facilities in Benghazi.

Just what the purpose of the U.S. mission in Benghazi was is still very much an open question, the opening of an “American Corner” notwithstanding.  But its purpose(s) were (was?) of sufficient importance to the accomplishing of the larger goals of the U.S. diplomatic mission in Libya that:

- It was established in the first place (to the accompaniment of whatever security waivers and exceptions may have been necessary to do so); and

- It remained upon until it was destroyed; and

- Amb. Stevens believed it necessary to travel there on as inauspicious a date as the 11^th anniversary of 9/11.

Now, CAA is going to pull back the gauzy veil that obscures some of the nuts-and-bolts of actual diplomacy with some observations and caveats.

Caveat #1:  CAA doesn’t know what the purpose of the Benghazi mission (beyond what little can be found at the embassy website) was because it is not now nor has it ever been part of my professional portfolio.  If there’s some especially classified aspect to that mission, as a professional matter CAA has had no need-to-know.  So I don’t know.

Caveat #2:  As someone who’s held a top secret clearance since before he could legally drink hard liquer, CAA realized decades ago that the possession of certain secrets meant that forever after, with respect to some fields of endeavor, even my guesses could be considered to be classified information.  So there are quite a fews things about which, due to the meandering nature of what I laughingly describe as my “career path,” CAA does not speculate aloud.  And CAA certainly does not do so in public fora such as the internet.

Observation #1:  Technically, there are a few clearcut categories of U.S. diplomatic facilities located overseas:  embassies, consulates general, and consulates. 

(But real life is never that neat and clearly delineated.)

Observation #2:  Since the breakup of Yugoslavia (if not before) and U.S. intervention in the Balkans, the State Department came up with things called “U.S. Liaison Offices” (or “USLO”).  These were kinda/sorta consulates, in that they often performed the sorts of services usually associated with U.S. consulates, but were generally not intended as permanent facilities.  USLOs sometimes get upgraded into more-or-less permanent posts and become consulates or consulates general; other times they are eventually closed.  The U.S. has continued using this model in places like Iraq.

Observation #3:  Once upon a time, CAA used to go TDY from the U.S. and participate in surveys of various U.S. diplomatic facilities.  Never mind what kind of surveys:  the point is that my teams would visit every U.S. diplomatic office in a particular country.  Off the top of my head I did that in eight or nine countries around Africa and the Middle East.  In some of the countries where we had a largish diplomatic presence, we might have “official” Americans scattered in penny-parcels across a vast landscape, all of them falling under the authority of the chief of mission (i.e., the U.S. ambassador) and all of the going about the legitimate business of foreign affairs, international development, or military assistance (to list just three examples).

So I don’t find it especially mysterious or troubling that the U.S. had an official office-building in Benghazi that wasn’t formally flagged as a consulate (or consulate general) under a U.S. consul (or consul general).

re: "A Kind Word For Fortress Embassies, From A Surprising Source"

TSB at The Skeptical Bureaucrat (" In the words of Dr. Evil, "the details of my life are quite inconsequential." However, I will say that I work in a small branch office of the foreign affairs department of the Washington DC area's largest employer. ") was surprised by support for robust embassy security (from an unlikely source).

Money quote(s):

"The Washington Diplomat had an article on embassy architecture versus security the other day (America’s Embassy Building Boom Fortifies Diplomacy, Security Abroad), which I thought was only mildly interesting until I got to the obligatory quote from Jane Loeffler. She is our foremost - only? - historian of diplomatic architecture, and premier critic of Fortress Embassies, and no article on the subject would be complete without her remarks.

Normally in an article of this sort, Dr. Loeffler provides unrelenting criticism of defensive embassy architecture, and then it's left to some poor Department spokesman or project architect to put up a weak rebuttal about the need for security. But this time, Dr. Loeffler played for the other team."

CAA has Dr. Loeffler's book. She raises perfectly valid points about the tension between wanting attractive architecture, suitable for the day-to-day working of diplomacy, and the onerous needs for security measures.

There will always be a tension between the ideal, which would be, I suppose, a sort of park-like campus without walls, and what's necessary to hinder bad actors from murdering our staff and guests.

"(T)he risks of terrorism can be high even in purportedly low-threat countries such as Latvia and Malta. For example, that new secure embassy in Malta replaced one that was located inside a multi-tenant commercial office building, a type of property in which it would never have been able to achieve satisfactory security.

If we are serious about moving our people out of high-risk situations and into better and more secure buildings, then our new embassies will inevitably have to have certain fortress-y characteristics. I'm not saying we need to go medieval and do the whole castle-on-an-island, but our embassies will need features such as setback distance from surrounding streets if they are to be reasonably well-protected against physical attack."

