I once told then Israeli President Weizman that I didn’t know how to govern his country. Of course that was preparatory to my suggestions on what I thought they were doing wrong. I still don’t know how to govern Israel, nor do I have the stake in the outcome that the Israeli government does, but that doesn’t stop me from suggesting a different course of action.
Tuesday, July 31, 2012
re: "Negotiations"
Monday, June 4, 2012
re: "Terrorist group’s supporters throw party in U.S. Congress"
Josh Rogin at The Cable ("Reporting Inside the Foreign Policy Machine") reported from bizarro-world (which is to say: Capitol Hill).
There is a long list of Iranian-American organizations that fund pro-MEK events and pay speakers fees to MEK supporters. Many of these organizations - such as the "Global Initiative for Democracy, whose homepage is entirely devoted to the MEK's concerns and who hosted an MEK conference in January -- seem to have no other function other than to advocate for the MEK, and the actual sources of their money is unclear.
Friday, June 1, 2012
re: "U.N. Iraq chief: The countries of the world must take MEK ‘refugees’"
Josh Rogin at The Cable ("Reporting Inside the Foreign Policy Machine") reported on the UN's efforts to resettle the PMOI.
Thursday, May 31, 2012
re: "Hitting nails on the head"
Nobody ate MREs on an extended basis, and the massively complicated logistics supply chain was until last Dec managed by DoD under the aegis of our SOFA (Status Of Forces Agreement). With the failure of the administration to negotiate a new or continuing SOFA, we had no option but to withdraw our military forces from Iraq.
Without a SOFA, the remaining USG organizations (and the contractors managing their logistics supply chain) HAD to be folded into DoS (with diplomatic status) or be essentially left as tourists, fully subject to Iraqi law even in the performance of their duties.
Monday, May 21, 2012
re: "My New York Times Mini Op-Ed'
Peter Van Buren at We Meant Well ("How I Helped Lose the Battle for the Hearts and Minds of the Iraqi People") shared some observations and predictions.
Money quote(s):
"The State Department’s reduction of staff in Iraq is the final act of the American invasion. The war is now really over.
The U.S. has finally acknowledged that Iraq is not its most important foreign policy story."
This is due to a couple-three factors.
First, the change in administrations. The Bush administration made the invasion and reconstruction effort in Iraq a national priority or mission. That national priority or mission drove things like causing Iraq embassy and PRT personnel requirements to, along with similar requirements in Afghanistan (and, to a degree, Pakistan) drive the Foreign Service's human resources engine.
As CAA predicted before the CPA was ever replaced by an actual U.S. embassy mission, Iraq was going to be the tail that wagged our assignments system dog. For better or worse.
The U.S. post-war reconstruction and security effort in Iraq, as of January 2009, became the Obama administration's war to lose.
Second, and deriving from the first, with the withdrawal of U.S. combat forces from Iraq, what media attention still focused there has dissipated. Until such time as things really go south, and the networks can get footage of helicopters lifting U.S. diplomats from the embassy's rooftops, that not really going to change.
"(O)nly days after the U.S. military withdrawal, the world’s largest embassy watched helplessly as Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki tried to arrest his own vice president, who fled to Kurdistan where Iraqi government forces are powerless to intervene."
What's that saying about history repeating itself as farce?
In any case, this episode alone makes the prognostications of others, such as Vice President Biden if I recall correctly, about Iraq best becoming three separate countries, a lot less risible. Likewise for the post-pandemic predictions of John Ringo.
"The U.S. has finally acknowledged that Iraq is not its most important foreign policy story, and that America’s diplomats cannot survive on their own in the middle of a civil war. The embassy will eventually shrink to the small-to-medium scale that Iraq requires (think Turkey or Jordan). America’s relationship will wither into the same uneasy state of half-antagonistic, half-opportunistic status that we enjoy with the other autocrats in the Middle East. Maliki will continue to expertly play the U.S. off the Iranians and vice versa. U.S. military sales and oil purchases will assure him the soft landing someday of a medical visa to the United States à la Ali Abdullah Saleh of Yemen, and not the sanctioned disposal awaiting Bashar al-Assad of Syria."
The prediction piece of Brother Van Buren's article could do with some un-packing. Frankly, the second part of the first sentence is simply not so. The U.S. continues, in Iraq and Afghanistan (and, to a degree, Pakistan) to expect our diplomats to "survive on their own in the middle of a civil war." They just do. I can't explain it.
