re: "What Lies Beneath"

Richard Fernandez a Belmont Club critiqued the Administration's habit of pre-emption.

Money quote(s):

"Pre-emption was also in evidence in foreign affairs, but this Pearl Harbor was not directed against America’s supposed enemies, but at its allies. Mark Perry at Foreign Policy writes an article strongly implies that the Obama administration is pre-emptively leaking Israeli military cooperation arrangements with Azerbaijan to protect Iran from a potential strike. Perry says officials told him that Israel was acquiring airfields on Iran’s northern border, something that may not have been common knowledge."

&

"Well if the Iranians didn’t know about Azerbaijan, they know now. Lee Smith says that this may be a blatant tip-off. “A number of Israeli journalists, led by Ron Ben-Yishai, one of the country’s esteemed security correspondents, claimed that Mark Perry’s article was clear evidence the White House was leaking critical information about Israel’s strategy in order to pressure Jerusalem to abandon its war plans and wait for the administration’s sanctions to bring the Iranian regime to its knees.” Maybe they’ll have to wait a long time. But for what it is worth, John Bolton believes the administration is alerting Iran, the administration acting as their Chain Home system, so to speak."

Omitted from my selective excerption were the passages that suggest the information about Azerbaijan may not have been correct, and the whys of that.

About half of Wretchard's post had to do with the Supreme Court's then-pending health care reform decision.

4/4

re: "China, Sudan, and a dose of irony"

Ian Bremmer at The Call ("Political Futures from Ian Bremer and Eurasia Group") provided an excellent analysis.

Money quote(s):

"Western officials (and more than a few Western celebrities) have criticized China in recent years for its protection of Sudan's government. They've charged Omar al-Bashir's regime in Khartoum with support for ethnically motivated militia attacks on civilians in the country's Darfur region -- and China's government with complicity. Bashir, the world's only fugitive head of state, was indicted by the International Criminal Court in 2008 for Darfur-related crimes against humanity. Beijing uses its veto power to block international efforts to supply UN peacekeepers for Darfur, critics say, to protect its oil interests in the country.

It's ironic then that China's energy needs are now helping forestall a broader (and perhaps bloodier) confrontation in Sudan."

China's got needs, and even Khartoum's greed and bloodthirst have to take a backseat to that fact.

"Last July, Sudan became two countries. The mostly Muslim North and mainly Christian South finalized a relatively amicable break-up as South Sudan became an internationally recognized independent state. But like most divorces, this one did not produce a clean break, because the two countries share custody of the country's oil wealth."

Not only that, but there are major issues about the un-agreed-to border and local ethnic and religious minorities straddling or to the north of that border.

"Not surprisingly, North and South have yet to agree on how to share oil revenue, and each side has used its leverage to pressure the other. An opening of negotiations offered little promise of progress: Khartoum demanded a transit fee of $36 per barrel. The southern government in Juba offered less than a dollar.

On Nov. 8, President Salva Kiir of South Sudan dramatically upped the stakes in the dispute by ordering the expulsion from the south of Sudapet, the North's national oil company and a financial lifeline for its government. Khartoum countered with an announcement that oil exports from South Sudan would be suspended.

China quickly jumped in.

This oil is especially important to the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), which has equity production in Sudan of about 200,000 bpd, 15 percent of its total overseas output."

For now, all the pipelines run north into Sudan, but there are other directions in which pipelines can run.

"Most of the crude that CNPC draws from Sudan is not shipped home to China but is sold on international markets. Yet Beijing has emphasized the importance of holding oil assets overseas, providing fuel that can be directed to China if events threaten a sharp drop in supply."

Oil, to a degree, is fungible. You can sell Sudanese oil somewhere conveniently close by (saving on shipping costs) and use the money to buy oil closer to Chinese ports (and markets), where you want it.

And, in extremity, you just ship it all the way to China.

