re: "Obama's Misplaced Mideast Optimism"

Daniel Pipes at danielpipes.org (" Opine briefly on diverse topics ") provided some thinkery on likely fallout from the Arab Spring.

10/25

re: "Former CIA Chief Hayden Bathing In Schadenfreude Over AG Holder"

GW at Wolf Howling wasn't overwhelmed by the outpouring of sympathy.

Money quote(s):

"Former CIA Director Michael Hayden has been so overcome by his schadenfreude over the many problems now besetting AG Eric Holder that Hayden had to share it with the world or burst. As you read this, you can almost hear Hayden laughing and rubbing his hands in glee at the poetic justice being dealt to Eric Holder. It really makes for a fun read."

GW then provided a nice excerpt of Hayden's remarks.

"You have to love how he refuses to give Holder the benefit of the doubt as to whether he is actually being subject to an unjust process."

2/2

re: "What You Need to Know About the CIA Getting Rolled Up in Lebanon. That, and Larry Munson."

Andrew Exum at Abu Muquwama examined a major intelligence setback in Lebanon.

Money quote(s):

"As some of you may or may not already know, Hizballah, together with the Lebanese government, has rolled up what is believed to be the vast majority of the assets of the Central Intelligence Agency in Lebanon."

As Dr. Exum implies, Hizballah and the Lebanese government are sufficiently interpenetrated as to be considered unitary at this point. I suppose a Venn Diagram might show the Lebanese government as comprising two overlapping circles: the circle belonging to Syria, the circle belonging to Hizballah, and a mutual zone which serves two masters.

"I know about as much about clandestine operations and running agents as I do about playing linebacker in the NFL, but I do know a little about Lebanon, and I also know something about what my boss John Nagl likes to refer to as "learning organizations," a concept I believe to be relevant here. I first heard about this story from a journalist over lunch last week, and I'll relate to you what I told him and some of what he told me.

1. As many of you know, Hizballah and Lebanese intelligence have been quite good at rolling up Israeli intelligence assets since 2006. (Contrary to what I would have thought, Israel managed to keep a pretty good human intelligence network alive in Lebanon after its withdrawal from southern Lebanon in 2000.) Our intelligence assets were vulnerable to the same counter-intelligence methods that did in the Israelis, but we apparently blew off the warnings."

Be sure to read the rebuttal comment as to what the CIA did or didn't manage to do.

"2. Given that negligence, if I am a member of the U.S. Congress, I am going to ask if it is really true that the station chief in Beirut was subsequently promoted within the ranks of the CIA. If told this is in fact true, I am going to ask who, if anyone, is being held accountable.

3. I am also, if I am a member of the U.S. Congress, going to be asking whether or not CIA tradecraft has eroded over the past decade as the agency has chased the bright shiny ball we'll call "drone-strikes-in-Pakistan". (A question that, quite frankly, needed to be asked afterthe 2009 bombing in Khost.) It's great to have an intelligence agency with a knife in its teeth, but the primary mission of an intelligence organization is to gather and analyze intelligence, not to thwack bad guys. If you fail in that primary mission, questions have to be asked as to why you are failing."

Sometimes you lose. Consider that in an environment like Lebanon, you're not just running an intelligence operation. You're simultaneously trying to run intelligence operations, counter-intelligence operations to protect your intelligence operations, and counter-counterintelligence operations (against your targets counterintelligence) as well.

And it only gets worse from there. Lebanon is a hostile, if not actually completely denied area for U.S. intelligence.

"In the same way that the U.S. Army has an institutional interest in convincing policy makers that every general officer is equal to another, the CIA has an interest in convincing outsiders that external evaluation will compromise valuable tactics, techniques and procedures and will endanger operational security. (This is not a good recipe for an organization that learns from its mistakes and solicits external criticism in an effort to be more effective.) All organizations resist criticism, but intelligence organizations resist criticism and then wrap themselves in the cloak of all-important operational security to avoid it."

Intelligence organizations, for reasons good and prudent, find it abhorant to "solicit external criticism."

