Daily Beast - Rex Tillerson Is Not Going to Fire the Top Asia Diplomat Bannon Hates

Of course, this is eclipsed by today's latest leaks from the White House.

Spencer Ackerman at the Daily Beast ("Independent. Irreverent. Intelligent.") interpreted the present and predicted the future.

Money quote(s):

"The State Department is standing firmly behind a senior Asia-focused diplomat under attack by Steve Bannon."

That is a nice thing to see.

"Thornton is a widely respected and non-ideological career diplomat"

At that level, most of them are.  Both.  (Or they are neither.)

"Bannon’s pledge to remove Thornton from State is the latest chapter in a long-running feud between Tillerson and the White House. For months, the Secretary of State has pushed back against efforts to meddle in his affairs and undermine his top aide, even reportedly yelling at White House personnel official over their resistance to making Thornton the permanent assistant secretary."

I don't mind a secstate who will raise his voice in support of his personnel picks.

"Haas said that the only reason for dumping Thornton was to ensure her position goes to a political loyalist.

“The only rationale I can think of for seeking to get rid of her is fact she’s a foreign service officer,” he said. “As a lapsed foreign service officer myself, I find that deeply disappointing – that anyone would be disqualified on basis having devoted their life, being sent around world, working long hours in high stress, for low pay, for the sole purpose of advancing America’s interest.” "

The real ideologues come and go with each administration.  They're called political appointees.  And with the housecleaning across State's sub-cabinet level earlier this year, the message should be clear among the career folks in both civil and foreign services.

"But if recent reports turn out to be true, Thornton may stick around longer in her gig than Bannon in his."

I suppose he'll go back to Breitbart.Com.  Which hasn't been the same since Andrew died.

re: "China's Century? Not if We Don't Give It Away"

DiploMad at The DiploMad 2.0 (" Wracked with angst over the fate of our beloved and horribly misgoverned Republic, the DiploMad returns to do battle on the world wide web, swearing death to political correctness, and pulling no punches. ") deflated the myth of rising China.

Money quote(s):

"The 21st will prove "China's century" only if we destroy ourselves; but, if we do, odds are we're taking China with us--and the Chinese rulers know it (more to follow).

I love Chinese history; been to China several times; and like and respect the Chinese people--they work hard, they like Americans, and want to study and live in America. I have dealt with China's very slick, tough, and well-trained diplomats. That said, I have found it impressive over the years to see how China has transformed itself from a poor, brutal authoritarian police state into a poor, brutal, authoritarian police state with large foreign currency reserves. Sorry, but shoddily-built skyscrapers, and streets clogged with Fords, BMWs, Lexus, and Buicks, and lined with luxury stores and restaurants cannot hide the hard facts."

CAA is nothing like an old (or new) China "hand." Never been there, don't know the language.

That being said, anybody in foreign affairs who doesn't try to know at least a little bit about China ought to find a new line of work.

China, in some ways, is like one of those banks or auto companies that's "too big to fail." Until it does. And when it does, it does so in a very big way.

"I saw the repression at work in a visit to Tibet which escaped the control of our handlers. Even outside Tibet the legal system, to put it mildly, remains opaque, capricious, subject to political manipulation, and harsh. Avoid Chinese cops--who seem to be everywhere--and courts. For all the vaunted economic progress, control of the legal-political system remains with an unelected and corrupt Communist Party cadre. These rulers have agreed among themselves that not one will have the total power once wielded so disastrously by Mao. The top jobs rotate; major decisions are not made solo. Progress? I don't know. We saw a similar development in the USSR after Stalin: how is the USSR doing these days? The people remain cut out. The elite decide what's best, the people must comply--see Confucius. This secretive, stale, corrupt, aloof, and repressive system remains a major hindrance for China's development as a true power. Despite ham-handed attempts to block outside influence, word spreads of ways to live which do not involve fear and blind loyalty. We probably will not see a Chinese 21st century, but we will see a "Chinese Spring," and it could get nasty." (Bold typeface added for emphasis. - CAA.)

&

"Thanks to Chinese preference for sons, the one-child dictate means females in China are disappearing: they are being aborted, killed, and given for adoption overseas. This is gendercide, a human rights disaster of major proportions and one almost ignored. Moral issues aside, China is heading for demographic disaster. Marrying age men vastly outnumber women. Among those who can afford it, there is a hunt on for foreign brides. Large groups of young Chinese men charter planes to Indonesia, Malaysia, and elsewhere, and hold "speed dating" sessions at local hotels in the hunt for brides, stoking the anti-Chinese hatred which lies just beneath the surface of many Asian societies."