2/11
Friday, April 20, 2012
re: "diplomacy"
Jack Savage said:
"When we are in a foreign land, aren’t we ALL diplomats?"
My response:
"Only when we screw up.
Seriously, I got that same briefing as a Private (E-2) in Germany back during the Bad Old Days (TM) of The Cold War as well.
So in a broad-swath philosophical sense that’s true.
From a perspective of international law (specifically the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations), anybody we send over on a diplomatic passport (IF THEY ARE GRANTED A DIPLOMATIC VISA BY THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT) is a “diplomat.”
But in terms of reality, it’s our Foreign Service Officers (FSO; both from State, USAID, and Dept. of Commerce “Foreign Commercial Service) and Foreign Service Specialists (FSS) who are “actual” diplomats by training and profession.
You could add to that some (but not all) of the various attaches (such as military ones) from other government “tenant agencies” as they get specialized training for working in a diplomatic environment."
2/11
Wednesday, April 18, 2012
re: "US Embassy Iraq Staffing: To Slash or Not to Slash, That is the Question"
Monday, April 16, 2012
re: "Costs"
snowshooze said:
"Are you guys really thinking there is any sanity in that?"
My response:
"Building an embassy complex to securely house not only our diplomatic mission but the management of a national reconstruction effort in a combat zone where they take indirect fire every day (including during construction) is going to cost a lot.
A lot.
And when I say “house,” I mean not only their working spaces (and warehouses, workshops, &tc. to support that work) but actual living quarters BECAUSE NONE OF IT MAY BE SAFELY PLACED OUTSIDE OF YOUR SECURITY PERIMETER.
For some perspective, take a look at The Skeptical Bureaucrat’s latest post: http://skepticalbureaucrat.blogspot.com/2012/02/and-another-thing-about-that-baghdad.html
TSB and I go way back. He knows whereof he speaks and is a security professional second to none."
2/11
Friday, April 13, 2012
re: "How funny"
duncer said:
"Few people are aware of those numbers partly because outside of their immediate family, few people miss the diplomats. The generals are a real loss to the nation as are every enlisted man that has put himself in harms way for love of country,not a career behind a desk."
My response:
"How funny you think that diplomat’s don’t put themselves into harm’s way while serving the country they love."
2/9
Wednesday, April 11, 2012
re: "Disturbing"
"We have truly reached a troubling state of affairs when I have become the voice of reason and experience."
Monday, April 9, 2012
re: "Thank you, Consul"
"I don’t have the knowledge to respond to a lot of the specific criticisms. Frankly, I don’t always have a lot of respect for those high up in Department hierarchy. But I’ve found that there is a lot of misunderstanding of diplomats and diplomatic families, and a lot of blaming us for policies over which we have no control. My husband is an IT specialist, for crying out loud–his job is to make sure that the embassy here has secure communications with headquarters, something I’d hope everyone agrees is important. Yet some people act as if we alone are responsible for all the things in US foreign policy with which they disagree, and I find myself constantly saying “Now this is just my opinion, not the position of the US government,” even when speaking with other Americans. And I’m not even the employee!
All that to say, thank you for providing a voice of experience and reason in response to these criticisms."
2/9
Friday, March 30, 2012
re: "Sticking It Out"
Wednesday, March 28, 2012
re: "Numbers"
CAA (that's me!) continued his response to Jeff Emanuel's post at RedState:, responding to Jack_Savage's comment of Thursday, February 9th at 10:14 PM EST(link).
Jack Savage said:
"Maybe it is because they really don’t do much of anything, and if they do anything, they don’t have a lot to show for it.
Example: You have the finest diplomats on the planet in Baghdad – 16,000 of them, as a matter of fact – and they can’t figure out a way to negotiate getting food shipments in a timely fashion? In a country we rescued from a dictator at great cost in lives and money? And their only strategy to achieve this objective is to whine to the New York Times?
And you seem to think they prevent wars and keep our enemies at bay?
Spare me."
My response:
"According to the original post (above), there _aren’t_ 16,000 diplomats at the Baghdad embassy.