(Frankly, "external criticism" is not much in short supply, particularly that of the uninformed variety.)

Now, CAA is perfectly aware of a tendancy towards over-classification on that part of those who would wish to shield themselves from the criticism which they are due, but that's as much a trait of political leadership as it is of the professional intelligence cadre.

"(T)hat's what it really comes down to: poor tradecraft. This is not a matter of some Lebanese Karla lurking out there, out-smarting us. This is our premier intelligence agency getting sloppy, resulting in the death or incarceration of some brave U.S. allies."

Might could be. Or they simply were better or luckier, on their home turf, than we were with our away game.

A commenter rebuttal included the following:

"1. Your statement that the CIA "apparently blew off the (counter-intelligence) warnings" is overly harsh. CI penetrations emanate from multiple vectors - whether from poor trade-craft or an asset that is posing as a double agent - and the problem is augmented when attempting to infiltrate a highly secretive and closed organization such as Hizballah. Rightfully, in a scenario such as this, the maximum amount of defensive CI measures should be implemented in order to thwart the efforts by the hostile intelligence services. Because of the "cloak of security," we will most likely not be privy to the efforts (if any) that were taken to mitigate the CI threat and protect the assets."

11/21

re: "Publishing In A Handbasket"

Sarah A. Hoyt at According to Hoyt ("playing the authorial game") discussed conspiracies, propaganda, disinformation, and "the narrative."

Money quote(s):

"“I entered our section offices through a washroom booth in MacArthur Station. You won’t find our offices in the phone lists. In fact, it does not exist. Probably I don’t exist either. All is illusion. Another route is through a little hole-in-the-wall shop with a sign reading RARE STAMPS & COINS. Don’t try that route either – they’ll try to sell you a Tu’ penny Black.” Robert A. Heinlein, The Puppet Masters."

Forget the movie version, read the book.

(Although CAA quite enjoys Donald Sutherland in general and thought Julie Warner was scrumptious as "Mary.")

"There is nothing so inherently human as feeling a frisson of excitement at the idea that behind the rational, dry world we know, conspiracies move in the shadow, manipulating men and societies to their whims."

Not that conspiracies don't exist in the real world. Quiet the opposite. The thing is there are so many conspiracies (for values of "conspiracies"), each working at cross-purposes, that it's hard to see any one or another getting much in the way of an upper hand.

The most successful conspiracies develop a narrative, a world-view, into a consensus that is self-perpetuating over the long term. (Which is a subject for another time and a better writer.)

"Science Fiction and Fantasy is particularly rife with conspiracies and long-held secrets. Part of this is that for some of our premises, say “there are aliens among us” or “the fairies have always been here” or even “of course there are vampires. They all work for the IRS.” "

The best science fiction takes just a single fact about reality or possible futures (or pasts) and twists it just so, and lets the logic flow therefrom.

"(E)ven in Puppet Masters, Heinlein had the UFO landings be real and the government has sat on them.

Yesterday I was talking to a young friend about conspiracies and the possibility of conspiracies, particularly by the US government. You have to understand, my own young self was convinced that the US government well well-night omnipotent, and I think so are most Europeans of all ages. I remember when, a few years ago, I told my parents that our passports were going to take – I think – six months (aftermath of 9/11) and was told I was lying. This was impossible. “Big country like that. Such an efficient government.”

I think I preferred it that way. Yes, yes, I saw all the movies with evil CIA does something evil. Sorry. I still preferred the idea that our government was sharp like a well-honed blade and capable of doing things and keeping them secret for years. Why don’t I believe that? Well… I first came to the States as an exchange student during the Carter presidency. Very few illusions can survive killer rabbits."

Just so.

"(F)or the record let me say right now that I don’t believe there are UFOs hiding among us. If the IRS employs vampires, they must survive on blood sausage. And the Kennedy assassination was a conspiracy. Well, duh. Of course it was. It was a soviet conspiracy. That was why Oswald was trained. He came to the US to kill Kennedy. Look, children, sometimes things are what they appear to be, and that’s the greatest conspiracy. (And why, you ask. Oh, tons of reasons, including the fact that our sainted president WAS on prescription drugs that lessened his self control. But it’s also possible it was an agit prop operation, something the Soviets were VERY GOOD at. Look at its effect: it succeeded in radicalizing the leftwing of US politics as nothing before it had. And sometimes the effect is exactly what it was meant to be.)" (Bold typeface added for emphasis. - CAA.)

