Living the Dream.





Friday, July 6, 2012

re: "Senators Propose U.S. Visas for Alien Home Buyers with $500K in Cash Investment, Dictators and Drug Lords Lining Up Over There"

Domani Spero at Diplopundit (" one of the best niche blogs for Foreign Service folks ") examined some proposed legislation.

Money quote(s):

"WSJ reports that Charles Schumer (D., N.Y.) and Mike Lee (R., Utah) are preparing to introduce a bipartisan bill that would give residence visas to foreigners who spend at least $500,000 to buy houses in the U.S.

According to WSJ, the proposed measure would offer visas to any foreigner making a cash investment of at least $500,000 on residential real-estate—a single-family house, condo or townhouse. Applicants can spend the entire amount on one house or spend as little as $250,000 on a residence and invest the rest in other residential real estate, which can be rented out."

The catch is that this sort of visa won't carry with it any authorization for work or employment.

"(T)he deep pockets foreigners with $500K can buy houses in the United States, and will be granted resident visas, but they’re not allowed to work. Of course, with 500K, it’s not like they’re the kind you see who shows up to pick apples in Washington State or oranges in Florida.

We are obviously looking for independently wealthy foreigners who do not need to work while they enjoy their new houses in a real American neighborhood."

As a relatively recent homeowner myself, I'm persuadable that homeowners pump a lot of money into local economies, what with what it takes to keep the inside indoors and the outside outdoors.

"It used to be that people who want to come here and can’t get visas pay smugglers to sneak them in. I hear that the price go from $2,000 to name that price. Now, under this proposed bill, people with $500K can come here with a resident visa, and we’ll even roll out the red carpet.

Wanna guess who has that much cash floating around? Well, for starters, dictators, drug lords, drug traffickers and their girlfriends/boyfriends always have that much cash around, in case.

But, but … that’s not going to happen because they will be screened scrupulously, and they won’t be able to take American jobs because working here without a separate permit would be illegal under this bill. Besides DHS/ICE will go after them. You know, like they’ve gone after other illegal aliens and overstays in this country. The same agency who has no idea when foreign visitors exit the country. Or not."

I only wish I didn't share DS's skepticism regarding DHS's interest (which is not the same as its ability) in immigration enforcement.

On the other hand, the bureaucratic imperative to go after low-hanging fruit, i.e., the easy way to improve your arrest and deportation statistics, is to go after otherwise law-abiding and non-dangerous violaters who can be detained and processed without fuss or muss.

"I have yet to read the text of the bill but I already feel for our consular officers working at over 250 consular posts. Videoconferencing, also coming soon to the a virtual interview booth near you.

Might this be a good time to suggest that the State Department invite Senators Schumer and Lee to go through ConGen training and deploy both under temporary consular commissions for at least 180 days at a visa issuing post? Preferably to Guangzhou, Manila, Lagos and Mexico City conducting visa interviews?

It’s a fun gig, you guys! This would help you both understand the process, as well as teach you that the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service process nonimmigrant visa petitions; but nonimmigrant visas are issued by the Department of State. I know it’s confusing. You will also learn that the State Department already charges $60 for expedited processing of U.S. passports (*** so no need to add that in the new bill unless you’re upping the tab). They’ll teach you how to read faces and how to administer a smell test to determine who is telling a fib; a great trick by the way to bring back to Congress. During training you’ll pretend like you’re in a different country, and then you will actually be shipped to a different country where all your new acquaintances become your best friends as you see them in front of your visa interview window. You won’t regret it ever or forget the experience for that matter! And it will help make you become better legislators especially on this interesting and exciting field of immigration."

10/21

Thursday, July 5, 2012

re: "America's Soul"

Jens David Ohlin at Lieber Code read this book that you might want to read too.

Money quote(s):

"Gregory Wallance has just published a fascinating – and contrarian – new book. Titled America’s Soul in the Balance: The Holocaust, FDR’s State Department, and the Moral Disgrace of an American Aristocracy, the book shines an uncomfortable spotlight on a rather unsavory moment in American history during World War II. Lawyers for the U.S. State Department became aware of the Nazi’s growing extermination of Jews, and rather than actively publicizing this fact, actually conspired to cover it up. At around the same time, the State Department blocked the rescue of 70,000 Romanian Jews on a death march in the Ukraine.