“So the wizards at State has suddenly realized that constructing a 104-acre, $750,000,000.00 embassy complex and building up the embassy staff to 16,000 people (including 2,000 diplomats and several times more contractors), without running either by the Iraqis first, “may have been ill advised.” ”
So support staff is 16,000 (presumably that includes locally-hired Iraqi staff members as well) handling all the support, medical, transportation, SECURITY, &tc. that used to be handled by the U.S. military because those services are/were either unavailable in Iraq or untrustworthy.
Leaving 2,000, of which probably a fifth are specialists of one sort (security, management, communications, administration) supporting the other 80 percent. Figure several hundred of that remainder are program specialists or attaches of one sort or another who belong to “tenant agencies” (such as USAID).
Frankly, if even 2 or 3 hundred of that figure are actual State Dept. commissioned foreign service officers (i.e., actual diplomats) I’d be surprised.
And wasn’t VP Biden “all over” getting that SOFA negotiated? (crickets)
Lastly, as I was ranting to the missus earlier today, too many people working either for State or at our embassies are under the mistaken impression that the New York Times and/or the Washington Post are somehow “on their side,” probably because they foolishly hold the same sorts of demented transnational progressive worldviews espoused by those fishwraps. The truth is that the NYT and the WP are never happier than when they can embarrass those who serve our country, whether that’s in uniform or out of it."
2/9
Monday, March 26, 2012
re: "Working On That Baghdad Footprint"
TSB at The Skeptical Bureaucrat ("From deep inside the foundations of our Republic's capital city") examined remarks related to AmEmb Baghdad by DepSec Nides.
Money quote(s):
"Downsizing the U.S. Mission in Baghdad isn't really about rationing chicken wings in the embassy's dining hall after all, despite yesterday's New York Times story.
Instead, it's all about the reducing the footprint, according to remarks by Thomas Nides, Deputy Secretary for Management and Resources, at a press teleconference today. He said "footprint" seven times."
The chicken wing (and arugula) story was never really more than just another big-media club with which to pummel Americans serving their country in a warzone, uniformed or not.
"(I)f we replace enough third-country security contractors with Iraqis, buy our groceries in the local market, and always, always, always re-think our engagement (Deputy Secretary Nides also said "engagement" seven times) we will eventually fit into a more nearly normal shoe."
Thinking is good. Right-sizing an embassy is a useful activity, particular when it's a out- (notice I don't say "over-") sized as our diplomatic/reconstruction/development/democratication establishment in Iraq.
That being said, placing too much of our embassy security in the hands of essentially un-vettable Iraqis, to say nothing of surrendering our food security, is a recipe for disaster.
"(M)ost of this footprint reduction will come about by hiring fewer foreign (i.e., non-Iraqi) security contractors and replacing them with local hires. That will help in at least two ways. First, it will eliminate a leading source of aggravation for the Iraqis. Second, the mission will not have to house and logistically support so many contractors, since our local hires will go home after their shifts are over, just like a normal local guard force does at a normal mission."
2/8
Wednesday, March 21, 2012
re: "Something Like That"
CAA (that's me!) continued his response to Jeff Emanuel's post at RedState:, responding to Locked and Loaded 's comment of Thursday, February 9th at 9:22 AM EST(link).
Locked and Loaded said:
"I see you came to put out fires related to this story.
Well, how about getting to some of the substance of the post? Is the annual outlay in the Iraqi embassy justified? Can you speak to the issue of the level of involvement of the Iraqis in the buildup?"
My response:
"Since I’m not at work today I re-discovered that I already had a log-in at Redstate. It’d been awhile since I commented here…. all props to Eric & Co.
Sixteen thousand sounds like a lot of folks. I don’t know if that includes all the posts in Iraq (not just Baghdad) or not, all the support services or just those being supported.
Remember that, just like in the military, when you deploy someone to support someone else, you now have +1 person to support every single time you do that. So logistics, fuel, food, all sorts of consumables, housing, it all increases as, IIRC, a cube function.
The military is not longer there providing transportation (including air), medical, security, and other services as it was until their withdrawal. So all of the USG efforts of reconstruction, modernization, democratization, stabilization, all of that “ization” stuff is now completely under State’s, and the embassy’s, umbrella. Big Army (and not-as-big-Marines) isn’t there to help anymore. And USAID is not the organization it was 2-3 decades ago. It’s well on its way to becoming fully absorbed by State, just like USIA/USIS was.
