10/22
Tuesday, July 17, 2012
re: "Today's Reading Assignment"
10/22
Friday, June 29, 2012
re: "Credit Where It's Due"
Tuesday, June 12, 2012
re: "Casing the Colors"
"For the U.S. military, the war in Iraq formally ended today, with a ceremony in Baghdad. From The Wall Street Journal:After nearly nine years of war, tens of thousands of casualties--including 4,500 Americans dead--and more than $800 billion spent, the U.S. military on Thursday formally ended its mission in Iraq and prepared to leave the country.
.
For years, U.S. commanders in Iraq have handed off to their successors the top call sign, Lion 6, along with the American battle flag adorned with a Mesopotamian sphinx. But on Thursday, in a tradition-drenched ceremony with Defense Secretary Leon Panetta looking on, the current Lion 6—Army Gen. Lloyd Austin—pulled down the colors and cased them for a return to the U.S."
Money quote(s):
"As with most modern wars, there was no surrender ceremony, and there won't be any ticker-tape parades through New York City for our returning heroes. And no one used the word "victory" to describe the outcome of our nine-year stay in Iraq.
"(I)it is well worth remembering the sacrifice, heroism and valor of the men and women who served there. All were volunteers, and many pulled multiple tours in Iraq, enduring months and years of separation from family, friends and loved ones.
Tuesday, May 22, 2012
re: "The Unraveling"
Tuesday, March 20, 2012
re: "Curious, but Sloppy"
George Smiley at In From the Cold ("Musings on Life, Love, Politics, Military Affairs, the Media, the Intelligence Community and Just About Anything Else that Captures Our Interest") pondered this assassination plot.
Money quote(s):
"We're still scratching our heads over the alleged Iranian plot to assassinate Saudi Arabia's ambassador to the United States. Not that the scheme isn't credible; Tehran has a long list of scores to settle with Riyadh, ranging from the kingdom's backing of Saddam Hussein during the 1980s Iran-Iraq War, to its more recent support of Bahrain, during that nation's crackdown against anti-regime protesters, who were aided by elements of Iran's Revolutionary Guards Corps."
Motive?
Check.
"Iran has no shortage of reasons for wanting to kill the senior Saudi diplomat in America.
But if that was the case, why was the "plot" conceived is such ham-handed fashion? According to court papers (and the comments of various U.S. officials), the key figure in the operation was Manssor Arbabsiar, a 56-year-old Iranian-American used car salesman from Texas. Arbabsiar reportedly attempted to enlist assistance from Mexico's infamous Zetas drug cartel in acquiring explosives and carrying out the attack. The plan reportedly involved detonating a bomb inside one of the ambassador's favorite D.C. restaurants while he ate."
Is nowhere sacred? Not that CAA is likely to share the same taste in D.C. restaurants as the Saudi ambassador. But still....
"Sources indicate the assassination plot involved high-level officials in the Qods force, the clandestine arm of the IRGC. Turk al-Faisal, a former Saudi ambassador to the U.S. told reporters this afternoon that "the burden of proof and amount of evidence in the case is overwhelming, and clearly shows official Iranian responsibility for this...someone in Iran will have to pay the price." "
What's left unstated is how unsurprising the idea of an arm of the Iranian government engaging in an assassination plot. This sort of behavior is, since the 1979 Iranian Revolution, utterly unremarkable. Nothing to see here. It's just how they roll.
Students of strategy know that warfare can be waged in more dimensions than the battlefield (or, as is fashionable to call it, the "battlespace"). Covert operations, as distinct from intelligence operations, and including assassinations are a form of controlled violence waged in places not generally perceived as being included in the "battlespace."
In other words, campaigns of assassination are a political tool by which Iran wages war against its enemies, at home or abroad. They are not the only form of warfare that Iran routinely engages in.
The key point being, as should be blindingly obvious, is that Iran is at war with its adversaries, whether they realize (or respond to) it or not.
"(S)ome western diplomats have expressed skepticism about the plot, saying it was highly unlikely that senior Iranian officials would sign off on such a plan. And they have a point; if Tehran wanted to kill Ambassador al-Jubeir, why entrust the enterprise to someone who hardly fits the profile of a professional Qods force operative.
