re: "My New York Times Mini Op-Ed'

Peter Van Buren at We Meant Well ("How I Helped Lose the Battle for the Hearts and Minds of the Iraqi People") shared some observations and predictions.

Money quote(s):

"The State Department’s reduction of staff in Iraq is the final act of the American invasion. The war is now really over.

The U.S. has finally acknowledged that Iraq is not its most important foreign policy story."

This is due to a couple-three factors.

First, the change in administrations. The Bush administration made the invasion and reconstruction effort in Iraq a national priority or mission. That national priority or mission drove things like causing Iraq embassy and PRT personnel requirements to, along with similar requirements in Afghanistan (and, to a degree, Pakistan) drive the Foreign Service's human resources engine.

As CAA predicted before the CPA was ever replaced by an actual U.S. embassy mission, Iraq was going to be the tail that wagged our assignments system dog. For better or worse.

The U.S. post-war reconstruction and security effort in Iraq, as of January 2009, became the Obama administration's war to lose.

Second, and deriving from the first, with the withdrawal of U.S. combat forces from Iraq, what media attention still focused there has dissipated. Until such time as things really go south, and the networks can get footage of helicopters lifting U.S. diplomats from the embassy's rooftops, that not really going to change.

"(O)nly days after the U.S. military withdrawal, the world’s largest embassy watched helplessly as Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki tried to arrest his own vice president, who fled to Kurdistan where Iraqi government forces are powerless to intervene."

What's that saying about history repeating itself as farce?

In any case, this episode alone makes the prognostications of others, such as Vice President Biden if I recall correctly, about Iraq best becoming three separate countries, a lot less risible. Likewise for the post-pandemic predictions of John Ringo.

"The U.S. has finally acknowledged that Iraq is not its most important foreign policy story, and that America’s diplomats cannot survive on their own in the middle of a civil war. The embassy will eventually shrink to the small-to-medium scale that Iraq requires (think Turkey or Jordan). America’s relationship will wither into the same uneasy state of half-antagonistic, half-opportunistic status that we enjoy with the other autocrats in the Middle East. Maliki will continue to expertly play the U.S. off the Iranians and vice versa. U.S. military sales and oil purchases will assure him the soft landing someday of a medical visa to the United States à la Ali Abdullah Saleh of Yemen, and not the sanctioned disposal awaiting Bashar al-Assad of Syria."

The prediction piece of Brother Van Buren's article could do with some un-packing. Frankly, the second part of the first sentence is simply not so. The U.S. continues, in Iraq and Afghanistan (and, to a degree, Pakistan) to expect our diplomats to "survive on their own in the middle of a civil war." They just do. I can't explain it.

2/11

re: "diplomacy"

CAA (that's me!) continued his response to Jeff Emanuel's post at RedState:, responding to Jack_Savage's comment of Friday, February 10th at 8:40 AM EST(link).

Jack Savage said:

"When we are in a foreign land, aren’t we ALL diplomats?"

My response:

"Only when we screw up.

Seriously, I got that same briefing as a Private (E-2) in Germany back during the Bad Old Days (TM) of The Cold War as well.

So in a broad-swath philosophical sense that’s true.

From a perspective of international law (specifically the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations), anybody we send over on a diplomatic passport (IF THEY ARE GRANTED A DIPLOMATIC VISA BY THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT) is a “diplomat.”

But in terms of reality, it’s our Foreign Service Officers (FSO; both from State, USAID, and Dept. of Commerce “Foreign Commercial Service) and Foreign Service Specialists (FSS) who are “actual” diplomats by training and profession.

You could add to that some (but not all) of the various attaches (such as military ones) from other government “tenant agencies” as they get specialized training for working in a diplomatic environment."


2/11

re: "US Embassy Iraq Staffing: To Slash or Not to Slash, That is the Question"

Domani Spero at Diplopundit ("an obsessive compulsive observer, diplomatic watcher, and opinionator who monitors the goings on at ‘Foggy-Bottom’ (i.e. the State Department) and the “worldwide available” universe from Albania to Zimbabwe") looked at the problem of right-sizing AmbEmb Baghdad.

Money quote(s):

"One of the most expensive part of Embassy Baghdad’s operation is security protection. So when the spokesperson says that the embassy is “currently too dependent on contractors” and that “we can do more with Iraqi staff” in one breath, one has to wonder if this includes having Iraqis provide local security protection for the embassy. Are armed Iraqi guards protecting our unarmed diplomats around the Green Zone and across Iraq, an option on the right-sizing table?

See, if State slashes the number of expensive contractors but won’t slash the number of diplomats, who will perform the necessary security protection? I understand that there are 200 Diplomatic Security Agents assigned in Iraq (where a traditional embassy normally gets 2-3), but that number won’t be enough to provide security protection for 1,600-2,000 diplomats.

