re: "What You Need to Know About the CIA Getting Rolled Up in Lebanon. That, and Larry Munson."

Andrew Exum at Abu Muquwama examined a major intelligence setback in Lebanon.

Money quote(s):

"As some of you may or may not already know, Hizballah, together with the Lebanese government, has rolled up what is believed to be the vast majority of the assets of the Central Intelligence Agency in Lebanon."

As Dr. Exum implies, Hizballah and the Lebanese government are sufficiently interpenetrated as to be considered unitary at this point. I suppose a Venn Diagram might show the Lebanese government as comprising two overlapping circles: the circle belonging to Syria, the circle belonging to Hizballah, and a mutual zone which serves two masters.

"I know about as much about clandestine operations and running agents as I do about playing linebacker in the NFL, but I do know a little about Lebanon, and I also know something about what my boss John Nagl likes to refer to as "learning organizations," a concept I believe to be relevant here. I first heard about this story from a journalist over lunch last week, and I'll relate to you what I told him and some of what he told me.

1. As many of you know, Hizballah and Lebanese intelligence have been quite good at rolling up Israeli intelligence assets since 2006. (Contrary to what I would have thought, Israel managed to keep a pretty good human intelligence network alive in Lebanon after its withdrawal from southern Lebanon in 2000.) Our intelligence assets were vulnerable to the same counter-intelligence methods that did in the Israelis, but we apparently blew off the warnings."

Be sure to read the rebuttal comment as to what the CIA did or didn't manage to do.

"2. Given that negligence, if I am a member of the U.S. Congress, I am going to ask if it is really true that the station chief in Beirut was subsequently promoted within the ranks of the CIA. If told this is in fact true, I am going to ask who, if anyone, is being held accountable.

3. I am also, if I am a member of the U.S. Congress, going to be asking whether or not CIA tradecraft has eroded over the past decade as the agency has chased the bright shiny ball we'll call "drone-strikes-in-Pakistan". (A question that, quite frankly, needed to be asked afterthe 2009 bombing in Khost.) It's great to have an intelligence agency with a knife in its teeth, but the primary mission of an intelligence organization is to gather and analyze intelligence, not to thwack bad guys. If you fail in that primary mission, questions have to be asked as to why you are failing."

Sometimes you lose. Consider that in an environment like Lebanon, you're not just running an intelligence operation. You're simultaneously trying to run intelligence operations, counter-intelligence operations to protect your intelligence operations, and counter-counterintelligence operations (against your targets counterintelligence) as well.

And it only gets worse from there. Lebanon is a hostile, if not actually completely denied area for U.S. intelligence.

"In the same way that the U.S. Army has an institutional interest in convincing policy makers that every general officer is equal to another, the CIA has an interest in convincing outsiders that external evaluation will compromise valuable tactics, techniques and procedures and will endanger operational security. (This is not a good recipe for an organization that learns from its mistakes and solicits external criticism in an effort to be more effective.) All organizations resist criticism, but intelligence organizations resist criticism and then wrap themselves in the cloak of all-important operational security to avoid it."

Intelligence organizations, for reasons good and prudent, find it abhorant to "solicit external criticism."

(Frankly, "external criticism" is not much in short supply, particularly that of the uninformed variety.)

Now, CAA is perfectly aware of a tendancy towards over-classification on that part of those who would wish to shield themselves from the criticism which they are due, but that's as much a trait of political leadership as it is of the professional intelligence cadre.

"(T)hat's what it really comes down to: poor tradecraft. This is not a matter of some Lebanese Karla lurking out there, out-smarting us. This is our premier intelligence agency getting sloppy, resulting in the death or incarceration of some brave U.S. allies."

Might could be. Or they simply were better or luckier, on their home turf, than we were with our away game.

A commenter rebuttal included the following:

"1. Your statement that the CIA "apparently blew off the (counter-intelligence) warnings" is overly harsh. CI penetrations emanate from multiple vectors - whether from poor trade-craft or an asset that is posing as a double agent - and the problem is augmented when attempting to infiltrate a highly secretive and closed organization such as Hizballah. Rightfully, in a scenario such as this, the maximum amount of defensive CI measures should be implemented in order to thwart the efforts by the hostile intelligence services. Because of the "cloak of security," we will most likely not be privy to the efforts (if any) that were taken to mitigate the CI threat and protect the assets."

11/21

re: "On Capability vs. Intent, Part II"

Andrew Exum at Abu Muqawama ("a blog that focuses on small wars and insurgencies in addition to regional issues in the Middle East") examined the significance of uncertainty in intelligence analysis.

