re: "US Embassy Iraq Staffing: To Slash or Not to Slash, That is the Question"

Domani Spero at Diplopundit ("an obsessive compulsive observer, diplomatic watcher, and opinionator who monitors the goings on at ‘Foggy-Bottom’ (i.e. the State Department) and the “worldwide available” universe from Albania to Zimbabwe") looked at the problem of right-sizing AmbEmb Baghdad.

Money quote(s):

"One of the most expensive part of Embassy Baghdad’s operation is security protection. So when the spokesperson says that the embassy is “currently too dependent on contractors” and that “we can do more with Iraqi staff” in one breath, one has to wonder if this includes having Iraqis provide local security protection for the embassy. Are armed Iraqi guards protecting our unarmed diplomats around the Green Zone and across Iraq, an option on the right-sizing table?

See, if State slashes the number of expensive contractors but won’t slash the number of diplomats, who will perform the necessary security protection? I understand that there are 200 Diplomatic Security Agents assigned in Iraq (where a traditional embassy normally gets 2-3), but that number won’t be enough to provide security protection for 1,600-2,000 diplomats.

As an aside, we’ve been training and arming Afghan soldiers in Afghanistan who in turn have used the guns and the training we’ve provided them to kill our own soldiers and coalition forces. And those are not isolated one or two cases. I just feel the need to mention that."

Going local with our embassy security services in Iraq is just chock full of fail. CAA sincerely advises against it and hopes that whomever, if anyone, is considering it do so swiftly and decisively in the negative.

"Iraqi staff at the US Embassy only need a year of service before qualifying for special immigrant visas to the United States (in other places, local employees need 15-20 years of service before qualifying for SIVs). Which means American officials are not the only ones learning on the job with each new rotation into Iraq. Local employees, traditionally the backbone of an embassy operation, are on Iraq’s case, in a state of perpetual training. Just as soon as they learn their jobs, they’re off to a new life in the United States. Then the embassy in Baghdad is off to recruiting and training new local employees to replaced the ones who left."

CAA doesn't find fault, exactly, with our Special Immigrant (SIV) program designed to save the lives of our local staff, as well as the military-employed folks for whom it was originally intended. Another situation chock full of good intentions that bites us where it hurts in terms of ongoing operations. This amounts to a self-inflicted brain drain.

2/9

re: "State Department to Jasim, Iraqi Translator… [Darleen Click]"

Darleen Click at Protein Wisdom ("because not just anybody can summarize the news") calls attention to the denial of a special immigrant visa to an Iraqi military translator.

re: "Visa Denial for Iraqi Translator"

TSB at The Skeptical Bureaucrat ("Giving my fellow Americans the view from my cubicle") has grasped the essentials of this case.


Money quote(s):

"I have no knowledge about consular or visa matters in general, much less this case in particular, so I looked up the State Department's publicly available description of the visa program under which the Iraqi translator applied.

He applied for a very narrow category of Special Immigrant Visa, for which he evidently is qualified. His problem was that in order to be approved for an SIV he also had to meet the regular admissibility requirements for an immigrant to the United States. The translator's criminal record makes him generally inadmissible, so his request for an SIV was denied."

"It has been alleged that the translator was denied an SIV out of some personal pique or bias against him by U.S. embassy personnel in Baghdad, but I very much doubt that was the case. The State Department has no choice but to implement the immigration laws that Congress passed and the President signed."

&

"He might be able to apply for a waiver of inadmissibility by arguing that his crime of stealing Uday Hussein's car shouldn't be held against him [personally, I'd give him a waiver just for having had the stones to do that]."

(Bold type added for emphasis. - CAA.)

re: "Trying to kill Heroes - Our State Department"

Blackfive is trying to be fair in his criticism.

Money quote(s):

"I know a lot of great State Department Officers. And just like the Army or other military outfits, there are some that just make you wonder how they keep their jobs."

&

"The State Department has made a decision to make an Iraqi translator, Jasim, wait another three years for a visa. One of the reasons that the denial was issued was that, Jasim, as part of the Kurdish Peshmerga, infiltrated Uday Hussein's organization to steal data and then stole Uday's car to escape. He was captured, tortured, and then released six years later when Saddam let all the prisoners go on the eve of the Invasion in 2003.

The theft of Uday's car is looked upon as criminal and not political."

I suppose none of the State Department's rewards programs apply to Jasim, which is a shame.

Blackfive solicits his readers to write to their congressional representatives and copy their text into the comments.

NYT - Officers Battle Visa Hurdles for Iraq Aides

From my archive of press clippings:

New York Times

May 14, 2008

Officers Battle Visa Hurdles for Iraq Aides

By CONRAD MULCAHY

When Lt. Col. Michael Zacchea left Iraq in 2005, he was torn. His yearlong mission to train an Iraqi Army battalion had left him wounded and emotionally drained, and he was eager to go. But leaving Iraq also meant leaving Jack, his Iraqi interpreter, to face an insurgency that has made a point of brutalizing those who help the Americans.

Read the whole article here.

Snippet(s):

"It took two years for Jack to get a visa. He is one of the very few to succeed among thousands who have worked as interpreters for the United States military.

To many veterans that is not an acceptable rate, given the risks the interpreters took, and Colonel Zacchea and others are taking up the cause.

They have created a growing network of aid groups, spending countless hours navigating a byzantine immigration system that they feel unnecessarily keeps their allies in harm’s way. There is, they say, a debt that must be repaid to the Iraqis who helped the most. To them it is an obligation both moral and pragmatic."

"Nearly 2,000 interpreters in Iraq and Afghanistan have applied to the State Department for a special immigrant visa, which was begun in 2006 as a last resort for those fearing for their lives. So far 1,735 cases have been approved, though it is unclear how many interpreters have come to the United States. In its first year the visa program for interpreters was limited to only 50 spots. Since then it has expanded to 500 spots a year.

But the numbers tell only part of the difficulty. The program does little to minimize the visa bureaucracy. The process, complicated for anyone, is especially hard for interpreters.

They are considered refugees, and refugees cannot apply from their native countries, in this case Iraq. But Jordan and Syria have closed their borders to the flood of Iraqi refugees. Passports issued by the government of Saddam Hussein are not valid, often making it impossible to cross borders legally."

&

"(T)he government’s hands were initially tied by the lack of federal legislation allowing special visas for interpreters. Now that more visas have been made available, he said, President Bush has directed Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and the homeland security secretary, Michael Chertoff, to “make sure the visa process for translators and others moves as quickly as possible.”"