Wallance’s book paints a devastating portrait of the State Department at this crucial moment in time. In so doing, it adds much to the historical record regarding U.S. governmental conduct during the time period. In particular, it avoids the quick and facile reduction of a state’s government into a single agent with a unified approach to a complex situation. Instead, it provides a micro-analysis of how different departments -- and different lawyers all presumably serving the same organizational client -- were responding to the increasingly disturbing reports of Nazi atrocities. "

CAA is currently reading Erik Larsen's In the Garden of Beasts, which provides a similar perspective on American diplomatic impotence in the face of evil.


5/8




re: "Losing a war and a peace"

UNCLE JIMBO at Blackfive ("the paratrooper of love") explained some quite simple concepts.

Money quote(s):

"We are making a deal with the Taliban, a losing one. Our Commander in Chief fundamentally misunderstands the way wars must be fought, and I am not talking about strategy or tactics. I am talking about winning or losing."

There is, for those who haven't been following along at home, quite a difference between the two, and the consequences will echo into eternity.

He goes on to admonish the president:

"You can't end wars Mr. President; They are won or lost. Afghanistan has been lost."

In all fairness, he also notes:

"I am not certain at all that the war in Afghanistan could have been won."

Not as it's been fought; it seems reasonable to question whether the proper action in Afghanistan should have been simply a punitive expedition to schwack a sufficient number of alligators, rather than attempting to drain, and subsequently gentrify, the swamp.

"We will now cede the field of battle, where so much US blood has been shed, to the enemy. And we will sue for something less than peace from the very people who hosted the planning and execution of 9/11."

I suppose the inevitable question, should this proceed as it appears envisioned, is how long before Taliban-sponsored and sheltered embark on their offensive against the U.S.

That and how much money we will pay in tribute, er, development assistance during the interim.

"It has been a long decade of war and we are all tired, none more so than the troops who have marched to the sound of gunfire over and over again. They, with the steadfast support of a real Commander in Chief George W. Bush, won the war in Iraq."


1/5


re: "Rule #36"

O at The Angry Drunk Bureaucrat (" THE OPTIMIST SAYS: "THE GLASS IS HALF FULL." THE PESSIMIST SAYS: "THE GLASS IS HALF EMPTY." THE BUREAUCRAT SAYS: "WHAT WE NEED ARE 5 GLASSES, 1/10TH THE SIZE." THE ANGRY DRUNK BUREAUCRAT SAYS: "WHERE'S MY DAMNED BOURBON?" ") published Rule #36 (of ), to wit:

"It always comes back when you least expect it."


10/21




Rule #36
It always comes back when you least expect it.


Wednesday, July 4, 2012

Happy Independence Day!

As part of eDiplomacy and "Communities @State on OpenNet", FSO Andy Miller runs an internal web log at the State Department. It's good stuff, for those with access to OpenNet (i.e., State's internal internet).

In Andy's latest post there he discusses the phenomenon of July 4th from the Foreign Service perspective. CAA won't excerpt (or outright steal) from his internatl blog, but will expand on his theme.

Independence Day in the Foreign Service breaks-down a couple of different ways.

If you're in a domestic assignment, it's a lot like a normal, hometown America Fourth of July, except 90+ percent of FS jobs in the U.S. are in the D.C. area and FSOs come from all 50 states. So for only a few of us are ever actually "home" even when we're back in the U.S.

Not a complaint, mind you; military folks go through the same thing, and since FSOs (and their families) will spend around a third of their working careers stationed in D.C., it becomes home.

Of course, there are more than a few FSO jobs jobs in D.C. that are going to make you work over the July 4th holiday, but that can happen in any job or career.

Overseas is a bit different.

In diplomatic circles, every embassy celebrates their "national day" and for the U.S., our national day is Independence Day.

So we put on a great big official shindig. And it's generally an all-hands evolution, with the "official" embassy Americans acting as the hosts, with lots of local dignitaries, diplomatic bigwigs, and quite a few guests with whom the mission may have established working relationships of one sort or another, a July 4th invitation being a very tangible way of expressing our appreciation for continued cooperation, &tc.