Money quote(s):

"(I)n my World Politics Review column this week, I tackle the intelligence problems related to intent, which are normally much more difficult than those related to capability. Specifically, I tackle the (understandable) failure of U.S. intelligence agencies to determine whether or not Israel will attack Iran -- a failure that matches my own inability to do so." (Emphasis in original text. - CAA.)

He fleshed that out a little bit more with reference to reading and conversation.

(It'll only take a moment to read.)

4/18

re: "Occupying Wall Street And The Leftist National Security Threat"

Paul Hair at Big Peace drew some lessons from intelligence failures of at least three sorts.

Money quote(s):

"One sentence in that paragraph leaves open the possibility that the intelligence community (IC) did its job in the lead-up to the Russian-Georgian conflict, but the rest of the paragraph indicates that the IC failed. And while the War College paper does not reflect the official position of the Army, Department of Defense, or U.S. government, its conclusion that the IC failed in issuing an adequate warning sounds similar to other accusations of the IC failing (September 11, Iran, the Egyptian Revolution, etc.)."

Calling something an "intelligence failure" is a pretty broad-brush statement. Among the various definitions of "intelligence" is that of the intelligence process or cycle. Intelligence can be both both a thing, a product, or more generally the process and function by which such products are, er, produced.

So it's important to consider which parts of the intelligence process, or which agencies within the IC may have failed.

Was it a failure of collection? Did we just not look in the right places, talk to the right people, or notice the right trends?

Was it a failure of analysis? Did we have the raw information or reports and just not recognize their significance? Did we downplay what turned out to be predictive or "big-up" what was deceptive or irrelevent?

Was it a failure of dissemination? Did the right intelligence just not get into the right hands? Were vital intelligence products "stove-piped" or "fire-walled" from getting to the analysts, commanders, policy-makers, or elected officials who needed them?

"So let’s accept the premise that the IC has repeatedly failed in recent years. Let’s forget that the Office of the Director of National Intelligence—the head of the IC—states in its “National Intelligence: A Consumer’s Guide,” that intelligence cannot predict the future (Adobe page 11; actual page 19). Let’s also forget that we here at home cannot accurately predict who will or will not run for president, even as we have firsthand, easy, non-life-threatening access on a scale that invades the personal lives of the people whose minds we are trying to predict. Instead, let’s just accept the criticism that the IC should have predicted or warned of the threats and revolutions that have occurred in recent years. And in doing so, let us also apply this same standard of responsibility to our domestic watchdogs (law enforcement agencies, politicians, news media, talk show hosts, and political pundits) that should be monitoring homeland safety and security."

Too true. Real-life intelligence analysis is not predictive. It can, carefully, do a certain amount of forecasting, such as by analysis of alternative futures or outcomes. But that's not quite the same thing.

"(W)e have a growing group of people who overtly say that they want a revolution that overthrows our government. And as more powerful and wealthy figures and organizations back them, they now have the finances, resources, and means to act on their overtly stated desires. (See also what Daniel W. Drezner writes at Foreign Policy.)

So if the IC has been wrong during the past few years for not issuing sufficient predictions or warnings of the disasters and revolutions in other countries of the world, then surely the watchdogs of our nation must be held accountable for their continuing failure to issue adequate warning of just how dangerous the left is, and for their failure to take necessary investigative actions."

There's an old saying in Liberal/Progressive circles, to the effect that "there are no enemies on the Left." And to this day, many elected officials from the Democratic Party, as well as the unelected officials of our mainstream media, continue to act as if this were true.

It's not.

"We say that those who are violent and a threat are peaceful protestors or those with legitimate grievances because we cannot bring ourselves to acknowledge them as the barbarians that they truly are. Meanwhile, we demonize and persecute those who follow the law because we know we can get away with it—we know they won’t actually act like we accuse them of acting"

If there are certain "protected classes" based upon ethnicity, politics, or lifestyle, then the converse of there being certain groups upon whom it is always "open season" is also true.

After all, it's not the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops that gets their followers to strap themselves into suicide vests, beheads those who disagree, or promotes honor killings of teenagers or estranged wives.

"Or we deem Islam the Religion of Peace even as we demonize those opposed to the worldwide jihad as “Islamophobic” and “dangerous extremists.” And, of course, we deem those occupying Wall Street and other cities as people who are justifiably angry and thirsting for democracy even as we continue vilifying Tea Partiers and conservatives as violent and a threat to society."