Demography, for nations, is like biology is for individuals: it is destiny. The mutually reinforcing trends of the one-child policy and selective-sex abortions mean that China will implode before it depopulates.

"China is deeply feared and resented. East Asian leaders would much rather deal with the United States, and are big proponents of an active US military and economic presence in the area. They do not want China (and previously Japan) as the undisputed big gorilla in the region."

Once-upon-a-time, CAA was called upon to write an essay on one of a menu of topics; the one I chose was to consider whether China would, in the next century (remember, I said "once-upon-a-time") become a superpower.

In the course of that essay, I explored what it takes to be a superpower and whether China had the capacity to develop those capabilities. In the end, I concluded that it could and, should it decide to do so, that it would become a superpower in short order after determining that it wished to do so.

Today, I would add the condition that while it could become a superpower, it cannot maintain that status for more than a generation.

"China's banks are a mystery. They are secretive, corrupt, and work closely with the Party and the government. China pursues a policy which will be coming to the end of its rope soon, that of keeping their currency artificially low to keep exports cheap and try to keep the job creation machine churning. The central bank, which holds the largest foreign currency reserves in the world, must come up with ways ("sterilization") to sop up the currency generated in China by the influx of foreign currency to prevent inflation and prevent the Chinese currency from appreciating against other major currencies. This involves forcing the banks to keep an ever increasing reserve, and forcing them to buy low or no yield government bonds. I am no expert, but the ones whom I know wonder how long that can continue. The experts ignore another aspect to this: the overseas political side of it. China's trading partners, the US and Europe most notably, are reaching the end of their patience with China's currency manipulations. A trade war is not inconceivable; China would have the most to lose."

&

"China will have as much power and influence as we let them have. China's future as a superpower will be decided in Washington, not in Beijing. Under the Communists, China has not proven an inventive or innovative society; their technological progress is bought, borrowed, copied, or stolen. The USSR tried that, too. They offer no compelling alternative vision to the West's prosperity andfreedom. They can try to become a military bully, but that will go only so far in their very complicated neighborhood and with the serious structural and resource weaknesses they suffer."

4/2

re: "China and Russia: Nothing to Worry About Here. Just Keep Whistling... "

The Conservative Wahoo at Information Dissemination ("The Intersection of Maritime Strategy and Strategic Communications") provided a stellar example of an alternate futures study.

Money quote(s):

"One of the reasons the military (and the commercial world) deal in alternative futures studies is the value that they provide in forecasting potential future events--events which in many cases, had been proceeded by a series of events that portended their arrival. These "signpost" events are then cataloged and monitored, for if more and more of the signposts line up, the event then grows more likely to occur."

CAA has some experience with this, having read a few of these and helped to write and edit one once. They're a very clever and hopefully useful product which combine the best of intelligence research and analysis tools and methodologies into something that should intellectually engage the reader.

"One of the things we speculated on in our work was a condominium of power between Russia and China, and for some reason, it was one of the most criticized portions of the piece (among those seeking to make thoughtful comments). Shortly after we published the paper, just such a "signpost event" occurred when I linked to a coordination of effort between the Chinese and the Russians with respect to missile defense."

This is not so crazy an idea, given that Russia (under its Soviet incarnation) and China were once closely (more-or-less) allied as major components in what was then thought of as "monolithic communism."

(Signpost or milestone events are intended to be clearly observable developments which indicate that a certain trend towards an alternate future is unfolding.)

"(A)nother signpost event (courtesy of a Galrahn Tweet): China and Russia are going to stage a naval exercise in the Yellow Sea in April. Russia plans to send 10 ships to participate. This of course, will occur in a body of water that the Chinese have increasingly indicated they wish we would not visit.

Have the two nations exercised jointly in the past? Yes they have."

There's already something of a framework for Russian-Chinese codominium already in existance, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which has been considered in alternate futures scenarios in the past (see p. 7, "World Without the West").

4/1

re: "China, Sudan, and a dose of irony"

Ian Bremmer at The Call ("Political Futures from Ian Bremer and Eurasia Group") provided an excellent analysis.

