re: "Showing contempt"

David Warren at DavidWarrenOnline ("Newspaper columns") wrote a column, the whole of which should be read.

Money quote(s):

"Perhaps we are all getting sick of the word "terrorism." The word is misused as if it represented an ideological faction, rather than a method for getting one's way; and at that, it is used evasively, to avoid naming one's enemy, which, under current strictures, counts as a faux pas." (Bold typeface added for emphasis. - CAA.)

Terrorism is a noun. It's not an enemy. Terrorism is how the U.S. was attacked on 9/11; terrorism isn't who attacked on 9/11.

"What the Iranian apostate Shia-Muslim revolutionary regime is accused of having plotted - an atrocity in a high-class Washington restaurant, whose focus would be the murder of the Saudi Arabian ambassador - was not exactly terrorism. It may never have been meant to work; it may have been meant to be discovered. In which case, it was pure diplomatic gesture, the meaning of which takes a moment to sink in." (Bold typeface added for emphasis. - CAA.)

It's basically flipping us (the U.S.) the bird, and doing it so the Saudis can't help but be forced to see it.

"We have to believe that Barack Obama's people are saner than Ali Khameini's people; or else, where would we be?"

By "people," our Canadian friend (Mr. Warren) seems to mean all of us in the federal departments and agencies, not just the White House or the Democratic Party.

(Which is quite correct, regardless of how individual civil (and foreign) servants may choose to vote.)

"Yet here was an unambiguous act of war, against both the U.S. and Saudi Arabia, that traces to Iran's "supreme leader" Khameini, according to State Department sources speaking anonymously but purposefully to the media. Perhaps not, they say, to the Islamic Republic's malicious clown of a president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (leaving an opening for one of their pet "Iranian factions" theories)." (Bold typeface added for emphasis. - CAA.)

As I read earlier today:

"the phrase "act of war" is really a political, rather than legal distinction."

Oh, and there are factions a-plenty in Iran, even within the Iranian government and power structure (which aren't quite congruent).

But evidence that any of these are particularly "moderate" (in Western terms) belongs primarily in the eyes of the beholders.

"(T)he U.S. is now showing the FBI evidence in foreign capitals; presumably to confirm what everyone long suspected: that Iran's leaders are (as we say in Persian) "Majnun."Unhinged they may be, but even a detached wooden door should understand the consequences of an unambiguous act of war. For that would be, war.

Did the Iranians think they wouldn't be caught, or did they think that, if caught, nothing would happen?

The first proposition is crazier than the second; for sad to say, "bad guys" all over the world have been learning that, since the last Stateside election, they can do anything they want to the U.S. with impunity. Unless, they are not actually heads of government, in which case they must watch out for drones." (Bold typeface added for emphasis. - CAA.)

This problem goes much further back than the last election; it ebbs and flows with the political vicissitudes. Even Pres. Reagan, he of sainted Conservative memory, isn't remembered for getting much in the way of payback for the Marine barracks bombing (Beirut 1983).

"When the ayatollahs learn that senior figures in their elite Quds force may be denied visas, I'm sure they laugh. They probably laughed harder when Susan Rice, America's UN ambassador, marched into their New York mission Wednesday to deliver a solemn letter. They know the U.S. has no leverage, short of military force, and that for the foreseeable future, force is off the table.

They even know that the U.S. military is about to be asset-stripped, when the current congressional budget-cutting exercise fails: for huge defence cuts automatically kick in when the Democrats decide they don't like the Republicans' alternatives. America has been quitting its thankless old job as "world policeman," with the whole world watching.

The greater risk is now being on the U.S. side, as the Saudis have been nervously discovering."

Denying visas to unsavory corruptocrats is a form of "soft power" that has legs in some parts of the world, but not-so-much in a country like Iran. And anybody who thought that it was a sort of "magic bullet" might consider tendering bids on a certain bridge.

"That Iran has international reach, through agents that can sometimes act competently, should be part of general knowledge. There is, for instance, an under-reported Argentine dimension of the plot."

Iran, or at least "factions" therein, has seen itself as the vanguard of a worldwide (Shia) Islamic revolution since their fundamentalist takeover in 1979. And parallels between their post-revolutionary behavior and that of the Bolsheviks are not accidental, they are deliberate, studied, and intentional. And that includes fielding a revolutionary "international" to do their dirty work abroad.

"(T)heir primary target was the Saudi ambassador. That is the key. The fact this mission was to be carried out on U.S. soil, was meant as a gesture of contempt for American power."