10/11

re: "Preventing Pearl Harbor"

George Smiley at In From the Cold ("Musings on Life, Love, Politics, Military Affairs, the Media, the Intelligence Community and Just About Anything Else that Captures Our Interest") commemorated America's most famous intelligence failure.

(Remember that operations are always successful; if they're not successful, then there was a failure of intelligence.)

Money quote(s):

"(C)ould the attack have been prevented, sparing the lives of 2,000 Americans who died on that fateful December day in 1941. While war clouds had been gathering for years before the Japanese strike, supporters of FDR claim that neither the President, nor his senior advisers, had any direct knowledge of a pending attack on Pearl Harbor, and could not provide definitive warning to Admiral Husband Kimmel and Lieutenant General Walter Short, the senior Navy and Army commanders in Hawaii.

Still, there is plenty of evidence that U.S. intelligence was aware the Japanese fleet was on the move in late 1941, and might carry out a strike against American possessions in the Pacific."

George details for us a lot of that intelligence.

"Pearl Harbor was clearly at the top of Japan's potential target list, but raids on the Philippines, Alaska, Wake Island and Guam couldn't be ruled out. So, U.S. commanders in the Pacific faced the daunting challenge of locating the Japanese fleet, across millions of miles of open seas."

All of these potential targets were eventually attacked, and at least portions invaded and seized (including part of Alaska's Aleutian Islands chain).

"(T)here is one incontrovertible fact: the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor could have been easily prevented, had President Roosevelt followed the advice of his previous Pacific Fleet commander, Admiral J.O. Richardson. During his tenure as CINCPAC, Richardson repeatedly warned of his fleet's vulnerability at Pearl Harbor, and requested that most of his ships return to their home port in San Diego. When FDR refused, Richardson stuck to his guns and paid a high price: he was fired as CINCPAC in early 1941 and replaced by Admiral Kimmel."

There's a price, sometimes, in being prematurely correct.

Richardson's memoir included this passage, from a message to the chief of naval operations:

"(T)he probable cost (human and physical resources) of any war should be compared [with] the probable value of winning the war."

Clearly Adm. Richardson was a strategic thinker and had read his Clausewitz.

"Sadly, only World War II buffs and naval historians are familiar with the courageous stand of J.O. Richardson. At the cost of his own career, Admiral Richardson stood on principle, trying to avert a military disaster that he believed could be averted, by returning the fleet to San Diego and engaging in the preparations needed to ready the Navy for war.

Richardson's integrity and candor offer an important lesson for military leaders--or anyone in a position to advise decision-makers. Even in that rarefied air, it is essential to tell "the boss" what they need to hear--not what they want to hear. Admirlal Richardson did just that, realizing his advice might fall on deaf ears and result in his dismissal. It's regrettable that so many of his peers failed to follow his shining example in the days before Pearl Harbor."

Tell the truth as you see it, interpret the facts you know as best you can, don't shade or flavor unpalatable truths to fit the preconceived notions or prejudices of your superiors, and let those above you, with access to a presumably wider range of sources and methods, decide on the basis of a fuller scope of information.

12/7

re: "Pearl Harbor and 9-11: Imagination, Deception and Audacity"

Austin Bay at Strategy Page explains how old lessons remain relevant.

Money quote(s):

"Imagination, deception and audacity, in combination, are the deadly acme of warfare. Japan’s Pearl Harbor ambush of America’s Pacific Fleet, which occurred 70 years ago this week, displayed these traits. So did al-Qaida’s 9-11 savaging of American cities.

Despite clues and suggestive bits of intelligence, both attacks caught America by surprise and thrust the nation headlong into ongoing global wars that it either tried to avoid or ignore. In other words, both imaginative and deceptive attacks, executed with audacity, leveraged American self-deception and lack of imagination.

Both attacks spawned critical re-examination of intelligence data and grim reflection on the complex process of intelligence assessment and political decision-making."

Self-deception is a somewhat harsher term, if still accurate, than the more neutral terminology surround the concept of cognitive bias. But it'll all get you there. Lots of very bright folks have studied, and continue to study, the best way to leverage our collection and analysis capabilities into an architecture that keeps us safer. Mostly it works, except when it doesn't.

"Operational and tactical intelligence data, however -- in 1941, 2001 and in 2011 -- arrive in fragments. A useful analogy is a pointillism painting or a Jackson Pollock drip painting. In the process of creation, the painting is random dots or disjointed splashes. Over time, a lucid pattern emerges; the viewer can step away from the canvas; what looked like chaos appears as a coherent design.