Money quote(s):

"Western officials (and more than a few Western celebrities) have criticized China in recent years for its protection of Sudan's government. They've charged Omar al-Bashir's regime in Khartoum with support for ethnically motivated militia attacks on civilians in the country's Darfur region -- and China's government with complicity. Bashir, the world's only fugitive head of state, was indicted by the International Criminal Court in 2008 for Darfur-related crimes against humanity. Beijing uses its veto power to block international efforts to supply UN peacekeepers for Darfur, critics say, to protect its oil interests in the country.

It's ironic then that China's energy needs are now helping forestall a broader (and perhaps bloodier) confrontation in Sudan."

China's got needs, and even Khartoum's greed and bloodthirst have to take a backseat to that fact.

"Last July, Sudan became two countries. The mostly Muslim North and mainly Christian South finalized a relatively amicable break-up as South Sudan became an internationally recognized independent state. But like most divorces, this one did not produce a clean break, because the two countries share custody of the country's oil wealth."

Not only that, but there are major issues about the un-agreed-to border and local ethnic and religious minorities straddling or to the north of that border.

"Not surprisingly, North and South have yet to agree on how to share oil revenue, and each side has used its leverage to pressure the other. An opening of negotiations offered little promise of progress: Khartoum demanded a transit fee of $36 per barrel. The southern government in Juba offered less than a dollar.

On Nov. 8, President Salva Kiir of South Sudan dramatically upped the stakes in the dispute by ordering the expulsion from the south of Sudapet, the North's national oil company and a financial lifeline for its government. Khartoum countered with an announcement that oil exports from South Sudan would be suspended.

China quickly jumped in.

This oil is especially important to the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), which has equity production in Sudan of about 200,000 bpd, 15 percent of its total overseas output."

For now, all the pipelines run north into Sudan, but there are other directions in which pipelines can run.

"Most of the crude that CNPC draws from Sudan is not shipped home to China but is sold on international markets. Yet Beijing has emphasized the importance of holding oil assets overseas, providing fuel that can be directed to China if events threaten a sharp drop in supply."

Oil, to a degree, is fungible. You can sell Sudanese oil somewhere conveniently close by (saving on shipping costs) and use the money to buy oil closer to Chinese ports (and markets), where you want it.

And, in extremity, you just ship it all the way to China.

"To save face, Khartoum announced it would allow the oil to pass but would seize about a quarter of the profits as compensation. Low-level violence will continue, and we can expect to see more of the increasingly common attacks on oil fields along the two countries' poorly demarcated border. There will be more turmoil in restive oil-producing regions in the North. But thanks to aggressive Chinese mediation, the oil continues to flow, and Chinese diplomats are now trying to broker a long-term deal on transit fees.

Don't expect China to dive more deeply into conflict resolution in other countries. On foreign policy, China's leadership is risk-averse even in the most confident of times, and the looming transition to a new president, premier, and party elite over the next two years will make officials even more cautious. Only when political and commercial interests clearly coincide, as they do in Sudan, will Beijing move quickly to intervene in the politics of other countries"

For decades, China's had an overall Non-Intervention Policy (NIP) regarding its international partners' internal matters.

(Of course, as of South Sudanese independence last July, Khartoum's relationship with the south is no longer an internal matter.)

12/15

re: "The ideologue’s fairy tale"

Karl at Patterico's Pontifications ("Harangues that Just Make Sense") considered election strategies for 2012.

Money quote(s):

"(T)he fact that the 7%-10% of voters who end up deciding elections are almost by definition not swayed by ideology does not lessen the importance of making the case for smaller government, economic freedom and personal responsibility."

The unstated (and mostly correct) assumption that the remaining 90+% of voters split evenly (more-or-less) between each of the two major candidates.

Most election years, that's true, regardless of whether those voters self- identify as Democrats or Republicans, liberals or conservatives, moderates or independents.

In other election years, one candidate (or party platform) is simply so discredited or another is simply so overwhelmingly popular, that this breaks down into a landslide. Wooing of "independents" in those years is unnecessary; they're self-wooed.

"(O)ne of the fundamental cliches of the progressive left is pragmatism, i.e., that they are simply doing “what works.” It is also one of the progressive left’s fundamental falsehoods.

The past century has been one in which progressives have put forth the idea that Soviet communism is what works, that Eurofascism is what works, that Maoism is what works, and that Eurosocialism is what works. The actual history of the past century is one in which Eurofascism was defeated in WWII, Soviet communism was defeated in the Cold War, Maoism has degenerated into a fascism and crony capitalism that only Tom Friedman finds attractive, and Eurosocialism is taking its own road to the dustbin of history."