"To save face, Khartoum announced it would allow the oil to pass but would seize about a quarter of the profits as compensation. Low-level violence will continue, and we can expect to see more of the increasingly common attacks on oil fields along the two countries' poorly demarcated border. There will be more turmoil in restive oil-producing regions in the North. But thanks to aggressive Chinese mediation, the oil continues to flow, and Chinese diplomats are now trying to broker a long-term deal on transit fees.

Don't expect China to dive more deeply into conflict resolution in other countries. On foreign policy, China's leadership is risk-averse even in the most confident of times, and the looming transition to a new president, premier, and party elite over the next two years will make officials even more cautious. Only when political and commercial interests clearly coincide, as they do in Sudan, will Beijing move quickly to intervene in the politics of other countries"

For decades, China's had an overall Non-Intervention Policy (NIP) regarding its international partners' internal matters.

(Of course, as of South Sudanese independence last July, Khartoum's relationship with the south is no longer an internal matter.)

12/15

re: "Tehran's embassies: Targets of popular rage since 1829"

Uri Friedman at PASSPORT ("A Blog By The Editors of FOREIGN POLICY") put the Iranian attack on the British embassy in its proper historical context.

Money quote(s):

"The storming of the British embassy in Tehran on Tuesday capped a week of diplomatic wrangling over the United Kingdom's decision to slap new sanctions on Iran in response to its nuclear program."

Just in case anyone actually believes this was the unsanctioned action of a "spontaneous mob," here's a link to some information that bears on that subject.

(Of course, if you equate, as I do, the term "spontaneous mob" to "state-sponsored assault team," then only the "unsanctioned" part of the above should be any bother.)

"(E)mbassy storming is a recurring phenomenon in Tehran, though Iran certainly isn't the only country to experience such attacks. The most infamous incident, of course, involves young Islamic revolutionaries seizing the U.S. embassy in 1979 and taking 63 Americans hostage for 444 days to demand that the United States hand over the recently ousted Shah. But there are other examples."

In addition to some post-Revolutionary examples, there's also this:

"Tehran also witnessed what may be the earliest instance of an embassy assault (if an earlier example comes to mind, please share it with us). In January 1829, Alexander Griboyedov, a famous Russian playwright tasked with imposing a humiliating peace treaty on the Persians, was murdered along with nearly his entire staff when a furious mob stormed the Russian embassy in Tehran following a series of disputes between Griboyedov and the Shah."

In addition to Britain closing its Tehran embassy and order Iran's diplomats out of London, France's mission will also be going on some sort of Ordered Departure.

11/29

re: "An awkward independence day for diplomats in South Sudan"

Edmund Downie at PASSPORT ("A Blog By The Editors Of Foreign Policy") noted a little problem of an ICC warrant being out on one of the invited guests.

Money quote(s):

"The International Criminal Court's March 2009 indictment alleged that Bashir was responsible for war crimes in the ongoing conflict in Darfur. Recent violence in border states Abyei and South Kordofan hasn't endeared him to the international community either. Bashir and rebel leaders pledged in late June to pull troops out of Abyei before the referendum, but Bashir's ambassador to Kenya reaffirmed yesterday the north's claim to the region."



(7/8)

re: "Does the acquittal of Geert Wilders signal a changing Netherlands?"

Robert Zeliger at PASSPORT ("A Blog By The Editors Of Foreign Policy") marked a significant development in Holland.

Money quote(s):

"The Dutch far-right politician Geert Wilders has called the Quran a "fascist book" that ought to be banned. He has referred to the Prophet Mohammed as "the devil," and said all Muslim immigration to the Netherlands should be stopped and immigrants currently there should be paid to leave. He's said women who wear the hijab should have to pay a tax and if Muslims continue immigrating, it would mean the end "European and Dutch civilization as we know it.""

Clearly offensive speech (at least to Muslims, and certainly at least some others) but Constitutionally-protected speech in an American context. It's nice to see this sort of thing (free speech, that is) catch on in foreign parts.

"(H)e was acquitted on charges of inciting racial hatred."

If a member of parliament can't speak freely, what hope is there for the average citizen?