10/15

re: "Iranian bomb plot blows up deterrence theory"

Robert Haddick at the Small Wars Journal blog ("facilitates the exchange of information among practitioners, thought leaders, and students of Small Wars, in order to advance knowledge and capabilities in the field") examined the problem of applying deterrence to Iran.

Money quote(s):

"U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder revealed an Iranian plot to kill the Saudi Arabian ambassador to the United States by bombing a restaurant in Washington. Holder’s description of the plot – which allegedly involved a bungled attempt by Mansour Arbabsiar, a dual citizen, to recruit the notorious Zeta cartel from Mexico – appeared simultaneously brazen and inept. What should worry policymakers the most is how this incident undermines the theory of deterrence, which some hope to use against Iran after it acquires nuclear weapons and long-range ballistic missiles. If Iranian policy cannot be checked with Cold War-style deterrence, the prospect of an inevitable shooting war against Iran will go up."

Cold warriors like CAA will recall deterrence theories such as MAD and the like; the bottom line was that while it's unclear just how much of which theories actually worked, clearly something worked and the world did not end in nuclear fire, despite decades of bipolar international standoff.

"(T)he operation may have been authorized by the highest level of the Iranian government. This would indicate that top-level Iranian officials are not concerned with the possible retaliatory consequences of a mass casualty attack in downtown Washington, DC. Iran’s leaders would come to that conclusion either because they perceive the U.S. government to be self-constrained or because they perceive the maximum likely U.S. retaliation against Iran to be inconsequential to their interests. Either way, U.S. retaliation against Iran lacks credibility, something the U.S. government will have to fix if it is to usefully employ deterrence theory in the future."

U.S. retaliation against Iran has, ever since the 1979 revolution, amounted to sanction regimes of varying strictness. Why would the Iranian regime ever consider that a U.S. response to provocation would ever amount to anything more than that?

"(I)ntermediate-level Quds Force officers may have initiated the operation without authority from top-level decision-makers. If so, this too would undermine deterrence theory. Deterrence is not useful if those to be deterred don’t have complete control over their weapons, an assumption U.S. and Soviet leaders both correctly made during the Cold War. Alternatively, the organizational culture inside the Quds Force may reward mid-level officers who “freelance” their own operations. Once again, not a comforting conclusion for deterrence theory." (Bold typeface added for emphasis. - CAA.)

The theory of deterrence requires a target of that deterrence. If the target (i.e., top Iranian leadership) doesn't actually have full control over their WMD, then the situation is drastically destabilized.

"(I)t is hard to believe that there is some attainable level of financial and travel sanctions, even with the best possible international cooperation, that will change the behavior of either top-level Iranian leaders or officers inside the Quds Force. The U.S. is thus left with a deterrent strategy against Iran that lacks credibility and in any case may be unsuitable for the situation.

Washington should expect more provocations and thus more pressure to eventually display a retaliatory response that will impress Iranian leaders. What kind of display would impress Iranian leaders is a subject many in Washington would prefer to avoid."

Unlike, for instance, the kleptocratic leadership class of various south-of-the-border countries, attempting to put a crimp into the Miami/New York/Paris-bound shopping trips of the mullahs just doesn't register on the viable-threat-o-meter.

10/12

re: "Curious, but Sloppy"

George Smiley at In From the Cold ("Musings on Life, Love, Politics, Military Affairs, the Media, the Intelligence Community and Just About Anything Else that Captures Our Interest") pondered this assassination plot.

Money quote(s):

"We're still scratching our heads over the alleged Iranian plot to assassinate Saudi Arabia's ambassador to the United States. Not that the scheme isn't credible; Tehran has a long list of scores to settle with Riyadh, ranging from the kingdom's backing of Saddam Hussein during the 1980s Iran-Iraq War, to its more recent support of Bahrain, during that nation's crackdown against anti-regime protesters, who were aided by elements of Iran's Revolutionary Guards Corps."

Motive?

Check.

"Iran has no shortage of reasons for wanting to kill the senior Saudi diplomat in America.

But if that was the case, why was the "plot" conceived is such ham-handed fashion? According to court papers (and the comments of various U.S. officials), the key figure in the operation was Manssor Arbabsiar, a 56-year-old Iranian-American used car salesman from Texas. Arbabsiar reportedly attempted to enlist assistance from Mexico's infamous Zetas drug cartel in acquiring explosives and carrying out the attack. The plan reportedly involved detonating a bomb inside one of the ambassador's favorite D.C. restaurants while he ate."

Is nowhere sacred? Not that CAA is likely to share the same taste in D.C. restaurants as the Saudi ambassador. But still....