As an aside, we’ve been training and arming Afghan soldiers in Afghanistan who in turn have used the guns and the training we’ve provided them to kill our own soldiers and coalition forces. And those are not isolated one or two cases. I just feel the need to mention that."

Going local with our embassy security services in Iraq is just chock full of fail. CAA sincerely advises against it and hopes that whomever, if anyone, is considering it do so swiftly and decisively in the negative.

"Iraqi staff at the US Embassy only need a year of service before qualifying for special immigrant visas to the United States (in other places, local employees need 15-20 years of service before qualifying for SIVs). Which means American officials are not the only ones learning on the job with each new rotation into Iraq. Local employees, traditionally the backbone of an embassy operation, are on Iraq’s case, in a state of perpetual training. Just as soon as they learn their jobs, they’re off to a new life in the United States. Then the embassy in Baghdad is off to recruiting and training new local employees to replaced the ones who left."

CAA doesn't find fault, exactly, with our Special Immigrant (SIV) program designed to save the lives of our local staff, as well as the military-employed folks for whom it was originally intended. Another situation chock full of good intentions that bites us where it hurts in terms of ongoing operations. This amounts to a self-inflicted brain drain.

2/9

re: "Costs"

CAA (that's me!) continued his response to Jeff Emanuel's post at RedState:, responding to snowshooze's comment of Friday, February 10th at 2:00 PM EST(link).

snowshooze said:

"Are you guys really thinking there is any sanity in that?"

My response:

"Building an embassy complex to securely house not only our diplomatic mission but the management of a national reconstruction effort in a combat zone where they take indirect fire every day (including during construction) is going to cost a lot.

A lot.

And when I say “house,” I mean not only their working spaces (and warehouses, workshops, &tc. to support that work) but actual living quarters BECAUSE NONE OF IT MAY BE SAFELY PLACED OUTSIDE OF YOUR SECURITY PERIMETER.

For some perspective, take a look at The Skeptical Bureaucrat’s latest post: http://skepticalbureaucrat.blogspot.com/2012/02/and-another-thing-about-that-baghdad.html

TSB and I go way back. He knows whereof he speaks and is a security professional second to none."



2/11

re: "See No Evil"

Richard Fernandez at Belmont Club described some uncomfortable truths.

Money quote(s):

"When Admiral Mike Mullen told the Senate that Pakistan directed the attack on the US embassy in Kabul it probably surprised no one. And when the Spectator sadly concluded that the Euro has finally been proved a swindle, probably not many were shocked many either. America has been stabbed in the back by it’s allies; its ‘partners against terrorism’. And Europe has been misled by its leaders."

Pakistan is, like unto it's near-neighbor Iran, is not a monolithic unitary entity. Not just within its governmental structure, but even within its military and intelligence organs there are factions and competing power bases, each with their own sets of interests and agendas.

So yes, Pakistanis.

(As for Europe's leaders, well, that's what you get for electing prime ministers and the like through a parliamentary system rather than the way we do it here. Our accountability mechanism isn't so diffuse as theirs is.)

"Did anyone expect the US to reorient its position away from Afghanistan and confront Pakistan? Does anyone believe the EU will give up the Euro, even if it is manifestly ruining them? Policy is no longer the art of doing the right thing. It is the craft of carrying forward a narrative.

Mullen said that “with ISI support, Haqqani operatives planned and conducted that truck bomb attack, as well as the assault on our embassy,” and “we also have credible evidence that they were behind the June 28th attack against the Inter-Continental Hotel in Kabul and a host of other smaller but effective operations.” Most tellingly he added “the Haqqani network acts as a veritable arm of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence Agency.” Pakistan attacked the national territory of a country at which it was at peace, that had supported it in the past diplomatically and from which it receives billions of dollars in aid. It was an act as perfidious as the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. Nor is this the worst of it. It is not inconceivable to think that al-Qaeda was also a “veritable arm of Pakistan’s ISI, though perhaps with assistance from the Middle East."

Politics is the art of the possible. As long as we remain engaged in Afghanistan, we need Pakistan. So Pakistan, and its sub-entities, get cut a lot of slack.

That being said, anyone who thinks we're in Afghanistan for the long haul is much more optimistic (if that's the right word) than CAA has been since 9/11. So Pakistan should enjoy its "immunity" while it can.

(In a more civilized age, I'd be confident that somewhere, in a Quiet Room, someone is making a little list.)

"(J)ust as the appeasers have now about abolished the last remaining justification for national self defense and as the Left continued to operate on the Western side of the Berlin Wall in the guise of their transnational schemes, nothing in recent history indicates that being correct about an issue settles anything. Being right has nothing to do with politics. It’s what you can sell that counts."