"(T)he truth is that the social and political ground have been shifting in the supposedly tolerant society for years. Last year, Wilders's Party for Freedom won 15 percent of the vote in national elections, making it the third largest in parliament. And his ideas are slowly creeping into mainstream politics: The Netherlands has some of the strictest immigration laws in Europe, and has banned face-covering attire like the niqab.

The current government depends on Wilders and his party to remain in power. Though not formally part of government, they are at the very least a silent partner. Without their votes, the minority-government wouldn't be able to pass its legislation."

Good political analysis, answering the question: "So what?"

"Wilders's judge today said that while some of his statements were "crude and denigrating," they were nevertheless protected speech. But the decision might widen the scope of the debate on multiculturalism in Dutch society, and embolden Wilders to take his anti-Islam and anti-immigration crusade further."

Widening "the scope of the debate on multiculturalism" should be considered a feature, not a bug. Why should a social construct or consensus (which is apparently far from universally held) be exempt from debate?

re: "WikiLeaks winners and losers: Early edition"

David Rothkopf at FP's new Wikileaked ("Inside the State Department's Secret Cables") puts some thought into not only who the ultimate beneficiaries of the leaked cable traffic are, but may surprise you with who they aren't.

Be sure to read the whole thing.

re: "Germany reintroduces Iron Cross"

James Downey at PASSPORT ("A blog by the editors of FOREIGN POLICY") has some news from the Bundeswehr.

re: "Blooper: Hillary traveled to the foreign country of Texas"

Preeti Aroon at FP's Madame Secretary ("An obsessive blog about Hillary Clinton") notes this "awshit."

Money quote(s):

"(T)he State Department's Web site included the "country" of Texas."

re: "Obama announces more appointments: State, CIA, Energy, Commerce"

Laura Rozen at FP's The Cable ("Reporting inside the foreign policy machine") has some political appointment news.

re: "Time to act like a state"

Tom Mahnken at FP's Shadow Government ("Notes from the loyal opposition") discusses the problem of Somali pirates.

Money quote(s):

"Piracy has grown in the waters bordering the Horn of Africa because states have failed to act like states and leaders have failed to lead. Whether military force is permitted as a response to piracy is, as my lawyer friends say, settled law. International law has recognized pirates as outlaws who may be killed on sight since the Roman Empire."

"The Obama administration's reaction to piracy in general, and the seizure of the ship in particular, betrays muddled thinking about the nature of the threat posed by piracy and the proper response to it. At least implicitly, the Obama administration appears to be treating pirates as if they were insurgents. Criminals (including pirates) represent a challenge of an altogether different sort. Whereas a mixture of political and ideological motivations drives insurgents to violence, it is the search for profit that fuels criminality."

&

"What the United States and those who wish to join us need to do is to drive up, rapidly and decisively, the cost of engaging in piracy. The successful operation to free Captain Richard Phillips from Somali pirates is a good start, but it is just a start. More will be needed to remove this threat to the global commons. Specifically, President Obama should give on-scene commanders permission to shoot pirates on sight. He should also authorize punitive strikes against the bases from which Somali pirates operate. Such actions, over the course of days or weeks, should be sufficient to drive the pirates off the seas."

re: "Spooky murder in Loudon County, VA"

Laura Rozen at FP's The Cable ("Reporting inside the foreign policy machine") draws us a Rorschachian sort of picture.

Money quote(s):

"Last month, former Army officer William Bennett was found murdered after being out with his wife on an early morning walk in a residential neighborhood in Lansdowne, Virginia. His wife Cynthia was badly injured but survived the March 22nd attack, which is being investigated by local and federal authorities.

In 1999, sources bring to our attention, Bennett was a retired Army lieutenant colonel working at the CIA on contract as a targeter during the 78-day NATO air war on Kosovo. He was one of the people, according to a former U.S. intelligence source, found responsible by the Agency for feeding the target into the system that resulted in the May 7, 1999 NATO bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade."

"The bombing of the Chinese embassy was immediately declared a terrible mistake by the U.S. government, but it caused severe diplomatic strain on U.S. relations with Beijing."