Remember what I said about above about the most successful conspiracies? Communism or bolshevism or marxism or whatever narratival expression of the "original" conspiracy did of course exist and many unspeakable (or least barely spoken-of) and fell deeds were committed in its furtherance and in its behalf. And that just scratches the surface. Adding Kennedy to that body count, justifiably or not, is in essence the merest feather-weights increase to that weighty collection of evils.

(Look, you can take CAA out of the Cold War, but you can't take the Cold War out of CAA!)

"I don’t believe in conspiracies, but I do believe in misinformation. As all of you know, I stop short of being Roman enough to deify Heinlein. BARELY short. So I will refrain from saying that his starting with the conspiracy and then leading us to the real way something really big can keep secret RIGHT UNDER OUR NOSES was deliberate and a work of genius. Perhaps it was. Ginny is no longer alive for me to ask.

It’s also entirely possible he just used the conspiracy to draw us in, and of course the misinformation was part of what he saw with World War II and the Cold War. The juxtaposition is possibly accidental.

The facts of the Kennedy assassination are right in the open. Have always been. But even those who know Oswald was a communist and had a Soviet wife, will say “yes but…” and then on go on blab about the climate of hatred or evil conservatives. Why? Because all the books, most of the articles and ninety nine point nine percent of the dramatizations involving Kennedy go haring off those points and leaving the obvious, visible truth by the way side as something of little importance." (Bold typeface added for emphasis. - CAA.)

Misdirection. It also works in magic, politics, and other stage performances.

"(W)hile I can’t believe in conspiracies – particularly conspiracies by bureaucracy (wikileaks, anyone?) I do believe in the efficacy of “the big lie”. It works because it doesn’t try to cover up every proof of what really happened. Instead, it suppresses the truth by repeating the lie so often and so loudly, and by accusing anyone who challenges it of being crazy or worse, until truth shuts up and goes away. It’s still there. It’s just that no one looks at it." (Bold typeface added for emphasis. - CAA.)

Just because Hitler used it (and did so successfully) doesn't mean others don't use the same technique. He also used staircases, automobiles, sidewalks, and tableware.

"(H)ere’s the thing, right now (wikileaks, Journolist) the levers of power and the “shut up, we’re smarter” aren’t working. There are to many other channels of communication, people are talking and posting phone videos of what they actually saw. Oh, some of it still works. The whole Arab Spring thing is not going anywhere as positively as it was painted. I’m sure the readers of this blog, innocent and fragile flowers all, will be shocked to know in most cases it might just be a way to more extremist religious regimes." (Bold typeface added for emphasis. - CAA.)

CAA hasn't, yet, read any of Mrs. Hoyt's books but, if her fiction is as good as her web log, that is going to have to change!

"They learned at college that they are smart because they believe a set of things their professors told them — and that only ignorant people believe otherwise. And they want to go on thinking they are smart. They want to be able to tell all those squabbling bloggers and indie writers to “shut up” and “you’re irrelevant” and “we’ll never invite you to the nice parties.” "

10/17

re: "State Department refuses to release documents about jihadist on CIA's kill or capture list, citing his right to privacy"

Robert at Jihad Watch ("dedicated to bringing public attention to the role that jihad theology and ideology plays in the modern world, and to correcting popular misconceptions about the role of jihad and religion in modern-day conflicts") asked a decent-enough question:

"Why is the Obama State Department worried about the privacy rights of this Islamic jihadist who has repeatedly inspired and masterminded plots to kill large numbers of Americans?"

And even posts the answer, in an excerpted passage:

"The Department of State, Passport Services has reviewed your request
and has given full consideration to the reasons provided. However, we have determined that your request must be denied. This denial is pursuant to subsection (b)(6) of the Freedom of Information Act. The release of this information to you would be an invasion of personal privacy of another person, without written authorization from that person."