"Sources indicate the assassination plot involved high-level officials in the Qods force, the clandestine arm of the IRGC. Turk al-Faisal, a former Saudi ambassador to the U.S. told reporters this afternoon that "the burden of proof and amount of evidence in the case is overwhelming, and clearly shows official Iranian responsibility for this...someone in Iran will have to pay the price." "

What's left unstated is how unsurprising the idea of an arm of the Iranian government engaging in an assassination plot. This sort of behavior is, since the 1979 Iranian Revolution, utterly unremarkable. Nothing to see here. It's just how they roll.

Students of strategy know that warfare can be waged in more dimensions than the battlefield (or, as is fashionable to call it, the "battlespace"). Covert operations, as distinct from intelligence operations, and including assassinations are a form of controlled violence waged in places not generally perceived as being included in the "battlespace."

In other words, campaigns of assassination are a political tool by which Iran wages war against its enemies, at home or abroad. They are not the only form of warfare that Iran routinely engages in.

The key point being, as should be blindingly obvious, is that Iran is at war with its adversaries, whether they realize (or respond to) it or not.

"(S)ome western diplomats have expressed skepticism about the plot, saying it was highly unlikely that senior Iranian officials would sign off on such a plan. And they have a point; if Tehran wanted to kill Ambassador al-Jubeir, why entrust the enterprise to someone who hardly fits the profile of a professional Qods force operative.

The U.S. military has spent years battling Qods force agents in Iraq and Afghanistan; intelligence officers will tell you they represent the most capable elements in the IRGC. Put another way, there are plenty of Qods force operatives who could easily enter the United States, carry out the plot and make a clean get-away."

This reminds us of the famous "America is not at war" signs. And yet, America's military has been at war since 9/11, fighting the enemies that attack us, in Iraq, in Afghanistan, whereever. And those attacking enemies have consistently included Iran.

"(T)he assassination plot may have been a deliberate ruse, aimed at shifting intelligence and law enforcement resources away from other teams preparing to carry out separate attacks. You'd better believe the folks at FBI Headquarters, Langley and Fort Meade are double-checking their information, looking for clues that might lead to other (and perhaps more menacing) Iranian plots while Arbabsiar spins his tale for investigators.

There's also a chance the assassination scheme was launched by rogue elements within the IRGC and Iranian political circles (yes, we realize that is an oxymoron)."

Yes, "rogue elements within the IRGC and Iranian political circles" is indeed an oxymoron.

Whenever someone, in discussions of Iran, wonders aloud what "Iran" wants, what "Iran's" goals are, what "Iran" hopes to gain with its nuclear program, what "Iran" really wants to do about Israel; CAA asks the questions: Which "Iran"? And which Iranians?

Just as communism was not, always, monolithic, neither can "Iran," even within its government, be considered as a unitary entity.

One would think that Americans, possessing not only fifty semi-sovereign individual states (including the "Commonwealth" states of Masschutsetts, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and Kentucky) but three co-equal branches of federal government, would be able to better grasp that essential fact.

"(Y)ou can't rule out the option that senior Iranian officials endorsed (and participated in) the hare-brained scheme. Intelligence and covert ops organizations have a long history of launching plots that are breathtakingly dumb. Readers will recall that the CIA engaged in a series of operations aimed at killing Fidel Castro, involving such diverse elements as an exploding cigar and the U.S. mafia. None of those plots came close to succeeding, but the boys at Langley kept trying, anyway. The men running the Qods Force are not immune to bad ideas, either."

10/12

re: "A Humanitarian Catastrophe at Ashraf Spells Political Catastrophe for the White House"

Henrick Hermansson at American Thinker ("a daily internet publication devoted to the thoughtful exploration of issues of importance to Americans") outlined the problem.

Money quote(s):

"U.S. troops are set to completely withdraw from Iraq on the 31st of December. That is also the date for another more ominous deadline: al-Maliki's government has ordered what looks to be a bloody attack on innocent political refugees on that very same day, despite strong condemnations from human rights groups, parliamentarians, and journalists from around the world. Maliki's order to empty Camp Ashraf, which will no doubt lead to a massacre, came after his meeting with the Iranian leader Khamenei. Dispersion of the camp residents no doubt will resemble what happened to the Jewish community during the Second World War.

The attack will target the 3,400 residents of Ashraf, or "Camp New Iraq," who are Iranian political dissidents hated by Iraq's powerful neighbor. The camp has been attacked by Iraqi forces twice before, once in April this year and once in 2009, and in total more than 47 of the civilian residents were killed -- either shot or run over by armored vehicles. At present the camp is inhumanely blockaded by Iraqi troops who prevent medical and other vital supplies, journalists, human rights groups, and parliamentarians from entering."