The U.S. military has spent years battling Qods force agents in Iraq and Afghanistan; intelligence officers will tell you they represent the most capable elements in the IRGC. Put another way, there are plenty of Qods force operatives who could easily enter the United States, carry out the plot and make a clean get-away."
This reminds us of the famous "America is not at war" signs. And yet, America's military has been at war since 9/11, fighting the enemies that attack us, in Iraq, in Afghanistan, whereever. And those attacking enemies have consistently included Iran.
"(T)he assassination plot may have been a deliberate ruse, aimed at shifting intelligence and law enforcement resources away from other teams preparing to carry out separate attacks. You'd better believe the folks at FBI Headquarters, Langley and Fort Meade are double-checking their information, looking for clues that might lead to other (and perhaps more menacing) Iranian plots while Arbabsiar spins his tale for investigators.
There's also a chance the assassination scheme was launched by rogue elements within the IRGC and Iranian political circles (yes, we realize that is an oxymoron)."
Yes, "rogue elements within the IRGC and Iranian political circles" is indeed an oxymoron.
Whenever someone, in discussions of Iran, wonders aloud what "Iran" wants, what "Iran's" goals are, what "Iran" hopes to gain with its nuclear program, what "Iran" really wants to do about Israel; CAA asks the questions: Which "Iran"? And which Iranians?
Just as communism was not, always, monolithic, neither can "Iran," even within its government, be considered as a unitary entity.
One would think that Americans, possessing not only fifty semi-sovereign individual states (including the "Commonwealth" states of Masschutsetts, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and Kentucky) but three co-equal branches of federal government, would be able to better grasp that essential fact.
"(Y)ou can't rule out the option that senior Iranian officials endorsed (and participated in) the hare-brained scheme. Intelligence and covert ops organizations have a long history of launching plots that are breathtakingly dumb. Readers will recall that the CIA engaged in a series of operations aimed at killing Fidel Castro, involving such diverse elements as an exploding cigar and the U.S. mafia. None of those plots came close to succeeding, but the boys at Langley kept trying, anyway. The men running the Qods Force are not immune to bad ideas, either."
10/12Friday, February 10, 2012
re: "Preventing Pearl Harbor"
George Smiley at In From the Cold ("Musings on Life, Love, Politics, Military Affairs, the Media, the Intelligence Community and Just About Anything Else that Captures Our Interest") commemorated America's most famous intelligence failure.
(Remember that operations are always successful; if they're not successful, then there was a failure of intelligence.)
Money quote(s):
"(C)ould the attack have been prevented, sparing the lives of 2,000 Americans who died on that fateful December day in 1941. While war clouds had been gathering for years before the Japanese strike, supporters of FDR claim that neither the President, nor his senior advisers, had any direct knowledge of a pending attack on Pearl Harbor, and could not provide definitive warning to Admiral Husband Kimmel and Lieutenant General Walter Short, the senior Navy and Army commanders in Hawaii.
Still, there is plenty of evidence that U.S. intelligence was aware the Japanese fleet was on the move in late 1941, and might carry out a strike against American possessions in the Pacific."
George details for us a lot of that intelligence.
"Pearl Harbor was clearly at the top of Japan's potential target list, but raids on the Philippines, Alaska, Wake Island and Guam couldn't be ruled out. So, U.S. commanders in the Pacific faced the daunting challenge of locating the Japanese fleet, across millions of miles of open seas."
All of these potential targets were eventually attacked, and at least portions invaded and seized (including part of Alaska's Aleutian Islands chain).
"(T)here is one incontrovertible fact: the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor could have been easily prevented, had President Roosevelt followed the advice of his previous Pacific Fleet commander, Admiral J.O. Richardson. During his tenure as CINCPAC, Richardson repeatedly warned of his fleet's vulnerability at Pearl Harbor, and requested that most of his ships return to their home port in San Diego. When FDR refused, Richardson stuck to his guns and paid a high price: he was fired as CINCPAC in early 1941 and replaced by Admiral Kimmel."
There's a price, sometimes, in being prematurely correct.