Once the Berlin Wall came down (and after the Left completed a period of ritual mourning), the reds re-branded themselves as greens, social democrats, &tc. It wasn't, for them, a very far walk after all. (And continued their struggle against human liberty, &tc.)

"The market is writing down the value of the world economy. Right across the board. It is making a judgement on what they think the future is worth. By recent numbers, not much. Not just because policymakers have gotten it wrong about the “root cause” of terrorism, or the Euro; but also about “Too Big To Fail”, population policy, multiculturalism, a crippling environmentalism and Global Warming, to name a few. The financial, national security and educational systems of the world are in utter collapse because they are stuffed with lies, which even when they are shown to be obviously false suck up trillions of dollars in their pursuit. And nothing will turn the global elites from continuing their ruinous path until they have spent the last nickle and dime they can lay their hands on. Certainly not the media." (Bold typeface added for emphasis. - CAA.)

Garbage in, garbage out. And if you find enough ratholes to throw enough money down (e.g., "“Too Big To Fail”, population policy, multiculturalism, a crippling environmentalism and Global Warming"), you ought not be surprised that there's an economic cost.

"Neither the BBC nor any of the similar organizations which have jointly created our fantasy world will return to honesty. Not until it annihilates itself into bankruptcy along with all the other causes it touted and supported."

9/22

re: "Sticking It Out"

CAA (that's me!) continued his response to Jeff Emanuel's post at RedState:, responding to Marcus_Traianus' comment of Thursday, February 9th at 1:29 PM EST(link).

Marcus said:

"I was only thinking they would eat MRE’s until they could get to Liberty for some Taco Bell or BK. Either that or to hold them over until the crudites dip was replenished in a week.

Realistically DoS is always a crap shoot. But I think he was hoping for Europe, Scandinavia or even Namibia (Ja, sie sprechen Deutsch). It’s like another guy I know who speaks fluent Spanish and ended up in Rome (where he became a chain smoker waiting for the constant PLO threatened attacks on the embassy).

Look, I don’t like whiners not matter where they live. There is always someone who has it a lot worse. Plus this Walmart-Embassy in Iraq was really not well thought out. That above all else is obvious."

My response:

"I hope your friend stuck it out and got a German-speaking post eventually. While not as widely useful as, say, French or Spanish, it’s certainly not a “boutique language” where you go to a lot of effort learning it and there’s only one place that speaks it (Slovenian, Estonian, that sort of language). With German, you’ve got utility in not only the (several, but not as many as there used to be) posts in Germany, but in Austria and Switzerland as well.

Italian isn’t bad for a Spanish speaker to learn, and Rome a lot nicer than some of the places Spanish speakers get assigned.

As a working level diplomat, I’m not really privy to the big policy-level decisions like “what’s our post-invasion plan for Iraq” or “how big should our embassy be in Iraq.” But those decisions were generally made outside of State or at its very highest levels; i.e., by political appointees."

2/9

re: "Numbers"

CAA (that's me!) continued his response to Jeff Emanuel's post at RedState:, responding to Jack_Savage's comment of Thursday, February 9th at 10:14 PM EST(link).

Jack Savage said:

"Maybe it is because they really don’t do much of anything, and if they do anything, they don’t have a lot to show for it.

Example: You have the finest diplomats on the planet in Baghdad – 16,000 of them, as a matter of fact – and they can’t figure out a way to negotiate getting food shipments in a timely fashion? In a country we rescued from a dictator at great cost in lives and money? And their only strategy to achieve this objective is to whine to the New York Times?

And you seem to think they prevent wars and keep our enemies at bay?

Spare me."

My response:

"According to the original post (above), there _aren’t_ 16,000 diplomats at the Baghdad embassy.

“So the wizards at State has suddenly realized that constructing a 104-acre, $750,000,000.00 embassy complex and building up the embassy staff to 16,000 people (including 2,000 diplomats and several times more contractors), without running either by the Iraqis first, “may have been ill advised.” ”

So support staff is 16,000 (presumably that includes locally-hired Iraqi staff members as well) handling all the support, medical, transportation, SECURITY, &tc. that used to be handled by the U.S. military because those services are/were either unavailable in Iraq or untrustworthy.

Leaving 2,000, of which probably a fifth are specialists of one sort (security, management, communications, administration) supporting the other 80 percent. Figure several hundred of that remainder are program specialists or attaches of one sort or another who belong to “tenant agencies” (such as USAID).

Frankly, if even 2 or 3 hundred of that figure are actual State Dept. commissioned foreign service officers (i.e., actual diplomats) I’d be surprised.