"The FBI has reportedly joined the Loudon County Sheriff’s office in investigating Bennett’s murder."

&

"(T)he LCSO has 13 investigators devoted full time to the case, and is being assisted by other federal agencies, including the FBI's Washington field office. He said last he heard as of Friday, Cynthia Bennett was still hospitalized in critical condition."

re: "The war on terror, RIP"

Christian Brose at FP's Shadow Government ("Notes from the loyal opposition") remarks on the end of the GWOT.

Money quote(s):

"So this means an end to preemptive strikes against "gathering threats", no more hard slogging on the "central fronts" (either Afghanistan or Iraq), a quick resolution to that whole Guantanomo problem, and no more need for the president to worry about what authorities he has to detain "enemy combatants", or whatever you want to call them?"

"(N)o one human being, only a government committee, could come up with something so awful as "Overseas Contingency Operation.""

&

"We could speak of fights, and confrontations, and violent extremism, and everyone would know what we were talking about. The policies wouldn't change. And we would avoid signalling that the most powerful nation on earth was at war with Islam, which though obviously wrong, most Muslims believed nonetheless."

re: "Freeman asks to withdraw"

Laura Rozen at FP's The Cable ("Reporting inside the foreign policy machine") had the news.

Yes, I know I'm a bit behind on this.

re: "ODNI inspector general reviewing Chas Freeman"

Laura Rozen at ForeignPolicy.Com's The Cable ("Reporting inside the foreign policy machine") has this update.

Money quote(s):

"In a letter today responding to 10 congressmen led by Rep. Mark Kirk (R-IL) who have raised concerns about the appointment of Chas Freeman to chair the National Intelligence Council, Edward Maguire, the inspector general of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, has written that he is reviewing the matters they have raised."

re: "Is the military invading the State Department?"

Christian Brose at FP's Shadow Government ("Notes from the loyal opposition") explores the idea of a mid-career entry program for military officers joining the Foreign Service.

Money quote(s):

"The thought that some military officer would move laterally into a mid-career diplomatic or civilian post in the State Department, jumping ahead of Foreign Service officers who had served their time stamping visas in Botswana or someplace, was a non-starter for the institutional Foreign Service. And needless to say, no military officer worth a damn would retire after a decade or so in uniform to stamp visas in Botswana with 24-year-olds fresh out of their A-100 class."

The idea that "stamping visas" is merely a form of serving time, a rite of passage for new FSOs crops up fairly often, sometimes even among actual FSOs (who should know better).

First, if all you're doing is "stamping" visas, then you're doing it wrong. Vice consuls and other visa adjudicators are expected to apply the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (as amended, and boy is it ever) and related regulations (found in the Foreign Affairs Manuals, the Foreign Affairs Handbook, scores of SOPs and tables, and hundreds of cables) in order to facilitate legitimate travel to the U.S. while serving as the first-line of border security.

So if you're doing it right, it's not exactly sleep-walking. This is serious business; nobody wants to import foreign criminals, terrorists, or even extra economic migrants; the U.S. domestic supply will suffice.

Second, while the visa functions (both non-immigrant and immigrant) probably account for 60-70 percent of consular jobs overseas, they aren't the sum total of consular work. While from the outside looking in, most foreigners would think of the visa function as being the most important part of consular section, from the U.S. perspective the American Citizen Services (ACS) function is much more important. Helping U.S. travelers and residents abroad is a State Department mission going back to the founding of our Republic.

Third, while entry-level FSOs may expect to serve at least one year (but I think two years is more likely) of their probationary period (typically two 2-year assignments abroad) doing consular work.

Those in other career tracks (political, economic, management, public diplomacy, & consular) will only return to consular work if they choose to bid on consular positions. That being said, a professional FSO needs to have a working knowledge of consular work, both visa and ACS, in order to effectively perform their jobs overseas.