In the midst of events, the significance of an intercepted coded Imperial Japanese Navy radio transmission indicating a fleet can be missed, especially if it didn’t fit a logically convincing (though preconceived) pattern. American strategists knew an attack on Pearl Harbor by carrier aircraft was possible, and they believed Japan might well expand its war. Their imaginative insight, however, was incomplete. They underestimated Japanese imagination and audacity.

After Dec. 7, 1941, the U.S. built a defense establishment designed to prevent another Pearl Harbor. America spent trillions of dollars spying on potential perpetrators of a surprise attack, building a security establishment to deter or defeat it, and engineering equipment to fulfill those missions.

Though the U.S. and U.S. allies suffered severe surprise attacks -- for example, Korea in 1950 and Tet (Vietnam) in 1968 -- in terms of protecting military capacities from pre-emptive attack, that effort has been successful."

Col. Bay hits a key point here: what used to be called our "second strike" capability has never, since Pearl Harbor, been successfuly attacked.

It's possible that 9/11 was genuinely intended as a decapitating strike against our economic, political, and military leadership. Which is a fascinating conversation unto itself; still, if it were, it failed. Even in (assumed) failure, 9/11 was plenty damaging enough.

"Al-Qaida declared war on the U.S., but American leaders preferred to treat the threat as criminal rather than military. Violent cults waging long-term cultural and theological struggles with the terms of social and technological modernity aren’t new. Their ability to employ massively destructive power at strategic distances is, however.

Al-Qaida used jumbo jets as ICBMs; all it lacked was a nuclear weapon. U.S. strategists had wargamed suicide aircraft attacks, but the conventional wisdom labeled the plot too Hollywood. Like Pearl Harbor, post-911 attack examination revealed that U.S. intelligence agencies had clues and facts, but failed to assimilate the data into a design -- the design of an audacious enemy."

Usually I've seen this argument phrased in terms of hijacked passenger jets being the poor-man's cruise missile, but Mr. Bay is still quite correct in his larger theme.

"A violent organization that announces it has declared war on America is no mere criminal problem."

And that is the lesson I wish more people would take to heart.

12/5

re: "Domino Theory of Democracy: Current Events Failure of Unified US Policy"

Thanks to Kat-Mo at The Middle Ground for the mention and the link.

Relevant passage(s):

"As the Consul At Arms points out, people are already pointing the finger, trying to figure out who to blame for not seeing Egypt's shake up and Mubarek's fall from power. There is already a cry that this was a massive failure of intelligence, but, as CAA points out, this is not an intelligence issue, but a policy failure."

re: "Egypt: The Blame Game Begins. Sigh. "

Abu Muqawama ("dedicated to following issues related to contemporary insurgencies as well as counterinsurgency tactics and strategy") at the Center for New American Security ("Developing Strong, Pragmatic and Principled National Security and Defense Policies") demonstrates uncommon good sense.

Money quote(s):

"(I)t was inevitable that in Washington, people would start asking "Who Lost Egypt?" before it was even clear what, exactly, is happening there."

&

"(L)ong ago the U.S. government had identified the fall or death of Hosni Mubarak as a likely contingency to plan toward. Everyone knew this was going to happen eventually. So I think the blame being heaped on the intelligence community here is a little silly. Intelligence cannot predict the future, though it can assist policy-makers in gaming out possible contingencies, and I think our intelligence services did that here."

&

"Even when administrations have decided to pressure Mubarak, by the way, they have found that the ~$1.5b we give Egypt annually has been a largely ineffective source of leverage. (Though it has, I would argue, helped foster now-invaluable connections with Egypt's military. Those last two sentences should serve as a warning for any legislators out there threatening to cut our aid.)"

re: "ANOTHER MASSIVE INTELLIGENCE FAILURE"

Glenn Reynolds at Instapundit ("I can take vacations, etc., and not feel any gnawing need to be at the computer.") continues following the finger-pointing narrative.

Money quote(s):

"Considering what we spend, I don’t think we’re getting our money’s worth."

It's a point of view.

But it's a great big world out there, and U.S. interests stretch to pretty much all of it. Collecting, analyzing, disseminating, &tc., through all the means, covert and otherwise, is a non-trivial task, and one for which we are constantly re-assessing our ability and capabilities to accomplish.

And that's exactly the point, we're constantly evaluating how we do things and trying to come up with better ways to do it. That's how we learn from mistakes (when they're made) and improve.

re: "An Intelligence Failure In The Middle East?"