I’m not familiar with the personnel breakdown by status or agency; still 16k is a big number. But to do all the things the USG has decided it wanted to do in post-conflict Iraq is going to take a lot of people.
Whether those things, in whole or in part, are good ideas or not is a policy-level decision made by our political leadership, i.e., the White House, Congress, and the SecState. But, (again) just like the military, State is going to salute and implement the programs and tasks its been assigned, and to do that it will need (and ask for) the resources required, whether that be a secure embassy complex or fresh food for the staff.
Anecdotally, the sickest I’ve ever been is after eating local produce in Iraq, Egypt, Kuwait, and the like. Lost 30 lbs. all together in Iraq. So trucking in fresh veggies is the smarter thing to do."
2/9
Tuesday, March 20, 2012
re: "Resettling the Mujahedeen-e Khalq of Iraq"
Daniel Pipes at Lion's Den ("a fast way to comment on many topics") is concerned about looming deadlines.
Money quote(s):
"Iraqi authorities threaten by April 30 forcibly to expel 3,400 Iranians, members of the Mujahedeen-e Khalq. MeK members rightly fear for their lives if pushed across the border for the Iranian regime criminalizes membership in the MeK and abominates the organization, its determined foe."
Prof. Pipes gives the (recent, Iraq-centric) background:
"Saddam Hussein allied with the MeK (also known as the People's Mujahedeen Organization of Iran, or PMOI) against their common enemy in Tehran. Following the U.S.-led conquest of Iraq in 2003, MeK members living in Iraq acquired "protected persons" status and entered a political limbo, neither friend nor enemy of the occupying powers. With the gradual withdrawal of U.S. troops and increasingly close ties between the Iraqi and Iranian governments, MeK circumstances worsened to the point that in April 2011 Iraqi troops attacked Camp Ashraf, its Iraqi home since 1986, killing 34 people and injuring 325.
Cooler heads prevailed after this dangerous flare-up. With U.S. government approval, Baghdad signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the United Nations in December 2011. In it, the Government of Iraq committed to the relocation of Camp Ashraf (now renamed Camp New Iraq) residents to a temporary transit facility where the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) would begin the process of transiting MeK members in Iraq to refugee status, a necessary first step to resettle them outside Iraq."
So that brings us up to the nearly-present day.
"(A)bout 400 MeK members voluntarily left Camp Ashraf on Feb. 18 and moved to Camp Liberty, a former U.S. military base. Their transfer, however, was marred by threats from Iraqi forces, harassment from elements of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, and inhospitable living conditions and constant police surveillance within Camp Liberty."
CAA has seen (on the internet, so it must be true!) reports that, following the U.S. withdrawal from Baghdad, Camp Liberty was truly and most-thoroughly looted.
In the Iraq context, that means (as it does in much of the Third World), plumbing and electrical fixtures, to include pipes and wiring, pulled out of walls, ceilings, and floors.
"(T)here is no clear sense how the MeK members will all be processed as refugees within the next two months, much less of their ultimate destination for resettlement outside either Iraq or Iran."
The easy cases, the ones who have passports, citizenship, or legal residency in Europe or the U.S., have likely already departed Iraq. The remainder are something of an indigestible lump, in terms of their relocation.
".... Washington.... must not abandon the organization most feared by the tyrants in Tehran"
To that end, Prof. Pipes has several suggestions. Scroll down and read them here.
Prof. Pipes point about the PMOI being the "organization most feared" by the Iranian regime is an interesting one. For all the legitimate (to one degree or another) criticisms of the PMOI/MEK and its related/umbrella/subsidiary groups; they're terrorists, undemocratic, a personality cult, neo-marxists, maoists, &tc.; the Evil Mullah Regime (TM) in Tehran is afraid of them.
2/28
Monday, March 19, 2012
re: "FS careers"
CAA (that's me!) continued his response to Jeff Emanuel's post at RedState:, responding to Marcus_Traianus's comment of Thursday, February 9th at 8:52 AM EST(link).
Marcus_Traianus said:
"No salad bar? That’s medieval . Wait…what does that make living on some remote FOB and only eating MRE’s? Question for another day.