5/6

re: "Chinese Dragons and Russian Bears"

"Sam Huntington" at Always On Watch ("Semper Vigilans") reviewed strategic issues involving our near-peer competitors.

Money quote(s):

"(A) far more dangerous situation is developing in Asia. No surprise, Americans are not hearing about any of this from the state-run media. Here are a few examples:

· China is claiming island territory within fifty miles of the Philippines.

· Chinese frigates regularly intruded Philippine territorial waters.

· Chinese ships fired upon Philippine fishing boats.

· Chinese naval vessels rammed Vietnamese fishing boats (See Note 1)

· Chinese accost Indian naval vessels operating off the coast of Vietnam, demanding to know why they are operating in Chinese waters.

· Chinese military aircraft intrude into Taiwanese air space.

· China intruded Japanese mainland territorial waters on 14 occasions.

· China intruded Okinawa territorial waters on 10 occasions.

· China created six major incidents with the US Navy at sea.

· Raise your hand if you aren’t aware that North Korea is China’s redheaded stepchild.

Note 1: Vietnam possesses one of the world’s largest armies: (China: 4.5 million, Vietnam: 5.9 million)."

You know the one about amateurs studying tactics and professionals studying logistics?

Well, in terms of international relations, geopolitics, and grand strategy, the professionals are studying China.

"Danger of a regional conflict is real. The consequence to China’s arrogance has been a dramatic increase in military spending among Southeast Asian countries. Australia, Japan, India, the Philippines, Vietnam, and Taiwan have all dedicated billions of dollars on new or upgraded military hardware. The United States is upgrading naval facilities in Guam —so much so that Representative Hank Johnson(D-GA) worries the island may capsize. Nevertheless, all of these countries recognize the wisdom of pooling their resources to keep China in check; Japan has taken the lead in establishing mutual defense cooperatives with Australia, South Korea, India, and the United States. Singapore has offered to provide bases for the US Navy."

CAA no longer worries that Guam will become overburdened, over-balanced, and capsize, having received assurances that Guam possesses a sufficiently sturdy keel and gyroscopic stabilizer.

"Owing to the fact that we don’t know what motivates Chinese behavior, the Australian General Staff worries that a mistake could lead to disastrous consequences —particularly when it is likely that China will attempt to use its military to enforce a Chinese Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).

The problem is that while demanding that other nations treat Chinese EEZs as its sovereign territory, China routinely refuses to acknowledge the EEZs of other nations. From the standpoint of international law, EEZs are not sovereign territory. We can therefore see how China might regard the US Navy’s mission to safeguard open sea-lanes as an intolerable trespass —a situation that could lead to deadly confrontation."

It's the old "what's-mine-is-mine-what's-yours-is-negotiable" attitude turned somewhat sideways: China will use existing international norms and fora to its own advantage and ignore those which infringe upon its own interests. That's what one does when one is the center of the Earth, after all.

"Some politicians argue that given China’s dependence on global trade, a deadly confrontation is unlikely. They may have forgotten that economic ties did not hinder German aggression at the beginning of the 20^th Century —a costly mistake for France. ....but here is where we find the real and present danger. Defense cuts may encourage China to challenge allied nations within the region of Southeast Asia —they are that arrogant."

Nor did close economic ties deflect World War I; for that matter, the United States' close economic ties with Saudi Arabia deter the 9/11 attacks.

(Marx notwithstanding, man is not solely, nor even primarily, an economic animal.)

"From Russia’s perspective, there couldn’t be a better time to threaten the United States and NATO with pre-emptive strikes unless we agree to cancel the so-called Missile Defense Shield, designed as a safeguard from Iranian ICBMs."

This seems a little over-the-top; threatening pre-emptive strikes is way more sabre-rattling than is necessary. Russia has far more effective economic and political levers to pull than jacking things up on the defcon meter.

"If one understands international relations, Russia’s timing couldn’t be better. We should anticipate this sort of behavior by an adversary whenever they perceive American leadership as weak, incompetent, ineffective, or confused."

Harsh words, but hardly unwarranted.

The "reset" button must have been like those ones installed near crosswalks: not really wired to anything but they give pedestrians something to do with their hands while waiting for the lights to change.

"This situation should once again remind us that American politicians and diplomats seldom learn important lessons of history. America cannot afford another war right now. Neither can we afford the perception of weakness, incompetence, or abject stupidity. We continue to live in a dangerous world"

Diplomats actually aren't slouches when it comes to learning their history lessons; however if you expand your definition of "diplomat" beyond those actually trained and experienced in it to those who practice it on our behalf at the highest levels....