Doug Mataconis at Outside the Beltway ("an online journal of politics and foreign affairs analysis") critiques the inevitable casting about for a fall guy.

Money quote(s):

"(M)any in Washington are expressing disappointment that the U.S. intelligence community seemingly missed the warning signs"

You mean, like Tunesia's "Jasmine Revolution"? Or like the fact that Mubarak was almost 82?

" I’ve got to agree with Ed Morrissey that there’s really very little to this criticism, and it looks to me like we’re seeing people in power stake out their positions for a “Who Lost Egypt?” debate should that come to pass"

It's right there! Right where it's always been! It was never ours to begin with!

"(D)ocuments from the Wikileaks diplomatic cables dump show that the U.S. has been concerned for years about the question of who would succeed Hosni Mubarak, and that we spend the last several years providing behind the scenes support to dissident groups in Egypt"

I can neither confirm nor deny (even if I knew, which I don't) whether this last is true, especially since FSOs (and others) have been directly ordered not to access Wikileaks.

"(O)n some level, the idea that the intelligence community missed anything here is simply absurd."

Remember: no policy failures, only intelligence failures. Or, alternatively, diplomatic failures.

&

"Anyone in Washington who says they didn’t see this coming is either lying or they weren’t paying attention to the world around them."

re: "INTELLIGENCE FAILURE"

Glenn Reynolds at Instapundit ("I can take vacations, etc., and not feel any gnawing need to be at the computer.") demonstrates that the finger-pointing has already begun.

-----

Remember always the following:

There are no operational failures. Never a failure of policy. Never a failure of decision-making or leadership.

These are always successes.

Failures are always intelligence failures.

-----

"It's because of you people that I cannot get outside!

It's always your fault. You are not capable of handling...

To take orders from me, who is..."

re: "Glass Houses"

Walter Jon Williams focuses his creative lense on the whole mess.

Money quote(s):

"The cables reflect pretty well on the State Department. These diplomats are doing what they’re trained for. They’re collecting local information, they’re reporting the candid views of foreign sources, and they’re providing information about personalities, sometimes hilariously— you’ve gotta love the detail about the Chechen dictator dancing at a wedding with his gold-plated pistol hanging out of his waistband.

It has to be said, though, that the big news is that this information was so easily obtained. The Pentagon’s Secret Internet Protocol Network (SIPRNet) is a worldwide US military network to which the State Department and its embassies have access. It runs on Windows XP, not exactly your best model of Internet security. Anyone with a Secret clearance has access not only to the diplomatic cables, but to everything else."

"SIPRNet is a classic example of a good idea gone haywire. The idea was to put every document related to terrorism on a single source, so that it could be accessed by anyone who needed it. But they dumped in loads of unrelated stuff as well, and now their own system has well and truly bitten them on the butt."

Actually, SIPRNet predates the GWOT by quite a few years, although Mr. Williams is correct (I think) if what he's getting at is State's inclusion of classified cable traffic. That came well after SIPRNet's establishment.

"It occurs to me that Russia may only exist because a few important people have decided that it does. And if those props are knocked out, does Russia just become another Iceland?"

It occurs to me that Russia already is another Iceland.

Except, of course, for all the things that make it so much more (and so much less) than Iceland.

No offense meant, Iceland.

"So for my money, the question now, is whether government and finance is only possible if the vast majority of the citizenry is kept in complete ignorance of what they are doing? If Secretary Rice, for fear of exposure, prevents her own analysts from analyzing anything, does that mean that government can no longer conduct the kind of debate and internal dialog that is necessary for a clear-sighted view of its future and its own operation? If the government can’t talk to itself for fear that someone’s listening, do we actually have a government, or just 2.15 million civil servants operating in a complete vacuum, unaware that a bigger picture even exists?"

Mr. Williams is getting to the heart of what I worry will be an over-reaction to the Wikileaks leaks; hamstringing our intelligence analysts and decision-makers through too-zealous or cookie-cutter application of need-to-know policies. After all, how does an intelligence analyst tell you he needs to know something if he doesn't already know about it? Kind of hard to do that if he's kept from knowing about it, isn't it?

This sort of thing spells "intelligence failure." Intelligence analysts know that there are, after all, only two kinds of military outcomes: operational successes and intelligence failures.

(Just to be clear, Mr. Williams knows that Sec. Rice no longer runs the State Dept.; he's mentioning her in the context of a story I didn't snippet from his post.)