Triple-A is now, thankfully, deceased, so the Privacy Act exclusion would no longer apply. Prior to his demise, however, even the fellow citizens we don't like are still entitled to their privacy rights.

This doesn't mean that law enforcement and other government agencies couldn't access that information for lawful purposes; that's part of the Privacy Act as well.

8/27

re: "Curious, but Sloppy"

George Smiley at In From the Cold ("Musings on Life, Love, Politics, Military Affairs, the Media, the Intelligence Community and Just About Anything Else that Captures Our Interest") pondered this assassination plot.

Money quote(s):

"We're still scratching our heads over the alleged Iranian plot to assassinate Saudi Arabia's ambassador to the United States. Not that the scheme isn't credible; Tehran has a long list of scores to settle with Riyadh, ranging from the kingdom's backing of Saddam Hussein during the 1980s Iran-Iraq War, to its more recent support of Bahrain, during that nation's crackdown against anti-regime protesters, who were aided by elements of Iran's Revolutionary Guards Corps."

Motive?

Check.

"Iran has no shortage of reasons for wanting to kill the senior Saudi diplomat in America.

But if that was the case, why was the "plot" conceived is such ham-handed fashion? According to court papers (and the comments of various U.S. officials), the key figure in the operation was Manssor Arbabsiar, a 56-year-old Iranian-American used car salesman from Texas. Arbabsiar reportedly attempted to enlist assistance from Mexico's infamous Zetas drug cartel in acquiring explosives and carrying out the attack. The plan reportedly involved detonating a bomb inside one of the ambassador's favorite D.C. restaurants while he ate."

Is nowhere sacred? Not that CAA is likely to share the same taste in D.C. restaurants as the Saudi ambassador. But still....

"Sources indicate the assassination plot involved high-level officials in the Qods force, the clandestine arm of the IRGC. Turk al-Faisal, a former Saudi ambassador to the U.S. told reporters this afternoon that "the burden of proof and amount of evidence in the case is overwhelming, and clearly shows official Iranian responsibility for this...someone in Iran will have to pay the price." "

What's left unstated is how unsurprising the idea of an arm of the Iranian government engaging in an assassination plot. This sort of behavior is, since the 1979 Iranian Revolution, utterly unremarkable. Nothing to see here. It's just how they roll.

Students of strategy know that warfare can be waged in more dimensions than the battlefield (or, as is fashionable to call it, the "battlespace"). Covert operations, as distinct from intelligence operations, and including assassinations are a form of controlled violence waged in places not generally perceived as being included in the "battlespace."

In other words, campaigns of assassination are a political tool by which Iran wages war against its enemies, at home or abroad. They are not the only form of warfare that Iran routinely engages in.

The key point being, as should be blindingly obvious, is that Iran is at war with its adversaries, whether they realize (or respond to) it or not.

"(S)ome western diplomats have expressed skepticism about the plot, saying it was highly unlikely that senior Iranian officials would sign off on such a plan. And they have a point; if Tehran wanted to kill Ambassador al-Jubeir, why entrust the enterprise to someone who hardly fits the profile of a professional Qods force operative.

The U.S. military has spent years battling Qods force agents in Iraq and Afghanistan; intelligence officers will tell you they represent the most capable elements in the IRGC. Put another way, there are plenty of Qods force operatives who could easily enter the United States, carry out the plot and make a clean get-away."

This reminds us of the famous "America is not at war" signs. And yet, America's military has been at war since 9/11, fighting the enemies that attack us, in Iraq, in Afghanistan, whereever. And those attacking enemies have consistently included Iran.

"(T)he assassination plot may have been a deliberate ruse, aimed at shifting intelligence and law enforcement resources away from other teams preparing to carry out separate attacks. You'd better believe the folks at FBI Headquarters, Langley and Fort Meade are double-checking their information, looking for clues that might lead to other (and perhaps more menacing) Iranian plots while Arbabsiar spins his tale for investigators.