4/2

re: "See No Evil"

Richard Fernandez at Belmont Club described some uncomfortable truths.

Money quote(s):

"When Admiral Mike Mullen told the Senate that Pakistan directed the attack on the US embassy in Kabul it probably surprised no one. And when the Spectator sadly concluded that the Euro has finally been proved a swindle, probably not many were shocked many either. America has been stabbed in the back by it’s allies; its ‘partners against terrorism’. And Europe has been misled by its leaders."

Pakistan is, like unto it's near-neighbor Iran, is not a monolithic unitary entity. Not just within its governmental structure, but even within its military and intelligence organs there are factions and competing power bases, each with their own sets of interests and agendas.

So yes, Pakistanis.

(As for Europe's leaders, well, that's what you get for electing prime ministers and the like through a parliamentary system rather than the way we do it here. Our accountability mechanism isn't so diffuse as theirs is.)

"Did anyone expect the US to reorient its position away from Afghanistan and confront Pakistan? Does anyone believe the EU will give up the Euro, even if it is manifestly ruining them? Policy is no longer the art of doing the right thing. It is the craft of carrying forward a narrative.

Mullen said that “with ISI support, Haqqani operatives planned and conducted that truck bomb attack, as well as the assault on our embassy,” and “we also have credible evidence that they were behind the June 28th attack against the Inter-Continental Hotel in Kabul and a host of other smaller but effective operations.” Most tellingly he added “the Haqqani network acts as a veritable arm of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence Agency.” Pakistan attacked the national territory of a country at which it was at peace, that had supported it in the past diplomatically and from which it receives billions of dollars in aid. It was an act as perfidious as the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. Nor is this the worst of it. It is not inconceivable to think that al-Qaeda was also a “veritable arm of Pakistan’s ISI, though perhaps with assistance from the Middle East."

Politics is the art of the possible. As long as we remain engaged in Afghanistan, we need Pakistan. So Pakistan, and its sub-entities, get cut a lot of slack.

That being said, anyone who thinks we're in Afghanistan for the long haul is much more optimistic (if that's the right word) than CAA has been since 9/11. So Pakistan should enjoy its "immunity" while it can.

(In a more civilized age, I'd be confident that somewhere, in a Quiet Room, someone is making a little list.)

"(J)ust as the appeasers have now about abolished the last remaining justification for national self defense and as the Left continued to operate on the Western side of the Berlin Wall in the guise of their transnational schemes, nothing in recent history indicates that being correct about an issue settles anything. Being right has nothing to do with politics. It’s what you can sell that counts."

Once the Berlin Wall came down (and after the Left completed a period of ritual mourning), the reds re-branded themselves as greens, social democrats, &tc. It wasn't, for them, a very far walk after all. (And continued their struggle against human liberty, &tc.)

"The market is writing down the value of the world economy. Right across the board. It is making a judgement on what they think the future is worth. By recent numbers, not much. Not just because policymakers have gotten it wrong about the “root cause” of terrorism, or the Euro; but also about “Too Big To Fail”, population policy, multiculturalism, a crippling environmentalism and Global Warming, to name a few. The financial, national security and educational systems of the world are in utter collapse because they are stuffed with lies, which even when they are shown to be obviously false suck up trillions of dollars in their pursuit. And nothing will turn the global elites from continuing their ruinous path until they have spent the last nickle and dime they can lay their hands on. Certainly not the media." (Bold typeface added for emphasis. - CAA.)

Garbage in, garbage out. And if you find enough ratholes to throw enough money down (e.g., "“Too Big To Fail”, population policy, multiculturalism, a crippling environmentalism and Global Warming"), you ought not be surprised that there's an economic cost.

"Neither the BBC nor any of the similar organizations which have jointly created our fantasy world will return to honesty. Not until it annihilates itself into bankruptcy along with all the other causes it touted and supported."

9/22

re: "It Is 3 AM And The Phone Is Ringing In The White House "

Hugh Hewitt at the Hewitt Blog is not being too alarmist.

Money quote(s):

"Right now the late '70s are back in reruns with Egypt playing the role of Iran. At a minimum, increase the security at the U.S. Embassy."

Not to be too snarky, but I'm curious what exactly are the sort of measures Mr. Hewitt had in mind for this.

Think about it. Seriously. Airports closed. Hundreds of thousands of people demonstrating in the area where the embassy is located. Tanks in the streets.

Basic questions like what sort of security, where does it come from, how does it get there, is it supportable and for how long?

Trust me, there are people whose professions are to ask, and have the answers, for this sort of thing.