Richardson's memoir included this passage, from a message to the chief of naval operations:
"(T)he probable cost (human and physical resources) of any war should be compared [with] the probable value of winning the war."
Clearly Adm. Richardson was a strategic thinker and had read his Clausewitz.
"Sadly, only World War II buffs and naval historians are familiar with the courageous stand of J.O. Richardson. At the cost of his own career, Admiral Richardson stood on principle, trying to avert a military disaster that he believed could be averted, by returning the fleet to San Diego and engaging in the preparations needed to ready the Navy for war.
Richardson's integrity and candor offer an important lesson for military leaders--or anyone in a position to advise decision-makers. Even in that rarefied air, it is essential to tell "the boss" what they need to hear--not what they want to hear. Admirlal Richardson did just that, realizing his advice might fall on deaf ears and result in his dismissal. It's regrettable that so many of his peers failed to follow his shining example in the days before Pearl Harbor."
Tell the truth as you see it, interpret the facts you know as best you can, don't shade or flavor unpalatable truths to fit the preconceived notions or prejudices of your superiors, and let those above you, with access to a presumably wider range of sources and methods, decide on the basis of a fuller scope of information.
Friday, December 23, 2011
re: "Today's Reading Assignment"
Spook86 at In From the Cold ("Musings on Life, Love, Politics, Military Affairs, the Media, the Intelligence Community and Just About Anything Else that Captures Our Interest") shared an excellent and detailed narrative explaining why military pensions are earned rather than being socialist "entitlements."
Money quote(s):
"Professor Lacey shares our outrage at a recent article in The New York Times, which described the armed forces retirement program as "another big social welfare system." Recounting the long list of military operations over the past two decades, Lacey reminds us that a soldier who enlisted in 1990 had more than "earned" his pension by the time he retired last year."
Prof. Lacey went on to provide a detailed fleshing out of what a recent 20-year military careers actually involved. If you didn't already experience it yourself, it makes educational reading.
"(O)nly two of the Republican candidates have actually served in the military."
That's a fact which deserves a bit more attention, at least from this registered voter. I know Gov. Perry served in the Air Force. Who is the other one?
"Sounds like a "lose-lose" for hundreds of thousands of career military members (and retirees) who gave so much for that $25,000 a year pension. We should also note that Professor Lacey's prototypical retiree was something of a fast burner. The average non-commissioned officer who leaves active duty after 20 years is an E-6, with an average annual pension of less than $20,000 a year. "
Which isn't a lot. Fortunately, given that the average NCO joined the military sometime before (or not long after) their 20th birthday, the average active duty retiree is around age 40, with a couple more decades of working life ahead during which to launch and make a second career. They will also have the experience and life skills learned in two decades of increasing responsibilities to help them make that second career a success.
(Which doesn't mean they aren't owed the earned military pensions to which they're due.)
10/5
Thursday, March 10, 2011
re: "Too Many White Guys "
Spook86 at In From the Cold ("Musings on Life, Love, Politics, Military Affairs, the Media, the Intelligence Community and Just About Anything Else that Captures Our Interest") addresses military diversity.
Money quote(s):
"The U.S. military has a problem, according to a DoD advisory panel.
And no, we're not referring to the demands of two on-going wars (and the toll on those who serve); escalating personnel costs, a shrinking fleet, aging nuclear forces and combat aircraft that are equally long-in-the tooth. The group wasn't asked to address those pressing concerns.
Instead, the panel was asked by Congress to look at diversity in our military. In fact, the Military Leadership Diversity Commission spent two years looking at the issue and released their final report earlier this week. You can probably predict their findings without reading this Associated Press article."
No real surprises. Just like recent recommendations about, for instance, DADT.
"It's tempting to dismiss the report as little more than PC drivel. But the commission's chairman, retired Air Force General Lester Lyles, has a reputation as a straight-shooter and an outstanding leader. It's hard to imagine that he would simply compile the usual rot and sign off on it. If General Lyles is willing to stake his reputation on the report, then it's probably worth a look."
"The armed forces need to train and promote the best and brightest, regardless of their ethnic background or gender. The advancement of minority and female officers has been slow, but no one can dispute that more members of those groups are reaching senior ranks in the U.S. military.