There's also a chance the assassination scheme was launched by rogue elements within the IRGC and Iranian political circles (yes, we realize that is an oxymoron)."

Yes, "rogue elements within the IRGC and Iranian political circles" is indeed an oxymoron.

Whenever someone, in discussions of Iran, wonders aloud what "Iran" wants, what "Iran's" goals are, what "Iran" hopes to gain with its nuclear program, what "Iran" really wants to do about Israel; CAA asks the questions: Which "Iran"? And which Iranians?

Just as communism was not, always, monolithic, neither can "Iran," even within its government, be considered as a unitary entity.

One would think that Americans, possessing not only fifty semi-sovereign individual states (including the "Commonwealth" states of Masschutsetts, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and Kentucky) but three co-equal branches of federal government, would be able to better grasp that essential fact.

"(Y)ou can't rule out the option that senior Iranian officials endorsed (and participated in) the hare-brained scheme. Intelligence and covert ops organizations have a long history of launching plots that are breathtakingly dumb. Readers will recall that the CIA engaged in a series of operations aimed at killing Fidel Castro, involving such diverse elements as an exploding cigar and the U.S. mafia. None of those plots came close to succeeding, but the boys at Langley kept trying, anyway. The men running the Qods Force are not immune to bad ideas, either."

10/12

re: "Spies Like Us"

CAA (that's me!) continued his response to Jeff Emanuel's post at RedState:, responding to punditpawn 's comment of Wednesday, February 8th (at 9:36PM EST (link).

punditpawn said:

"16,000 employees? Does that mean in reality that 15,995 of those are CIA spies and the other 5 run the embassy?"

Response:

"Embassies are the U.S. government representation in a foreign country. They house not only an ambassador and various State Dept. functions (consular, management, political, economic, and public diplomacy) and the activities (communication, security, &tc.) necessary to support them, but various “tenant agencies” housed along with them.

Overseas, those range from the routine (IRS, FAA, GSA, military attaches and liaison/assistance officers) to the exotic (DEA, Marshal Service, Library of Congress).

Much of the Baghdad mission is likely (I have no personal knowledge of this) engaged in various USAID and other development/reconstruction activities with the Iraqis.

Oh, and being called a CIA agent got old when I worked in DC; it’s a lot less funny overseas."

2/9

re: "Obama’s Muslim Brotherhood Favoritism Will Lead to War in the Middle East"

Keith Davies at Big Peace attributes to malice what can adequately be explained by naïveté.

Money quote(s):

"Over the last year we have seen our government sell out Hosni Mubarak, the key leader who has brought relative peace and stability in the region. Instead, we have jumped on board with the “Arab Spring” which has led to Islamists taking power. My colleagues and I are not privy to CIA intelligence, but if we were able to predict such things based on common sense and our expertise in Middle East affairs, why could not our government see? Or maybe they can. It seems our government is infiltrated by the Muslim Brotherhood and, along with political correctness from politicians who choose reelection over common sense, has allowed the Middle East to become a powder keg ready to explode."

Still and all: once is happenstance or accident; twice is coincidence (even if some folks don't believe in "coincidence"); but three times is enemy action.

12/3

re: "Fred Fleitz: Leftist Legacy of Bad Intel Estimate on Iran"

Secure Freedom Radio at Big Peace hosted an interesting guest.

Money quote(s):

"(F)ormer CIA Intelligence Officer Fred Fleitz shares his concerns with the U.S. Intelligence community’s scandalous refusal to “make an honest call” on the Iranian nuclear weapons program. Fleitz explains the biased nature of U.S. Intelligence’s 2007 assessment that concluded Iran halted its program in 2003, even as experts have widely concluded the existence of an active program."

From the outside, it's hard to conclude anything but that this NIE's conclusion was politically-motivated.

re: "Call Him John"

Lex at Neptunus Lex ("The unbearable lightness of Lex. Enjoy!") has an interesting snippet from AP.

Money quote(s):

"Intelligence drives operations."