And wasn’t VP Biden “all over” getting that SOFA negotiated? (crickets)

Lastly, as I was ranting to the missus earlier today, too many people working either for State or at our embassies are under the mistaken impression that the New York Times and/or the Washington Post are somehow “on their side,” probably because they foolishly hold the same sorts of demented transnational progressive worldviews espoused by those fishwraps. The truth is that the NYT and the WP are never happier than when they can embarrass those who serve our country, whether that’s in uniform or out of it."

2/9

re: "Stop “whining” about the salad bar to the NYT, it’s “inappropriate”"

Domani Spero at Diplopundit ("one of the best niche blogs for Foreign Service folks") correctly identified some unfair criticism.

Money quote(s):

"You’ve heard about that earth shaking news on the US Embassy staffing in Iraq? The State Department Spokesperson Victoria Nuland had to address the topic in yesterday’s Daily Press Briefing, and threw our Embassy Baghdad employees under the bus. How could you, Victoria?"

Amb. Nuland's bio can be read here. Her previous postings include (from most-recent to earliest):

2010-11 "Special Envoy for Conventional Armed Forces in Europe," (D.C.-based, presumably lots of time elsewhere);
2008-9 National War College, (Ft. McNair, D.C.);
2005-8 NATO, (Brussels, Belgium);
2003-5 "Principal Deputy National Security Advisor to the Vice President," (D.C.);
2000-3 NATO, (Brussels, Belgium);
1999-2000 "two years at the Council on Foreign Relations as a “Next Generation” Fellow," (D.C. or NYC, presumably);
1997-9 Department of State (D.C.);
1996-7 "State Department Fellow" at CFR, (D.C. or NYC, presumably);
1993-6 "Chief of Staff to the Deputy Secretary of State," (D.C.);
1991-3 Moscow, (Russia);
1988-90 Soviet Desk, (D.C.);
1988 Ulaanbaatar, (Mongolia);
1987 State Dept., (D.C.);
1985-6 Guangzhou, (China);

Draw your own conclusions about this particular career trajectory, but Amb. Nuland is clearly what the Air Force would call a "fast burner." She's gone straight to the top.

(By way of disclaimer, CAA has never met the lady in person but has heard her speak (live) and was favorably impressed.)

That being said, she's probably not the best person to go on record characterizing her fellow employees, stationed in what is still a war zone, as "wingeing."

"(J)ust to be clear, not enough aragula has never been a hardship in Iraq or in other diplomatic posts around the world. Salad greens are not foremost in your mind, especially if you need to wash them in Clorox, and rinse them with bottled water three times before you eat them. Freeze-dried aragula is much better, yum! Of course, the US Embassy in Iraq is unlike any other in the world. Our diplomats cannot just run out to a grocery store in the Green Zone to buy lunch or dinner, or even tree bark coffee. It turns out their food supply had to be brought in from elsewhere.

And so if they are now low on sugar or Splenda, or if the cafeteria is rationing chicken wings on chicken wings night, you gotta ask the question — what happened to the command and supply structure?" (Bold typeface added for emphasis. - CAA.)

As Omar Bradley may (or may not have) said: "Amateurs study tactics, while professionals study logistics." All the synergy, transformation, and press releases in the world won't matter if our embassy staff in Baghdad have to start relying on local sources of provinder.

Would you trust that foodstuffs procured locally, and in mass, from Iraqi vendors, would be safe from tampering, adulteration, or even more lethal substitution?

"Did State anticipate that crossing the borders now manned by Iraqis would be messy? Did they anticipate that the Iraqis would want to approve/deny entry of supply convoys but that the government may have no process in place, but will never admit it? Did State anticipate the multiple layers of bureaucracy required to approve entry of frozen chicken wings, and salad bar weeds trucked in from Kuwait? Is there a new SOP on what to do if the Iraqi guards do on chay break the rest of the day while supply trucks gets barbequed under the sun?"

As Messrs. Ringo and Kratman wrote in "Yellow Eyes," Ch. 8 (sec. 1, cl. 7): "The ability of a State Department fool to deny unpleasant reality is deservedly the stuff of legend."


2/8

re: "Something Like That"

CAA (that's me!) continued his response to Jeff Emanuel's post at RedState:, responding to Locked and Loaded 's comment of Thursday, February 9th at 9:22 AM EST(link).

Locked and Loaded said:

"I see you came to put out fires related to this story.

Well, how about getting to some of the substance of the post? Is the annual outlay in the Iraqi embassy justified? Can you speak to the issue of the level of involvement of the Iraqis in the buildup?"

My response:

"Since I’m not at work today I re-discovered that I already had a log-in at Redstate. It’d been awhile since I commented here…. all props to Eric & Co.

Sixteen thousand sounds like a lot of folks. I don’t know if that includes all the posts in Iraq (not just Baghdad) or not, all the support services or just those being supported.

Remember that, just like in the military, when you deploy someone to support someone else, you now have +1 person to support every single time you do that. So logistics, fuel, food, all sorts of consumables, housing, it all increases as, IIRC, a cube function.