Which leads us to another point: the commission (and elected officials) say they want an officer corps that reflects America. That's a worthy goal, but are you willing to trade mission effectiveness to achieve it? Among its various recommendations, the panel urges DoD to "open additional career fields and units involved in 'direct ground combat' to qualified women."
Trouble is, the vast majority of military women will never qualify to serve in such positions, the result of physiology--not discrimination.
Almost 20 years ago, columnist Fred Reed published results of an Army study, comparing fitness levels among male and female soldiers. The data reaffirms that most women simply lack the upper body strength and endurance required by an Army infantryman, a Marine rifleman, or most special forces MOS's."
Insert obligatory blather about how many jobs don't require upper body strength and enduranc (ignoring the fact that we're talking about some specific jobs that actually do).
"(W)hat's a chief diversity officer supposed to do (don't laugh--the commission recommends creation of that very post, reporting directly to the SecDef). Water down the standards so more women will qualify for combat service, removing that "barrier" to reaching the flag ranks? Or create some sort of double-standard, allowing females to punch their resumes in the right places and continue their climb to the stars. Either approach is unacceptable, yet some sort of "modification" is inevitable, to open up more combat billets to women."
The goal is apparently to allow women to become chair-person of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, no matter the "unintended" consequences. This caters to the roughly one-percent of female military members who are trade-school types (i.e., military academy grads) resentful of a presumed glass ceiling.
"General Lyles insists that military performance and effectiveness remain the real bottom line, but if the commission's recommendations are fully implementing, the armed forces will be walking a very fine line.
No one disputes the benefits of more flag officers who are women or members of minority groups. But the real emphasis should be on demanding excellence from all who aspire to flag rank, and promoting those who meet--and exceed--a very high bar. Some of the "remedies" outlined in the Lyles report seem closer to social engineering, particularly when you introduce the notions of "measurement" and "metrics." "
Friday, February 11, 2011
re: "Failure of Analysis "
George Smiley at In From the Cold ("Musings on Life, Love, Politics, Military Affairs, the Media, the Intelligence Community and Just About Anything Else that Captures Our Interest") gives, as always, an educated assessment.
Money quote(s):
"The United States maintains close ties with both the Egyptian military and its intelligence services. In fact, the nation's recently-appointed vice-president, Omar Sulieman, has been described as "the CIA's man in Cairo," a reference to his lengthy tenure as head of Egyptian intelligence and close ties to his American counterparts.
In other words, Egypt is not a country where the U.S. intelligence community is without sources."
"(I)f that weren't bad enough, our Director of National Intelligence, James Clapper, had his own howler on the same day. In his own testimony before Congress, General Clapper said the Muslim Brotherhood "is largely secular;" has "eschewed violence," and is "pursuing social ends."
By days end, Mr. Clapper was walking back those remarks. True, the Brotherhood operates hospitals and social programs in Egypt, but there is ample evidence that many of its factions are active participants in terrorism and still want to wipe Israel off the map. Needless to say, Clapper's comments raised a lot of eyebrows in Washington--and beyond.
But this goes beyond two senior spooks making laughably bad calls on a critical subject. Most individuals in the positions held by Mr. Panetta and Mr. Clapper are very guarded in their comments, knowing the potential impact of their words. And, in virtually all cases, there public remarks reflects the intelligence community's assessment of a particular situation.
So, in that sense, the observations of the CIA Director and the DNI (likely) reflected the consensus of our intelligence community."
&
"(R)emember: the former Air Force General isn't paid to study terror groups in depth; his assignment is to run the nation's intel bureaucracy. His remarks on the Muslim Brotherhood reflect the "consensus" of the intelligence community, i.e., all those well-educated analysts whose sole job is to attain expertise on the Brotherhood, Al Qaida, or other other Muslim terror groups.
If the "smart guys" in the spook world believe the Muslim Brotherhood is morphing into a mainstream political group, we are in trouble."
Monday, November 29, 2010
re: "Upping the Ante"
Money quote(s):
"Historically, all responses to Pyongyang's provocations have been deliberate and measured, and limited to political and diplomatic measures. While North Korea has routinely targeted U.S. and ROK military personnel for decades, we have been extremely reluctant to return the favor.