Every U.S. diplomat will be the recipient of questions about visas and passports in the course of their assigned duties; except for the most senior of diplomats abroad, every FSO will take their turn as duty officer, where 90 percent of after-hours calls will be consular-related; and the senior-most diplomats will find themselves as the supervisors of consular managers, and be legally obligated to provide oversight of consular accountability and perform adjudication reviews. So having a clue is helpful in avoiding any career-killing mis-steps.

Fourth, the average age of a new FSO is 32 years old, the maximum age of a new FSO is in the late 50's; so the number of 24 year old vice consuls, fresh from grad school or university, is fairly small. Most are starting their second or even third careers, just like the hypothetical military officer with a decade in uniform behind him (or her).

(Thought experiment: how do you suppose the DoD would react to the suggestion that government employees with 10 years experience transfer in as majors and colonels? Would they embrace this bold, fresh new approach?)

Fifth (and last), prior government (including military) experience is accounted for in determining an entering FSOs initial class and step (similar to GS grades and steps). There's a formula whereby HR evaluates each entering FSO's level of formal education along with their years of professional-level experience. I'm reasonably certain that the hypothetical major (or lieutenant commander) with 10 years experience will get credit for all of those 10 years as being "professional-level." So I would expect them to enter in Class 4 (or "FP-o4"), the FS equivalent of a captain. And within five years to be Class 3 ("FS-03", the first of the three mid-grade ranks and equivalent to a major).

A fairly brief journeymanship of 3-5 years would put a military officer, starting in an entirely new commissioned service, back at a rank equivalent (or higher) than the one they held in their former career, with the potential to reach the "brass" they'd thought out of their reach.

I should also mention that a Veteran's Preference is factored into the FS selection process.

"I remember in the fall of 2006 asking one U.S. Army officer whether mid-career entry into the State Department appealed to him, and he answered emphatically, yes. He was a veteran of both the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq as I recall. He had maybe a dozen years of experience -- managing people, programs, resources, and working overseas. He loved to serve, but he could see the writing on the wall. He knew he wasn't destined for brass on his shoulders, and the thought of moving to work as a civilian or Foreign Service Officer thrilled him."

I encourage any U.S. military or naval person, commissioned or not, to at least look into the Foreign Service as your next career.

And to not limit that consideration solely to the generalist FSO fields. Someone with overseas experience managing people, programs, and resources might also be a fit for one of the Foreign Service Specialist fields.

"(R)eal change requires institutionalizing the thinking behind "smart power" -- which really requires creating an entirely new set of assumptions and expectations about what life today as a diplomat will be (hint: more dangerous, more lonely, and less glamorous). Another hint: this will be extremely unpopular with much of the Foreign Service."

Not to get into personalities, but I took a moment to read Mr. Brose's bio page and note that his State Department experience is limited to being a speech writer for Secretaries Powell and Rice. As one or two of FS web loggers have noted in the past, one of the ways the Foreign Service does itself a disservice is by our over-diligence as control officers for foreign visits by members of Congress and high-ranking State Department officials. We literally knock ourselves silly ensuring that these visits go smoothly and bump-free.

I'm sure traveling the world inside the secretary of state's "bubble" was quite cozy for Mr. Brose, but it certainly doesn't equip someone to get snarky about how glamorous Foreign Service life is these days, nor about how in the future it'll be more dangerous and lonely.

The future is now, Mr. Brose.

_____

Hat tip to The Hegemonist ("a personal weblog touching on international relations, foreign policy, and diplomacy").

_____

Please see my additional comments at "And what about Botwana?"

re: "Don't look for foreign leaders at the inauguration"

Joshua Keating at Passport ("A blog by the editors of FOREIGN POLICY") explains a traditional aspect of U.S. presidential inaugurations.

Money quote(s):

"While U.S. ambassadors and their spouses are invited to attend the event, foreign leaders have been asked to stay home."

This is not something new. This is still an American event; foreign ambassadors who are accredited to the U.S. (there's kind of a difference between them and "U.S. ambassadors") are welcome to attend (and will get fairly good seats, plus lunch at Blair House, IIRC) but every head of state who's hoping to scrape up air fare and a winter coat is expected to stay home.