The military is not longer there providing transportation (including air), medical, security, and other services as it was until their withdrawal. So all of the USG efforts of reconstruction, modernization, democratization, stabilization, all of that “ization” stuff is now completely under State’s, and the embassy’s, umbrella. Big Army (and not-as-big-Marines) isn’t there to help anymore. And USAID is not the organization it was 2-3 decades ago. It’s well on its way to becoming fully absorbed by State, just like USIA/USIS was.

I’m not familiar with the personnel breakdown by status or agency; still 16k is a big number. But to do all the things the USG has decided it wanted to do in post-conflict Iraq is going to take a lot of people.

Whether those things, in whole or in part, are good ideas or not is a policy-level decision made by our political leadership, i.e., the White House, Congress, and the SecState. But, (again) just like the military, State is going to salute and implement the programs and tasks its been assigned, and to do that it will need (and ask for) the resources required, whether that be a secure embassy complex or fresh food for the staff.

Anecdotally, the sickest I’ve ever been is after eating local produce in Iraq, Egypt, Kuwait, and the like. Lost 30 lbs. all together in Iraq. So trucking in fresh veggies is the smarter thing to do."

2/9

re: "Mission"

CAA (that's me!) continued his response to Jeff Emanuel's post at RedState:, responding to Adjoran's comment of Wednesday, February 8th at 11:27 PM EST
(link).

Adjoran said:

"but it doesn’t have to be more than a Secretary and a couple dozen support staff. There is no need for embassies anymore, only consulates to serve Americans abroad (but those getting the services should be paying for them). They don’t conduct any “diplomacy” besides throwing parties for corrupt despots and their pals, and haven’t for decades.

Most of the State Department deserves the description they earned long, long ago: “a nest of traitors.”"

Response:

"The U.S. diplomatic mission in Iraq (including activities in places like Basra, Mosul, &tc.) are doing what the elected government in Washington sent them there to do.

You raise a debatable point about the need for embassies in today’s modern world, one that gets hashed over every few years when somebody notices that it’s easy to make a long-distance call to a foreign capital and decides we don’t need embassies and should just have a web site instead.

So the point gets debated, all sides are heard from, and eventually the decision makers realize they weren’t aware of what those embassies had been doing all along and maybe we should shutter them just yet.

State has virtually no domestic political constituency, because the work force is do diffuse (from all over) that the votes don’t impact any one congress member, because the money gets spent overseas mostly, and because visiting members of congress searching for facts abroad get the red carpet rolled out for them so they have no idea what day-to-day life is like in that embassy.

(It’s really not four star hotels and restaurants all the time; those are for when congress members visit.)"


2/9

re: "Dead Ambassadors"

CAA (that's me!) continued his response to Jeff Emanuel's post at RedState:, responding to snowshooze 's comment of Wednesday, February 8th (at 9:36PM EST (link).

snowshooze said:

"For all the good they have done, even that is too good.The United States should sent one Ambassador.He can talk the US line all by hisself. Hell, I would do it.And I would be glad to stay in a motel and fry my own eggs for breakfast.16,000… you hve got to be kidding me.That is an occupation."

Response:

"Since World War II, we’ve already had more U.S. ambassadors killed in the line of duty than generals and admirals.

Putting one into a Baghdad motel (assuming such a thing existed) is a spectacularly bad idea."

2/9

re: "Spies Like Us"

CAA (that's me!) continued his response to Jeff Emanuel's post at RedState:, responding to punditpawn 's comment of Wednesday, February 8th (at 9:36PM EST (link).

punditpawn said:

"16,000 employees? Does that mean in reality that 15,995 of those are CIA spies and the other 5 run the embassy?"

Response:

"Embassies are the U.S. government representation in a foreign country. They house not only an ambassador and various State Dept. functions (consular, management, political, economic, and public diplomacy) and the activities (communication, security, &tc.) necessary to support them, but various “tenant agencies” housed along with them.

Overseas, those range from the routine (IRS, FAA, GSA, military attaches and liaison/assistance officers) to the exotic (DEA, Marshal Service, Library of Congress).

Much of the Baghdad mission is likely (I have no personal knowledge of this) engaged in various USAID and other development/reconstruction activities with the Iraqis.

Oh, and being called a CIA agent got old when I worked in DC; it’s a lot less funny overseas."

2/9

re: "Two Items"

CAA responded to Jeff Emanuel's post at RedState:

"Two items:

The first is logistics. “Unexpectedly,” since U.S. diplomatic
activities can no longer piggyback (which made lots of sense at the time) on U.S. military logistic and other support activities, long and vulnerable supply routes are an easy way for the Iraqis to put pressure on us.