Now may be the time to return the favor. As Kim Jong-il pushes the peninsula towards the brink, the U.S. and South Korea must be clear in explaining the consequences of future attacks--and be willing to follow through. One reason the DPRK has grown so emboldened is a consistent lack of action on the part of the United States and our allies in Seoul. Recent history suggests North Korea has little to fear from allied bluster. At this point, they have little incentive to back down.
No one wants war on the Korean peninsula. But the feckless appeasement of Kim's regime is hardly a path to peace."
Tuesday, March 30, 2010
re: "Today's Reading Assignment"
Money quote(s):
"Hayden also notes that the administration has failed to assemble its highly-touted high-value interrogation group, designed to debrief terrorism suspects. But there has been no difficulty in building a legal team to interrogate intelligence operatives accused of violating those suspect's rights. As Hayden observes, the Obama "approach" to terrorism has devastated morale among field agents"
Sunday, August 9, 2009
re: "Bert Bank, R.I.P."
Important quote(s):
"We were saddened to learn of the recent passing of Major Bert Bank, U.S. Army (Retired). Bank, a World War II veteran, died last month in his hometown of Tuscaloosa, Alabama at the age of 94."
"(H)e survived the Bataan Death March and nearly three years of hellish captivity in a Japanese POW camp. Many of his comrades weren't as fortunate; thousands perished during the march to the camp, or during their years as "guests" of the Emperor."
"Bank joined the Army ROTC program at the University of Alabama. After graduation and commissioning, he spent a brief stint with a coastal artillery unit before transferring to the Air Corps, with an assignment as a B-17 bombardier at Clark Field in the Phillippines. He arrived in the fall of November 1941, just a few weeks before the Japanese attack.
Mr. Bank's flying career was cut short on December 8, 1941, when Japanese aircraft destroyed most of the B-17s at Clark and other airfields in the Philippines. The few surviving bombers--and trained crew members--were dispersed to other bases and eventually moved to Australia. Other personnel (including Bert Bank) were reassigned to the infantry for the defense of Bataan, the narrow peninsula where General Douglas MacArthur planned to fight a holding action against superior Japanese forces.
Working as a G-2 (intelligence officer), then-Lieutenant Bank was given the task of determining the enemy's location. "But that wasn't hard to figure out," Bank later told Hampton Sides, "The enemy was everywhere."
As the battle raged, the situation on Bataan went from bad to desperate. U.S. and Filipino troops were desperately short of food, ammunition and medical supplies--with no hope of resupply from the United States or Australia. Despite exhortations from Washington to "hang on," General Edward King, the senior commander on Bataan, surrendered his forces on April 9, 1942. It was the largest capitulation in U.S. military history.
Mr. Bank was among those Americans who passed into captivity with General King's surrender. A few days later, he became one of the thousands of sick, emaciated men who were force-marched to prison by their enemy."
"Mr. Bank's eyewitness account of the march and the camps affirms all of the atrocities associated with those events. Walking towards Camp O'Donnell--the former U.S. military post that Japan converted into a POW camp--Bank saw the worst of it. A Lieutenant Colonel he had been holding up slipped from his grasp and fell into the road; instantly, a Japanese solider ran him through with his bayonet. He was later forced at gunpoint to bury several Filipino prisoners who were severely wounded, but still alive.
Conditions in the camp were equally grim. Thousands of prisoners died from beatings, illness, malnutrition or a combination of those factors."
&
"Mr. Bank and his fellow POWs were finally liberated in early 1945 during a daring raid by the U.S. Army's 6th Ranger Battalion. The story of that mission--and the men who carried it out--form the other half of Ghost Soldiers, and it's a compelling read. The Rangers, led by their charismatic leader, Lt Col Henry Mucci, marched 30 miles into Japanese territory, freed more than 500 Allied POWs, and escorted them back to American lines."
Read the whole post here.
Monday, April 27, 2009
re: "Are You a Domestic Terrorist?"
Money quote(s):
"As reported by Audrey Hudson and Eli Lake of the Washington Times, DHS recently published a nine-page assessment on "Rightwing Extremism" that appears to lump many traditional conservatives in the ranks of potential terrorist."
