Living the Dream.





Showing posts with label CNAS. Show all posts
Showing posts with label CNAS. Show all posts

Wednesday, February 9, 2011

re: "U.S. Policy in Mubarak's Egypt: Harder Than It Looks "

Abu Muqawama ("dedicated to following issues related to contemporary insurgencies as well as counterinsurgency tactics and strategy") at the Center for New American Security ("Developing Strong, Pragmatic and Principled National Security and Defense Policies") highlights some on-point thinking by Pincus.

Money quote(s):

"In short, it was relatively easy to predict the trainwreck on the horizon. It was difficult, by contrast, to use what leverage the United States had over Egypt to avert the disaster. "

Friday, February 4, 2011

re: "Egypt: The Blame Game Begins. Sigh. "

Abu Muqawama ("dedicated to following issues related to contemporary insurgencies as well as counterinsurgency tactics and strategy") at the Center for New American Security ("Developing Strong, Pragmatic and Principled National Security and Defense Policies") demonstrates uncommon good sense.

Money quote(s):

"(I)t was inevitable that in Washington, people would start asking "Who Lost Egypt?" before it was even clear what, exactly, is happening there."

&

"(L)ong ago the U.S. government had identified the fall or death of Hosni Mubarak as a likely contingency to plan toward. Everyone knew this was going to happen eventually. So I think the blame being heaped on the intelligence community here is a little silly. Intelligence cannot predict the future, though it can assist policy-makers in gaming out possible contingencies, and I think our intelligence services did that here."

&

"Even when administrations have decided to pressure Mubarak, by the way, they have found that the ~$1.5b we give Egypt annually has been a largely ineffective source of leverage. (Though it has, I would argue, helped foster now-invaluable connections with Egypt's military. Those last two sentences should serve as a warning for any legislators out there threatening to cut our aid.)"




Tuesday, June 1, 2010

re: "Understanding State's Budget Woes"

Matt Armstrong at Mountain Runner ("Discourse on America's Discourse") shared a detailed critique of State's flawed relations with Congress.

Money quote(s):

"Andrew Exum at CNAS blames - only somewhat tongue in cheek - the absence of federal money creating jobs in Congressional districts for the State Department's budget woes. His point, of course, is that Congress sees little direct benefit from State's activities."

He's not really kidding. Well, even if he was, it's still true.

The State Department has no (or little, which amounts to the same thing) domestic political constituency. We don't create jobs in anybody's district (aside from the various domestic passport centers, which is another subject). And most of the time nobody writes, emails, or calls their congressional representative unless they're seeking help with a problem they're having with the State Department.

Fortunately, most of the legislative staff who deal with State Department on behalf of their constituents quickly learn that we don't capriciously create problems and obstacles for their constituents. Most of the time the problems are actually the creation of the constituent themselves, and State Department folks (usually consular officers) are either simply following the laws that Congress itself passed or are limited in what they can do by either budgetary constraints (also an artifact of Congress) or reality itself (i.e., foreign courts and police forces don't actually work for the United States, so I can't order them to release someone just because they're American).

This is why I take every opportunity I can to help create at least a shadow of a glimmer of a domestic constituency whenever I get the chance. You're a college professor or church leader bringing a gaggle of your students or parishioners to my consular district and you'd like a quick tour of the embassy or consulate while you're in country? If I can spare someone for even an hour, I can make it happen. I've got a relatively brief Powerpoint presentation kept up-to-date, can reserve a meeting room, and if you'll get me everyone's passport information ahead of time then embassy security can pre-clear your group.

And then I get an hour to tell some congressman's constituents what the State Department does for them and for the country.

I've also learned to not be shy about telling people who are thanking me about something I or my staff has done for them that, yes, I appreciate their thanks but if they're really grateful it'd be even better if they dropped their congressman or senator an email or postcard. I generally add that other people are never slow to send complaints about the things they don't like, so it's just good citizenship to ensure their representative is getting the whole picture.

It's constituency building at the micro level, in the field, which is not the aim of Matt's post, but you have to start somewhere.

&

"If Congress is to fund (and stop defunding) State, it requires greater awareness of State's purpose, requirements, and limitations, especially those that must be overcome. State cannot continue to rely on the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and other members of the uniformed community to ask Congress for money and authorities to build capacity and capabilities to fulfill current and future requirements.

State has a role in making sure the discourse over its purpose and activities become more public, and thus a higher profile, and more informed. The President and the American people require it. Guns and bombs do not create or sustain peace."

Sunday, April 11, 2010

re: "Just Admit It: The Surge Worked (Updated)"

Abu Muqawama at CNAS ("an independent and nonpartisan research institution") came to a reasonable conclusion.

Money quote(s):

"If you really move the goal posts, defining up "success" as the Surge having not only reduced levels of violence and addressed immediate drivers of conflict but having also managed to fix all the problems in Iraq's political process, then yeah, it failed. But I don't recall that ever being the aim of the operation in 2007, and I don't think it's reasonable to expect the U.S. military and its friends in the diplomatic corps to be able to settle the political affairs of a host nation."

&

"(T)here can be no denying that a space has indeed been created for a more or less peaceful political process to take place. Acts of heinous violence still take place in Baghdad, but so too does a relatively peaceful political process.

If you want to argue that getting involved in Iraq in the first place was a stupid decision, fine. I agree with you. But trying to argue that the Surge "failed" at this point -- even if Iraq someday descends anew into civil war -- simply isn't a credible option anymore.
"


Hat tip to Glenn Reynolds at Instapundit ("the intersection between advanced technologies and individual liberty").