Official Fourth of July celebrations can be held at the ambassador's residence, the embassy itself, or even a hotel. Some are very informal affairs, with the familiar barbecue grill taking the place of honor; others are on the dressy and ceremonial end of the spectrum.

FSOs and other embassy staff do all the preparation, planning, set-up, execution, and clean-up. And while its going on we're "working" the party. And it is work, even if we're smiling and acting like it's a good time.

And, just due to the problems of local climate or other scheduling considerations, the official observance may be weeks or even months in advance, or after, the actual holiday.

Again, not a complaint; just an explanation of how this works overseas.

(Since 2003, CAA always takes a moment on Independence Day to recall the July 4th he spent in Iraq, at an out-of-the-way place he's unlikely ever to visit again. The MP battalion co-located with us expended some colored illumination flares by way of a fireworks display. Good times.)

(Some of my most favorite, if somewhat blurrily remembered, July 4th memories are from my military assignments in Germany, where the entire week of Independence Day was "Deutsche-Amerikanische Freundschaft Woche" or German-American Friendship Week, complete to beer tents and oompah bands. Good times.....)

At many posts, as Andy Miller noted in his blog, there are other, unofficial celebrations at most U.S. embassies and consulates abroad.

That's when we'll organize a picnic/cookout at somebody's house or on a residential compound, play some slow pitch softball, drink some beers from our coolers, and watch our kids and dogs play.

Or whatever; it's the low-pressure, letting-off-some-steam version where we let our hair down, relax, and act very much like our friends and family do back home on Independence Day.

Only without fireworks (in a lot of places), parades, and other public patriotic observances; it's not our there country after all.

That's not to say that in many countries we're not wished well on our national day, just that it's not their national day.

Anyhow, I hope this gives something of a feel for how July 4th works in the Foreign Service.

Tuesday, July 3, 2012

re: "Stop “DREAM”-ing And Embrace Reality"

Robert at Atlantic Crossings ("Between the Hudson Highlands and the South of England...") gave the issue of child illegal immigrants some careful thought (in advance of DHS taking this issue on unilaterally).

Money quote(s):

"(T)his needs saying plainly: denoting as an “immigrant” anyone other than a landed arrival with legal permission to settle, is an egregious misnomer that is insulting to actual landed immigrants. The word “immigrant” is not properly applied to those who have taken it upon themselves to “settle unilaterally” (if we wish not to say “illegal”), but have not received a legal right to reside. Nor does it ever apply to the “unilaterally settled” no matter how often it is misused, children included."

Insulting legal immigrants, those who followed the rules and waited their turn, is never a sufficient deterrent to those who want to jump the queue.

"Many activists and journalists do appear to think that whenever someone sets foot in the U.S., he should apparently be allowed to remain permanently regardless."


"(I)n Britain, every child’s immigration status is ascertained upon initial enrollment in school. Doing so prevents any rearing of a generation of “imagined Britons” who spend 10 years in school and think they are British citizens when they are not. Also the “passive barrier” of checking the legality of schoolchildren’s residency makes “unilateral settlement” by adults with children who must attend school extremely difficult to manage.

As a result, “unilateral settlement” in the UK is almost entirely an “adults only” issue. But we, in the U.S., have accidentally allowed the creation of “imagined U.S. citizens.” We have done so due to our being unfailingly “generous” in educating unquestioningly every child who shows up at the school gate."

American citizen children have to come up with birth certificates and proofs of innoculation in order to register for schools. So what gives with unlawfully resident children?

"Even if all of those “undocumented students” of today are overnight granted the right to remain, if the U.S. does not change its approach fundamentally it is inevitable there will ALWAYS be children and parents who are “unilaterally settled” in the U.S.

Moreover if we are seriously considering legislating that if one can essentially sneak children into the U.S., that once in they will be allowed to remain legally a few years later as adults, let us understand the road down which we are heading. It is no secret that word spreads like global wildfire in a world in which media is now immediate. No one on the planet is less than 24 hours’ travel from a U.S. airport.