"Rather than facing a deadly and costly regional conflict in Southeast Asia, it would be far less expensive to deter Chinese aggression vis-à-vis a strong military presence along the Pacific Rim. As for the Russian Bear, they understand but one thing: force or its promise."

5/4

re: "Managing decline"

David Warren at DavidWarrenOnline ("newspaper columns") argued against the inevitability and necessity of declinism.

Money quote(s):

"Gideon Rachman got his otherwise much-ignored Financial Times column linked on the Drudge Report, this week. (Drudge is "the bull" in this scenario.) In his smuggest, most superior, British tone, he lectured the Americans on "the management of decline." "

Even last October (when this saw print), it was far too late for any Europeans (even the British) to be lecturing Americans on this topic.

"(T)he phrase was meant to be droll: to ridicule the mindset of people who were destroying the British economy through nationalizations, while walking away from her responsibilities "east of Suez"; who portrayed Britain's decline as inevitable, and themselves as the ingenious lords of this great recessional dance."

The British have always done droll quite well.

"We "running dogs of American imperialism" (as the Maoists used to call us) regret the decline of American power, not necessarily from adoration of everything American, but because the alternative to American power in the world is Chinese power, and the rise to consequence of an array of regional powers perhaps nastier. For as America goes down, these unspeakable powers go up, relatively, and get their opportunity to throw their weight around."

True enough. America's decline, to the extent that it is real and not merely public relations in advance of reality, does not occur in a vacuum. Nature, and international relations, abhores a vacuum.

"In a similar way, in a previous generation, many not British themselves, cheered on the works of "British imperialism." For imperialism is always with us, and the British form was rather more benign than, say, the German form.

That is a point characteristically lost upon "progressive" minds, with their underlying, usually unexamined, utopian premises. This has been on exhibit throughout the Arab Spring, where it is assumed that the overthrow of Arab dictators must naturally lead to roses."

Clearly Mr. Warren's crystal ball was working pretty well last year, since he saw where the Arab Spring would almost inevitably lead in places like Egypt.

"Decline is of two kinds, relative and absolute. The relative decline of the U.S. was inevitable, as other countries which had destroyed themselves through war and totalitarianism gradually recovered, and wealth with its accompanying powers was disseminated through the world. The misfortune here is that America's allies in Canada, Europe, and elsewhere, declined their share of military expenditure. All were content to let the U.S. carry the weight of NATO, while they embarked on nanny-statist ventures more advanced than the American.

These in turn contributed to absolute decline: and to the effective bankruptcy of states across the European Union, as well as America and Japan. Behind the budgetary catastrophes are the demographic realities of aging societies, which can never catch up. They simply don't have enough working young to pay all the "entitlements."

Relative decline was unavoidable; but absolute decline was a choice."

Relative decline isn't such a bad thing when a rising tide is lifting other countries out of poverty. It's less of a good thing when poor countries are getting poorer.

""Managing decline" now means making the best of the fallout; of choosing what we can still afford and what we can no longer. The British "managed their decline," and now sneer at Americans whose turn it is to manage theirs.

There was in Britain a Churchillian force that did not accept decline. It "won the war" on its last sprint, then snuffed out just after.

There is likewise in the United States today a force - call it Tea Party - that does not accept inevitable decline. It is allied with every other faltering life force in American society. And, as an exponent of this "rabid right" myself, I will not only cheer them on, but continue biting their detractors. "

10/19

re: "The Long Term"

The late, great Lex at Neptunus Lex (" The unbearable lightness of Lex. Enjoy! ") remarked on a U.S. diplomatic "win" out in the far reaches of the Pacific Rim (i.e., in China's front yard).

Money quote(s):

"(T)here’s always a but in diplomacy – one move, even a series of well choreographed and expertly timed moves – does not a match make"

The point being, I think, that the "match" is rarely ever fully over, except in such exceptional circumstances such as the end of a major war, the collapse of a dynasty or empire, or some sort of mass extinction event.

(And then a new match will start, and some of the "new" players will look awfully familiar.)

"First comes the political succession, then the internal struggle for power and the coalescence of a national strategy. That is, of course, if the Peoples’ Liberation Army has the patience for it.

In the really long term, we’re all dead. The state within a state represented by the PLA gets to ponder its over-reaching, rebuke and subsequent loss of face and decide how long “long” is." (Emphasis in original text. - CAA.)

The PLA isn't going anywhere, absent a really cataclysmic (for China) turn of events.