Personally I skipped out on a career in DoS after a friend of mine spent half his life becoming fluent in German only to get posted in Peru and spending years dodging the Sendero Luminoso. I think he said at the time if he wanted a career where he constantly git sent to remote countries where people were trying to kill him, he would have joined the military.
Note to DoS; an embassy is no substitute for a military base. No matter how appealing it sounds on paper."
My response:
"Congratulations! You are one of the few people who’s ever actually met or known a U.S. diplomat. (There aren’t that many of us,)
Having spent as much time at remote bases eating MREs in Iraq (in uniform) as I’d care to, I would note that they’re not intended for long-term diet. Eating them daily for the duration of a 12-month diplomatic assignment, while it might provide entertainment value for snarky folks far from the warzone, leads to malnutrition.
German is a tough language, I’ll admit. I had a very tough time learning it. On the other hand, I didn’t spend half my life doing it in the expectation that the State Dept. was only going to station me in Germany.
There’s this thing called “Worldwide Availability” in terms of FS assigments. So those folks who learned French aren’t guaranteed careers shuttling between Paris and Brussels. They can expect West Africa and places where they may need to learn another language entirely, like the Philippines."
Friday, March 16, 2012
re: "Pipeline, &tc."
romeg said:
"Saddam Hussein and his family was pilloried publicly in Western media.
While there may be dedicated career members of the Diplomatic Corps and serious-minded State Department employees, it is an agency that is rotten to its core and overrun with fops.
While they are downsizing missions abroad, they may want to consider making equivalent cuts here at home. Why is it that an agency with a budget as large as the State Department takes years to figure out if a pipeline can be built across the U.S./Canada border?"
Response:
"Do you really think that decision was made in Foggy Bottom and not at the White House?
Take another look at Departmental budgets. State is miniscule compared to others.
Oh, and thanks for entertaining the notion that State does include some dedicated employees. Seriously."
2/9
Thursday, March 15, 2012
re: "State Department Fibs About Camp Liberty and MEK"
Money quote(s):
"(T)he US and the UN brokered a deal to move the MEK people from their unsafe and politically volatile Camp Ashraf location to the old US Camp Liberty, where the UN would supposedly process them as refugees. As part of the deal, the US would monitor conditions at Camp Liberty to ensure the MEK were treated well."
So far so good.
"It seemed reasonable for diplomats to make the 45 minutes trip out to Camp Liberty once in awhile, in that the World’s Largest Embassy (c) comes with the World’s Largest price tag, some $3.8 billion (about $2.5 billion of that is for security) a year in operating costs, about a fourth of all State’s yearly costs. The idea of US diplomats visiting MEK completes the circle: the US Dips will be surrounded by massive security to protect them from the Iraqis the US liberated while at the same time using their own presence to protect the MEKs from the liberated Iraqis."
This, by at least some reports, isn't what's happened. According to a report by Allan Gerson (who's got some credibility), the facilities at the former Camp Liberty, for whatever reason, aren't in the sort of shape they would have been when it was a functioning U.S. base.
2/24
Wednesday, March 14, 2012
re: "Mission"
(link).
Adjoran said:
"but it doesn’t have to be more than a Secretary and a couple dozen support staff. There is no need for embassies anymore, only consulates to serve Americans abroad (but those getting the services should be paying for them). They don’t conduct any “diplomacy” besides throwing parties for corrupt despots and their pals, and haven’t for decades.
Most of the State Department deserves the description they earned long, long ago: “a nest of traitors.”"
Response:
"The U.S. diplomatic mission in Iraq (including activities in places like Basra, Mosul, &tc.) are doing what the elected government in Washington sent them there to do.
You raise a debatable point about the need for embassies in today’s modern world, one that gets hashed over every few years when somebody notices that it’s easy to make a long-distance call to a foreign capital and decides we don’t need embassies and should just have a web site instead.
So the point gets debated, all sides are heard from, and eventually the decision makers realize they weren’t aware of what those embassies had been doing all along and maybe we should shutter them just yet.
State has virtually no domestic political constituency, because the work force is do diffuse (from all over) that the votes don’t impact any one congress member, because the money gets spent overseas mostly, and because visiting members of congress searching for facts abroad get the red carpet rolled out for them so they have no idea what day-to-day life is like in that embassy.
(It’s really not four star hotels and restaurants all the time; those are for when congress members visit.)"
2/9