So as we blunder around looking for some politically plausible framework to address how to assist “undocumented students,” let us at least also bear both of those realities in mind, as well as recall also how the road to hell is indeed often paved with good intentions."

Robert clearly understands how globalization has accelarated the effective speed of information communication, as between the illegal immigrant and prospective illegal immigrant communities.

"The only viable approach to ending the “imagined U.S. citizen” dilemma appears to be two-fold. First, grant a “green card” to anyone under age 26 who can demonstrate “permanent” presence in the country since age 6 — which is easy enough to glean from school records. If for some reason that is not possible, or if they were “brought in” older, give them a student/ work visa, with the “Rubio Plan” for permanent residency and later citizenship, then to kick in."

CAA is not as sanguine about the sanctity and trustworthiness of school records as is Robert, but it's not that bad an idea, it's certainly a start, and is very likely to be a cornerstone of how DHS will actually implement its latest child amnesty scheme.

"More importantly for the longer-term solution is to stop the creation of “imagined U.S. citizens” at all. It appears the only way to do that is end the lackadaisical attitude toward U.S. legal residency and school enrollment. So, second, nationwide, after Part 1 is implemented, from the following August/September every child when first enrolled in school must have produced on his behalf a U.S. birth certificate, green card, or valid U.S. visa (to be asterisked for re-checking at its renewal date), as part of the routine registration process. If some form of legal U.S. residency cannot be supplied, the child cannot be enrolled.

Doing both should largely put the issue to rest. It ends the “legal limbo” entrapping those kids and young adults currently “through no fault of their own.” It will also prevent the arising of yet another generation of “imagined U.S. citizens” who will end up trapped just like them." (Emphasis in original text. - CAA.)

This would be a tough sell, and one that might cause more serious problems (for the U.S.) in the long run than the supposed "imagined U.S. citizen" problem. That's the "permanent underclass" problem of creating an un-educated, un-innoculated underclass of the permanently disadvantaged.

It's bad enough we import them, or allow them to self-import.


5/7


re: "China, Sudan, and a dose of irony"

Ian Bremmer at The Call ("Political Futures from Ian Bremer and Eurasia Group") provided an excellent analysis.


Money quote(s):

"Western officials (and more than a few Western celebrities) have criticized China in recent years for its protection of Sudan's government. They've charged Omar al-Bashir's regime in Khartoum with support for ethnically motivated militia attacks on civilians in the country's Darfur region -- and China's government with complicity. Bashir, the world's only fugitive head of state, was indicted by the International Criminal Court in 2008 for Darfur-related crimes against humanity. Beijing uses its veto power to block international efforts to supply UN peacekeepers for Darfur, critics say, to protect its oil interests in the country.

It's ironic then that China's energy needs are now helping forestall a broader (and perhaps bloodier) confrontation in Sudan."

China's got needs, and even Khartoum's greed and bloodthirst have to take a backseat to that fact.

"Last July, Sudan became two countries. The mostly Muslim North and mainly Christian South finalized a relatively amicable break-up as South Sudan became an internationally recognized independent state. But like most divorces, this one did not produce a clean break, because the two countries share custody of the country's oil wealth."

Not only that, but there are major issues about the un-agreed-to border and local ethnic and religious minorities straddling or to the north of that border.

"Not surprisingly, North and South have yet to agree on how to share oil revenue, and each side has used its leverage to pressure the other. An opening of negotiations offered little promise of progress: Khartoum demanded a transit fee of $36 per barrel. The southern government in Juba offered less than a dollar.

On Nov. 8, President Salva Kiir of South Sudan dramatically upped the stakes in the dispute by ordering the expulsion from the south of Sudapet, the North's national oil company and a financial lifeline for its government. Khartoum countered with an announcement that oil exports from South Sudan would be suspended.

China quickly jumped in.

This oil is especially important to the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), which has equity production in Sudan of about 200,000 bpd, 15 percent of its total overseas output."

For now, all the pipelines run north into Sudan, but there are other directions in which pipelines can run.

"Most of the crude that CNPC draws from Sudan is not shipped home to China but is sold on international markets. Yet Beijing has emphasized the importance of holding oil assets overseas, providing fuel that can be directed to China if events threaten a sharp drop in supply."