"Never mind that the "threat" posed by militias and white supremacist organizations has been routinely inflated, and there hasn't been a serious attack from those elements since Timothy McVeigh blew up the federal courthouse in Oklahoma City 15 years ago. Under the leadership of Janet Napolitano, DHS is hot on the trail of conservative reactionaries."
"Homeland Security has a rather odd way of defining possible terrorists, looking for them among the ranks of libertarians, conspiracy theorists and ex-military members, among others."
&
"Welcome back to the pre-9-11 security mindset, where everyone worried about the "next McVeigh" that was supposedly lurking at every militia meeting. Meanwhile, we never paid attention to the really important stuff, like young Muslim men enrolled in U.S. flight schools--the same ones who had no interest in learning to land the aircraft."
Tuesday, March 17, 2009
re: "Today's Good News (Chas Freeman Bows Out)"
Money quote(s):
"In our view, Mr. Freeman's positions in support of China (and against Israel) were enough to disqualify him for the NIC job. Lest we forget, the council is supposed to provide policymakers with unvarnished and unbiased information. Given his obvious biases, any National Intelligence Estimate coordinated under Freeman's watch would have been suspect, at best.
But there was another (and equally important) reason to reject Ambassador Freeman as the next council chair: his lack of intelligence experience. As a career diplomat, Mr. Freeman is a long-time consumer of intel information, but he has virtually no expertise in the underlying trade craft."
Sunday, March 15, 2009
re: " "Overwhelmed" "
Money quote(s):
"Every new administration--and president--goes through an adjustment process, but this is ridiculous."
Ouch.
"(I)n regard to Obama's meeting with Gordon Brown, there is no excuse for the diplomatic faux pas. Both the White House and the State Department have permanent, professional protocol staffs who work these events on a daily basis. If the Obama team was unsure of how to "handle" a meeting with a British Prime Minister, all they had to do was ask.
Apparently, no one did, since Mr. Brown was not afforded the press conference or formal dinner that normally accompany a U.S.-British summit. Additionally, protocol experts could have prevented the embarrassment over those cheesy DVDs given by Mr. Obama to the British leader."
There's also such a thing as "managing upwards."
Did no one in a protocol position at either the White House or State Department know that PM Brown was going to visit?
I hate to sharpshoot the guys/gals whose responsibility this was; I read the job description for State's protocol officer during last summer's bidding season and, despite protocol and ceremony being an interest of mine (perhaps rising to the level of a hobby), I'd take that job only if someone very senior to me asked me to do so (and if said senior official was someone I both liked and respected). It's the kind of job that'll make you lose your hair.
Tuesday, January 13, 2009
re: "The Wrong Choice"
Money quote(s):
"Mr. Panetta is the consummate Washington insider who is best know(n) as Bill Clinton's Chief of Staff during the Monica Lewinsky episode."
"Readers will note a common theme in Panetta's professional life: the wholesale lack of intelligence experience. While Mr. Panetta is certainly acquainted with the intel community and his capabilities, he has never served (let alone, led) an intelligence organization, or served on a Congressional panel charged with its oversight."
"When the Bush Administration entered office eight years ago, it inherited a CIA that was dysfunctional, highly politicized and woefully inept at its critical missions of intelligence collection and analysis."
"(T)he CIA has added thousands of new operatives and analysts, and there is some evidence that the new hires (and their more experienced colleagues) are making a difference. After all, there hasn't been a terrorist attack on American soil since 9-11, and the CIA deserves some credit for that remarkable record."
"The threat facing our nation remains very real; a recent study suggests that terrorists will stage a chemical or biological attack inside the United States during the next five years. Meeting that challenge requires a leader who doesn't need on the job training, and will hold his organization to the highest standards of tradecraft and professional conduct.
Mr. Panetta is a capable administrator and experienced political operative, but he's the wrong man to lead the CIA at this critical juncture."
&
"(T)he job of CIA Director doesn't carry the power it once did. The agency chief now works for the Director of National Intelligence, who oversees the functions of 16 organizations that form our intel system. But in a community of "equals" some agencies are more important than others, and the Central Intelligence Agency clearly falls in that former category."