"For US diplomats, it’s all pats on the back, champagne toasts and Washington fêtes, for now. A chance to celebrate a coup. An opportunity, even, to treasure an adversary worth tilting against, after a decade of squashing irrational bugs, and making uncomfortable alliances.

Let’s hope we haven’t forgotten how to play this game."

Kudos to all involved, but don't get cocky.

p.s. For friends and fans of Lex, be sure to drop by The Lexicans.

11/20

re: "Afghanistan and Honor"

GRIM at Blackfive ("the paratrooper of love") asked the hardest questions about Afghanistan.

Money quote(s):

"I asked a question at the end of the last post. The consensus from you ladies and gentlemen is... let it go. We've spent almost three thousand American, UK and NATO soldiers' lives there. That's a hard thing to walk away from.

Not that you're wrong."

In business, the concept is "sunken costs."

(It means not throwing good money after bad.)

But it doesn't mean it won't leave a bad taste in your mouth for some time afterwards

"The logistics have never worked, except for illegal goods whose value is exaggerated by artificial scarcity. Moving them into legitimate markets was never an option. Take a look at the railroad situation. They have no seaports, so rail roads are the next best thing. Of their neighboring countries, China is on a different track gauge; Pakistan and nearby India are on another; Iran is on a third; only the former Soviet states share their gauge. But that means a vast distance to the nearest seaport, and connection to global trade; or else, investment in the kind of infrastructure needed to hook up with the several other lines on offer."

Grim is talking about logistics in terms of integrating Afghanistan, and its economy, into the wider global economy; in other words: nation-building.

The same problems complicate the logistical effort necessary to support our military (and diplomatic) efforts in Afghanistan.

"If we walk away from the dead, though, there is a debt of honor owed. We must have a reckoning with those who led us to this place."

The same could have been said about our war dead from Vietnam, a reckoning long overdue.

2/1

re: "Addendum on National Myths"

Joseph W. at Grim's Hall considered the necessity of the national myth.

Money quote(s):

"The highly successful (the Chinese have one of the most successful national myths in the world; and their beastly treatment of the Uighurs and Tibetans comes along with it), the once successful (for I can dimly remember a time when public schools in this country taught an American national myth, and I've read enough old things to know it was once very strong), and the decidedly troubled."

Consider the highly successful and millenia-long experiment in cultural imperialism, and assimilation, waged by the Han. It's truly remarkable.

(Although it's much harder to consider it dispassionately if you're the next target for assimilation.)

"(I)f I had to pick a single factor that really makes a recognizable "people," a national myth is that factor. A common language helps; a common government helps; a common religion helps; but it is the national myth (that may well be bound up with all these things) that really does the trick."

Calling something a myth doesn't necessarily mean it's untrue, per se, although the imputation is certainly there.

"Smith however concludes that the Palestinian myth is not "strong enough" because their leadership is unwilling to accept a limited state that coexists with its Israeli neighbors. But I think that is not a sign of the myth's weakness, but simply its character. For better or worse, and mainly for worse, the Palestinians have indeed become a people because they have got a national myth. It's just a barren and ugly one. It is of recent vintage - that is the kernel of truth in Mr. Gingrich's statement (which I used to agree with) - but that doesn't invalidate it. All national myths have got to start somewhere." (Bold typeface added for emphasis. - CAA.)

These are indeed the key points to carry away from Mr W.'s analysis: the Palestinian national myth is a "barren and ugly" (indeed, it's genocidal) one; and, it's of very recent vintage.

"What makes our own myth remarkable is the way it rests on ideas and laws, more than any race or religion. The complaints that led to independence for certain grew out of the British constitution, and its common-law way of developing rights. Let colonists vote for the assemblies that tax them, as Britons vote for the Parliament that taxes them, and they'll pick up the idea that they have a right to it - not in the civil-law sense that someone formally granted it, but in the common-law way, that the unifying theory is to be discerned from the actual decisions made. And our myth certainly relies on the idea of these things as rights - yet is blessedly detached from any continued racial identity. Our national identity is not weakened if we admit that Anglo-Saxons can commit beastly atrocities - the document that started it all is filled with such accusations. More remarkably, if we admit that the ideas are noble, and the men who made them law were doing noble acts, we can admit much more wihtout weakening the myth at all - that they carried flaws with their nobility, as true heroes always do, and that Americans have done many awful things since by not living up to those ideas." (Emphasis in original text. - CAA.)

1/3