Oil, to a degree, is fungible. You can sell Sudanese oil somewhere conveniently close by (saving on shipping costs) and use the money to buy oil closer to Chinese ports (and markets), where you want it.

And, in extremity, you just ship it all the way to China.

"To save face, Khartoum announced it would allow the oil to pass but would seize about a quarter of the profits as compensation. Low-level violence will continue, and we can expect to see more of the increasingly common attacks on oil fields along the two countries' poorly demarcated border. There will be more turmoil in restive oil-producing regions in the North. But thanks to aggressive Chinese mediation, the oil continues to flow, and Chinese diplomats are now trying to broker a long-term deal on transit fees.

Don't expect China to dive more deeply into conflict resolution in other countries. On foreign policy, China's leadership is risk-averse even in the most confident of times, and the looming transition to a new president, premier, and party elite over the next two years will make officials even more cautious. Only when political and commercial interests clearly coincide, as they do in Sudan, will Beijing move quickly to intervene in the politics of other countries"

For decades, China's had an overall Non-Intervention Policy (NIP) regarding its international partners' internal matters.

(Of course, as of South Sudanese independence last July, Khartoum's relationship with the south is no longer an internal matter.)



12/15




re: "The Iraq Withdrawal Is Nothing to Brag About"

at Commentary (magazine) took a military historian's perspective.

Money quote(s):

"If there is one constant of American military history it is that the longer our troops stay in a country the better the prospects of a successful outcome. Think of Germany, Italy, Japan or South Korea. Conversely when U.S. troops rush for the exits hard-won wartime gains can quickly evaporate. Think of the post-Civil War South, post-World War I Germany, post-1933 (and post-1995) Haiti, post-1972 Vietnam, or, more recently, post-1983 Lebanon and post-1993 Somalia."

Very nice set of examples. Recall that Mr. Boot authored Savage Wars of Peace.

"Far from being cause for celebration, Obama’s announcement that we will keep only 150 U.S. troops in Iraq after the end of the year–down from nearly 50,000 today–represents a shameful failure of American foreign policy that risks undoing all the gains that so many Americans, Iraqis, and other allies have sacrificed so much to achieve. The risks of a catastrophic failure in Iraq now rise appreciably. The Iranian Quds Force must be licking its chops because we are now leaving Iraq essentially defenseless against its machinations. Conversely the broad majority of Iraqis who fear Iranian influence and who want their country to become a democracy will come to rue this day, however big a victory it might appear in the short term for the cause of Iraqi nationalism."

&

"The issue of immunity could have been finessed if administration lawyers from the Departments of State and Defense had not insisted that Iraq’s parliament would have to vote to grant our troops protections from Iraqi laws. Surely some face-saving formula that would not have needed parliamentary approval could have been negotiated that would have assuaged Iraqi sovereignty concerns while making it unlikely in the extreme that any U.S. soldier would ever go before an Iraqi court for actions taken in the line of duty."

Recall that the recently-withdrawn ambassadorial nominee for Iraq was a major figure in this failed negotiation. Perhaps that's the real reason for his withdrawal.

"Once U.S. forces pull out by December 31, negotiations could and should be reopened to bring back a sizable contingent–I would argue for a bare minimum of 10,000 troops–to conduct counter-terrorist operations, support the Iraqi Security Forces, and act as a peacekeeping force along the ill-defined border between Iraq proper and the Kurdish Regional Government. By showing our willingness to pull out our troops, the U.S. can show the Iraqis that we are serious about respecting their sovereignty and not bent on a long-term occupation of their country. But of course pulling out all U.S. troops and then bringing some back would be costlier than simply keeping them there."

Absent a major military event, I just don't see the U.S. sending major numbers (bigger than a few hundreds, nor units larger than company/battalion-size) to Iraq anytime soon.



10/21


Monday, July 2, 2012

re: "To fix PME, decide whether you are training or educating officers -- and do it!"

LTC Jason Dempsey, USA guest-posted at The Best Defense ("Tom Rick's Daily Take on National Security") about how to improve professional military education.