Write that down somewhere. And read the whole thing.

re: "Joint Chiefs of Staff Sweepstakes"

James Joyner at Outside the Beltway ("an online journal of politics and foreign affairs analysis") had some thoughts about who should fill this important post.

Money quote(s):

"Both (Petraeus and Stavridis) epitomize the scholar-warrior-diplomat that the military has been touting for a generation as the ideal type."

Subsequent to Mr. Joyner's insightful post, GEN Petraeus was offered, and accepted the directorship of the Central Intelligence Agency.

"The United States has been at war for most of the last two decades. That we launched an operation in Libya whilst still bogged down in two major wars and are ratcheting up rhetoric elsewhere in the region gives me little confidence that we’re about to change.

Further, while it’s certainly possible to be an outstanding strategic leader without having been in harm’s way, the fact of the matter is that the Army and Marine Corps have done the lion’s share of the fighting in these wars. It would be odd, indeed, to disqualify our ground force leaders for the chairmanship because they’ve been off fighting the country’s wars rather than thinking about the wars we might one day fight."

re: "A Foolish Consistency"

Lex at Neptunus Lex ("The unbearable lightness of Lex. Enjoy!") takes us into some "inside baseball" at the high end of the intelligence community.

Money quote(s):

"For years, intelligence agencies at home and abroad have watched the nuclear program in Iran with growing concern. In 2007, a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) provided to policy makers by the intelligence community deprecated that threat, saying that Iran had stopped work on its weaponization program in 2003. There were concerns at the time that the NIE had been deliberately shaded by members of the IC to forestall a rumored attack on Iranian nuclear sites by the George W. Bush administration in its waning years."

This was hardly the first NIE whose conclusions seemed policy- (or politics) rather than intelligence-driven, but it's one of the more prominent ones.

"(A) veteran CIA analyst critical of the agency’s 2011 NIE says that the agency has prevented him from revealing the names of outside analysts who reviewed the draft"

Why is that important?

Outside analysts such as academics, think-tankers, and former intelligence officials are used as a form of outside validation. Publicizing those names makes them accountable for that validation.

"Critics have long claimed, with little supporting evidence, that the Bush administration deliberately politicized intelligence in order to justify the Iraq war. At worse, the intelligence community in 2002 was guilty of “confirmation bias”: Told to look for evidence of an Iraqi WMD program, analysts found what they were looking for in the tangled mess of pre-war all-source data and disregarded what didn’t fit the picture. It was a costly, if understandable mistake. Using outside analysts to endorse a position on Iranian nuclear weapons which is clearly at odds with the evidence, and who have evident biases of their own may be just as costly, if not more so."

It's nice to read something outside the specialist literature that touches on the problems of cognitive bias in intelligence analysis. Confirmation bias isn't something you set out to have, although it's something you maybe could have perhaps avoided.

re: "Birtherism rising"

Jeff Goldstein at Protein Wisdom ("because not just anybody can summarize the news") has something that surprised me.

Money quote(s):

"Major General Paul Vallely makes extraordinary claim that every former CIA agent he’s had look at the Obama long-form birth certificate has declared it a forgery."

MG Vallely is a big name from back when. It's quite surprising to see this sort of thing from someone so prominent.

"Releasing a forgery easily identified as such would indicate the President has nothing but enormous contempt for the country and it’s people, and would illustrate an arrogance unheard of in a US President."

(Okay, so Jeff likes the snark.)

re: "re: "This Week at War: Rise of the Irregulars" "

Robert Haddick at Small Wars Journal ("facilitates the exchange of information among practitioners, thought leaders, and students of Small Wars, in order to advance knowledge and capabilities in the field") turns a frequent criticism on its head.

Money quote(s):

"Last week, the Washington Post's David Ignatius discussed how the line between the Central Intelligence Agency's covert intelligence activities and the Pentagon's military operations began blurring as George W. Bush's administration ramped up its war on terrorism. In his column, Ignatius took some swipes at former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld for exceeding his authority by encroaching on turf legally reserved to the CIA. The Defense Department also was criticized for taking on too many diplomatic and foreign aid responsibilities as well. Ignatius expressed concern that without clearer boundaries separating covert intelligence-gathering from military operations, "people at home and abroad may worry about a possible 'militarization' of U.S. intelligence."