We truck in our supplies, including food, for the same reason
the military did: local supplies are either unreliable (in terms of quantity and quality) and untrustworthy (in terms of security).

Fresh produce, including salad bar type items, are simply the
“canary in the coal mine” in terms of this logistical chokehold. While it’s easy to make fun of “arugula” eaters (and I would make fun of it too if I was entirely certain what arugula was/is), this is just the first turn of the ratchet for putting the squeeze on our diplomatic mission.

(Of course, it could just be a question of paying more bribes
at the border.)"

2/9

re: "Why State is Incompetent at Development"

Josh Rogin at The Cable ("Reporting Inside the Foreign Policy Machine") reported on Amb. Crocker's return to Kabul and a turf battle to resolve (as of this weekend, he's still there).

Money quote(s):

"One of his first tasks in his new job will be to repair the dysfunctional relationship between U.S. diplomats in Kabul and Afghanistan-based USAID officials, which has hampered U.S. development assistance in the country."

In light of recent developments, this doesn't seem like that big a deal. But given the monetary amounts involved, that perception would be, perhaps, short-sighted.

"(A)ccording to a recent report by the State Department Inspector General's office, the relationship has suffered from bureaucratic and communications issues between aid workers and diplomats.

The report found that the problems between the embassy and USAID in Kabul stem in part from the State Department's idea that chiefs of mission should be in charge of all development issues in their country, as envisioned by the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR) that State released earlier this year."

Where could the State Dept. possibly have gotten this idea, considering that ambassadors are the personal representatives of the president and responsible for all U.S. Government activities in their country-of-assignment (unless there's a MOU or SOFA to the contrary)?

(CAA is being disingenuous, of course.)

"The report went on to say that bureaucratic differences "exacerbate feelings of professional misunderstanding" between CDDEA and USAID, and that officials in Washington need to step in to impose a resolution to these problems."

CAA loves his USAID colleagues, wishing them well even to the extent that he mourns the ever-tightening and anaconda-like envelopment of USAID by the State Dept. It never fails to remind of the similar fate of USIA/USIS.

That being said, if D.C. is called upon to knock-heads on this issue, it's fated to go only one way.

"USAID personnel in Kabul chafe at the embassy's demands for lots of briefings and explanations of their financial management. They also feel like second-class citizens because the embassy doesn't provide them with the best housing and office space, the report said.

On the other hand, the embassy folks don't believe the USAID personnel are on board with the "whole of government" approach, the report states. They think USAID withholds information from them and sometimes creates political messes they are then forced to clean up."

Hmm. Color CAA unsympathetic about USAID personnel not getting the "best housing and office space" in a war zone.

7/27

re: "State Department Fixing the Facts Based on Policy"

Say or think what you want about Peter Van Buren 's wisdom in tilting at State Dept.'s windmills, at We Meant Well ("How I Helped Lose the Battle for the Hearts And Minds of the Iraqi People") he made some on-target points about AmEmb Baghdad.

Money quote(s):

"The State Department can often times be so inward looking that it fixes the facts based on the policy need, making reality fit the vision whether that naughty reality wants to or not. Sometimes it’s funny, sometimes it can be tragic."

There is an institutional tendency at State to, as someone in the military might say, "fake it 'til you make it." Just keep talking the talk, and walking the walk, and perhaps others will follow.

(Other institutional tendencies include what I call "the full employment for ambassadors program" of opening or re-opening missions that we probably ought not, or at least not yet. Another is a forward-leaning bias towards making an agreement, signing a treaty, any agreement or any treaty, just to have something signed and on paper, irrespective of how good a deal it might be for the U.S.)

"(A)s the State Department rushes to replace all of the military support it needs to exist in still-dangerous Iraq without the Army, there are fears that the warping of reality may indeed endanger lives in Baghdad."

Brother Van Buren posted this in December (my apologies for the time-delay) so the previously-mentioned military support has vaporized. Gone. Pined for the fjords.

"Currently every item of food for the Embassy, from sides of beef to baby carrots, is procured in “safe” Kuwait and convoyed up to Baghdad. It is an expensive system, one that occasionally even entails the loss of life protecting boxes of Raisin Bran, but it has ensured the safety and cleanliness of the food for almost nine years.

The State Department, facing the crazy costs of this system without the nearly bottomless budget of the Defense Department, is once again swaying the facts to fit the policy. Undersecretary for Management Pat Kennedy told Congress in mid-November that seeking to cut costs in Iraq, State is looking to locally purchase some of the food its personnel will eat, breaking with the U.S. military’s practice of importing. Nothing has changed on the ground vis-a-vis food security, but to save money, State is warping that reality to fit its own needs."

Regular readers will note that this developing situation has already born somewhat bitter fruit (or lettuce) in terms of a tightening stranglehold on our Baghdad mission's logistics and support.