Money quote(s):

"The Scales and Kuehn discussion on PME has piqued a long-running interest of mine in the failures of professional military education (PME). While obviously I am more with Scales in my overall assessment of the system, I think Kuehn's piece helps frame the debate because it highlights some of the confusion over the purpose of PME. Specifically, it seems our colleges cannot decide whether they are in the business of training or educating. This confusion has led to a muddied curriculum and a faculty that is required to cover both educating and training, and which as a result fails to do either one very well."

The semi-public debate to which Col. Dempsey* alludes is, somewhat, inside baseball. But serious students of national security would do well to pay attention. What gets decided will have very real consequences for decades to come.

Training and education are executed quite similarly, have extensive areas of overlap, and serve parallel purposes. But they aren't (quite) the same thing.

It's perfectly fine if the military wishes to combine the two purposes into single curriculae at the various service schools and colleges, but it should be quite clear and transparent, to both faculty and staff, as to which courses belong to which categories.

"(L)et's look at the faculty. These are typically officers on the verge of retirement who have been out of the operational force for several years and are interested in academia, but have not yet completed advanced degrees or had any classroom experience outside of the military system. This places them on the fringes of both the operational force and academia. Yet we ask them to cover both the 'core curriculum' and electives, essentially guaranteeing mediocrity in both areas."

Looking over Col. Dempsey's bio blurb (see below), he appears to have personal experience in the PME swamp up to the Command & General Staff College (CGSC) level. Plus whatever research he did as a Ph.D. student and/or researching his book.

Not to knock or discredit him personally, but CAA's experience with PME faculty appears to have been considerably more positive.

Yes, in the course of CAA's military and diplomatic careers, CAA attended at least one service college. Frankly, CAA was stunned at the bright lights that were hidden under that particular bush. And if we're being credentialist, even the serving military members had advanced (graduate or higher) degrees from civilian universities.

(One secret about the stars in the PME constellation: vanishingly few of them are accredited by anyone other than the Department of Defense itself. So while the diplomas look nice in a frame, good luck getting much credit for them at civilian-accredited institutions.)

"The 'core curriculum' at our service colleges should be restructured with a singular focus on training officers for the command and/or staff responsibilities they are about to assume. This is largely the case now, but the focus should be similar to what occurs at the pre-command courses, where senior leaders rotate in to provide insights, mentorship, and current operational perspectives. At CGSC this would mean that commanders and their staffs at the brigade and battalion levels would be the ones rotating in to instruct and to facilitate scenario-driven staff exercises. This would ensure that students received the most relevant training available while reinforcing to the officer corps the importance of taking the time and effort to properly train the next generation."

The point about bringing in operational commanders and staffs as instructors is an interesting one, particularly if training is the objective.

As for scenario-driven exercises, CAA used to live-and-breath them, and is a huge(if closeted) believer there in.

"As for the elective portion of PME, at least at CGSC, the list of offerings should be considered an outright embarrassment. Again, because of not understanding the difference between training and education, valuable time -- that could be spent broadening -- is instead spent on 'courses' that are mere recitations of doctrinal manuals or job descriptions and are about as far as you can get from anything broadening or academically rigorous ('Logistics for the Battalion XO', etc.). This is not to say that there are not great instructors and courses out there (the history departments are indeed strong, and I'd be remiss not to tip my hat to Don Connelly for carrying the torch for the study of civil-military relations). But, as Kuehn notes, these few good courses are drowned out in a curriculum that could only charitably be described as vo-tech for field grades. So long as we aren't kidding ourselves that this is a broadening experience or equivalent to education, fine, but if we are serious about the need to get officers to think critically and out of their comfort zone than it is this portion of PME that needs the most restructuring."

Frankly, CAA always thought that C&GSC was all about "vo-tech for field grades" in the first place, although my recent reading of World War I history gave me a somewhat different understanding of how and where American general staff training originated.

But for much of its history, C&GSC has been more than the sum of its parts that way, going beyond "vo-tech" into actual and broadening (professional military) education.

_____
* "Lt. Col. Jason Dempsey is a career infantry officer and a graduate of a couple levels of PME, including the infantry officers basic course, the amphibious warfare school at Quantico, and CGSC. He also holds a PhD from Columbia University and is the author of Our Army: Soldiers, Politics and American Civil-Military Relations."