Ignatius missed the larger and far more significant change that continues to this day. In order to survive and compete against the military power enjoyed by national armies, modern irregular adversaries -- such as the Viet Cong, Iraq's insurgents, the Taliban, and virtually all other modern revolutionaries -- "civilianized" their military operations."

Read the whole thing here.

re: "Quick Takes, June 02, 2011"

Mike M. at Confederate Yankee ("Because liberalism is a persistent vegetative state.") makes a fairly damning assessment.

Money quote(s):

"ITEM: AG Eric Holder continues to investigate CIA personnel, who, acting on the specific advise of the Department of Justice, protected American lives during the Bush Administration. John Hindearaker at PowerLine (here) suggests that the only reasonable conclusion is that Mr. Obama is at war with America’s intelligence community. I agree. See if you do."

re: "Four tasks for Petraeus to fix the CIA"

Paul Miller at Shadow Government ("Notes From The Loyal Opposition") provides some thoughtful advice.

Money quote(s):

"Petraeus is not just smart: he is capable of challenging groupthink, which is exactly what the CIA needs. If Petraeus is ready to rewrite the book on intelligence the way he did, not just for counterinsurgency doctrine, but for the Army's culture as a whole, he could do wonders for the CIA."

"Let me say right off that I do not think the intelligence community is hopelessly broken, it does provide an irreplaceable service to policymakers and I have the highest respect for the folks I worked with during seven years at the CIA. But I do not think the taxpayers are getting the most bang for their buck."

Some suggestions:

"The Directorate of Intelligence (DI) has the capability of being a leading foreign affairs think tank in the world. Instead, it has largely limited itself to being a massive, overpriced, secretive magazine staff for a readership of one, pouring most of its resources in to the President's Daily Brief (PDB). Analysts live under a maze of restrictions that bar them from public activities, ostensibly to protect their objectivity and credibility. The restrictions are silly. Instead of enhancing their credibility, the restrictions just isolate them and make contact with other experts in their field difficult, awkward, and sporadic.

Analysts can and should be open and regular participants in the world of academia, think tanks, and conferences, encouraged to publish and speak on their areas of expertise. Their writing may actually have a larger impact if they focus less on the PDB and more on the broader foreign policy establishment, which is where policy is shaped in broad outline before it makes it to the President. Petraeus might even experiment with having the DI publish a regular, unclassified product. It's not like we keep our classified documents secret anyway."

Having gained a little familiarity with our analytical profession in the course of my own professional journey, these suggestions make sense to me. Keeping our analysts apart from the larger streams of thought will only make their analyses more and more detached from reality.

re: "Static, One-Dimensional Analysis 1; Dynamic, Multi-Dimensional Analysis 0"

Andrew at Abu Muqawama ("dedicated to following issues related to contemporary insurgencies as well as counterinsurgency tactics and strategy") gives credit where it's due.

Money quote(s):

"Since the intelligence community is so rarely congratulated when they get something right, it's worth pointing out that had they been wrong, we would not be conducting combat operations in Libya right now. But their order-of-battle analysis, sadly, proved all too accurate. Readers, if you will, join me in a quiet golf clap for the men and women at Langley, Fort Meade and Bolling AFB."

re: "Mubarak was wrong, and so were we"

Peter Feaver at Shadow Government ("Notes From The Loyal Opposition") dissects in the aftermath.

Money quote(s):

"(A)lmost everyone, including bloggers like me, managed to get it wrong:

The Intelligence community. The beleaguered IC was already reeling from White House criticism about failing to predict events unfolding in Tunisia and Egypt. (This criticism is a bit unfair since I bet there were some warnings -- given the volume of intelligence products and the way they are written, virtually everything has been predicted as "possible." Moreover, it is clear that those with vastly better intelligence and sources on Egypt than anything the IC ever could hope to amass, the Mubarak regime itself, were also surprised by the flow of events.) Then came the gaffe by Director of National Intelligence Clapper about the "largely secular" Muslim Brotherhood, a statement his staff was obliged to walk back later in the day. And the topper was CIA Director Panetta's admission that his forward-leaning prediction yesterday about Mubarak's departure was based not on intelligence analysis but on television reports. This is an almost textbook case of the CNN effect."

re: "Glad the adults are in charge- National Security FAIL!"