"Much has been made of State’s plan to hire over 5500 mercenaries as security guards for its Iraq-bound diplomats. However, while numbers do matter, the skills that those merc possess matter more. Currently in Iraq, with the US Army in place, a State Department convoy ambushed can call on a QRF, an Army quick reaction force. On standby 24/7, these soldiers are literally the cavalry that rides in to save the day."

"(M)ercenaries" is a bit of a loaded/pejorative term, which I believe is Br. Van Buren's intent. While technically correct on some levels, they might more accurately be called "auxiliaries" if the official terminology of "security contractor" seems to euphemistic.

That being said, he's quite correct in his larger point.

"There remain other concerns harder to nail down in an unclassified environment — security at the Baghdad Airport once control leaves U.S. hands, availability of a blood supply (another contractor, who will have to create a logistics schema with the Armed Services Blood Program) and proper trauma care for the diplomats (yet another contractor), particularly should someone suffer the horrific burns now too common in IED attacks. Under the military system, even during an attack, an injured soldier would receive first aid from a trained buddy, be helicopter evacuated from the site within minutes, stabilized at a specialized trauma unit and on a med flight to a hospital in Germany within an hour or two. While the danger on the ground in Iraq will remain the same (if not more dangerous given the lack of American troop presence), State in no way will be able to replicate the vast resources the military can bring to bear."

Allowing for the OBE ("overcome by events") nature of his observation (which is my fault, not his), these are all potentially fatal (and I mean that quite literally) vulnerabilities of our diplomatic mission in Iraq.

Whatever you might personally think of the wisdom of current (or past) U.S. policies in Iraq or of just how good an idea it is to have an embassy of this (or any) size there, or your possibly prejudiced views about diplomats in general, the ground truth there is that the U.S. has stationed civilian personnel overseas on its behalf, on your behalf, to be about America's business. The diplomats and other staff assigned in Baghdad (and other places in Iraq) are there because our elected government determined they must be there.

"State’s responses have been weak. Can’t travel safely outside the Green Zone? “The Embassy will attempt to mitigate the loss of tactical intelligence by establishing closer working relationships with the Government of Iraq.” Although Embassy medical plans do not currently include the capability for handling a mass casualty event, Embassy officials magic-wanded the problem away by stating that “even the US military’s current combat support hospital can be overwhelmed by a large enough number of casualties.” Meanwhile, State “will continue to explore possibilities for mitigating the impact of a mass casualty event.”

In other words, again the policy seems to be warping the reality on the ground. Only this time, it’s not politics, it’s personal, or maybe, without irony, personnel, at stake."

12/7

re: "The State Department Staff at the Baghdad Embassy is Embarrassing Itself "

Jeff Emanuel at RedState ("the most widely read right of center blog on Capitol Hill") made some fairly predictable snipes at State Dept. folks serving in Iraq.

Money quote(s):

"A Tuesday New York Times article called “U.S. Planning to Slash Iraq Embassy Staff by as Much as Half” purported to describe the plight of U.S. State Department employees in Iraq, whose diplomatic efforts are being rebuffed by a host nation and government that has little use for them." (Bold typeface added for emphasis. - CAA.)

CAA became somewhat, er, involved in the comment thread there.

What people don't understand is that perishables like fresh produce for the salad bar are the "canary in the coal mine" in terms of logistics and supply chains.

2/8

re: "State Dept to Baghdad employees: Stop “whining” about the salad bar"

Josh Rogin at The Cable ("Reporting Inside The Foreign Policy Machine") is following the Arugula-Gate story.

Money quote(s):

"The State Department in Washington has a message for the 16,000 employees at the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad: If you can't get arugula in the cafeteria, just deal with it and stop complaining to the New York Times." (Emphasis in original text. - CAA.)

Note that this mention of "arugula" comes from the Department of State, or at least press coverage of the Department of State, in Washington, D.C.

"According to the Times, embassy employees and contractors are so restricted from doing things in Iraq, it has become a waste of money to keep them there. The story contained many gripes from embassy staff, whose supply chains have been disrupted due to the departure of all U.S. troops in December.

"Within days [of the troop pullout], the salad bar at the embassy dining hall ran low. Sometimes there was no sugar or Splenda for coffee. On chicken-wing night, wings were rationed at six per person," the Times reported."

Chicken wings. Sugar. Splenda. Salad. So "arugula" is not mentioned in the NYT article?

""Does the State Department consider, you know, not enough arugula to be a hardship in Iraq?" one reporter asked."

Ah, so this "arugula" is something that a reporter first brought up, at a Washington, D.C., press conference at the State Dept.

Funny, isn't it, that although the first mention of this "arugula" stuff is by some journalist back stateside, it's the embassy staff in Baghdad who're being pilloried for their fancy-schmantzy tastes in salad bar fixings.