6/4

re: "The ideologue’s fairy tale"

Karl at Patterico's Pontifications ("Harangues that Just Make Sense") considered election strategies for 2012.

Money quote(s):

"(T)he fact that the 7%-10% of voters who end up deciding elections are almost by definition not swayed by ideology does not lessen the importance of making the case for smaller government, economic freedom and personal responsibility."

The unstated (and mostly correct) assumption that the remaining 90+% of voters split evenly (more-or-less) between each of the two major candidates.

Most election years, that's true, regardless of whether those voters self- identify as Democrats or Republicans, liberals or conservatives, moderates or independents.

In other election years, one candidate (or party platform) is simply so discredited or another is simply so overwhelmingly popular, that this breaks down into a landslide. Wooing of "independents" in those years is unnecessary; they're self-wooed.

"(O)ne of the fundamental cliches of the progressive left is pragmatism, i.e., that they are simply doing “what works.” It is also one of the progressive left’s fundamental falsehoods.

The past century has been one in which progressives have put forth the idea that Soviet communism is what works, that Eurofascism is what works, that Maoism is what works, and that Eurosocialism is what works. The actual history of the past century is one in which Eurofascism was defeated in WWII, Soviet communism was defeated in the Cold War, Maoism has degenerated into a fascism and crony capitalism that only Tom Friedman finds attractive, and Eurosocialism is taking its own road to the dustbin of history."


5/6

re: "Spy problems"

Uncle Jimbo at Blackfive ("the paratrooper of love") critiqued how America collects intelligence.

Money quote(s):

"One of the biggest flaws in our national security is the lack of any serious human intelligence capabilities. I do not mean to demean those who do practice this most dangerous craft, but to point out our lack of focus on this area."

We do have folks whose (dangerous) business this is; CAA has had the privilege of working with some of them in the past.

"I am saddened by the amateur nature of it. We decided back in the days of Jimmy Carter that spying was too nasty a game for a civilized nation to play and consequently we have blundered about like Mr. Magoo since then. We rely on signal intercepts to learn what is going on, and while this is valuable, absent the context and reality check of human intelligence it is guess work. Sadly all too often our guesses have turned out to be wrong."

Within the IC, the "science is settled" on this; the post-Vietnam focus on technical intelligence and severe cuts our human intelligence capabilities were a mistake.

Post-9/11, much time, effort, and money has gone to re-building our human collection capabilities but this isn't something that can simply be achieved, it's a moving target.

"If we want to avoid big wars, then we need a true intelligence gathering capability. That means spies, real spies, spying on people. We can scarf up all the data we want, but the value of an insider telling us what is really going on trumps all that. So let's thaw out some of the Cold War tactics that kept us safe. It may not be Boris & Natasha (or it might) but we need to keep an eye on all kinds of folks."



11/21

re: "Gaddafi and the desecration of the dead"

Neo-Neocon ("slowly but surely leaving the fold and becoming that dread thing: a neocon") was troubled by the barbarity of barbarians.

Money quote(s):

"It’s hard to escape the grisly death photos and videos of Gaddafi. A flamboyant figure who was photographed often during his long and very public life, his well-earned enemies have made sure that his death has been especially well-documented, too."

It's called globalization, which, St. Thomas Friedman of Globalization notwithstanding, is not an unmixed blessing. Nowadays even barbarians can, and do, use cell phone cameras to record video of grisly torture and executions.

"My reluctance to gaze on Gaddafi’s dead face or to watch people mistreating his corpse has nothing to do with any admiration for the man. I have little doubt that he’s perpetuated many murders and kept the people of Libya under his brutal and capricious yoke for four decades, and that their rage at him is justified.

However, the moral stature of a culture and its people are judged by many things, and one of them is the way the bodies of the dead are treated, even the most hated and reviled dead on whom they understandably wish to wreak revenge."

So consider the "moral stature" of the culture of Libyan militiamen for a moment.

"This issue is not Gaddafi at all, nor anyone in particular—it’s about how a society behaves. There is a word for this sort of thing, and that word is “barbaric.”"

None of this bodes well for the "Arab Spring."


10/21