Uncle Jimbo at Blackfive ("the paratrooper of love") is none too pleased and doesn't mince words about it.

Money quote(s):

"So far as regards the Egyptian revolution, our President has voted present, our Vice President denied that a dictator of 30 years was a dictator of 30 years, our Secretary of State stated two completely contradictory positions in the course of 4 days, our Director of National Intelligence wasn't even joking when he called the MUSLIM Brotherhood a secular group that has eschewed violence, and now the Director of the CIA testifies to Congress (incorrectly) based on the information his agency gleaned by watching f***ing CNN!

Boy I'm tickled pink that we have this impressive group of professionals to reestablish America's position in the world. The most significant event in the Middle East in decades and we have a clown car full of pint-sized personalities running around saying things so dumb that Saturday Night Live has fired its writers and now will just run clips from C-Span. What a great idea to hire a completely unexperienced, perpetual grad student as President & Commander in Chief. His amazing blend of bong hit diplomacy & a failed cult of personality have made him almost transparent on the international stage."

&

"(N)ow Europe and the Anglosphere seem to be waking up and smelling the tea and croissants as well. Australia, England, Canada, Germany & France have all noted the bleedingly, freaking obvious, that multi-culturalism creates multiple cultures and that some of those cultures are reprehensibly barbaric.

A Bush admin aide caught a lot of crap about saying that they created their own reality. What he was talking about was getting inside our enemies decision loop and not allowing them to dictate the situation. If you move swiftly enough you can create a reality your enemies couldn't plan for. That requires the courage of your convictions (or convictions period) and the stones to act. It is all well and good to call inaction pragmatism, or Realpolitik and there are times when caution is obviously the proper course."

re: "Failure of Analysis "

George Smiley at In From the Cold ("Musings on Life, Love, Politics, Military Affairs, the Media, the Intelligence Community and Just About Anything Else that Captures Our Interest") gives, as always, an educated assessment.

Money quote(s):

"The United States maintains close ties with both the Egyptian military and its intelligence services. In fact, the nation's recently-appointed vice-president, Omar Sulieman, has been described as "the CIA's man in Cairo," a reference to his lengthy tenure as head of Egyptian intelligence and close ties to his American counterparts.

In other words, Egypt is not a country where the U.S. intelligence community is without sources."

"(I)f that weren't bad enough, our Director of National Intelligence, James Clapper, had his own howler on the same day. In his own testimony before Congress, General Clapper said the Muslim Brotherhood "is largely secular;" has "eschewed violence," and is "pursuing social ends."

By days end, Mr. Clapper was walking back those remarks. True, the Brotherhood operates hospitals and social programs in Egypt, but there is ample evidence that many of its factions are active participants in terrorism and still want to wipe Israel off the map. Needless to say, Clapper's comments raised a lot of eyebrows in Washington--and beyond.

But this goes beyond two senior spooks making laughably bad calls on a critical subject. Most individuals in the positions held by Mr. Panetta and Mr. Clapper are very guarded in their comments, knowing the potential impact of their words. And, in virtually all cases, there public remarks reflects the intelligence community's assessment of a particular situation.

So, in that sense, the observations of the CIA Director and the DNI (likely) reflected the consensus of our intelligence community."

&

"(R)emember: the former Air Force General isn't paid to study terror groups in depth; his assignment is to run the nation's intel bureaucracy. His remarks on the Muslim Brotherhood reflect the "consensus" of the intelligence community, i.e., all those well-educated analysts whose sole job is to attain expertise on the Brotherhood, Al Qaida, or other other Muslim terror groups.

If the "smart guys" in the spook world believe the Muslim Brotherhood is morphing into a mainstream political group, we are in trouble."