Take a look at the folks in the picture illustrating Mr. Rogin's article. Take a look at those faces, in particular the beefy guy (he's got "security" written all over him) on the far left of the picture.

Do any of these people look like "arugula" eaters? Do any of these people look like they could pick "arugula" out of a selection of lettuce varietals?

Can anyone give me the rough distance (miles, kilometers, or nautical miles are acceptable) from our embassy in Baghdad and the Whole Foods store where that unnamed reporter does his (or her) shopping?

2/8

re: "February 11"

Thanks to John Brown at Public Diplomacy Press and Blog Review, Version 2.0 ("particularly interested in the relationship between public diplomacy and propaganda") for the mention and the quote:

"PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

The State Department Staff at the Baghdad Embassy is Embarrassing Itself - Jeff Emanuel, redstate.com: "So the wizards at State has suddenly realized that constructing a 104-acre, $750,000,000.00 embassy complex and building up the embassy staff to 16,000 people (including 2,000 diplomats and several times more contractors), without running either by the Iraqis first, 'may have been ill advised.' [Comment by] Consul_At_Arms ... Embassies are the U.S. government representation in a foreign country. They house not only an ambassador and various State Dept. functions (consular, management, political, economic, and public diplomacy) and the activities (communication, security, etc.) necessary to support them, but various 'tenant agencies' housed along with them. Overseas, those range from the routine (IRS, FAA, GSA, military attaches and liaison/assistance officers) to the exotic (DEA, Marshal Service, Library of Congress). Much of the Baghdad mission is likely (I have no personal knowledge of this) engaged in various USAID and other development/reconstruction activities with the Iraqis." "

re: "Another task for Crocker: Fix relations between embassy and USAID"

Josh Rogin at The Cable ("Reporting Inside The Foreign Policy Machine") has a little something for the new COM's "to do" list.

Money quote(s):

"Ambassador Ryan Crocker was sworn in today as U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan. One of his first tasks in his new job will be to repair the dysfunctional relationship between U.S. diplomats in Kabul and Afghanistan-based USAID officials, which has hampered U.S. development assistance in the country."

The relationship between State and USAID, to put it opaquely, has been in transition for years. The office of USAID's chief or "Administrator" is held or "dual-hatted" by a senior State Dept. official.

And yet USAID is not (yet) actually an organic or subsidiary agency within the Department of State.

At the same time, except for military or DoD personnel operating under the authority of a memorandum of understanding (MOU) that puts them under the authority of a military commander, all official U.S. persons working within a foreign country are supposed to come under the authority of the "chief of mission" or COM (i.e., the U.S. ambassador).

Confused yet? Okay; now imagine you're a USAID staffer working in Afghanistan

"(T)he Coordinating Director for Development and Economic Affairs (CDDEA). The office was meant to oversee USAID's efforts in the country, but according to a recent report by the State Department Inspector General's office, the relationship has suffered from bureaucratic and communications issues between aid workers and diplomats.

The report found that the problems between the embassy and USAID in Kabul stem in part from the State Department's idea that chiefs of mission should be in charge of all development issues in their country, as envisioned by the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR) that State released earlier this year."

Where ever would State get such an idea?

"The IG said that Crocker should work with the office of the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan (SRAP) Marc Grossman, Deputy Secretary Tom Nides, and the Office of the Director of Foreign Assistance to explain to USAID exactly how they should work with the embassy.

USAID personnel in Kabul chafe at the embassy's demands for lots of briefings and explanations of their financial management. They also feel like second-class citizens because the embassy doesn't provide them with the best housing and office space, the report said.

On the other hand, the embassy folks don't believe the USAID personnel are on board with the "whole of government" approach, the report states. They think USAID withholds information from them and sometimes creates political messes they are then forced to clean up.

The USAID mission has responsibility for a large portion what will reportedly be over $71 billion of U.S. assistance to Afghanistan by the end of 2011, making it a significant player in the largest U.S. development mission in the world.

It's been a rough few weeks for the USAID mission in Afghanistan. A report last week by the Government Accountability Office found that USAID is failing to properly oversee aid dollars."

re: "US Mission Iraq: Not DOD's Giganotosaurus Footprint, But a Super Embassaurus For Real"

Domani Spero at Diplopundit ("Just one obsessive observer, diplomatic watcher, opinionator and noodle newsmaker monitoring the goings on at Foggy Bottom and the worldwide available universe.") has the details for our diplomatic footprint in Iraq.

Money quote(s):

"It'll be your new normal diplomatic one-year deployments with no end."

Since at least 2003, when the first bid list for the not-yet-open new embassy in Baghdad was first published, it was obvious that this "new normal" was destined to become the deployment "tail" that would subsequently "wag" the Department's assignment "dog."