The deadline has obviously passed, without (yet) tragic results for Camp Ashraf's inhabitants.

Sec. Clinton has deputized Amb. Daniel Fried to lead U.S. efforts on resolving this issue and in a U.N.-brokered compromise with the al-Maliki government, the residents of Camp Ashraf will be moved to the former Camp Liberty, where their situation can be monitored by both UNHCR and U.S. Embassy personnel.

See Amb. Fried's presser here.

"The residents of the camp have a complicated history. They fled Iran after tens of thousands of political dissidents were executed by the Khomeini regime in the eighties. They were welcomed in Iraq, which, with the support of Western governments, was at war with Iran. Most of the residents have lived in or near Ashraf now for a quarter-century and have built lives, schools, and a beautiful mosque there. They were also integral in revealing the Iranian secret nuclear facilities. As a source of inspiration, they are important to the "Persian Spring." All in all, this is more than enough to put them on the regime's death list.

The residents also have a complicated history with the U.S. In 1997, as a gesture of goodwill to the "moderate" Khatami government in Iran, the U.S. put the residents (or rather the organization many of them belong to) on the State Department list of foreign terrorist organizations, without any factual basis. In the EU and Britain, courts have declared terror designations of this organization "perverse" and removed them. Despite a federal court ruling ordering the designation to be reviewed, the removal process is being stalled for political reasons in the U.S. by the State Department. At the same time, the residents of Ashraf have been protected by and had very good relationships with U.S. troops, been designated as protected persons by the U.S. under the fourth Geneva Convention, and have been declared U.S. allies by chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, FBI directors, and other prominent members of the intelligence community."

With all due respect to Mr. Hermansson, some of the above isn't exactly the whole truth and nothing but the truth.

1. "They fled Iran after tens of thousands of political dissidents were executed by the Khomeini regime in the eighties." They fled Iran after the Revolution (which they participated in as allies of Khomeini, including, possibly, the U.S. embassy takeover) and the mullahs started purifying the new regime (as one does). They may even have started the fighting between the Khomeini regime and their particular faction, being rather fond of explosive and other violent forms of assassinations at the time.

2. "They were welcomed in Iraq, which, with the support of Western governments, was at war with Iran." They were welcomed by Saddam Hussein's regime, which used them as loyal shock troops to put down revolts by, among others, the Kurds. With Saddam gone, they don't have a lot of friends left in Iraq.

3. "As a source of inspiration, they are important to the "Persian Spring." " That's wish-fulfillment fantasy talk. There was never any indication that the protesters who filled the streets took any inspiration from the PMOI/MEK. If anything, the mullahcracy seems to have been successful in painting the PMOI/MEK as traitors to Iran, due mostly to the PMOI/MEK's own actions in fighting against Iran during the Iran-Iraq War.

4. "In 1997, as a gesture of goodwill to the "moderate" Khatami government in Iran, the U.S. put the residents (or rather the organization many of them belong to) on the State Department list of foreign terrorist organizations, without any factual basis." While CAA takes a backseat to none in questioning the timing of the decision to list the PMOI/MEK, they have done what they have done, fully meriting their place on said list.

5. "Despite a federal court ruling ordering the designation to be reviewed, the removal process is being stalled for political reasons in the U.S. by the State Department." Placement, and removal, of an organization on the State Department's terrorist organizations list follows a protocol, subject to periodic review. CAA had a chat, last year, with one of the people who had previously been charged with conducting that review and didn't come away thinking that the process had been politicized.

6. "At the same time, the residents of Ashraf have been protected by and had very good relationships with U.S. troops, been designated as protected persons by the U.S. under the fourth Geneva Convention, and have been declared U.S. allies by chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, FBI directors, and other prominent members of the intelligence community." Camp Ashraf's PMOI/MEK inhabitants took great care and pains with what we used to call their "charm offensive" to ingratiate themselves to the U.S. troops assigned to their protection. This doesn't by itself make them bad people (assassinating U.S. personnel in Iran before the Revolution will suffice on the organizational level to earn that classification), nor does, necessarily, being enemies of America's enemies (i.e., the "evil mullah regime" in Iran) make them good people. Their entitlement, based upon my own close reading of the Laws of Land Warfare, to Protected status doesn't hinge upon them good or bad people. Lastly, the JCS, FBI, and the IC don't get to decide who are U.S. allies (or not).

"The residents of Ashraf enjoy as wide bipartisan support as any issue in Washington today."

True enough. And CAA would view them much more sympathetically, given how long ago the PMOI/MEK's anti-U.S. violance took place, if they'd simply own up to it (at long last) and stop with the denials.

12/18